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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is a comparative constitutional study of the origin and role of direct 
democracy in Switzerland, California, and New Zealand. It reveals that the direct 
democracy systems in these jurisdictions came into being as a consequence of 
sustained periods of economic turmoil which coincided with widespread 
disillusionment with the performance of elected representatives. Constitutional 
reformers in these jurisdictions embraced direct democracy as a means of improving, 
not displacing, representative democracy . Their aim was to restore the legitimacy of 
their constitutional systems. 
The study also demonstrates that the majoritarian potential of the direct democracy 
devices in Switzerland, California, and New Zealand is limited. It is limited to the 
extent that is consistent with the constitutional principles underlying representative 
democracy in these jurisdictions , particularly those designed to protect minority 
rights . This reconciles the competing philosophical traditions on which most of the 
arguments for and against direct democracy are based. Provided minority rights are 
protected sufficiently , Jeffersonian-inspired advocates of direct democracy should not 
offend adherents of representative democracy, whether Burkeian or Madisonian in its 
conception. 
This thesis concludes that the direct democracy systems in Switzerland, California, 
and New Zealand are not the same, nor could be, given the unique forces that 
contributed to the formation and practice of constitutional law in these jurisdictions. 
They are different primarily because direct and representative democracy coalesced 
differently in Switzerland, California, and New Zealand due to variations in the 
constitutional principles underlying representative democracy in these jurisdictions. 
These principles vary because constitutional law in each jurisdiction is a unique and 
intricate confluence of law, politics , history , economics , and cultural expectations. 
This study also fills a void in the literature on direct democracy, primarily by 
documenting the origin of New Zealand's direct democracy system, analysing its 
possible role, and comparing it to the origin and role of the systems in Switzerland 
and California. In doing so, it provides a detailed examination of the origin and role 
of direct democracy in Switzerland and California, topics that have previously 
escaped comprehensive treatment. 
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1 
INTRODUCTION 
Power is the essence of government. A government endowed with legitimacy has the 
power to determine the law and to enforce it. However constituted, governments 
generally use their power to distribute burdens and benefits among those they govern. 
At its most basic level, governmental power in a democracy based on the rule of law 
is legislative. Governments enact laws to tax, to spend, to coerce, and to punish. 
The ambitious strive and compete for this legislative power as it offers the possibility 
of increasing their benefits and reducing their burdens. The meek have little choice 
but to obey. Constitutional law is their only sanctuary. It is a shield against the 
nightmare of absolute legislative power. 
The size and strength of the shield varies among constitutional systems. It depends on 
the range of institutions and devices deployed to limit legislative power. Since 
Montesequieu, representative democracies have, to varying degrees, generally limited 
this power by dividing it among three separate branches of government: the 
legislature, the executive, and the judiciary. By diffusing the locus of power, this 
approach is intended to ensure that no one group or individual can wield complete 
control over the functions of government. 
Direct democracy is another, although less common, means by which to limit 
legislative power in representative democracies. It consists of two basic forms: the 
initiative and the referendum. The initiative allows the electors to propose or enact 
new laws while the referendum allows them to veto legislative enactments. By 
providing the electors with the power to propose, enact and veto laws, the principal 
direct democracy devices limit the legislative power exercised by elected 
representatives. Switzerland, California, and, to a far lesser extent, New Zealand, 
are examples of constitutional systems which have limited legislative power in this 
fashion. To ensure that the electors do not abuse their legislative power, these 
systems have, in one form or another, imposed anti-majoritarian safeguards upon 
their direct democracy devices. 
In 1891 Simon Deploige predicted that other countries would eventually consider 
adopting Switzerland I s direct democracy system. 1 However, with the notable 
IS Deploige The Referendum in Switzerland (trans, Lon1UIlans, Green & Co, London, 1898) 290. 
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exceptions of Albert Venn Dicey in England and John Vincent in America/ his 
contemporaries were less optimistic. Both Lilian Tomn and Numa Droz, for 
example, doubted that other countries could adopt direct democracy without importing 
other parts of the Swiss constitutional system.3 However, the experience of California 
during the Progressive Era and New Zealand during the early 1990s have proven 
otherwise. Not only can direct democracy take root outside of Switzerland's unique 
constitutional environment, but constitutional considerations peculiar to each 
jurisdiction have made its adaptation unavoidable. 
This, in itself, explains the differences in the direct democracy systems existing in 
Switzerland, California, and New Zealand, which is the primary objective of this 
thesis. This conclusion is derived from three case studies of the origin and role of 
direct democracy. The first case study is Switzerland, which is a necessary example 
for the following reasons: direct democracy, as defmed in this thesis, originated in 
Switzerland; Switzerland is one of the few countries that has instituted direct 
democracy on the national level; the Swiss system has inspired the adoption of direct 
democracy throughout the world; and the Swiss system is usually cited in arguments 
for and against direct democracy. 
The second case study is California, which is pertinent for the following reasons: 
California is representative of the American states that adopted direct democracy 
during the Progressive Era; California's direct democracy system is based on the 
Swiss system; most of the useful literature on direct democracy is concerned with its 
use in California; and California's system is generally cited in arguments for and 
against direct democracy. 
The third case study is New Zealand, which is appropriate for the following reasons: 
the events leading up to the introduction of the Citizens Initiated Referenda Act 1993 
provide the most recent evidence of the process of constitutional reform involved in 
the struggle for direct democracy; New Zealanders have been debating whether to 
adopt direct democracy for over a century; it is the first Westminster-style 
constitutional system in the world to have direct democracy; and both the Swiss and 
California systems have influenced New Zealand's direct democracy debate. 
2See A V Dicey "Ought the Referendum be Introduced into England?" (1890) 57 Contemp R 489, 497 
(concluding that "[n]o vital change in either the law or the customs of the Constitution would be so easy 
of introduction into England as the establishment in principle of the Referendum, or of a popular veto 
on any amendment or alteration in the Constitution"); J Vincent State and Federal Government in 
Switzerland (John Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1891) 126-131 (advocating the adoption of direct 
democracy on the state and federal levels in America). 
3See Deploige, above n 1, vii . 
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These case studies are valuable for two additional reasons. First, the literature on the 
origin and role of direct democracy is inadequate. The literature on Switzerland, 
although relatively substantial, treats this subject in a disjointed and highly 
fragmentary fashion. 4 The literature on California, despite its vastness, contains only 
one brief attempt to address this topic directly. 5 The literature in New Zealand is 
extremely sparse, despite experience with government controlled referendums. None 
of it discusses the process that produced the Citizens Initiated Referenda Act 1993.6 
Secondly, no study of direct democracy has compared the origin and role of direct 
democracy in Switzerland, California, and New Zealand. The following case studies 
redress these gaps in the literature. More importantly, they also provide the evidence 
that explains why the direct democracy systems in Switzerland, California, and New 
Zealand are not the same, nor could be. 
The evidence reveals that constitutional law is an intricate confluence of law, politics, 
history, economics, and cultural expectations. Viable and enduring constitutional 
systems account for this complexity by providing the principles and mechanisms by 
which to regulate the interests competing in society. How well a constitutional 
system manages 'this conflict determines its legitimacy. This determination is, to a 
large extent, a function of perception. Those who agree with the outcomes produced 
by their constitutional system are more likely to support it than those who do not. 
Predictably, the number of those who question their system's legitimacy generally 
increases during periods of economic hardship, especially if their plight can be 
4See generally eg, Deploige, above n 1, 1-123 (noting that the evolution of democracy in Switzerland is 
very complicated to trace because of Switzerland' s highly pluralistic composition, Deploige opted for 
an institutional approach, with a post-1798 emphasis on the Grisons and Berne, at the expense of 
discussing the forces that created and shaped direct democracy in Switzerland); J Vincent, above, n 2, 
3-29 (providing a succinct and useful account on the forces leading to the creation of the new Swiss 
Confederation in 1848, but without discussing their effect on creation and evolution of direct democracy 
in Switzerland); F de Salis Switzerland and Europe: Essays and Reflections (trans, Oswald Wolff, 
London, 1971) 19-37 (same). Consequently, the process in Switzerland had to be pieced together from 
a wide variety of sources . 
5See generally League of Women Voters of California Initiative and Referendum in California: A 
Legacy Lost? A Study of Direct LegisLation in CaLifornia from Progressive Hopes to Present Reality 
(League of Women Voters of California, Sacramento, 1984 reprint 1987) 1-11. Consequently, the 
process in California also required piecing together , although the existence of a single state-wide polity 
simplified the task as compared to Switzerland. 
6See generally A Simpson (ed) Referendums: ConstitutionaL and Political Perspectives (Victoria 
University of Wellington, Wellington, 1992) (debating the constitutional and political aspects of 
implementing direct democracy in New Zealand); Report of the ElectoraL Law Committee: Inquiry into 
the Report of the RoyaL Commission of the ELectoraL System (Government Print, Wellington, 1988) 55-
62 (evaluating the Royal Commission recommendations regarding the use of direct democracy in New 
Zealand); Report of the RoyaL Commission on the ELectoraL System (Government Print, Wellington, 
1986) 167-181 (discussing the extent to which direct democracy should be used in New Zealand). 
Throughout this work, the word "referendums" is used in preference to the word "referenda" as it is in 
keeping with current usage in the literature on direct democracy and the position taken by the Oxford 
English Dictionary scholars. See J Boyer Lawmaking by the PeopLe: Referendums and Plebiscites in 
Canada (Butterworths, Toronto, 1982) xxvi n.1. 
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attributed to political corruption. During these periods, new political parties spring to 
life and proposals for constitutional reform abound. 
Paradoxically, constitutional law governs the process of constitutional reform. Short 
of revolution, the acceptance of any particular proposal depends on the degree to 
which it reconfigures the rules regulating the interests competing in society and the 
degree to which its proponents control the process of constitutional reform. 
Obtaining the necessary support and power is difficult, especially for those who do 
not control the exercise of governmental power. Hence, constitutional reform is 
usually achieved by those working within the governmental system. 
In theory, direct democracy offers the means of circumventing the restrictions or 
safeguards of representative democracy. In practice, however, this promise or threat 
remains largely unfulfilled. While direct democracy can break the monopoly that 
representatives or parties have over the legislative agenda, its mechanisms and 
constitutional milieu have limited its utility as a means of by-passing the existing 
governmental structure. The promise or threat of direct democracy nevertheless 
animates both its proponents and its opponents. Its proponents are motivated by a 
vision of good, open, responsive, and responsible government characterised by public 
participation, greater civic awareness and pride, and prosperity. Its opponents are 
motivated by the fear of mob-rule characterised by the oppression of minorities, ill-
informed decision-making, the loss of parliamentary sovereignty, and economic 
chaos. 
The legitimacy of the constitutional system is at issue in this debate. One side sees 
direct democracy as a means of restoring legitimacy by correcting the problems 
associated with representative democracy. The other side sees it as a means of 
destroying legitimacy by undermining the virtues of representative democracy. The 
acceptance of either view depends on the prevailing theory of representative 
democracy underlying the debate and the extent to which representatives are 
perceived to have complied with it. Ironically, proposals for direct democracy cannot 
circumvent the existing system's process of constitutional reform. If they survive the 
process, they are likely to reflect the principles enshrined in that process, including 
those regarding representative democracy, which explains why the direct democracy 
devices in Switzerland, California, and New Zealand are subject to safeguards that 
limit the legislative power they confer on the electors. 
Constitutional reformers in Switzerland, California, and New Zealand embraced 
direct democracy as a means of improving, not displacing, representative democracy. 
Their aim was to restore the legitimacy of their constitutional systems primarily by 
4 
providing the electors with the means to ensure that the exercise of governmental 
power confonns with their expectations. They shared the conviction that law should 
be made and applied in accordance with established constitutional principles, not 
merely to advance the interests of privileged elites. In Switzerland and California, 
where the electors are sovereign both legally and politically, direct democracy has 
become an indispensable component of their respective constitutional systems. In 
New Zealand, where Parliament remains the legal sovereign, direct democracy is not 
yet established as an essential part of its constitutional system. 
These observations owe their articulation to the completion of two essential tasks: a 
study of the origin and role of direct democracy in Switzerland, California, and New 
Zealand; and a comparison of these studies. Part I lays the foundation required to 
complete these tasks. It defmes the principal forms of direct democracy in terms of 
their use in Switzerland, California, and New Zealand, and outlines the main 
arguments for and against direct democracy. It also explains the general 
constitutional principles underlying direct and representative democracy and their 
relationship to the question of legitimacy. 
Part II traces the centuries-long evolution of direct democracy in Switzerland and the 
factors which drove the Swiss Democrats to campaign for its inclusion in the 
Constitution of 1874. It then discusses the main direct democracy devices used in 
Switzerland and examines the role that they play in the Swiss constitutional system. 
Part III examines the factors that gave rise to the California Progressives and inspired 
them to establish direct democracy in California. It then describes the principal direct 
democracy devices used in California and analyses their role in the California 
constitutional system. Part IV documents New Zealand's long running direct 
democracy debate and the factors that led the National Party to enact the Citizens 
Initiated Referenda Act 1993. It then outlines the Act and examines its place and 
possible role within the New Zealand constitutional system. Part V concludes that the 
direct democracy systems in Switzerland, California, and New Zealand are not the 
same, nor could be, given the unique forces that contributed to the formation and 
practice of constitutional law in these jurisdictions. 
5 
PARTI: THEORY 
6 
2 
THEORY 
Switzerland, California, and New Zealand adopted direct democracy as a means of 
improving, not displacing, representative democracy. To appreciate why direct 
democracy was embraced for this purpose in these jurisdictions requires an 
understanding of the general constitutional principles underlying direct and 
representative democracy and their relationship to the question of legitimacy. The 
origin and role of direct democracy in Switzerland, California, and New Zealand 
makes little sense without it. It also provides the basis for understanding why the 
direct democracy devices in these jurisdictions are not the same. 
In addition, the literature tends to be careless in its treatment of the underlying 
principles, particularly in the New Zealand constitutional context. l Aside from 
redressing this complaint, definitional clarity will avoid the widespread practice of 
using observations peculiar to one kind of direct democracy device to support 
conclusions regarding direct democracy in general. 2 Accordingly, this chapter begins 
by defining the principal direct democracy devices in terms of their use in 
Switzerland, California, and New Zealand. It then discusses the principles involved 
in the direct democracy debate. It concludes that direct democracy complements 
rather than debases representative democracy, which would explain its appeal to 
constitutional reformers in Switzerland, California, and New Zealand. 
I PRINCIPAL DIRECT DEMOCRACY DEVICES 
In representative democracies like Switzerland and California, direct democracy 
transfers legislative power from elected representatives to their electors. This 
transference constitutes the central issue in the direct democracy debate. Proponents 
see the transfer as a means of revitalising representative democracy. Opponents 
believe it undermines representative democracy. The debate regarding the merit of 
direct democracy, however, is shrouded in a confusion of ill-defmed terms, 
conceptual overlaps, and de-contextualised information. For example, those engaged 
in the debate often fail to realise or acknowledge that the degree to which direct 
lSee eg, R Mulgan Democracy and Power in New Zealand: A Study of New Zealand Politics (Oxford 
University Press, Auckland, 1984) 9-33 (discussing the meaning of 'democracy'); see also generally G 
Sartori The Theory of Democracy Revisited (Chatham House Publishers, Chatham, 1987) (combating 
stipulativism by revesting meaning into concepts regarding democracy). 
2For examples of this practice, see Report of the Royal Commission on the Electoral System 
(Government Print, Wellington, 1986) 172-176; NZPD, no 38,6722, 10 March 1992 (Cullen). 
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democracy transfers legislative power from representatives to electors depends on the 
type of direct democracy device. This oversight often leads or allows them to use 
arguments appropriate for one device to characterise direct democracy in general. 
The primary purpose of this section is to eliminate this confusion by classifying the 
principal direct democracy devices and identifying those which are discussed further 
in Parts II, ill, and IV. Broadly defmed, the principal direct democracy devices fall 
into two categories: the referendum and the initiative. 
A The Referendum 
The referendum appears throughout the world in a variety of permutations. The three 
most common are government controlled referendums, constitutionally required 
referendums, and legislative referendums. In each case, the electors are asked to 
approve or reject a measure that the government has proposed or enacted. 
1 Government controlled referendums 
Switzerland, California, and New Zealand regularly hold government controlled 
referendums. 3 All of the nation-wide referendums that have taken place in New 
Zealand are examples of government controlled referendums. The most famous one 
was held in conjunction with the 1993 general election when the National Government 
asked the electors whether Mixed Member Proportional Representation should replace 
the First-Past-the-Post electoral system.4 The 1975 United Kingdom referendum on 
whether Britain should stay in the European Economic Community is another 
example of a government controlled referendum. 5 
The government determines the timing , subject-matter, wording, and effect of 
government controlled referendums. They mayor may not be binding on the 
3See D Butler and A Ranney (eds) Referendums: A Comparative Study of Theory and Practice 
(American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington, DC, 1978), 39-66 
(Switzerland), 87-122 (California), 236, 237 (New Zealand). 
4Por background on this referendum, see H Catt, P Harris , and N Roberts Voter's Choice: Electoral 
Change in New Zealand? (Dunmore Press, Palmerston North, 1992); P Temple Making Your Vote 
Count: A Guide to Electoral Reform (John McIndoe, Dunedin, 1992); Report of the Electoral Law 
Committee: Inquiry into the Report of the Royal Commission of the Electoral System (Government 
Print, Wellington, 1988); Report, above n 2. 
5Por discussions of the constitutional issues raised by the British Labour Party's decision to hold this 
government controlled referendum see S George An Awkward Partner: Britain in the European 
Community (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1990); L Robins The Reluctant Party: Labour and the 
EEC, 1961-1975 (G W & A. Hesketh, Lancashire, 1979); A King Britain Says Yes: The 1975 
Referendum on the Common Market (American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 
Washington, DC, 1977); D Butler and U Kitzinger The 1975 Referendum (Macmillan Press, London, 
1976); P Goodhart Full-Hearted Consent: The Story of the Referendum Campaign - and the Campaign 
for the Referendum (London, 1976). 
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government. 6 Only the government can initiate them. Although the government can 
set special majority requirements, generally a simple majority of the electors voting 
on a particular government controlled referendum decides the issue.7 The device is 
usually used to give legitimacy to constitutional changes or to sanction government 
policy, although New Zealand governments have consistently used it to avoid 
deciding controversial issues. 8 The Swiss, for example, used it to ratify their fIrst 
Swiss-authored federal constitution in 1848. 
Napoleon, Hitler, and de Gaulle, however, are still notorious for using the device to 
legitimise policy decisions taken outside of the established legislative process. 
Consequently, government controlled referendums are widely perceived as being 
tainted, that is, subject to the manipulation of those in power. 9 Stephen Levine and 
Nigel Roberts have suggested that the New Zealand electorate would reject any pro-
government government controlled referendum that is held on the date of a general 
election if they disapprove of the government. 10 Conversely, Jim Anderton, former 
Leader of the Alliance, has argued that any reform proposal put before New 
Zealanders in the early 1990s would have been approved, regardless of its merits, 
simply because New Zealanders had lost faith in their representatives. 11 Logically, an 
unpopular government with a vested-interest in a particular policy will avoid 
subjecting the policy to a referendum. If it must, the government would be expected 
to do its utmost to ensure that the result is interpreted favourably. 12 
6Butler and Ranney, above n 3, 23; see also Temple, above n 4,4. 
7For example, approval of the New Zealand liquor licensing (prohibition) polls conducted in 1908, 
1911, and 1914 required a "yes" vote from 60 percent of those voting. Butler and Ranney, above n 3, 
above, 236. 
8In addition to two referendums on proportional representation, New Zealand has had two referendums 
on the term of Parliament, two on drinking hours , one on betting, one on conscription, and 31 regular 
questions on liquor licensing since 1896. See J Wilson New Zealand Parliamentary Record: 1840-1984 
(Government Print, Wellington, 1985) 298-30 (listing referendums and voting results for them between 
1896 and 1984); Department of Statistics New Zealand Official Yearbook (93 ed, Department of 
Statistics, Wellington, 1988) 74 (listing results of liquor polls between 1972 and 1987); New Zealand 
Gazette No. 209 (29 October 1990) 4505-4506 (listing the results of the second term of Parliament 
poll); Report of the Select Committee on the General Election 1990 [1990] AJHR E.9 (same); The 
Electoral Referendum 1992 [1993] AJHR E.9 (listing the results of the first referendum on proportional 
representation); The General Election and Electoral Referendum 1993 [1994] AJHR E.9 (listing the 
results of the second referendum on proportional representation) . 
9See eg L Watt The Referendum: Its Uses and Abuses (unpublished MA thesis in political science held 
by Victoria University of Wellington, 1956) (discussing government controlled referendums held in 
New Zealand) . 
ION Roberts and S Levine "Electoral Reform and Referendums: The Views of Voters in New Zealand 
in 1987 and 1990" in A Simpson (ed) Referendums: Constitutional and Political Perspectives (Victoria 
University of Wellington, Wellington, 1992) 119. 
I1J Anderton "Reflections on Referendums" in Simpson, above n 10, 89. 
12For example, members of the National Government made an abortive attempt to characterise the 
results of the 19 September 1992 referendum on proportional representation as inconclusive as the 
media initially reported that only 48.3 percent of the electorate turned out; however, the overwhelming 
vote for change (84.7 percent) and the choice for Mixed Member Proportional Representation (70.5 
percent), as opposed to Single Transferable Vote (17.4 percent), Preferential Voting (6.6 percent), and 
Supplementary Member (5.5 percent), and an official turnout of 55.2 percent rendered the strategy 
9 
Government controlled referendums are not discussed in any further detail, as this 
thesis is concerned with those direct democracy devices that the electors can initiate. 
They are mentioned here simply to provide a point of reference and comparison, and 
to highlight their manipulative reputation as this reputation is often erroneously 
applied to all direct democracy devices. 
2 Constitutionally required referendums 
Switzerland and California often have constitutionally required referendums, but New 
Zealand does not have them. 13 In Switzerland, if the Federal Assembly adopts a 
constitutional amendment, it must be submitted to the electors for approval in the 
form of a referendum. Although the proposal can be re-submitted to the electors at a 
later date, the outcome of the referendum is binding on the government. A 
constitutionally required referendum can only be initiated by a government proposal 
to amend the constitution. In Switzerland, it requires a double majority for approval, 
that is, a simple majority of all the electors voting plus a majority vote in more than 
half of the cantons. 14 
California's system is similar; however, approval of the government's proposal only 
requires a simple majority of the electors. 15 In addition, two-thirds of the full 
membership of each house of the state legislature must approve the proposal before it 
is submitted to the electors for approval. The process guarantees widespread political 
support for the proposal and tends to produce proposals that are less controversial 
than most initiatives. As a result, the electors have approved nearly 300 
constitutionally required referendums between 1911 and 1976. The enormous length 
of the California constitution is directly attributable to this direct democracy device. 16 
otiose as the result supported the statistical inference that MMP had the support of the majority of 
electors. See "Referendum Results" National Business Review, Auckland, New Zealand, 25 September 
1992; P Luke "Don't Bet the Farm on Electoral Change Yet" The Press, Christchurch, New Zealand, 
26 September 1992; S Upton "An Electoral System for All Seasons" The Dominion, Wellington, New 
Zealand, 28 September 1992; "Turnouts Topped 60 per cent in Some Electorates" New Zealand 
Herald, Auckland, New Zealand, 9 October 1992; Electoral Referendum 1992, above n 8, 170-171. 
13See generally Butler and Ranney, above n 3, 39-66 (Switzerland) , 87-122 (California). Although 
section 268 of New Zealand's Electoral Act 1993 states that certain changes to the electoral laws can be 
accomplished by referendum, this statutory option does not amount to a constitutionally required 
referendum as the government of the day can also accomplish such changes by winning the support of 
75 percent all members of the House or by abolishing the option altogether as it is not entrenched. 
New Zealand's lack of constitutionally required referendums can be attributed to the absence of a 
written constitution embodying law superior to legislative enactments. In New Zealand, every 
legislative enactment constitutes the supreme law of the land. See P Joseph Constitutional and 
Administrative Law in New Zealand (Law Book Co, Sydney, 1993) 12, 13, 16. 
14Fed Const Swiss, art 123; J Aubert "Switzerland" in Butler and Ranney, above n 3,41. A canton is 
the Swiss equivalent of a state in the United States or Australia. 
15Cal Const, art 2, ss 9 and 10. 
16E Lee "California" in Butler and Ranney, above n 3, 89. 
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In both Switzerland and California, the constitutionally required referendum is used 
far more frequently than any other direct democracy device. Out of 737 referendums 
submitted to Californians between 1912 and 1976, 543 were constitutionally 
required. 17 From 1848 to September 1978 the Swiss voted on 297 referendum 
questions, 212 of which were constitutionally required!S As in California, the 
relatively unwieldy nature of the Swiss Constitution is due to this device. 19 
When the California Progressives came to power in 1911, they used the 
constitutionally required referendum to amend California's constitution to provide for 
the constitutional initiative, the legislative initiative, and the legislative referendum.20 
The Swiss used it in 1874 to revise their constitution of 1848, when they 
institutionalised the legislative referendum. They used it again in 1891 to amend the 
constitution of 1874 to include the constitutional initiative.21 
The constitutionally required referendum, like the government controlled referendum, 
is not analysed further, as it is not a device which the electors can initiate. 
Nevertheless, knowledge of its existence and function is necessary to understand those 
direct democracy devices which are discussed in greater detail in Parts II, III, and IV. 
3 Legislative referendums 
Switzerland and California permit legislative referendums, but New Zealand does not. 
The legislative referendum is a means by which the electors may veto government 
legislation. In Switzerland, if the Federal Assembly passes a new law or amends an 
old one, the Swiss can require their government to hold a referendum on the 
enactment if they present a petition to that effect signed by 50,000 electors or eight 
cantons within 90 days of the enactment. The outcome of the referendum is binding 
on the government. It can be initiated by the electors or the cantons. The enactment 
comes into force if it is approved by a simple majority of those voting on the 
referendum. 22 Operationally, a petition with the requisite signatures has the effect of 
17Above. 
ISJ Aubert "Switzerland" in Butler and Ranney, above n 3,43. 
19J Aubert "The Swiss Federal Constitution" in Modern Switzerland (The Society for the Promotion of 
Science and Scholarship, Palo Alto, 1978) 305. 
20See G Mowry The California Progressives (Quadrangle Books, Chicago, 1963) 139. 
21W Martin Switzerland: From Roman Times to the Present (Elek Books, London, 1971) 237; G 
Thurer Free and Swiss: The Story of Switzerland (Oswald Wolff, London, 1970) 119-120; Focus on 
Switzerland: The Historical Evolution; Political Institutions (2 ed, Swiss Office for the Development of 
Trade, Lausanne, 1982) 72; see also W Oechsli History of Switzerland: 1499-1914 (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1922) 398; C Hughes Switzerland (Ernest Benn, London, 1975) 110. 
22Fed Const Swiss, art 89. 
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a presidential veto which can only be overridden by a majority vote in favour of the 
enactment. 
In California, the legislative referendum trigger is set at 5 percent of the votes cast for 
governor in the last gubernatorial election. This amounts to more than 393,835 
signatures ,23 which must be collected within 90 days of the enactment that the electors 
wish to subject to referendum. The outcome of the referendum is binding on the 
government. It can only be initiated by the electors. A simple majority of those 
voting on the referendum determines the fate of the enactment. 24 
The legislative referendum is among those direct democracy devices which are 
considered further in Parts II , III , and IV, as it is a device which the electors can 
employ. It provides a means by which the electors can scrutinise and, if necessary, 
countermand the government's legislative program on an issue-by-issue basis between 
elections. Essentially , the legislative referendum gives the electors the ability to veto 
legislation that is inconsistent with their expectations. 
B The Initiative 
The initiative is a procedure by which a prescribed number of electors can compel the 
government to hold a binding referendum on a measure proposed and drafted by the 
electors. The electors can also use it to repeal law. 25 The initiative exists in two 
forms: the constitutional initiative and the legislative initiative. 
1 Constitutional initiatives 
California and Switzerland regularly have constitutional initiatives, but New Zealand 
does not provide for them. The constitutional initiative gives a prescribed number of 
petitioning electors the power to force the government to hold a referendum on a 
constitutional amendment proposed by the electors. In Switzerland, a constitutional 
initiative can be triggered by a petition signed by 100,000 electors. The outcome is 
binding on the government. Only the electors can initiate it. To be adopted, 
however, a constitutional initiative must be approved by both a simple majority of the 
23League of Women Voters of California Initiative and Referendum in California: A Legacy Lost? A 
Study of Direct Legislation in California from Progressive Hopes to Present Reality (League of Women 
Voters of California, Sacramento, 1984 reprint 1987) 21. 
24Cal Const, art 2, ss 9 and 10. 
25G Walker Initiative and Referendum: The People 's Law (The Centre for Independent ~ tudies Ltd, St 
Leonards, 1987) 138. Walker, an unabashed proponent of direct democracy, is a Pn fessor of Law 
and the Dean of the University of Queensland Faculty of Law. Letter from G Walker I ) M Gobbi (22 
May 1991). As Part IV reveals , Walker, through his book, correspondence, and speaking 
engagements, was the intellectual force behind the call for direct democracy in New Zea.and. 
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electors voting and a majority vote in more than half of the cantons.26 Eighteen 
months is allowed for the collection of signatures. 27 
In California, the trigger is set as 8 percent of the previous gubernatorial vote. In 
1914 it required 30,857 signatures. 28 It now requires more than 630,136.29 The 
outcome of a constitutional initiative is binding on the government. It can only be 
initiated by the electors. The initiative takes effect as part of the constitution if 
approved by a simple majority of those voting on the initiative. The required 
signatures must be collected within 150 days of registering the intent to initiate the 
petition drive. 30 
In both jurisdictions, the government may present a counter proposal to the electorate 
via its power to hold a government controlled referendum. If both proposals win 
approval, the proposal with the greater number of affIrmative votes is enacted. The 
same procedure is used regarding competing constitutional initiatives sponsored by 
rival citizen groups. If both measures win approval, the measure that received the 
most votes will prevail. 31 
The constitutional initiative, like the legislative referendum, is among the direct 
democracy devices considered further in Parts II, III, and IV. It is relevant because it 
gives the electors the power to propose and enact changes to their constitutional 
system, irrespective of the wishes of their elected representatives. 
2 Legislative initiatives 
California has the legislative initiative, but Switzerland, on the federal level,32 and 
New Zealand do not. The legislative initiative operates like the constitutional 
initiative. It gives a prescribed number of petitioning electors the power to force the 
government to hold a referendum on a statute proposed by the electors. Legislative 
initiative systems may be direct or indirect. Direct systems present measures 
proposed by petition directly to the electors for approval. Indirect systems, however, 
initially require presentation of measures proposed by petition to the legislature for its 
26Fed Const Swiss, art 121. 
270 Sigg Switzerland's Political Institutions (3 ed, Pro Helvetia, 1988) 30. 
28n Magleby Direct Legislation: Voting on Ballot Propositions in the United States (John Hopkins 
University Press, Baltimore, 1984) 41,67. 
29League, above n 23 , 21. The figure was 615 ,958 in 1991 , which may be an indication of a 
decreasing elector turnout in gubernatorial elections. Bancroft "S.F. Lawyer's Initiative: Long 
Vacations - By State Law" San Francisco Chronicle , San Francisco, USA, 29 July 1991 , 1. 
30Cal Const, art 2, ss 8 and 10; League, above n 23 , 20. 
31See eg Cal Const, art 2, s 10 (b) (stating that "if the provisions of 2 or more measures approved at the 
same election conflict, those receiving the highest affirmative vote shall prevail "). 
32Switzerland: People State Economy Culture (Kummerly & Frey, Berne, 1989) 34. 
13 
approval. If the legislature makes amendments unacceptable to the initiative I s 
proponents or fails to approve the initiative, its proponents may submit the original 
measure to the electors for approval. In some jurisdictions, a disapproving legislature 
may place a competing proposal on the ballot with the original measure. 33 
California has a direct legislative initiative system. The trigger is set at 5 percent of 
the previous gubernatorial vote, which requires more than 393,835 signatures. 34 The 
signatures must be collected within 150 days of registering the intent to initiate the 
petition drive. 35 The outcome is binding on the government unless the electors 
specify in the initiative that the legislature may amend or repeal it. The governor 
may not veto a legislative initiative approved by the voters. Only the electors may 
initiate the legislative initiative. The proposal becomes law upon approval by a 
simple majority of those voting on the initiative.36 
As with the constitutional initiative, the government can present a counter proposal to 
the electors via its power to hold government controlled referendums. If both 
proposals win acceptance, the proposal with the highest number of affIrmative votes 
becomes law. The same procedure is used regarding competing legislative initiatives 
sponsored by rival citizen groups. If both measures win approval, the measure that 
received the most votes will prevail. 37 
Essentially, the legislative initiative allows the electors to propose and enact 
legislation, which gives them some control over the legislative agenda at the expense 
of their elected representatives. The legislative initiative, like the constitutional 
initiative and the legislative referendum, is among the direct democracy devices which 
are considered further in Parts II , III, and IV as it is a device which the electors can 
initiate. 
C "Citizens Initiated Referenda" 
Jack NagaI refers to the constitutional initiative, the legislative initiative, and the 
legislative referendum collectively as "citizens initiatives, ,,38 which is logical as they 
are devices which the electors can employ. The system created by New Zealand IS 
Citizens Initiated Referenda Act 1993 (CIR Act)39 falls within this classifIcation; 
33Magleby, above n 28 , 35-36. 
34League, above n 23, 2l. 
35League, above n 23 , 20. 
36Butler and Ranney, above n 3. 24. 
37 See above note 3l. 
38J Nagal Participation (Prentice-Hall , Englewood Cliffs, 1987) 93. 
39Merv Rusk, once the most influential proponent of direct democracy in New Zealand, coined the 
phrase "citizens initiated referendums ". or "CIR" , in an attempt to refer to the legislative referendum 
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however, it does not fit neatly within the definitional framework for direct democracy 
outlined above. 
The CIR Act provides any person, legal or natural, with the means to initiate a non-
binding referendum on nearly any topic if that person collects the signatures of 10 
percent of all eligible electors, approximately 232,000, within a 12 month period.40 
This system, which is considered further in Part IV, is distinguishable from the 
constitutional initiative, the legislative initiative, and the legislative referendum in 
several important respects. First, it is intended to provide the electors with the means 
to place a "precise question" on the ballot, not a complete legislative or constitutional 
proposal. Second, the wording of any question is subject to the fmal determination of 
the Clerk of the House of Representatives,41 which diminishes the promoter's ability 
to frame a question as he or she pleases. Third, the result is non-binding, which 
means that neither Parliament nor the government of the day is legally required to 
give effect to citizens initiated referendum results. 
David Magleby endorses the non-binding approach as it involves the electorate but 
keeps responsibility for law-making with the legislature.42 Although Thomas Cronin 
believes that jurisdictions with direct democracy are likely to reject advisory 
referendums on the basis that they would diminish established political rights, he 
suggests that they "could be a reasonable experimental alternative for states and 
communities that do not now provide for the initiative and referendum. ,,43 Cronin 
also argues that while the results would be non-binding "issues that won approval by 
significant majorities would place the legislature under pressure to either go along or 
to explain its opposition. ,,44 The National Government used both of these arguments 
to answer criticism from direct democracy advocates within its own party when it 
chose to introduce its non-binding citizens initiated referendum system in New 
Zealand. 45 
without including the initiative or invoking thoughts of government controlled referendums. Letter 
from M Rusk to M Gobbi (15 August 1991). The phrase, however, soon began to be used 
indiscriminately in New Zealand to refer to any or all of the principal direct democracy devices, which 
is understandable as it truncates and juxtaposes the terminology used to distinguish them. See generally 
eg Simpson, above n 10; Submissions to the National Party Caucus Committee on Electoral and 
Parliamentary Reform (1990) ; see also Letter from Wayne Eagleson, Director National Parliamentary 
Research Unit, to M Gobbi (19 June 1991); FAIR Newsletter No. 13 (March 1991). 
40Citizens Initiated Referenda Act 1993, s 19. 
41CIR Act, above n 40, ss 9, 10, and 11. 
42Magleby, above n 28, 195. 
43T Cronin Direct Democracy: The Politics of Initiative, Referendum, and Recall (Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge, 1989) 241. 
44Cronin, above n 43, 240-241. 
45See eg NZPD, no 88, 17951-17954 (Graham). 
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With the exception of New Zealand's citizens initiated referendum system, the direct 
democracy devices considered further in Parts II, ill, and IV transfer, to varying 
degrees, the power to legislate from elected representatives to the electors.46 
Initiatives, particularly those in Switzerland and California, entail the greatest transfer 
of legislative power. They are binding. In addition, subject to the limitations 
discussed in Parts II and III, their subject matter is determined by those who employ 
them. More importantly, they give the electors the means to legislate regardless of 
the disposition of their representatives or the parties to which they owe allegiance.47 
Advisory referendums transfer no legislative power, as New Zealand's citizens 
initiated referendum system, which is considered in Part IV, reveals. Although the 
system has virtually no subject matter limitations, the outcomes it produces are not 
binding. Whether the outcome will be given effect depends on elected 
representatives. The legislative referendum is between the two, since its results are 
binding but its subject matter is determined by elected representatives. 
II STANDARD ARGUMENTS REGARDING DIRECT DEMOCRACY 
The standard arguments for and against direct democracy are essentially concerned 
with the transfer of legislative power from elected representatives to their electors. 
Proponents of direct democracy see it as a means of promoting good, open, 
responsive, and responsible government characterised by public participation, greater 
civic awareness and pride, and prosperity. Its opponents see it as an invitation to 
mob-rule characterised by the oppression of minorities, ill-informed decision-making, 
the loss of parliamentary sovereignty, and economic chaos. This section simply 
outlines the standard arguments, as they are well-canvassed in the literature on direct 
democracy, as the work of David Butler and Austin Ranney, Geoffrey Q de Walker, 
Cronin, Magleby, Patrick Boyer, the League of Women Voters of California, and 
Lisa Whitehill attests. 48 Its primary purpose is to provide a brief overview of the 
specific concerns that have influenced the form of direct democracy in Switzerland, 
California, and New Zealand. 
46The transference metaphor is apt because the initiative and referendum, both in Switzerland and 
California, were established after experience with constitutional systems in which the electors delegated 
all legislative power to an assembly of elected representatives. 
47Butler and Ranney, above n 3, 29-30, 222. 
48See generally Butler and Ranney, above n 3; Walker, above n 25; Magleby, above n 28; J Boyer 
Lawmaking By the People: Referendums and Plebiscites in Canada (Butterworths, Toronto, 1982); 
League, above n 23; L Whitehall "Direct Legislation: A Survey of Recent Literature" (1985) 5 Legal 
Reference Services Q 3-45. 
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A Main Arguments For 
Essentially, the main arguments in favour of direct democracy are premised on a 
Jeffersonian faith in the electorate at large and distrust of those in positions of power. 
Butler and Ranney, in a restatement of the views of the Progressives, have offered the 
following arguments in favour of direct democracy: ~it increases the legitimacy of 
political decisions, promotes public interests as opposed to vested interests, allows the 
electorate to consider specific issues rather than an entire manifesto or platform, 
brings the legislative process closer to the electors and makes it less secretive, gives 
expression to the "general will" of the electorate, provides the means to promote 
participation, counteracts apathy and alienation, and maximises the human potential of 
the electorate.49 
'{.. 
Walker adds the following arguments in favour of direct democracy: it counteracts 
the shortcomings of representative democracy, the decline in political debate, and 
political elitism, encourages bipartisanship, separates policies from personalities, 
loosens the grip of parties and pressure groups on the legislative process, increases 
the legitimacy of the law and the rule of law, and overcomes the problems of scale, 
distance, and isolation. 50 It also increases an elective representative's respect for 
public opinion.51 Cronin and Magleby cover, more or less, the same range of 
arguments as Walker, and Butler and Ranney . 52 
B Main Arguments Against 
The main arguments against direct democracy are premised on Madisonian belief in 
the ability of elected representatives to make wise and deliberative decisions in the 
best interests of the nation. In accordance with this belief, Butler and Ranney offer 
the following arguments against direct democracy: it weakens the power of elected 
representatives and representative democracy, gives governmental power to those who 
do not have the ability to make wise decisions, lacks any means to measure intensity 
of belief, forces decisions at the expense of consensus, and presents a danger to 
minorities. 53 
49Butler and Ranney, above n 3,24-33 . 
5OWalker, above n 25, 29-55 ; 
51G Walker The People's Law: Initiative and Referendum: University of Queensland Inaugural Lecture 
(delivered 3 June 1987, University of Queensland Press, St Lucis, 1988) 7. 
52See Cronin, above n 43, 10-11; Magleby, above n 28,27-28. 
53 Butler and Ranney, above n 3, 34-37. 
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Walker adds the following arguments against direct democracy: it is inconsistent with 
Westminster parliamentary democracy, it would create ballot clutter, result in poorly 
drafted laws, cost a great deal of money, be an administrative inconvenience/ suffer 
from voter apathy which would produce skewed results,1iUow those with money and 
media access a disproportionate voice, and ~tall a tyranny of the majority.54 
Magleby adds that it would 'fbenefit special interest groups, produce frivolous 
legislation, and fail to educate the electors or increase their interest in government. 55 
Cronin, more or less, covers the same ground as Magleby, and Butler and Ranney. 56 
C Central Constitutional Concern 
As some of these scholars have noted, very little of the argumentation goes beyond 
the political rhetoric developed during the Progressive Era,57 as can be seen in the 
New Zealand parliamentary debates on the perennially ill-fated Referendum Bill 
(1893-1906), the short lived Popular Initiative and Referendum Bill (1918-1919), the 
Popular Initiatives Bill (1983-1985), and the Citizens Initiated Referenda Act 1993 
(1992-1993).58 The reliance on rhetoric, rather than practice, has had several 
important consequences. 
It has allowed opponents to ignore the high level of support direct democracy enjoys 
where it exists59 and proponents to overlook the constitutional safeguards which 
typically characterise the constitutional initiative, the legislative initiative, and the 
legislative referendum. 6O In addition, it has allowed opponents to criticise the practice 
of direct democracy in terms of representative democracy theory, 61 which is 
misleading as it ignores the failure of elected representatives to live up to the 
theoretical ideal of representative democracy. Similarly, proponents of direct 
democracy tend to exaggerate the failings of representative democracy in terms of 
direct democracy theory, 62 which is misleading as it ignores the shortcomings of 
direct democracy, particularly its majoritarian nature. Furthermore, it has allowed 
5"walker, above n 25,59-98 . 
55Magleby, above n 28, 29-30. 
56Cronin, above n 43, II. 
57See eg Butler and Ranney, above n 3,26-29,37; Magleby, above n 28, 3. 
58For discussions of these debates, see generally chapters seven, eight, and nine. 
59See eg Magleby, above n 28, 9-10 (citing survey data indicating that 77 percent of Americans 
nationwide support direct democracy, a figure which reaches 85 percent in California); see also Cronin, 
above n 43, 4 (citing subsequent surveys indicating comparable levels of support for direct democracy). 
60See generally Submissions on the Citizens Initiated Referenda Bill to the Electoral Law Select 
Committee (1992). 
61See eg, NZPD, vol 522, 6706 (Lange), 6715 (Hunt), 10 March 1992 (both relying on Burke's theory 
of representation as an argument against direct democracy); see also Walker, above n 25, 61 (arguing 
that theory of direct democracy should be compared with theory of representative democracy or the 
practice of direct democracy with the practice of representative democracy, not the practice of direct 
democracy with the theory of representative democracy). 
62See Walker, above n 25, 251. 
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proponents to champion and opponents to malign direct democracy as a utopian 
alternative to representative democracy, 63 which ignores the reality that the 
constitutional initiative, the legislative initiative, and the legislative referendum are 
merely complementary supplements to representative democracy where they exist. 
Magleby, who builds on the work of Butler and Ranney, 64 provides the most rigorous 
empirical analysis of whether the ideals of direct democracy are met in practice. He 
concludes that direct democracy in practice falls short of its theoretical ideals in 
several respects, primarily because its procedural safeguards, particularly the 
combination of high signature requirements and short collection periods, limit 1ts use 
to large grassroots volunteer organisations or small but well-fmanced interest 
groups.65 However, he does not consider the continuous and vital role interest groups 
play in democracies as the main means by which people organise themselves to 
influence policy and legislation. 66 
Magleby also argues that the demographic make up of electors in general elections is 
broader than in referendums; specifically, older, well-educated, and affluent electors 
vote in referendums in numbers that are greater than their proportion of the general 
population, which means that young, less well-educated, and less well-to-do electors 
are proportionately under-represented. 67 Although this appears to be a serious 
criticism, it actually undermines the standard argument that the electors are generally 
incompetent to decide the issues put before them in referendums. 
63Walker, above n 25, 60 (arguing that many of the arguments against direct democracy are built upon 
the false premise that direct democracy is an alternative to representative democracy). 
64See generally Butler and Ranney, above n 3. 
65Magleby, above n 28, 76. 
66See eg K Jackson The Dilemma of Parliament (Allen & Unwin, Wellington, 1987) x (asserting that 
there are "some 500 nationally organised pressure groups serving New Zealand's 3 million people); P 
Schlessinger and R Wright Elements of Government in California (Holt, Rinehart & Winston, New 
York, 1962) 24 (stating that lobbyists perform a valuable service without which legislation would often 
be completely unrealistic and unresponsive to the wishes of the people and that they usually represent 
the conflicting pressures that must be assessed before that compromise can be made in the legislative 
~rocess) . 
Magleby, above n 28, 121, 183 . 
19 
In addition, unlike Cronin and Walker, who have had the benefit of Magleby's work, 
Magleby does not consider the failure of representative democracy in meeting its 
theoretical ideals as a basis of comparison. As Cronin points out: 68 
Critics of direct legislation frequently have a view of state legislators that borders on the 
mythical: highly intelligent; extremely well informed; as rational as a virtuous, wise 
and deliberative statesman; and as competent as corporate presidents and university 
professors. These same critics tend to view the people as a "mob," unworthy of being 
trusted. Yet the people, or so-called mob, are the same persons who elect legislators. 
How is it that they can choose between good and bad candidates but cannot choose 
between good and bad laws? 
Nevertheless , Magleby shares Cronin's and Walker's belief that direct democracy has 
become an important, if not permanent, feature of the constitutional systems in which 
it exists. 69 They also agree that the central political issue is whether electors should 
playa greater role in the exercise of governmental power. 70 
The practical constitutional concern underlying this issue is whether, and to what 
extent, direct democracy can be established in a representative democracy without 
significantly impairing minority rights. This concern regarding the negative aspects 
of majoritarianism is largely irrelevant to New Zealand's CIR system, primarily 
because the results are non-binding, which means that either Parliament or the 
government of the day can ignore them or take steps to remedy or counteract any 
perceived defects attributed to them. Ultimately, the power to legislate remains with 
elected representatives. 
The concern regarding majoritarianism also does not apply to the legislative 
referendum. In Switzerland and California, the government can re-enact legislation 
vetoed by the electorate. In addition, as the device acts as a break: on the legislative 
activity of elected representatives , it cannot be used to deprive any group of existing 
rights. It can only temporarily prevent the reallocation of existing rights or the 
creation of new rights. Although the electors can use the device to frustrate reform-
minded representatives, they cannot use it to place burdens on any particular group . 
However, the majoritarian concern is applicable to initiatives. If these devices were 
stripped of their safeguards in Switzerland and California, the electors could use them 
to deprive select groups of their rights, including the "propertied few" whose 
interests James Madison believed could only be protected against the "propertyless 
68Cronin, above n 43 , 87; see also Walker, n 25, 39 (stating that the representation principle has been 
Eerverted by institutional and other factors) . 
9See Magleby, above n 28, 16, 192; Walker, above n 25, 197; Walker, above n 51, 13; Cronin, above 
n 43, x (stating that his research confirms that direct democracy "is here to stay"). 
70See MagJeby, above n 28,4; Cronin, above n 43,37; Walker, above n 25, 3-4, 187. 
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many" through a representative democracy whose power is divided among three 
branches of government: the legislature, the executive, and the jUdiciary. 71 These 
safeguards are examined in Parts II, ill, and IV, as they are essential to understanding 
the role of direct democracy in Switzerland, California, and New Zealand. 
III UNDERLYING CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES 
As Parts II, ill, and IV also show, direct democracy became an attractive reform 
option in Switzerland, California, and New Zealand when their respective 
representative democracy systems had fallen into disrepute. However, ascertaining 
why reformers in these jurisdictions embraced direct democracy as a means of 
improving representative democracy requires an understanding of the general 
constitutional principles underlying direct and representative democracy and their 
relationship to the question of legitimacy. These principles also help to explain why 
the direct democracy devices in each jurisdiction are different. 
A Key Concepts 
In 1765 William Blackstone made a singularly important contribution to the 
development of constitutional theory by publishing the following observation: 72 
In all tyrannical governments , the supreme magistracy, or the right both of making and 
enforcing the laws is vested in one and the same man, or one and the same body of 
men; and wherever these two powers are united together, there can be no public liberty. 
On 18 June 1787, in a fateful speech delivered at the American Constitutional 
Convention, Alexander Hamilton recast Blackstone's observation as a guiding maxim 
which remains a corner-stone of modern constitutional theory:73 
Men love power. . . . Give all power to the many, they will oppress the few. Give all 
power to the few, they will oppress the many. Both therefore ought to have power, that 
each may defend itself against the other. 
Upon this maxim rests two distinct, yet interrelated, constitutional concepts which are 
essential to the existence of democracy: the separation of powers and the protection 
of minority rights. Both support a third constitutional concept: the consent of the 
71A Koch "Introduction" in Notes of Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 Reported by James 
Madison (2 rev ed, Ohio University Press, Athens , 1985) xix. 
72W Blackstone Commentaries on the Laws of England (reprint 1st ed, London, 1966) vol. 1, 142. 
73Notes of Debates, above n 71 , 131 , 135. 
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governed, which constitutional theorists since James Madison have viewed as a litmus 
test for legitimacy. 74 
1 Separation of powers 
The doctrine of the separation of powers, in its purest theoretical form, holds that 
governmental power should be divided among three distinct, separately staffed, and 
independent branches of government of roughly equivalent constitutional status: the 
legislature, the executive, and the judiciary. 75 The purpose of this sharp division of 
governmental power is to prevent its concentration in anyone branch, group, or 
individual, thus eliminating the primary threat to individual liberty or rights. 76 The 
doctrine, then, is intended to safeguard individual liberty or rights, which is essential 
to the protection of minority rights as the individual is the ultimate minority. 
Although the constitutional systems in Switzerland, California, and New Zealand are 
different, each has, to a greater or lesser extent, conformed to the doctrine. 
California, which has formalised the separation of powers in a written constitution, 
approximates, on paper at least, the theoretical ideal. New Zealand, whose 
Westminster-style constitution lacks any formal separation of powers, appears to lie 
"at the other end of the continuum. ,,77 Nevertheless, Philip Joseph maintains that the 
doctrine remains "pivotal to constitutional and administrative law" in New Zealand. 78 
Switzerland, whose written constitution features some aspects of the Westminster 
model, is more similar to California in terms of its approximation of the separation of 
powers ideal. The doctrine is useful as a means to describe and evaluate the elements 
and workings of each constitutional system, including direct democracy. It also 
provides a basis for understanding some of the factors which gave rise to the call for 
direct democracy in Switzerland, California, and New Zealand. 
74See eg, Koch "Introduction" in Notes to Debates, above n 71, xviii; Sartori, above, n 1, 90; G 
Marshall Constitutional Theory (Oxford University Press, London, 1971) 210. 
75Marshall, above, n 74, 100. 
76H Street and R Brazier (eds) de Smith Constitutional and Administrative Law (4 ed, Penguin Books, 
London, 1981 reprint 1983) 31. 
77Joseph, above n 13, 228 (quote), 237. 
78oseph, above n 13, 5 (quote) , 237 (function of the concept of law), 239-240 (supported by 
conventions) . 
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2 Protection of minority rights 
In casual conversation, democracy is frequently described in terms of "majority rule." 
The association appears to be based on democracy's origin in small face-to-face 
assemblies and its modern association with electoral systems. However, the 
formulation is misleading . As Butler and Ranney have observed:79 
The very existence of democracy rests upon the willing acceptance by minorities of 
decisions made by majorities - and upon the forbearance of majorities from imposing on 
minorities conditions they cannot bear. 
Minorities, not majorities, are the concern in the constitutional context. Specifically, 
minorities must have the right of opposition, as that is the means by which they can 
maintain respect for and safeguard their rights . Oppressing this right results in the 
"tyranny of the majority. ,, 80 Under majority tyranny, the dynamics and the 
mechanics of democracy cannot be sustained because the protection of minority rights 
is "a necessary condition of the democratic process itself. ,, 81 As Giovanni Sartori has 
argued, "'majority rule' is only a shorthand formula for limited majority rule , for a 
restrained majority rule that respects minority rights. ,, 82 
If democracy is to survive, majority rule must be limited majority rule. 83 Given 
Dicey's observation that all majorities are themselves coalitions of minorities,84 any 
other construction would ultimately be self-defeating. Consequently, New Zealand's 
constitutional conventions depend as much on the respect of minority rights as the 
written constitutions of Switzerland and California, which have express provisions 
protecting minority rights. 85 
This constitutional principle is essential to understanding why the direct democracy 
systems in Switzerland, California, and New Zealand are different. As Parts II, m, 
and IV show, these jurisdictions have adopted different institutional arrangements for 
protecting minority rights. Once they chose to establish direct democracy, they had 
to decide how to preserve or extend existing safeguards to account for its majoritarian 
nature. As these decisions were based on local constitutional variables and 
conditions , direct democracy , quite naturally , manifested itself differently in each 
jurisdiction. 
79Butler and Ranney, above n 3,26. 
SOSartori, above, n 1, 133. 
8lSartori, above, n 1, 33. 
82Sartori, above, n 1, 31. 
83Sartori, above, n 1, 239. 
Mw Riker Liberalism Against Populism: A Confrontation between the Theory of Democracy and the 
Theory of Social Choice (W H Freeman & Co, San Francisco, 1982) 234. 
85See Sartori, above, n 1, 239. 
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3 Consent of the governed 
The coercive authority of government, at least in Switzerland and California, is based 
on the doctrine of the consent of the governed. 86 According to Cronin, people 
initially gathered together for mutual protection. Once life and limb were relatively 
safe, they formed governments to secure and enhance their natural rights, 'which 
implies that people are paramount to government. Consequently, the doctrine 
stipulated, at least during the 1780s, that a government's worth depended largely on 
"how it improved the well-being and protected the natural rights of its citizens. ,,87 
Cronin, however, does not address the fate of governments that fail to meet this test. 
Apart from civil disobedience or electoral opposition, whether the governed can 
withdraw their consent is rarely considered outside of the context of revolution or 
immigration. Leaving aside these options, Geoffrey Marshall has noted three 
circumstances in which the common good gives rise to the duty to resist and replace 
legitimate authority: first , when government is conducted in a manner in which no 
legal means of repealing bad law exists; second, when private interests permeate the 
political system to the extent that there has ceased to be a common interest in 
maintaining it; and third, when the authority for the objectionable command is 
sufficiently unrelated to the maintenance of social order and settled rights that it can 
be resisted without serious detriment to either. 88 
As Marshall does not provide any examples, these categories are of uncertain 
application. If, in practice, the governed cannot withdraw their consent, except 
through revolution or immigration, it would explain why constitutional change 
generally occurs within the established constitutional system, which was the case 
regarding the establishment of direct democracy in Switzerland, California, and New 
Zealand. It would also explain why direct democracy in each jurisdiction 
complements, rather than debases, pre-existing constitutional arrangements. A 
constitutional reform measure passing through a system it is intended to reform 
cannot avoid accounting for the constitutional principles underlying that system. As 
the pre-direct democracy systems in Switzerland, California, and New Zealand were 
86 Article I, section 2 of the California Constitution states that "all political power is inherent in the 
people." Article 71 of the Swiss Constitution states that "subject to the rights of the people and the 
Cantons the supreme power of the Confederation shall be exercised by the Federal Assembly." In New 
Zealand, however, Parliamentary sovereignty, as opposed to the doctrine of the consent of the 
governed, is the primary theoretical explanation for the coercive authority of government. See below 
text accompanying notes 124-156. 
87Cronin, above n 43 , 12. Sartori argues that democracy exists "when the relation between the 
governed and the government abides by the principle that the state is at the service of the citizens and 
not the citizens of the state, that the government exists for the people, and not vice versa." Sartori, 
above, n 1, 34. 
88See Marshall, above, n 74, 206. 
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different, this, in itself, explains why the direct democracy systems in each 
jurisdiction are different. 
4 Legitimacy 
If the coercive authority of government is derived from the consent of the governed, 
then, as Sartori has concluded, "power is legitimate only if it is actually bestowed 
from below, only if it is an emanation of the popular will, and only if it rests on some 
expressed, basic consensus. ,, 89 Although extremely influential in the formation of the 
Swiss and California constitutional systems, this principle was slowly incorporated 
into Westminster constitutional systems, where, in its unadulterated form, it still sits 
somewhat uneasily with the concept of the Crown and, despite its decreasing 
importance, the theory of parliamentary sovereignty. 
Butler and Ranney, however, have developed a more applicable conception of 
legitimacy. In their view, legitimacy consists of two components: 1) the people I s 
conviction that the institutions and processes by which political decisions are made 
are, by law, custom, and moral principle, the right and proper ways to make such 
decisions; and 2) their conviction that these decisions do not go beyond acceptable 
limits of fairness and decency in awarding benefits to, or imposing burdens on, any 
part of the population. 90 Essentially, the exercise of governmental power is legitimate 
if it creates generally accepted obligations rather than a set of prescriptive norms that 
require force to ensure widespread compliance. In a pure representative democracy, 
this acceptance is expressed in periodic elections which allow the electors, in a 
generalised form, to provide some indication of their approval or disapproval of the 
exercise of governmental power. The principal direct democracy devices, however, 
provide the electors with the means to voice their approval or disapproval more 
frequently and with greater precision. 
If either of the convictions identified by Butler and Ranney are undermined, the 
legitimacy of the constitutional system, and its crucial role in maintaining the rule of 
law, is undermined.91 Broadly speaking, this could have two important consequences. 
First, if the means of creating and enforcing law are widely perceived as illegitimate, 
89Sartori, above, n 1, 34. 
90Butler and Ranney, above, n 3, 24 . Butler and Ranney have also noted that all political decisions 
should be as legitimate as possible and that the highest degree of legitimacy is achieved by decisions 
made by the direct, unmediated vote of the people, which leads them to equate referendums with 
greater legitimacy. Above; see also Walker, above n 51 , 12 (stating that direct democracy has proved 
to be a source of new legitimacy for enacted law and a bulwark against extremism); Walker, above n 
25, 195 (same). 
91 Por an analysis of the rule of law and its importance to constitutional democracy, see G Walker The 
Rule of Law: Foundation of Constitutional Democracy (Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 
1988). 
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people, by and large, will lose their inner impulse to obey the law. 92 Second, a 
growing distrust of legislative bodies, coupled with a growing suspicion that 
privileged interests exert a disproportionate influence, will produce a demand for 
more democracy. 93 The experience in Switzerland, California, and New Zealand 
readily confIrms the second proposition. However, it also leaves room for the 
suggestion that those in power may have yielded to the demand for direct democracy 
because they were unwilling to risk the consequences of undermining the rule of law. 
B Relationship of Representative and Direct Democracy 
The relationship of representative democracy to direct democracy depends on the 
constitutional framework in which the two co-exist. In Switzerland and California, 
they operate within constitutional systems that are based on the Constitution of the 
United States of America. In New Zealand, they exist within a system that is based 
on the United Kingdom's Westminster system. The conceptual differences between 
American and Westminster constitutionalism present different theoretical concerns 
regarding the relationship of representative democracy to direct democracy. These 
differences help to explain why direct democracy in Switzerland and California differs 
from direct democracy in New Zealand. 
1 Representative and direct democracy 
In classical democratic theory, popular self-government not only required, but 
promoted the direct participation of citizens in government.94 Until the unexpected 
success of American constitutionalism, democracy meant "rule by the people" in 
small polities, as this was the only conceivable circumstance in which authority over 
governmental decisions could rest directly with the people. 95 In ancient Athens, the 
old Swiss Landsgemeiden, and the early New England town meetings, citizens 
gathered together to exercise governmental power. 96 As a flourishing political 
practice, this form of democracy is still the principal means of local self-government 
for millions of people around the world. 97 
92Walker, above n 51, 2. 
93Cronin, above, n 43, 10. 
~ alker, above n 25, 53. 
95Nagal , above n 38, 69. 
96A Ranney "The United States of America" in Butler and Ranney, above n 3,68. 
97Nagal, above, n 38, 70 (noting that this form of democracy exists in places as diverse as Chinese 
villages, Swiss communes, Israeli kibbutzim, and New England towns). 
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Democracy became widely understood as representative democracy once Madison 
and his associates found a way to reconcile tIthe democratic value of popular 
sovereignty with the capacity to govern a large territory. ,,98 To overcome the obstacle 
of size, both in territory and population, which rendered face-to-face assemblies 
impractical, the Founding Fathers embraced the principle of representation. 99 As a 
consequence, rather than conveying connotations of direct participation, democracy 
came to mean a system of government in which citizens participate authoritatively 
only by electing representatives who alone have the power to make laws. loo 
However, this conception of democracy is incomplete. On the local level, as 
mentioned above, people have continued to participate directly in the exercise of 
governmental power. More importantly, it overlooks the advent of the initiative and 
referendum, both of which pre-date the American constitutional convention by 
centuries. Early instances of the referendum occurred in 1552 when electors in 
Switzerland and France legitimised the annexation of Metz.101 Joseph Zimmerman 
traces its flrst use in America to the Massachusetts Bay Colony in 1640.102 He also 
traces the flrst initiative to Massachusetts in 1715.103 
This conception of democracy also ignores the importance of the initiative and 
referendum in representative democracies that use them. In 1900 Ellis Oberholtzer 
predicted that the initiative and referendum would not supplant representative 
democracy, but would thrive and influence it materially. 104 Walker, writing 87 years 
later, validated this prediction with the following conclusion: 105 
98 
A century of experience in Europe and America has shown direct legislation to be a 
valuable supplement to the representative institutions of liberal democratic societies. It 
has neither replaced the elected assemblies nor degraded their functions. It has, 
however, improved the quality of their work by giving them an incentive to take more 
notice of public opinion, to be more careful to put legislation into the best possible 
form, and to formulate with greater clarity and care the arguments in support of it. 
Nagal, above, n 38, 69. 
99See Cronin, above, n 43,247 . 
100 Nagal, above, n 38, 69. 
IOI League, above n 23, l. 
102J Zimmerman "Populism Revived" (1986) 58 State Government 172; see also Cronin, above n 43, 
41. According to Philip Goodhart, the Council of the Army to Oliver Cromwell, under the leadership 
of Colonel Ireton, proposed in 1647 that a form of the referendum should be adopted to protect the 
basic rights of the people against bare majorities in the House of Commons. P Goodhart Referendum 
(Tom Stacey, London, 1971) 70. 
103Zimmerman, above n 102, 172. 
100E Oberholtzer The Referendum in America (Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1900) 412-13. 
According to Woodrow Wilson, "[t]heir intention was to restore, not destroy, representative 
democracy." Cronin, above, n 43, 2. 
105Walker, above, n 25, 195. 
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The initiative and referendum, as they exist in modern representative democracies, 
are a far cry from "government by the masses. ,,106 Their majoritarian nature is, as 
shown in Parts II, ill, and IV, subject to a host of limitations designed to safeguard 
minority rights. 107 Further, as Sartori has argued, if participatory forms of 
democracy, including the initiative and referendum, are "conceived as being inimical 
to representative democracy - and if the former actually undermines the latter - then . 
. . both are in deep water. ,,1 08 Essentially, direct democracy cannot be viewed as an 
alternative to representative democracy. It is simply a complementary supplement 
whose primary purpose is to enhance representative democracy. 
2 Westminster dimension 
Representative and direct democracy merge differently in different constitutional 
systems. In systems where a strict separation of powers exist, as in Switzerland and 
California, responsibility for governmental decisions is diffused through different 
branches and levels of government as well as a relatively weak party system. 
Consequently , adding another locus of decision-making or another check to balance 
the system, be it the referendum, the initiative, or both, presents little theoretical or 
constitutional difficulty . 109 As Cronin has noted: 110 
1060berholtzer, above, n 104, 412. 
107Above. 
108Sartori, above, n 1, 245-246. 
109See Butler and Ranney, above n 3, 225-226. American Courts· have ruled that the initiative and 
referendum are permissible under the US Constitution. Eg Kadderly v Portland 44 Or 118 (1903) 
(Oregon Supreme Court holding that the republican clause does not prevent the people of the several 
states from amending or changing their constitution in any way they see fit as long as it does not abolish 
a republican form of government , whose exact form is not in any way prescribed by Article IV of the 
US Constitution). In 1912, the US Supreme Court refused to rule on the constitutionality of direct 
democracy on the grounds that it was a political question best left to Congress to decide, that is, outside 
the jurisdiction of the Court. Pacific States Telephone and Telegraph Company v Oregon 223 US 118 
(1912) . The Pacific States decision has been widely interpreted to mean that initiatives and 
referendums fall within the confines of the US Constitution. Magleby, above n 28, 48. In 1971, the 
US Supreme Court expressed its deference towards direct democracy. James v Valtierra 402 US 141 
(1971) (concluding that "California's entire history demonstrates the repeated use of the referendums to 
give citizens a voice on questions of public policy. . . . Provisions for referendums demonstrate devotion 
to democracy .... ") In Fair Political Practices Commission v Superior Court 599 P2d 46, 157 Cal 
Rptr 855 (1979), the Califorrtia Supreme Court ruled that the constitutional provisions establishing 
direct democracy were drafted in the light of the theory that all power of government ultimately resides 
in the people. Observing that the provisions reserve the power of initiative and referendum to the 
people, rather than grant it to the people, the Court concluded that: "It has long been our judicial policy 
to apply a liberal construction to this power wherever it is challenged in order that the right be not 
improperly annulled. If doubts can be resolved in favor of the use of the reserve power, courts will 
~reserve it. " 
IOCronin, above n 43, 34-35; L Sirico, Ir "The Constitutionality of the Initiative and Referendum: 
(1980) 65 Iowa L R 637; but see C Fountaine "Lousy Lawmaking: Questioning the Desirability and 
Constitutionality of Legislating by Initiative" (1988) 61 So Cal L R 733 (suggesting, against the weight 
of judicial and academic authority, that direct democracy is unconstitutional); D Hsiao "Invisible Cities: 
The Constitutional Status of Direct Democracy in a Democratic Republic" (1992) 41 Duke L J 1267 
(same). 
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State supreme courts have [denied] that direct democracy devices such as the initiative 
violate the principle of a republican form of government. They have ruled that a 
republican form of government is one administered by representatives chosen or 
appointed by the people or by their authority. The initiative and referendum merely 
reserve to the people a certain share of the legislative power. Government is still 
divided into legislative, executive, and judicial departments, and their duties are still 
discharged by representatives selected by the people. There remains, in effect, only one 
legislative department, but now with two subdivisions . 
The effect of the merger depends, for the most part, on the authority of referendum 
and initiative results and the extent to which they override the decisions of elected 
representatives. 111 In Westminster systems like New Zealand's, however, the merger 
presents several theoretical concerns, particularly regarding collective ministerial 
responsibility, electoral mandates, parliamentary sovereignty, and Burkeian 
representation. 
(a) Collective ministerial responsibility 
In theory, the Ministers of the Crown in Cabinet (the Executive) are collectively 
responsible to the electorate through a majority in the House of Representatives (the 
Legislature). If issues are decided by the electorate against the wishes of the 
government, holding it accountable under the principle of collective ministerial 
responsibility would be nonsensical, as judging a government at the polls on the basis 
of its overall achievements would be virtually impossible if it had not made all of the 
important decisions. 112 
However, this objection fails to acknowledge that New Zealand has regularly held 
government controlled referendums since 1894113 without diminishing reliance on the 
theory ,,14 It also ignores the same outcome in the United Kingdom regarding its 1975 
government controlled referendum on membership in the European Community. 115 
David Butler and Uwe Kitzinger concluded that it "demonstrated once and for all the 
feasibility of a referendum" in a Westminster system,, 16 In constitutional terms, they 
concluded that the "referendum also showed itself to be a less revolutionary 
constitutional innovation than many had feared" even though it produced, for the fIrst 
time an "offIcial acceptance of a public cabinet split within a one-party 
III See Butler and Ranney, above n 3, 226. 
112See Butler and Ranney, above n 3, 225 ; see also F Brookfield "Referendums: Constitutional and 
Legal Aspects" in Simpson, above n 10, 11-12 (arguing that ministers would be morally bound to give 
way to the will of the electors, which reduces the importance of ministerial responsibility and 
suggesting that the government of the day should be neutral in polls and the ministers should be free to 
sg:ak for or against a proposal, as they were in England for the 1975 EEC referendum.). 
I 3Wilson, above n 8,298. 
1I4See eg Joseph, above n 13, 45, 282, 626. 
115For discussions of this referendum, see generally above note 5. 
1I6Butler and Kitzinger, above n 5, 286. 
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government. ,,117 Furthermore, collective ministerial responsibility is intended 
primarily to prevent individual ministers from taking public positions against 
decisions taken by Cabinet. ll s In a referendum context, unless Cabinet decides 
otherwise, New Zealand Ministers are free to state publicly their personal views on 
the issue. 119 
(b) Mandate 
This collective ministerial responsibility objection is also weakened by its dependency 
on the mandate theory, which electoral politics in New Zealand has shown to be 
unsatisfactory. Under this theory, a person who votes for a given candidate is 
regarded as giving him a mandate to implement every item in his party's manifesto. 120 
As a corollary, ruling parties are expected to fulfil their manifesto promises, which 
forms the basis of assessing a government's achievements at the polls. 
The electorate, however, is not free to discriminate among items within manifestos, 
or among candidates within a party. Suggesting that a party that has come to power, 
either on its own or as part of a coalition, has a mandate to implement every single 
item in its manifesto would appear to be unreasonable, especially if the majority of 
the electorate did not vote for the ruling party or parties, or their candidates. 121 In 
addition, broken electoral promises, particularly between 1984 and 1992, have not 
been uncommon in New Zealand. 122 Giving the electorate the means to decide some 
of the key issues of the day would, as Butler and Ranney have suggested, "by-pass 
some of the absurdities inherent in the mandate doctrine. ,,123 
(c) Parliamentary sovereignty 
The merger of representative and direct democracy in Westminster systems also runs 
into the theory of parliamentary sovereignty. The theory, as restated by Dicey in 
1885, insists that "a sovereign power cannot, whilst retaining its sovereign character, 
117Above. 
l1sJoseph, above n 13, 45. 
119See eg R Laugesen "How MPs Vote on Electoral Reform" The Dominion, Wellington, New Zealand, 
5 August 1992 (14 ministers for first-past-the-post, 3 for supplementary member, 1 undecided, 5 
unwilling to comment, 3 unavailable for comment). 
120Butler and Ranney, above, n 3,225 
121See above; see also Walker, above n 25,41 (discussing breakdown of mandate theory). 
122See Joseph, above n 13, 450-451; Interview with Wayne Eagleson, Director of National's 
Parliamentary Research Unit, Wellington (25 March 1991) (suggesting that the demand for direct 
democracy is related to the overall dissatisfaction with the "broken promises" perception of the present 
parliamentary system and a rejection of the validity of the assumptions underlying the present form of 
~overnment by a significant number of people). 
23Butler and Ranney, above, n 3, 225; see also A V Dicey "The Referendum" (March 1894) Nat'l R 
65, 71-72 (advocating the referendum as it lets electors decide specific issues unlike voting for 
representatives which involves endorsing a host of unrelated yet inseparable issues). 
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restrict is own powers by any particular enactment. ,,124 Legal scholars have 
interpreted this to mean that Parliament, as the legal sovereign, cannot impose 
substantive, as opposed to procedural (manner and form), restrictions on future 
parliaments. l25 Although Parliament can impose rules upon itself by which it must 
enact, amend, or repeal law, it can alter these rules if it complies with them while 
doing so. In short, Parliament cannot bind itself. By extension, Parliament cannot 
permanently entrench direct democracy devices or the laws that they produce. 
In this context, David Butler has suggested that an advisory referendum can constrain 
the freedom of Parliament to do absolutely what it likes. Consequently, "[a] binding 
or constitutionally entrenched referendum would present a much more fundamental 
challenge to the traditional rules of the game. ,,126 However, like Dicey before him, 
Butler concludes that "[r]eferendums can be grafted onto the British system of 
government. ,,127 In a manner that echoes Oberholtzer, he also concludes that "they 
must in some degree change its nature. Still more, they must challenge the theories 
and the textbook assumptions about its nature. ,,128 
The challenge, in fact, is underway. F M Brookfield, after canvassing the response 
of the "manner and form" theorists to "Diceyan objections" to entrenching laws in 
New Zealand, has suggested that "an appropriate referendum may itself be the means 
of basic constitutional change, effective to assist the establishment of double 
entrenchment, ,,129 that is, laws that Parliament cannot amend or repeal without super 
majorities or the approval of the electors. Anupam Chandler, who rejects the 
"manner and form" approach as open to abuse, nonetheless concludes that 
entrenchment of a bill of rights in the United Kingdom could be and should be 
124 A V Dicey Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (10 ed, Macmillan, London 1965) 
68 n 1. In his text, Dicey quotes from Todd Parliamentary Government in the British Colonies (1880) 
192 as follows : "a Parliament cannot so bind its successors by the terms of any statute, as to limit the 
discretion of a future Parliament, and thereby disable the Legislature from entire freedom of action at 
any future time when it might be needful to invoke the interposition of Parliament to legislate for the 
f:ublic welfare." Dicey, above , 67-68 . 
25See eg Joseph, above n 13, 12,458; A Chander "Sovereignty, Referenda, and the Entrenchment of a 
United Kingdom Bill of Rights" (1991) 101 Yale L R 457, 463; Brookfield "Referendums: 
Constitutional and Legal Aspects" in Simpson, above n 10, 16-17; B Harris "Parliamentary Sovereignty 
and Interim Injunctions: Factortame and New Zealand" (1992) 15 NZULR 55, 58-59. 
126D Butler "United Kingdom" in Butler and Ranney, above n 3,218. 
127Above. 
128Above. 
129Brookfield "Referendums: Constitutional and Legal Aspects" in Simpson, above n 10, 17. For a 
fuller discussion of these conflicting views, see F Brookfield "Parliamentary Supremacy and 
Constitutional Entrenchment: A Jurisprudential Approach" (1984) 5 Otago L R 603. Double 
entrenchment means that the provision in a statute that entrenches the statute or some of its provisions 
is also entrenched. For example, section 268 of the Electoral Act 1993 entrenches certain provisions in 
the Act; however, it is not entrenched itself, which means that Parliament could repeal section 268 in 
the usual way and proceed to amend or repeal the provisions it had entrenched. For a recent discussion 
of the entrenchment provision in the Electoral Act 1993, see P Joseph "Constitutional Entrenchment 
and the MMP Referendum" (1994) 16 NZULR 67. 
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achieved through a referendum. 130 Walker, writing in an Australian context, simply 
rejects the theory of parliamentary sovereignty as being without legal foundation. 13l 
Nevertheless, aware of Dicey's support for constitutionally required referendums, he 
also argues that direct democracy is consistent with the theory. 132 
While these approaches may be useful, they have overestimated Dicey's attachment to 
the theory of parliamentary sovereignty. 133 He viewed the theory as a political 
fiction. 134 He believed that "the electorate is king" and argued that "[t]he referendum 
gives expression to the will of the people, and under any form of popular government 
the people must be treated as the sovereign, and entitled to obedience." 135 In 
accordance with this principle, Dicey advocated the establishment of a constitutionally 
required referendum to check the growth of the party system and its self-serving 
abuse of power. 136 He was particularly concerned with the progressive habit of 
governments enacting changes designed to benefit their parties but not necessarily the 
nation. 137 
Dicey viewed British constitutional history as a record of transactions by which the 
prerogatives of the Crown had been transformed into the privileges of the electors, 
who had become the true political sovereign.138 Consequently, he argued that changes 
to the constitution and its fundamental laws should not be made without the approval 
of the electors. 139 Although he believed that Parliament had the legal power to evade 
130Chander, above n 125, 473 , 480 . Once entrenched by referendum, the bill of rights would only be 
amendable by referendum. Chander, above n 125, 473. 
131Walker, above n 25 , 23 ; but see Vauxhall Estates v Liverpool Corp [1932] 1 KB 733, 743 (per Avory 
J, stating, speaking for himself, that "no Act of Parliament can effectively provide that no future Act 
shall interfere with its provisions "), 746 (per Humphreys J, withholding comment on the issue), 747 
(per MacNaghten J, withholding comment on the issue) (Div Ct); Ellen Street Estates Ltd v Minister of 
Health [1934] 1 KB 590; [1934] All ER 385,389 (per Scrutton U, stating "Parliament can alter an Act 
which it has previously passed") , 390 (per Maugham, U , stating that it is "plain that the legislature is 
unable, according to our constitution, to bind itself as to the form of subsequent legislation; it is 
impossible for Parliament to say that in a subsequent Act of Parliament dealing with this subject-matter 
shall there never be an implied repeal") , 391 (per Talbot J, agreeing) (CA). 
132Walker, above n 25, 23-24, 42. 
l33E S C Wade, Dicey's posthumous editor , chose to "eliminate all reference" to the "new constitutional 
idea of the referendum" which Dicey favoured. A V Dicey Introduction to the Study of the Law of the 
Constitution (9 ed, Macmillian, London 1952) x . As the 10th edition, above n 124, is the most easily 
obtainable of Dicey's works , Wade's editorial decision could explain how some legal scholars might 
have formed the impression that the theory of parliamentary sovereignty presents an obstacle to the 
establishment of direct democracy in Westminster systems. 
134A V Dicey "Ought the Referendum be Introduced into England?" (1890) 57 Contemp R 489, 503. 
135 A V Dicey "The Referendum and Its Critics" (1910) 212 Q R 538, 551. 
136Dicey, above, 540-541, 543 , 546-547, 552-555, 557, 559-562 (arguing for the adoption of 
constitutionally required referendums for constitutional issues and important legislation); Dicey, above 
n 134, 498, 510-511 (recommending consideration of the principle of the constitutionally required 
referendum for important legislation, but withholding a direct or decisive recommendation to adopt it). 
137Dicey, above n 135, 562; Dicey, above n 134, 510-511. 
138Dicey, above n 134, 498. 
139Dicey, above n 135, 546, 559-562. 
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his proposed Referendum Act,140 he doubted that any party leader would take the 
political risk of depriving the electors of their legal power under his proposed Act. 141 
He concluded that "[t]he latent sovereignty of Parliament is in truth an argument, not 
against, but in favour of the Referendum. ,,142 
The approaches outlined above have also assumed that the merger of representative 
and direct democracy in Westminster systems depends on finding a way to entrench 
direct democracy. Unless it can be entrenched, as Brookfield has argued, the 
participation of the electorate by referendum in law-making is necessarily by the 
grace of Parliament. 143 While this may be correct, it does not follow that direct 
democracy is inconsistent with the theory of parliamentary sovereignty, as Dicey's 
support for both demonstrates. Furthermore, Parliament can easily adopt procedural 
restrictions which would, in effect, redefme Parliament for the purpose of repealing 
or amending any direct democracy Act or any measure enacted as a result of it. For 
example, as Harnish Gray has reasoned, such an Act or measure could "be placed 
practically though not formally beyond repeal" if Parliament passed "an Act protected 
from repeal except with the assent of 90 per cent of the adult registered voters in a 
referendum. ,,144 As the Privy Council held in The Bribery Commissioner v 
Ranasinghe: 145 
140Dicey's proposed Referendum Act consisted of two provisions: 1) no Bill which repealed, changed, 
added to, or otherwise affected the Acts (of the highest importance, especially constitutionally) 
enumerated in the Schedule to the Referendum Act should become an Act of Parliament, even though 
passed by both Houses of Parliament, unless submitted to and sanctioned by a majority of the electors 
voting on the question of whether the Bill should become law; and 2) any Bill pertaining to the Acts 
enumerated in the Schedule that was not submitted to or did not receive the approval of the electors 
should be held invalid by the courts. Dicey, above n 135, 554. Dicey also recommended the 
exemption of matters of an urgent nature in which the safety of the country imperatively demanded 
raEid and immediate legislation. Dicey, above n 135, 555. 
14 Dicey, above n 135, 551. 
142Above. 
143Brookfield "Referendums: Constitutional and Legal Aspects" in Simpson, above n 10, 20. 
1~ Gray "The Sovereignty of Parliament Today" (1953) 10 U Toronto L J 54, 71-72. The New 
Zealand courts are unlikely to use the doctrine of implied repeal to negate an Act with special repeal 
provisions if Parliament were to pass a contrary enactment by simple majority. See Harris v Donges 
[1952] 2 SA 428, [1952] 1 TLR 1245 (South African Supreme Court holding that a law that failed to be 
enacted according to special majority requirements was void); Attorney-General (NSW) v Trethowan 
[1932] AC 526 (Privy Council holding that the government of NSW could be enjoined from abolishing 
the Legislative Council by ordinary legislative process because a previous Act which was still law 
required a referendum to be held before such a constitutional change could take place); but see Joseph, 
n 13, 475-476 (stating, after reviewing relevant authorities, including Harris, Trethowan, and 
Ranasinghe, below, that modes of entrenchment include referendums and special majorities in 
Parliament but that referendums requiring more than 50 percent majorities may be swept aside as 
impeding legislative power, whereas special parliamentary majorities may be upheld as binding). 
145[1964] 2 WLR 1301, [1964] 2 All ER 785. According to Gray, Ranasinghe eliminated the 
possibility of distinguishing Harris and Trethowan on the basis that they involved non-sovereign as 
opposed to sovereign legislatures . H Gray "The Sovereignty of Parliament and the Entrenchment of 
Legislative Process" (1964) 27 Modern L R 705, 708 (discussing Ranasinghe); see also Attorney-
General of Trinidad and Tobago v McLeod [1984] 1 WLR 522 (Privy Council holding an act to amend 
entrenched provisions of Constitution of Trinidad and Tobago was valid as it was passed in the manner 
and form required); but see Joseph, above n 13, at 471-472 (stating that language in Ranasinghe 
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a legislature has no power to ignore the conditions of law-making that are imposed by 
the instrument which itself regulates the power to make law. This restriction exists 
independently of the question whether a legislature is sovereign . . .. A constitution 
can indeed be altered or amended by the legislature if the regulating instrument so 
provides and if the terms of those provisions are complied with: and the alternation or 
amendment may include the change or abolition of these very provisions. The 
proposition which is not acceptable is that a legislature, once established, has some 
inherent power derived from the mere fact of its establishment, to make a valid law by 
the resolution of a bare majority which its own constituent instrument has said shall not 
be a valid law unless made by a different type of majority or by a different legislative 
process. 
In addition, the Privy Council decisions in the Canadian cases In Re The Initiative and 
Referendum Actl46 and R v Nat Bell Liquorsl47 show that the theory has had no role in 
determining the constitutional validity of direct democracy legislation or legislation 
enacted under it. In Re The Initiative, the Privy Council invalidated Manitoba's 
Initiative and Referendum Act 1916. Section 92(1) of the Constitution Act 1867 gave 
each provincial legislature in Canada the power to amend "the constitution of the 
province, except as regards the office of the Lieutenant Governor." The Act, among 
other things, allowed the electors to initiate legislation, which could, upon approval 
of the electorate, become law without the assent of the Lieutenant Governor. 148 The 
Privy Council considered this diminution in the Lieutenant Governor's role to be in 
conflict with section 92(1). Consequently, it ruled the Act invalid on the grounds that 
the Manitoba Parliament did not have the authority to enact it. 149 The Privy Council 
refused to answer the question of whether the Act was invalid because it undermined 
Parliament's primacy, which was the primary basis of the decision in the Manitoba 
Court of Appeal, 150 as it had "no relation to the real topic of controversy. ,,151 
regarding parliamentary sovereignty was dicta); Chander, above n 125, 465 (stating that Ranasinghe 
and McLeod demonstrates the Privy Council's willingness to enforce manner and form restrictions on 
colonial legislatures but that the jurisprudence is not readily transferable to the domestic UK context 
because of the absence of a rigid constitution which requires obedience and the reluctance of the courts 
to engage in any sort of judicial review of Westminster legislation). 
146[1919] AC 935; [1919] 3 WWR 1, 48 DLR 18. 
147[1922] 2 AC 128. 
148The Act allowed the electors to initiate law by a petition signed by at least eight percent of their 
number voting in the last election and presented to Legislative Assembly. If the Legislative Assembly 
did not enact the proposal, it had to be submitted to the electorate. If the electorate, by simple 
majority, approved the proposal , it became law without further action by the Legislative Assembly. It 
also allowed the electors, via a petition signed by five percent of their number voting in the last 
election, to force a referendum on any law. No Act of the Legislative Assembly could take effect for 
90 days after the session in which it was passed, unless two-thirds of the members voting declared it to 
be an emergency measure. The emergency measure clause did not apply to a Supply Bill or an 
Appropriation Act under $100,000. In Re Initiative, above n 146, 939-940. Although the Act left the 
Legislative Assembly intact and in possession of all its powers, the Act could be used to repeal or alter 
the normal representative process. More importantly, the Act gave the electors the means to 
completely by-pass the normal legislative process, including the "automatic formality" of the Lieutenant 
Governor's assent. P Hogg Constitutional Law of Canada (2 ed, Carswell, Toronto, 1985) 291. 
149In Re Initiative, above n 146, 945. 
150(1916) 27 Man R 1, [1917] WWR 1012, 32 DLR 148 (Man CA) (reversing the decision of Chief 
Justice of the Court of the King's Bench for Manitoba). 
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In Nat Bell Liquors, the Privy Council upheld Alberta's Liquor Act 1916, which was 
passed pursuant to a referendum initiated under its Direct Legislation Act 1913. 
Unlike the procedure in Manitoba, which completely by-passed the Manitoba 
Parliament, the procedure in Alberta required the Alberta Parliament to enact, without 
substantive amendment, approved referendum measures as if they were ordinary 
legislation. 152 As the Alberta Parliament had followed this procedure, the Privy 
Council reasoned: 153 
It is impossible to say that it was not an Act of the legislature, and it is none the less a 
statute because it was the statutory duty of the legislature to pass it. If the deference to 
the will of the people, which is involved in adopting without material alteration a 
measure of which the people has approved, were held to prevent it from being a 
competent Act, it would seem to follow that the legislature would only be truly 
competent to legislate either in defiance of the popular will or on subjects upon which 
the people is either wholly ignorant or indifferent. If the distinction lies in the fact that 
the will of the people has been ascertained under an Act which enables a single project 
of law to be voted on in the form of a Bill, instead of under an Act which, by regulating 
general elections, enable numerous measures to be recommended simultaneously to the 
electors, it would appear that the legislature is competent to vote as its members may be 
pledged to vote individually and in accordance with what is called an electoral 
"mandate," but it incompetent to vote in accordance with the people's wishes expressed 
in any other form. Unless the Direct Legislation Act can be shown, as it has not been 
shown on this occasion, to interfere in some way formally with the discharge of the 
functions of the legislature and of its component parts, the Liquor Act, 1916, being in 
truth an Act duly passed by the legislature of Alberta and no other, is one which must 
be enforced, unless its scope and provisions can themselves be shown to be ultra vires. 
Peter Hogg has argued that this decision violates the sovereignty of Parliament as the 
Direct Legislation Act, "as interpreted by the Privy Council, purported to tie the 
hands of future Legislatures by imposing upon them a duty to enact whatever policies 
were determined upon by the initiative and referendum process. ,,154 Ironically, his 
criticism emphasises the inconsequential role that the theory of parliamentary 
sovereignty has played in Privy Council decisions regarding direct democracy. It also 
does not acknowledge the Privy Council's implicit reliance on the manner and form 
151In Re Initiative, above n 146, 937, 945-946. In obiter dicta, the Privy Council stated that a 
legislature cannot "create and endow with its own capacity a new legislative power not created by the 
Act to which it owes its own existence." In Re Initiative, above n 146, 945 . Hogg asserts that this 
statement suggests that the Privy Council would have agreed with the Manitoba Court of Appeal's 
decision that the Act was unconstitutional on the grounds that "it invested primary powers of legislation 
in a body (the electorate) which was not a 'Legislature'" had it ruled on the question. Hogg, above n 
148,293. 
152The Act established an initiative and referendum procedure. An initiative petition containing the 
proposed measure had to be presented to the Legislative Assembly with a request to hold a referendum. 
The Assembly had to present the Bill to the electorate. If approved by the electorate, it had to be 
enacted by Parliament without substantial alteration. Nat Bell Liquor, above n 147, 339. 
153Nat Bell Liquor, above n 147, 339-340. 
15~ogg, above n 148, 294-295; but see Boyer, above n 48, 34 (stating the Act was constitutional as it 
did not alter the essential ingredients by which laws in the province were still enacted). 
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approach in reaching its decision. 155 Moreover, it overlooks the significance of 
Parliament's decision to permit referendums or to give the electors the power to 
trigger referendums. As Brookfield has observed, all of the referendums held in New 
Zealand were carried out under the authority of Parliament with no theoretical or 
practical affect on the sovereignty of Parliament. 156 
(d) Burkeian representation 
Edmund Burke has had an immense influence on the theory of representative 
democracy.157 After being safely elected to represent Bristol in 1774,158 he delivered a 
speech which is still cited by politicians to justify acting contrary to the desires of the 
constituents in their electorates. 159 Essentially, Burke declared that elected 
representatives are not delegates charged with the task of presenting the views of their 
electorate, but independent members of Parliament with the freedom and duty to 
exercise their judgment in the interests of the nation as a whole. l60 Opponents of 
direct democracy have argued that this conception of representation, which is not 
without its critics,161 would be undermined by direct democracy, as it would, in 
effect, reduce elected representatives to the status of delegates. 162 
155 After reviewing In Re Initiative, Nat Bell Liquor, and Hogg's criticism, David Conacher concluded 
that direct democracy can be established in Canada in one of two ways: 1) by following the Alberta 
system; or 2) by following the Manitoba system, adding the step that the Lieutenant Governor in 
Council has to give royal assent for the initiative to take effect, and prohibiting the initiative on certain 
subjects to ensure it is defined as a delegated power. D Conacher "Power to the People: Initiative, 
Referendum, Recall and the Possibility of Popular Sovereignty in Canada" (1991) 49 U Toronto 
Facu1ty L R 174, 189. For additional discussion of In Re Initiative and Nat Bell Liquor, see Boyer, 
above n 48, 30-37. 
156Brookfield "Referendums: Constitutional and Legal Aspects" in Simpson, above n 10, 10. In any 
case, the theory is under attack in New Zealand. See eg Joseph, above, n 13, 446-453, 458-476. 
157V Bogdanor "Introduction" in V Bogdanor (ed) Representatives of the People? (Gower, Hartshire, 
1985) 4. 
158Walker, above n 25,31. 
159See eg FAIR Newsletter No. 10 (September 1990) (quoting Mike Moore, then leader of the Labour 
Party and Prime Minister, as follows: "1 am an old-fashioned parliamentarian and draw on the system 
of Burke and Westminster, where it is said that a member of Parliament is a representative, not a 
delegate, in that of all (the) things you owe your electors, judgment is the most important ... . ") . 
According to Walker, Burke's disregard for the views of his electors generated so much criticism from 
his electors that he withdrew his re-election bid. Walker, above n 25, 31. 
I60For a reprint of Burke's speech see, M Chen and G Palmer Public Law in New Zealand: Cases, 
Materials, Commentary and Questions (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1993) 604-605. 
161 See eg R Dixon Jr Democratic Representation: Reapportionment in Law and Politics (Oxford 
University Press, London, 1968) 31 (stating that given a choice between an independent legislator and a 
delegate, the delegate must be chosen, else there is no representative function, that is, no democracy); 
Walker, above n 91,31-40. 
162See eg NZPD, vol 122, 580, 24 September 1902 (Mr Fisher) (stating, in a speech against the 
Referendum Bill, that "Burke ... teaches us that a member of Parliament should be a leader of the 
people; his prime function is to instruct and guide the people; he is to lead, and the people are to 
follow"). 
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This criticism, however, overlooks the modern reality of political party discipline, a 
phenomenon unknown to Burke. 163 In Burke's time the right to vote "was on the 
whole restricted to a comparatively small number of male property owners. ,,164 As it 
was humanly possible to develop a close relationship with constituents, Burke's 
speech appears to be calculated to free himself from the burden of doing so. Today, 
however, the main threat to a representative's independent judgment comes from his 
or her party, not his or her constituents, especially as the nominating process is 
intended to select those who will represent the interests of the party, or more 
accurately, those who control the party. 165 The typical member of Parliament, in 
Burkeian terms, is arguably no more than a delegate of the party, who is paraded into 
the House to vote as the party whips direct. 166 As direct democracy would only have 
the effect of changing the delegate's political master on occasion, Burke's theory of 
representation constitutes a spurious objection to direct democracy, especially as it 
appears to be inconsistent with the mandate theory discussed above. 167 
3 American dimension 
Although refutable, the arguments against direct democracy in the Westminster 
constitutional context provide some indication as to why New Zealand's citizens 
initiated referendum system is non-binding. The other significant factor is caution. 
New Zealand is the first Westminster system to adopt direct democracy. The advisory 
referendum approach is, as Cronin has pointed out, a prudent first step. The Swiss 
and the Californians eschewed this approach, largely because they were influenced by 
American constitutionalism. In America, Burke's theory of representation underwent 
a subtle, but important, transformation. The change was instrumental in establishing 
the philosophical foundations of the two competing constitutional responses to direct 
democracy in Switzerland and California. 
163Bogdanor, above n 157, 3 -4 . 
l~ogdanor, above n 157, 4. 
165See above. 
166See H Clark "No to PR, Yes to Parliamentary Reform" The Evening Post, Wellington, New 
Zealand, 6 January 1992, 5; Address by Michael Laws, Member of Parliament for Hawke's Bay, 
Commonwealth Press Editors' Conference, Wellington (6 June 1991); M Gobbi "The Trial of Socrates: 
A Matter of Conscience (Is the Party Whip System Justifiable?)" NZU 451 (December 1988). 
167See Walker, above n 25, 30. 
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(a) Madisonian representation 
Madison refmed Burke's theory by linking it with the idea of protecting minority 
rights. He believed that the purpose of representation was: 168 
to refme and enlarge the public views, by passing them through the medium of a chosen 
body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interests of their country, and 
whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or 
partial considerations. 
As Madison believed that direct democracy could only be feasible in small 
communities, as in tl.Ie ancient city states where citizens voted and simple majority 
rule held sway, he rejected it as inapplicable to a country as vast as the United 
States. 169 More importantly, as Adrienne Koch has summarised, Madison believed 
that simple majority rule would be: 170 
pernicious wherever it might be applied because of its failure to provide protection for 
the rights of minorities. He distrusted this simple or direct democracy for its minimal 
use of deliberative judgment, exercised in a favoring atmosphere of limited powers with 
opportunities for debating, rethinking, and reasonably deciding intricate issues of 
moment. At the mercy of this type of simple direct democracy were especially the 
propertied few (compared to the propertyless many) and wise and honest leaders who 
would tend to be cast aside in favor of demagogues who would be prepared, at the first 
opportunity, to emerge in the true colors of despots. 
Madison's refmement constitutes a more serious objection to direct democracy than 
Burke's theory of representation, as it strikes at the heart of democratic constitutional 
theory. For this reason, his concern still constitutes the principle argument against 
direct democracy. It also explains why the direct democracy devices in Switzerland, 
California, and New Zealand are structured in ways that limit their majoritarian 
potential, as Parts II, III, and IV reveal. 
(b) Jeffersonian democracy 
The logical extension of Madisonian representation IS that the so-called common 
citizen should never be allowed to participate in the exercise of governmental power. 
Jefferson anticipated this consequence in letter he wrote to Madison from Paris in 
1787, in which he warned against giving government too great a role in determining 
the affairs of the people as it would be oppressive. 171 As Cronin has written, 
Jefferson, like Jean-Jacques Rousseau before him,172 believed that: 173 
168The Federalist No. 10 (J Madison). 
169Koch "Introduction" in Notes to Debates, above n 71, xix. 
170Above; see also A Toffler The Third Wave (Pan Books, London, 1981) 438. 
l7lCronin, above n 43, 40. 
172Rousseau disapproved of nations which delegated their sovereignty to representatives: "By dint of 
laziness and money, they fmally have soldiers to enslave the country and representatives to sell it. ... 
The English people thinks it is free. It greatly deceives itself; it is free only during the election of the 
members of Parliament. As soon as they are elected, it is a slave, it is nothing. Given the use made of 
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the will of the people is the only legitimate foundation of any government; even a 
deficient popular government was preferable to the most glorious autocratic one. Of 
course, people who rule themselves may commit errors, but they have means of 
correcting them. He had enormous confidence in the common sense of mankind in 
general. As long as citizens were informed, they could be trusted with their own 
governance. 
Jefferson, unlike most of his associates , was more willing to trust in the wisdom of 
the people.174 His deep suspicion of government lent support to his position. 17S 
Fundamentally, he believed that people had the capacity to govern themselves. 176 This 
idea, while not an endorsement of direct democracy, 177 has become the philosophical 
basis upon which most arguments for direct democracy are based, particularly as 
developed later by Andrew Jackson, then the Populists, the Progressives, and fInally 
the latter-day participatory democrats. 178 Essentially, faith in Madisonian 
representation as a bulwark against "the tyranny of majority factionalism" has waned 
in the face of a "consequent impatience with all forms of indirect or attenuated 
representation, ,,179 especially as people have become more informed and technology 
has made their participation easier. 180 
Nevertheless, many of those following Jefferson have not lost sight of Madison's 
central concern regarding the protection of minority rights. 181 The founders of direct 
democracy in Switzerland, California, and New Zealand were aware of, and took 
steps, to counter-balance the majoritarian potential of the systems they established, as 
Parts II, III, and IV show. 
these brief moments of freedom, the people certainly deserve to lose it." J Rousseau On the Social 
Contract with Geneva Manuscript and Political Economy (trans, St Martin's Press, New York, 1978) 
102; see also Oberholtzer, above n 104, 2-3. 
l73Cronin, above n 43, 40. 
174Cronin, above n 43 , 37,40. 
17SSee Cronin, above n 43, 40. 
176Dixon, above n 161, 42. 
177Cronin, above n 43,40. 
178Cronin, above n 43, 37; Dixon, above n 161, 42; see also eg, D Kramer Participatory Democracy 
(Schenkman, Cambridge, Mass, 1972); L Tallian Direct Democracy (People's Lobby, Los Angeles, 
1977); B Barber Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age (University of California 
Press, Berkeley, 1984); P McGuigan The Politics of Direct Democracy in the 1980s: Case Studies in 
Popular Decision Making (Institute for Government and Politics, Washington, DC, 1985). 
179Dixon, above n 161 , 42. 
1BOBernard Robertson has argued that information technology has solved many of the practical problems 
which required the selection of representatives; therefore, citizens are now obliged to take a more 
active part in decision-making. B Robertson "Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand" 
NZU 213 (June 1993) . 
181Dixon, above n 161, 42. 
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IV ASSESSMENT 
Walker views the struggle for direct democracy as part of an age-long conflict 
between the philosophical traditions represented by Madison and Jefferson, 
respectively. It pits aristocrats against democrats, the party of the elite against the 
party of the people. 182 According to Walker, elites, throughout history, have 
embraced and discarded theory after theory to justify denying access to the legislative 
process by the presumably incompetent masses. 183 Rousseau's theories were startling, 
and led to tremendous upheaval, as they constituted a protest against the monarchal 
forms that supported elites nearly everywhere in his day.l84 As "vague and fanciful" 
as it may have been, the philosophical movement led by Rousseau was, as 
Oberholtzer has noted, an "appeal for a new political order, in which the people 
would receive back their own from unauthorized agents who had got into control of 
the machinery of government and maintained themselves there through the complexity 
of the political organization. ,,1 85 
However, as Oberholtzer and Cronin point out, not even Rousseau, who spoke of 
primary assemblies as the ideal in government, believed that Paris or France could be 
ruled by town meeting. 186 As modern ballot systems had not yet been devised, "the 
people were still to act through representatives, albeit as a necessary evil from which 
it was thought there could be no escape, at any rate in populous countries of a large 
territorial area. ,,187 Even Walker, despite the revolution in communication 
technologies and his commitment to the party of the people, believes that the initiative 
and referendum are simply valuable supplements to representative democracy. 188 
David Magleby sums up the position as follows: 189 
Proponents of both direct democracy and representative democracy share an important 
common ground: they agree that most of the business of governing cannot be done 
directly by the people but must be delegated to elected representatives. The initiative 
and referendum process, even at best, is a complement to the legislative process . 
182Walker, above n 51, 13; Walker, above n 25, 3-4 (stating that the debate regarding direct democracy 
boils down to those who want government by the people and those who want rule by the elite). For a 
tabular summary of the key elements of the competing views, see Cronin, above n 43, 249. 
183See Walker, above n 25, 177, 180-181, 187-189, 197. 
184See Oberholtzer, above n 104, 390. 
185 Above. 
186Above; Cronin, above n 43 , 39. 
1870berholtzer, above n 104, 390. 
18Bwalker, above n 25, 2 (arguing that the initiative and the referendum are the means to take 
controversial issues out of the hands of extremists, pressure groups, and power elites thereby allowing 
the common sense and moderation of the electorate acting as a whole to prevail); see also Butler and 
Ranney, above n 3, 29 (stating that the Progressives viewed direct democracy as a means of enriching 
the political process). 
189Magleby, above n 28,2. 
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Cronin has articulated a hybrid model of democracy that explains direct democracy's 
attraction as a complementary supplement to representative democracy. In his view, 
people value representative institutions and want their representatives to make the vast 
majority of laws. They also value majority rule, but understand the need to protect 
minority rights most of the time, which accounts for the general acceptance of the 
safeguards regulating the majoritarian potential of direct democracy devices. 
Although people want to improve the legislative process, they also want to vote 
occasionally on policy issues, particularly on matters that concern them directly. 
Having ease of access to the legislative process is no less important than actually 
participating in it. While they trust their representatives most of the time, they 
distrust the concentration of power in anyone institution. They are also interested in 
opening up the legislative process to lessen the influence of secrecy, money, and 
single-interest groups. 190 
This model accounts for the general support for both representative and direct 
democracy where they co-exist, the acceptance of limitations on direct democracy 
devices, and the general lack of interest in creating teledemocracies enabling routine 
public participation. The model also reconciles the competing philosophical traditions 
on which most of the arguments for and against direct democracy are based. 
Provided minority rights are protected sufficiently, Jeffersonian-inspired advocates of 
direct democracy should not offend adherents of representative democracy, whether 
Burkeian or Madisonian in its conception. 
The model also explains why reformers in Switzerland, California, and New Zealand 
embraced direct democracy as a means of improving, not displacing, representative 
democracy. As the underlying constitutional principles upon which the model is 
based vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, it also provides the basis for 
understanding why representative and direct democracy have merged differently in 
Switzerland, California, and New Zealand and why the direct democracy devices in 
these jurisdictions differ . 
190Cronin, above n 43 , 249-250. 
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PART II: SWITZERLAND 
42 
3 
ORIGIN OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN SWITZERLAND 
The constitutional initiative, legislative initiative, and legislative referendum 
originated in Switzerland after extensive experience with government controlled and 
constitutionally required referendums. St Gall established the legislative referendum 
in 1831, and Vaud founded the legislative initiative in 1845. These innovations, 
which coincided with a widespread disenchantment with representative democracy, 
spread quickly to other Swiss cantons. Eventually, the Swiss Democrats, who were 
behind the push for direct democracy on the cantonal level, were successful in 
establishing the constitutional initiative and the legislative referendum on the federal 
level. A cumbersome version of the constitutional initiative appeared in the 
Constitution of 1848. The legislative referendum appeared alongside this device in 
the Constitution of 1874. In 1891, the Swiss amended the Constitution of 1874 to add 
a more flexible version of the constitutional initiative. 
The Swiss initially embraced these direct democracy devices as a solution to the 
problems associated with representative democracy in Switzerland during the 
industrial revolution, particularly the advent of elected representatives dedicated to 
furthering the economic interests of their class . The installation of these devices on 
the federal level ended a short-lived experiment with a pure liberal representative 
democracy modelled after the United States constitutional system. The experiment 
failed largely because it ignored Swiss constitutional history, especially its emphasis 
on local autonomy and direct participation in the exercise of governmental power. 
Swiss history is well-chronicled. However, the development of the initiative and 
referendum, as well as their inclusion in the Constitution of 1874, has escaped 
comprehensive treatment. Simon Deploige, John Vincent, Francis Adams, and E 
Bonjour provide the most informative accounts, such as they are, in works published 
between 1889 and 1922.1 This subject, when it is treated at all by subsequent 
scholars, is generally dealt with in a cursory or fragmentary fashion. 2 However, an 
IS Deploige The Referendum in Switzerland (trans, Longmans, Green & Co, London, 1898); J Vincent 
State and Federal Government of Switzerland (John Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1891); F Adams and C 
Cunningham The Swiss Confederation (Macmillan & Co, London, 1889); E Bonjour, HOffler and G 
Potter A Short History of Switzerland (Oxford University Press, London, 1952). 
2See generally eg W Martin Switzerland: From Roman Times to the Present (Ekek Books, London, 
1971); G Thurer Free and Swiss: The Story of Switzerland (adapted & trans, Oswald Wolff, London, 
1970); W Oechsli History of Switzerland: 1499-1914 (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1922); 
see also J Steinberg "Imitations of Switzerland: Historical Reflections" (1988) 23 Gov't & Opp 13. 
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understanding of the factors which led to the inclusion of the constitutional initiative 
and the legislative referendum in the Constitution of 1874 is vital to understanding 
their role in the Swiss constitutional system. It is also vital to understanding the 
appeal of direct democracy to reformers in California and New Zealand. 
To provide this understanding, this chapter identifies the factors which converged to 
produce and develop direct democracy in Switzerland. It accomplishes this task by 
tracing the origin of direct democracy in Switzerland. It begins with a discussion of 
the geographical, economic, and political factors existing in Switzerland prior to the 
creation of the modem Swiss state. It then examines the forces which led to the 
formation of the Swiss Confederation and influenced its evolution. Finally, it 
discusses the circumstances which led the Swiss to produce the Constitutions of 1848 
and 1874 and to incorporate the constitutional initiative and legislative referendum 
into their federal constitutional system. 
I PRE-CONFEDERATION (400 to 1291) 
The development of the constitutional initiative, legislative initiative, and legislative 
referendum in Switzerland is intimately related to the country's constitutional history, 
which begins with the seeds of Swiss political unity. Swiss political unity evolved 
from a peculiar set of geographical, economic, social, and political circumstances 
extant in the Alpine communities of central Switzerland after the fall of the Roman 
Empire. 3 
A Teutonic and Lombardian Influences 
Long before the Swiss Confederation came into existence, the Romans had governed 
the Celtic tribes inhabiting the Alpine province known as Helvetia. In the early 400s, 
however, Teutonic invaders partially destroyed this Romanic civilisation. The Celts, 
Romans, and Teutonic invaders intermingled with Lombardian and Illyrian tribes that 
came from the south, and Latinised Burgundians who ventured into the region from 
the west. 4 This blend of diverse cultures in the Alpine regions affected Switzerland's 
constitutional development. Both the Teutonic and Lombardian influences were 
especially important. 
For a Marxist view of Switzerland's development and institutions, see J Ziegler Switzerland Exposed 
(Allison & Busby, London, 1978). 
3See J Steinberg Why Switzerland? (University of Cambridge Press, Cambridge, 1976) 11. 
4F de Salis Switzerland and Europe: Essays and Reflections (trans, Oswald Wolff, London, 1971) 19-
20. 
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By settling in Helvetia, particularly in the valleys of Uri, Schwyz, and Unterwalden, 
the Teutonic invaders, who customarily decided all vital questions at popular 
assemblies, laid the foundations of Switzerland's existing political institutions. They 
organised their conquest by dividing the land into districts among elected chieftains. 
These districts were subdivided into 'hundreds', which were governed by counts. 
When the Franks conquered the region in the 500s, they made the chieftains dukes of 
the Merovigian Empire. In the early 800s, when Helvetia became part of the Holy 
Roman Empire, Charlemagne instituted a system whereby the districts were ruled by 
governors appointed by royal warrant instead of by election. The district governors 
administered the law under the oversight of royal commissioners. In the hundreds, 
however, the counts continued to hold court upon minor offences with the whole body 
of citizens assembled about them as judges and jury. Uri, Schwyz, and Unterwalden 
were hundreds within the Helvetian district of Thurgau, which originally included all 
the north eastern and central part of Switzerland. 5 
The Lombardians also influenced the inhabitants of Uri, Schwyz, and Unterwalden. 
For centuries, the mountaineers were primarily oriented toward Italy, which affected 
both their political and religious outlook. From the 1100s they received news of 
events in Italy from merchants, clerics, and muleteers who travelled across central 
Switzerland via the newly opened Gotthard Pass. These travellers inspired the 
mountaineers with reports of the Lombard League, an oath-based alliance of 
Lombardy's free urban communities. In 1183, Emperor Friedrich Barbarossa 
acknowledged the Lombard League after he had failed to subdue it. As Uri, Schwyz, 
and Unterwalden maintained friendly relations with the Lombard League, its initial 
success provided them with an influential precedent for their initial defensive alliance 
in 1291,6 from which the modem Swiss state evolved. 7 
B Economic and Political Factors 
Unique economic and political factors combined with these influences to produce 
institutions of collective, communal self-government in Uri, Schwyz, and 
Unterwalden. In economic terms, Alpine conditions promoted communal enterprise. 
For example, raising cattle in the region resulted in common pastures, common 
marketing of animal and dairy products, and common activity on important passes and 
roads. Communal enterprise eventually led the inhabitants to organise themselves into 
extended valley communes. These soon became unified, enclosed cooperatives with 
5Vincent, above n 1, 4; J Herold The Swiss Without Halos (Columbia University Press, New York, 
1948) 116. 
6Herold, above n 5, 117; see also D de Rougemont and C Muret The Heart of Europe (1941) 37. 
7See J Steiner Amicable Agreement Versus Majority Rule: Conflict Resolution in Switzerland (trans, rev 
ed, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1974) 264. 
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common interests regulated by a common administration in the 1100 and 1200s. Even 
where, as was frequently the case, a valley was subject to noble or clerical lords, 
these communities remained non-hierarchical and undivided, that is , non-feudal in 
character. 8 
The commune affected Switzerland's constitutional development in several ways. 
First, it provided a model for democratic organisation. The commune's limited area 
was an ideal environment for direct participation in government. Each citizen 
personally took part in all decisions concerning the commune; the people directly 
appointed the members of all administrative bodies . Commune members had the 
opportunity to discuss , assess, and decide issues , and to personally experience the 
consequences of their decisions. Second, as an assemblage of individuals and families 
inhabiting a defmed territory with common interests regulated by a common 
administration, the commune served as an influential precedent for cantonal, then 
federal administration. Third, the commune provided an organised centre of 
resistance to feudalism, which contributed largely to the foundation of Swiss political 
liberties and to the creation of the Swiss Confederation. The Swiss trace both their 
unity and their political liberties to the independence of the early Alpine communes. 9 
The political interplay of feudalism and the Church in the Alpine regions between 900 
and 1200 also fostered the autonomy of Uri, Schwyz, and Unterwalden. Feudalism 
had changed and complicated land ownership; lordship of the districts and hundreds 
had become hereditary in different families. Many small owners put themselves under 
the protection of powerful lords or in feudal relation to the monasteries. Since the late 
800s, Uri was a fief of the Abbey of Zurich, which gave Uri immunity from the 
jurisdiction of the district governor and the local count. Consequently, Uri enjoyed 
the milder rule of the monastic officials and, later, the direct protection of the 
Emperor, who appointed the advocate who oversaw the Abbey's possessions. The 
arrangement allowed the inhabitants of Uri to form the "Community of the People of 
Uri ," which regulated all matters pertaining to their common pastures and 
woodlands . 10 
8Steinberg, above n 3, 11 ; see also Adams, above n 1, 99. The general movement of trade through 
Switzerland's 22 major and 31 minor passes produced a wave of urban foundations , a struggle between 
the various existing cities, their feudal overlords , and the valley cooperatives for control of customs, 
tolls , and carrying trade along the routes. This trade, and its accompanying struggle, contributed to the 
political independence of the Alpine communities by weakening customary relationships. Steinberg, 
above n 3, 11-12. 
9 A Siegfried Switzerland: A Democratic Way of Life (Jonathan Cape, London, 1950) 129-130; Adams, 
above n 1, 98-99. 
IOVincent, above n 1, 4-5. 
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Schwyz also managed to preserve its valley cooperative, which owned its own land 
and made its own local laws. However, its external political status was not as 
desirable as Uri's . Schwyz was under the protection of overlords and, as a result, far 
removed from the Emperor's direct authority. Unterwalden was in a similar position, 
except that ownership of land was more divided up among monasteries and nobles. In 
addition, Unterwalden had fewer free farmers than Schwyz. Small land owners in 
Schwyz and Unterwalden were constantly threatened by the prospect that their 
overlords would deprive them of their remaining rights by acquiring territorial 
ownership of their land. lI 
The scope of law-making in Uri, Schwyz, and Unterwalden at this time went little 
beyond the concerns of their common farming and pasturage. Popular rights were 
really expressed in the application of law, that is, by participating as judges or jury 
members in local trials. In this regard, the mountaineers jealously guarded ancient 
usages and resented foreign interference. More importantly, their common interests 
and occasional assemblies promoted a sense of mutual dependence which became the 
glue that held the Swiss Confederation together in the centuries ahead. In addition, 
their local agricultural freedom contained the seeds of greater political liberty; it 
supplied both the instinct and the experience required for action when the time came. 12 
The time for action was hastened at the beginning of the 1200s when the Duke of 
Zahringen gained hereditary possession of the combined offices of the Count of 
Zurichgau, now partitioned out of Thurgau, and the Advocate for the Abbey of 
Zurich. This development brought Uri, Schwyz, and Unterwalden under the control 
of the same overlord, but with far different relations . In Uri the Duke only exercised 
a general superintendence through a sub-advocate, while in Schwyz and Unterwalden 
he administered the laws through his Hapsburg vassals, to whom he had previously 
awarded offices of count as hereditary fiefs. This situation increased the concern that 
feudal serfdom would gradually displace the local liberties of the people. This threat 
was temporarily arrested in 1218 when the House of Zahringen became extinct and its 
fiefs reverted to the Emperor. 13 
The disappearance of the House of Zahringen coincided with two important 
developments: a decline in the power of the Holy Roman Empire and the rise of the 
House of Hapsburg. The Holy Roman Empire was torn by strife between the 
partisans of the Pope and the Emperor. 14 The long running struggle between the 
IIYincent, above n 1, 5. see also Adams , above n 1, 3. 
12Yincent, above n 1, 5-6. 
13Yincent, above n 1, 6. 
I~ougemont, above n 6, 36. In the 1200s the Holy Roman Empire was a vast construction which 
bound together semi-sovereign states of various kinds: kingdoms, duchies , bishoprics, knight holdings, 
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Hohenstaufen Emperors and the Popes accelerated the development of political 
autonomy in Uri, Schwyz, and Unterwalden. The conflict had placed Friedrich II, the 
last Hohenstaufen Emperor, in desperate fInancial straits, which robbed him of both 
the power to defend the Alpine communes and the means to force them to remain 
subservient. Initially, this simply forced each community to assume a greater burden 
for its own defence and government. However, these communes eventually gained 
responsibility for local law enforcement, which, in effect, freed them from Imperial 
control. 15 
The Holy Roman Empire was also threatened by the conflict inherent in the growth of 
the liberal movement in the communes of northern Italy, Flanders and France, and the 
ambitions of powerful feudal houses, particularly the House of Hapsburg, whose lands 
were constantly extending in the Alpine region. The growth in Hapsburg territorial 
ownership was of concern to both the mountaineers and the Emperor. The road over 
the Gotthard passed fIrst through the valley of Uri, then through the territory of 
Schwyz. It was vital to the Emperor that this pass not fall into Hapsburg hands, 
because the Hapsburgs were, at the time, supporting the Pope in the struggle against 
the Emperor. 16 As the mountaineers dreaded the oppressive grasp of the Hapsburgs, 17 
Uri, Schwyz, and Unterwalden offered their allegiance to the Emperor in exchange 
for the preservation of their liberties and new found independence. 18 The Emperor, 
anxious to preserve free passage for himself over the strategic Alpine passes, saw that 
it was in his interest to give the mountaineers what they wanted. 19 Uri forced the 
Emperor's hands in 1231 when it purchased back the overlordship of its valley, which 
had been pawned.20 Henri, the Emperor's son and Vicar, granted Uri Imperial 
Immediacy, which freed Uri from the control of feudal overlords and placed it in 
direct dependence on the Empire. 21 
The situation was somewhat different in Schwyz and Unterwalden. The Emperor 
hesitated for nine years before he decreed that they should be given the same status as 
Uri, that is, imperial fIefs governed by imperial advocates .22 The Emperor's 
reluctance may have been generated by the Hapsburgs' feudal rights in Schwyz and 
Unterwalden. The Hapsburg had long held the offIces of count in these valleys. 
and free cities . It comprised roughly the greater part of the German-speaking territories of Europe, and 
also a large part of Italy. Above. 
15Steinberg, above n 3, 12-13; G Codding The Federal Government of Switzerland (Houghton Mifflin 
Co, Boston, 1961) 20. 
16Rougemont, above n 6,36-37. 
17Rougemont, above n 6,36. 
I 8Steinberg , above n 3, 12; Codding, above n 15, 20. 
19Rougemont, above n 6,37. 
20Steinberg, above n 3, 13. 
21 Above; Rougemont, above n 6, 37. 
22Steinberg, above n 3, 13; Vincent, above n 1, 6. 
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Changing the status of the valleys to imperial fiefs would make the Hapsburgs 
imperial instead of feudal administrators. However, this would give the people the 
right to appeal directly to the Emperor in the case of misgovernment.23 The Emperor 
must have realised that this would give him a tighter reign on Hapsburg conduct in the 
Alpine region. In 1240 he granted charters to Schwyz and Unterwalden that made 
them free communities within the Empire.24 
During this period, Uri, Schwyz, and Unterwalden experienced a growth in the 
importance of their valley cooperatives . In Uri, for example, the valley cooperative 
had become a well-established community of largely free peasants under the direction 
of several powerful families. 25 In the 1230s, they began holding a popular assembly 
called Landsgemeinde which, given the growing necessity for self-government, passed 
legislation, selected leaders , and elected judges.26 The Landsgemeinde can be traced 
to Teutonic popular assemblies in which tribes decided all vital issues facing them. 27 
It gave full citizens among the mountaineers the opportunity to participate directly in 
the exercise of governmental power. While gathered together, they decided on 
legislative proposals and resolutions , usually by a show of hands . They were also 
entitled to present legislative proposals . 28 
The initiative and referendum are the successors of the Landsgemeinde, 29 the means by 
which the participatory principles of the Landsgemeinde were adapted to larger 
populations and larger geographical areas .30 In addition, the Landsgemeinde is the 
foundation of Switzerland's existing constitutional system. It is based on the 
"assumption that ultimately the ideal state is the direct democracy or the 
Landsgemeinde, the assembly of all the free citizens in the historic ring. This, the 
23Vincent, above n 1, 6. 
24Steinberg, above n 3, 13; Codding, above n 15, 20. 
25Steinberg, above n 3, 13. 
26Steinberg, above n 3, 73 ; Salis , above n 4 , 22. The literature setting forth early Swiss history uses 
following terms, sometimes interchangeably, to designate the common administrations governing the 
communes and valley cooperatives : Markgenossenschaften , Talgenossenschaften , and Landsgemeinden. 
Literally each term refers to something different. A Markgenossenschaft is a rural association, a term 
which probably originally referred to the commune alone , but is now used to refer to the valley 
cooperative as well . A Talgenossenschaft is a valley cooperative. A Landsgemeinde is a popular 
assembly, but the term is often used to refer to the administration of pre-Landsgemeinde periods, most 
likely the valley cooperative. Since the commune led to the development of valley cooperative and the 
cooperative led to the creation of the Landsgemeinde, the terms can be considered synonyms in an 
evolutionary sense. However, only the term Landsgemeinde, or its plural Landsgemeinden, is used in 
this thesis. 
27Herold, above n 5, 41 , 116. 
28Bonj our , above n 1, 300. For a fuller discussion of the operation of the Landsgemeinde, see 
Deploige, above n 1, 3-18. 
29 Above. 
30D Butler and A Ranney Referendums: A Comparative Study of Theory and Practice (American 
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington DC, 1978) 6. 
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pure form, not the clauses of a constitution or its preamble, is the truly venerable 
element in Swiss political life. 1131 
C The Pact of 1291 
These factors led to the creation of the Swiss Confederation in 1291. In 1250, with 
the death of Emperor Friedrich II, the Hapsburgs once again threatened the political 
independence and freedom of Uri, Schwyz, and Unterwalden. After a long and 
bitterly fought succession struggle, Rudolf of Hapsburg was elected Emperor in 1273. 
This placed both imperial and feudal overlordship over the Alpine valleys into his 
hands, which gave him a dangerous combination of governmental power. While 
Rudolf immediately confIrmed the imperial relationship of Uri, he deferred deciding 
the status of Schwyz and Unterwalden without directly refusing to renew the 
privileges granted by Friedrich II. Mindful of the Gotthard route to Lombardy, 
Rudolf began to increase his holdings in central Switzerland and to exercise his feudal 
rights more actively. 32 The mountaineers believed Rudolf's objective was to gain, by 
gradual usurpation, the territorial lordship over the valleys and to add them to the 
increasing hereditary possessions of his family. Rudolf's purchase of Lucerne and 
many small landed properties scattered over Uri, Schwyz, and Unterwalden, along 
with the imposition of foreign bailiffs and higher taxes confIrmed their suspicions. 33 
Rudolf exacerbated the situation by dying in 1291 without confIrming the status of 
Schwyz and Unterwalden. 34 Seventeen days after his death, to prevent further loss of 
liberty at the hands of his heir, Albrecht, whose character did not inspire hope of 
better treatment,35 Uri, Schwyz, and Unterwalden entered into a Pact, which is now 
recognised as the genesis of present day Switzerland. 36 To resist Hapsburg claims, 
and to prevent conflicts among themselves, the representatives of the three valleys 
formed a league of mutual aid, swearing eternal fealty in a famous oath taken on the 
Rutli Meadow in 1291.37 "Nothing united them, but the common will to defend their 
liberties. 1138 The object of the Pact of 1291 was not total independence of all outside 
domination, but the preservation of their direct connection with the empire and long 
accustomed local rights. 39 A central feature of the Pact was the refusal of Uri, 
31 Steinberg , above n 3, 72-73. 
32Codding, above n IS , 20. 
33Yincent, above n I, 7. 
34Above; Codding, above n IS, 20. 
35Yincent, above n I , 7. 
36Salis, above n 4, 21. 
37Steinberg, above n 3, 13. 
38H Kohn Nationalism and Liberty: The Swiss Example (reprint 1958 ed, Greenword Press, Westport, 
Connecticut, 1978) 18. 
39Yincent, above n I, 7; Adams, above n I, 3; Steinberg, above n 3, 14. 
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Schwyz, and Unterwalden to accept any judge or, by implication, any law not of their 
own making.40 
The alliance between Uri, Schwyz, and Unterwalden was only one among hundreds of 
similar alliances concluded in Italy and elsewhere. However, it was the only one that 
survived the pan-European trend toward monarchy to form the basis of a genuine 
State. Uri, Schwyz, and Unterwalden alone preserved their civic liberties by 
successfully opposing the absolutist forces consuming the rest of Europe. In addition 
to securing their right of self-determination, their tenacious struggle encouraged the 
growth of the Swiss Confederation, which became the only democratic institution to 
survive the conflicts which took place in the late Middle Ages. Elsewhere the battles 
waged for liberty by the peasants of western Europe were defeated.41 
II SWISS CONFEDERATION (1291 to 1798) 
Throughout most of its existence the Swiss Confederation was little more than a 
military alliance of sovereign states called cantons . Initially it served to secure local 
independence for Uri, Schwyz, and Unterwalden. Its growth from three to 13 cantons 
by 1513 came about primarily for military reasons. Each canton saw the 
Confederation as a means of resisting foreign domination and preserving local 
autonomy. The autonomy of each canton within the Confederation distinguished it 
from other European political groupings. It also affected Switzerland's constitutional 
development in two important ways. First, it allowed the Swiss42 to escape the full 
consequences of three characteristic European trends: centralisation, nationalism, and 
religious conflict,43 which allowed pluralism to flourish. Second, the shared 
experiences and common interests of the Swiss paradoxically promoted a sense of 
unity while reinforcing local independence, particularly a brand of cantonal 
sovereignty that derived its legitimacy from the citizenry. In their struggle to protect 
their local independence from Hapsburg aggression, the cantons developed a 
republican statecraft which made an enormous contribution to the evolution of the 
consultative principles underlying Switzerland's constitutional system. 
4OSteinberg, above n 3, 13 . 
4lRougemont, above n 6, 37-39. 
42During this period the mountaineers and their confederate allies began to identify themselves as Swiss . 
Salis, above n 4, 25. 
43Steinberg, above n 3, 6. Paradoxically, pan-European economic problems triggered by shortages of 
silver, debasement of coins, lower crop yields, and the black death strengthened the Swiss tendency to 
deviate from European norms. Steinberg, above n 3, 15-16. 
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A Securing Local Independence through Unity 
The Hapsburg response to the Pact of 1291 had the ironic effect of securing the local 
independence of the Swiss. Although Albrecht reacted by marching on Zurich, the 
election of his rival, Adolf of Nassau, as Emperor, gave Uri, Schwyz, and 
Unterwalden a reprieve from Hapsburg intervention. Adolf encouraged their 
independence by leaving them to themselves and by renewing, in 1297, the privileges 
granted by Friedrich II. However, the Hapsburg threat was renewed when Adolf was 
killed in battle in 1298 and Albrecht succeeded him. 44 
Albrecht outraged the mountaineers with tyrannical measures of government. He 
lumbered them with overbearing bailiffs who acted as if they were overseers of 
Hapsburg private estates, rather than governors of imperial fiefs. The bailiffs also 
angered the Swiss by violating both the written privileges of the cantons and the 
commonest laws of justice. 45 Exasperated, the Swiss resolved in 1307 to expel their 
oppressors and to recover their ancient rights. 46 Upon news of Albrecht's murder in 
1308 the confederates drove out the despised bailiffs. The new Emperor, Heinrich 
VII, who was not a Hapsburg, assisted the Swiss in their struggle by confirming their 
imperial independence. He also gave them freedom from the jurisdiction of any court 
outside their territory, except the royal tribunal. 47 
Heinrich's death in 1314 triggered a succession battle between Ludwig V of Bavaria 
and the Hapsburg Friedrich III of Austria. As natural enemies of the Hapsburgs, the 
Swiss sided with Ludwig, a decision which led them into battle against the Hapsburgs 
at the narrow defile of Morgarten in 1315. The outnumbered mountaineers surprised 
and routed the invading forces. 48 Their knowledge and understanding of Switzerland's 
Alpine environment gave them a decisive advantage. Foreign control of the Swiss 
communities required the impossible: occupation of hundreds of valleys, villages, and 
communes spread over thousands of mountainous square miles. The demanding 
environment in which the Swiss earned their living also gave them an advantage in 
strength and stamina, which made them formidable opponents in warfare. 49 
In the wake their victory, the Swiss renewed the Pact of 1291 with an important 
amendment: they stipulated that no member of the Swiss Confederation could submit 
44yincent, above n 1, 8. For a comprehensive list of the names and dates of the kings of Germany, see 
Meyers Grosses Handlexikon (Bibliogrphisches Institut Mannheim, WieniZurich, 1985) 186. 
45Yincent, above n 1, 8. 
46Adams, above n 1, 3-4. 
47Yincent, above n 1, 8-9. 
48W Rappard Collective Security in Swiss Experience: 1291-1948 (George Allen & Unwin, London, 
1948) 5. 
49Steinberg, above n 3, 14-15. 
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to an overlord or negotiate with a foreign power without the consent of the others. 50 
Ludwig V rewarded their support by confIrming their imperial status in 1316.51 In 
1324, he strengthened their independence by declaring the manorial and feudal rights 
of Friedrich ill forfeited to the Crown, and the tenants of his lands free imperial 
citizens. This removed most of the inequalities existing between the inhabitants of 
Uri, Schwyz, and Unterwalden. It also allowed them to displace the jurisdiction of 
the manor courts with their common law and customs. Both developments secured, at 
the expense of the Hapsburgs, the local independence of the Swiss and enhanced the 
sense of unity among the cantons. 52 
B Pluralistic Nature of the Confederation 
The Confederation's origin was due not to an imposed, systematic, and rationalised 
plan for a federated states, but to a collective grassroots phenomenon,53 which, when 
it grew, contributed to the pluralistic nature of the Confederation. The desire for 
local independence brought Uri, Schwyz, and Unterwalden together. 54 The Swiss had 
united to remain free. 55 Their wish to preserve local independence fuelled the growth 
of the Confederation,56 primarily because the geography of the Alps required further 
expansion for security reasons. The resulting diversity militated against the formation 
of a strong centralised government, which ultimately led to the demise of the 
Confederation. However, it enhanced the Swiss orientation toward local autonomy. 
1 Unplanned growth of the Confederation 
The Confederation grew without forethought as to its structure; its growth was based 
on military considerations. For example, Lucerne was strategically important to Uri, 
Schwyz, and Unterwalden because it commanded the approaches of the Gotthard Pass 
and possessed a respected armed force. 57 Lucerne found the defensive potential of the 
Confederation attractive as it was eager to protect itself against the abuses of 
50Vincent, above n 1, 9. 
51Rappard, above n 48,6. 
52Vincent, above n 1, 9. 
53Rougemont, above n 6,39. 
54yincent, above n 1, 29. 
55Rougemont, above n 6, 39. They also wanted the right to elect their own judges and to levy dues on 
trade in transit through their territory. Initially, however, the Confederation was just a part of a 
medieval pan-European communal movement. Its original members did no more than claim greater 
administrative autonomy, and defend themselves against those who would subjugate them. It took on a 
£olitical hue when the city cantons began to join it. Salis, above n 4, 21. 
6See Vincent, above n 1,9-12. 
57Rougemont, above n 6,40. 
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Hapsburg rule, which was increasingly perceived as foreign and oppressive.58 
Accordingly, Lucerne joined the Confederation in 1332.59 
The imperial city of Zurich allied itself with the Confederation for the same reasons in 
1351, which triggered another war with Austria. This time the Hapsburgs lost the 
cantons of Glarus and Zug, which became members of the Confederation in 1352.60 
Berne, an imperial free city that began the war as an ally of the Hapsburgs, joined the 
Confederation in 1353 when its leaders concluded that fighting against the Swiss was 
contrary to their interests. 61 Berne was already an ally of Zurich and had plans to 
extend its authority over Vaud and the Argovian plateau. 62 In 1481 Fribourg and 
Solothurn joined the Confederation.63 Basel and Schaffhausen joined in 1501, and 
Appenzell in 1513.64 The Confederation consisted of these thirteen diverse sovereign 
cantons65 until overwhelmed by Napoleon in 1798.66 
The union of these cantons was accomplished in the urban cantons by a referendum 
system in which their associated village communes constituted the sovereign 
decisional bodies. 67 These communes were consulted on everything from canton 
treaties with the Hapsburgs to barrel repair . In the Landsgemeinde cantons decisions 
regarding these matters were reached at frequent and lengthy meetings. This 
predilection for treating citizens as the real government and elected officials as 
powerless attendants is still a fundamental characteristic of Switzerland's political 
system today. 68 
58Rappard, above n 48,6. The House of Hapsburg, as it acquired power, eventually became known as 
the House of Austria. Accordingly, the wars against the Hapsburgs generally involved Austria. 
59 Adams, above n 1, 1. The expansion of the Confederation also owed a lot to aristocratic bankruptcy. 
Many small feudal lords collapsed under their debts and frequently pawned their feudal rights, dues or 
tolls. The still prosperous cities of the Confederation bought these pawned territories. Steinberg, 
above n 3, 16. 
60 Adams, above n 1, 1; Rougemont, above n 6, 40. 
61Vincent, above n 1, 11. 
62See Rougemont, above n 6,40. 
63 Adams, above n 1, 2. After 1388 there were no serious attempts to subjugate the confederates. Since 
they were valuable to large neighbouring powers for strategic reasons, they had to stage several 
defences of their freedom in first 100 years of their independent existence. However, they offered little 
temptation to foreign conquerors, as their land was arid and sparsely populated. In the following two 
centuries Uri, Schwyz, and Unterwalden were aggressors. Their main troubles were economic; their 
most implacable enemy was nature. Herold, above n 5, 118. 
64 Adams, above n 1, 2. AppenzeU was repeatedly denied admission to the Confederation because of the 
warlike disposition of its people and its likelihood of getting into trouble without sufficient cause. 
Vincent, above n 1, 17. 
65Rougemont, above n 6,40. 
66 Adam, above n 1, 2. During the 1300s, leagues with overlapping membership gradually formed 
between the principal free mountain valleys and urban communities. Steinberg, above n 3, 16. 
67Steinberg, above n 3, 73. This practice was also adopted in America by the New England towns. 
See generally E Oberholtzer The Referendum in America (Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1900). 
68Steinberg, above n 3, 73; B Barber The Death of Communal Liberty: A History of Freedom in a Swiss 
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54 
2 Alliances and subject territories 
The Confederation was also augmented by alliances between one or more of the 
confederates and other towns and states. Geneva, St Gall, the Grisons, the Valais, 
Mulhouse, and Neuchatel, among others, became allies of the Confederation in this 
manner. 69 Like the Confederates, these allies preserved their complete political 
independence. 7o These alliances meant that several cantons belonged to two types of 
alliances: one in which obligations were reciprocal and another in which obligations 
were not reciprocal. 71 In addition, various combinations of the cantons controlled 
subject territories which they ruled as sovereign masters. The Ticino, for example, 
was the property of all the cantons except Appenzell, while Berne and Fribourg ruled 
over some areas in western Switzerland.72 
These circumstances contributed to the pluralistic character of Swiss federalism. Each 
city or valley had its own special role within the Confederation; and, the 
Confederation respected the local interests and the particular needs of its constituents. 
For centuries, it favoured local liberties without lessening the cohesion required to 
defend them. 73 In reality, the Confederation was less a central government than a 
highly effective collective security arrangement intended to protect local 
independence.74 Each community had reserved the right of self-government. As the 
Confederation grew in size and strength, it gradually shook off its dependence on the 
Empire. Its dependence was only nominal by the end of the 1400s and was abolished 
by the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 when the contracting powers recognised the 
Confederation's sovereignty. 75 
These factors, along with the conquest of French- and Italian-speaking territories, 
contributed directly to the development of Switzerland's diverse make-up, its 
federated nature, and its republican form of government at a time when the rest of 
Europe was under monarchical rule. 76 They also set the stage for the torrent of 
constitutional changes that took place in the 1800s, particularly the adoption of the 
initiative and the referendum by the cantons and the newly created Swiss state. 
69Salis, above n 4, 23-24; Codding, above n 15, 25. The communal movement also gained ground in 
bishop-ruled towns and provinces that did not belong to the Confederation, particularly in Geneva, 
Lausanne, Basle, Valais, and the Grisons. Administrative autonomy, independent jurisdiction and 
fc0litical freedom grew rapidly at the expense of episcopal rights. Salis, above n 4, 21. 
°Salis, above n 4, 23-24. 
7lRougemont, above n 6,40. 
72Codding, above n 15, 25. 
73Rougemont, above n 6,41. 
74Above; see also generally Rappard, above n 48. 
75 Adams, above n 1, 3. 
76Salis, above n 4, 23-24. 
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3 Differences between rural and urban cantons 
The emphasis on local independence also allowed institutional differences to develop 
between the Confederation's rural and urban cantons. These differences, coupled 
with those produced by the Reformation, generated conditions which militated against 
the centralisation of political power within the Confederation, a weakness which 
prevented the Confederation from pursuing anything but reactionary policies. 
In the rural cantons of Uri, Schwyz, Unterwalden, Zug, Glarus, and Appenzell, a 
pure democracy prevailed. The Landsgemeinde, was the sovereign, deciding upon 
peace and war, alliances, treaties, and laws; it elected the chief magistrate and the 
other cantonal officials. All adult males who possessed rights of citizenship not only 
had the right, but the duty, under threat of penalty, to participate in the 
Landsgemeinde. Every year in the spring the men of the cantons, rich and poor, came 
together from the mountains and the valleys for the principal cantonal assembly; they 
were also frequently summoned to extraordinary assemblies. They took their 
responsibility seriously as they were fully aware that the highest authority of the State 
was vested in them in common. 77 In the BOOs, these citizens used the Landsgemeinde 
to curb the growing oligarchical influence of prominent families by extending the 
communal features of the valley cooperative.78 
It was otherwise in the urban cantons of Lucerne, Zurich, Berne, Basel, Fribourg, 
Solothurn, and Schaffhausen. Originally the communes in Switzerland possessed vast 
fields, pasturages, and woods which were held in common by all the inhabitants. As 
population grew the share of each inhabitant decreased. In the cities, this led to the 
creation of close corporations, the burgher-communes. By fixing their numbers they 
excluded others from participating in local administration. The system eventually 
created a tax problem. The majority, who were not burghers, felt that the burghers 
should administrate their taxes according to the principles of equity. But the burghers 
were adverse to giving up their property to increase participation. The solution was 
the double commune: the burghers kept their property and looked after their interests, 
while the other inhabitants of the municipality provided for public services. 79 
In addition, the jurisdiction of the cities extended far beyond their walls. Their extra-
mural populations did not, however, possess the same rights as those living within the 
city. In a sense, the city had replaced the former feudal lords, ruling the extra-mural 
regions as subject lands through bailiffs. Moreover, the burghers as a whole did not 
77 Oechsli, above n 2, 17. 
78See Steinberg, above n 3, 16; see also Focus on Switzerland: The Historical Evolution: Political 
Institutions (2 ed, Swiss Office for the Development of Trade, Lausanne, 1982) 27. 
79 Adams, above n 1, 101-H>2. 
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usually participate in government. 80 Executive responsibility was vested in the "Small 
Council" and the legislative power was vested in the "Grand Council". Although 
sovereignty was legally vested in the whole body of free citizens, essentially only the 
male members of a ruling family could expect to sit in either Council. 81 The members 
of either Council were very rarely elected directly by the burghers. In most of the 
cities the councils fIlled gaps in their own ranks in accordance with some artificial 
scheme. Invariably, the authorities of the chief cities were also the supreme 
government of the respective cantons, and only its citizens were eligible for office. 82 
The tenure of office was not originally a privilege reserved to certain families. In the 
councils, manual workers sat side by side with merchants and knights; the extraml,lral 
populations could easily enter the city, acquire civic rights, and be eligible for all 
dignities and offices. Even the rural communes ranked as members of the urban 
cantons, just as did the guilds in the cities. When issues important to the canton had 
to be decided, government officials were accustomed to ask the opinions of the 
country folk as well as of the townsmen, and to take action in accordance with the 
popular decision. 83 
Eventually, however, the patrician class gained supremacy. The old families assumed 
more and more privileges in government, in society, and in trade. In some instances, 
the civil service became the monopoly of a limited number of families, who were 
careful to perpetuate their privileges. To a degree, this family supremacy was also 
visible for a time in the rural cantons;84 after all, the Confederation owed its creation 
to the leading families in Uri, Schwyz, and Unterwalden. 85 In contrast to the rural 
cantons, however, the attempts at reform were rigorously suppressed in the cities, and 
government became more and more aristocratic. By the 1590s, the government and 
its offices in Lucerne, Berne, Fribourg, and Solothurn had became concentrated in 
ever decreasing numbers of patrician families. They had obtained permanent rule to 
the exclusion of all others from power. Zurich, Basel, Schaffhausen were semi-
aristocratic,86 which meant that they still permitted new recruits to the privileged 
families. 87 
These differences greatly worried the rural cantons. They feared that the growing 
power of the city cantons endangered their liberties. The chief cause of this concern 
80Adams, above n 1, 17-18. 
81 Codding , above n 15, 24-25. 
820echsli, above n 2, 18. 
83Above . 
84Vincent, above n 1, 20. 
85Focus, above n 78, 27; see also Codding, above n 15, 20. 
86 Adams, above n 1, 10-11. 
87Codding, above n 15, 25. 
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was the distinction the cities had made between the populations within and without 
their wails , a distinction which disadvantaged the extramural population. In general, 
they held their rural subjects in invidious subordination. The rural cantons had no 
desire to become appendages of the rich, aristocratic, and sometimes unscrupulous 
governments of Lucerne, Zurich, or Berne. 88 The differences existing between the 
rural and urban cantons eventually destabilised the Confederation and sparked 
uprisings when the French revolutionaries invaded in 1798.89 Combating the 
oligarchical power of privileged elites would become a recurring feature of Swiss 
constitutional development,90 particularly in the 1830s and the 1860s, and led the 
Swiss to embrace direct democracy . 
4 The Reformation 
Religion was another divisive, yet paradoxically unifying, factor in Switzerland. The 
Reformation deeply affected the development of Switzerland's political institutions. 
Religious conflict almost destroyed the Confederation on several occasions .91 At one 
point two confederations existed side by side, one Catholic and the other Protestant. 
However, a permanent split never materialised. Instead, a religious dualism, which 
cut across the rural-urban divide, came into existence. Uri, Schwyz, Unterwalden, 
Lucerne, Fribourg, and Solothurn remained Catholic, while Zurich, Berne, Basle, and 
Schaffhausen became Protestant. In Glarus and Appenzell , where the two faiths were 
equally divided, each parish was free to chose its faith. Appenzell later split into two 
independent cantons along the lines of religious preference. Among the allies, Geneva 
and St Gall became Protestant, while Valais and the Abbey of St Gall remained 
Catholic. The independent communes of the Grisons were divided. Almost all of the 
subject territories remained Catholic. 92 
In addition, the religious divisions did not coincide with language frontiers. The 
Reformation gave Switzerland both French- and German-speaking Protestants and 
Italian-, French-, and German-speaking Catholics. The one Italian exception was Val 
Bregaglia, a valley community in the Grisons which became Protestant. 93 
The Reformation's affect on Swiss politics was pronounced. For example, in Geneva, 
as in Zurich, the new church identified itself with the city republic; Calvinism 
88Codding, above n 15, 15 . 
89Codding, above n 15, 13. The uprisings were instigated and carried out by subjects , not citizens. 
Above. 
9OVincent, above n 1, 20-21. 
91Salis, above n 4 , 25. Four internal wars of religion were fought , mainly over the faith to be adopted 
in the subject territories, in 1529, 1531 , 1656, and 1712. Codding, above n 15, 23. 
92Codding, above n 15, 24. 
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promoted the active participation of the laity in church affairs, a democratic influence, 
which in time was to make itself felt throughout Switzerland. It also strengthened the 
bonds between the Latin and Alemannic Swiss . The Reformation had the same effect 
in Catholic regions where it reinvigorated religious life and brought together French-, 
ltalian-, and German-speaking Swiss.94 The schism probably saved the Confederation 
by preventing anyone cultural or political group from dominating the it. However, 
the schism also enhanced its traditional weakness by increasing the obstacles to 
coordinated action and centralised decision-making. It also contributed to keeping the 
Swiss out of the religious wars that devastated the rest of Europe in the 1500s and 
1600s, which gave the Swiss the opportunity to develop their political institutions. 
C Key Constitutional Development: ad audiendeum et referendum 
Although the Confederation was primarily a defensive arrangement among sovereign 
cantons, it made important contributions to Switzerland I s constitutional development. 
The Confederation laid the foundations of Switzerland I s unique form of federalism by 
encouraging unity within diversity and emphasising local autonomy. 
In the Confederation, the real power rested with the sovereign cantons. Each had its 
own laws and its own militia. In addition, political rights throughout the 
Confederation were far from uniform. These conditions , as well as the absence of an 
effective common government, made the active and coordinated pursuit of policy 
impossible. Despite these weaknesses, the collaboration of the cantons in a federated 
association greatly strengthen their unity. Essentially , a republican statecraft enabled 
the delegates to the Diet, the representative assembly of the Confederation, to 
deliberate on the interests which brought them together and the questions which 
divided them. 95 
The governmental mechanics of the Confederation were very simple: if something 
had to be done in concert, the canton that perceived the need called a Diet, which was 
the only organ for coordinating common action among the confederates. Each canton 
appointed delegates who acted in accordance with the instructions of their cantonal 
governments. Each canton was entitled to one vote.96 
If disagreement arose between two states, each appointed referees. If the referees 
were unable to agree, they chose an umpire whose opinion prevailed. The Swiss 
established arbitration for the peaceful settlement of disputes. Its primary aim was to 
94Salis, above n 4, 27-28. 
95Salis, above n 4, 24-25. 
96yincent, above n 1, 18-19. 
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guarantee the security of Switzerland on a basis of reciprocity. The policy was 
effective as long as the confederates had the will to settle by compromise the 
difficulties they confronted. 97 The Swiss Federal Tribunal evolved from these 
arbitration procedures. 98 
If an issue beyond the instructions of the delegates arose during the course of the Diet, 
then a process called ad audiendeum et referendum took place. 99 Because the 
confederation had no powers of its own, the delegates would listen and report back to 
their respective cantons. Once the cantons had considered the matter at hand, the 
delegates would report the decisions of their cantons at the next Diet. 100 Since the 
Diet had no means of enforcing its own decrees , its decrees were merely 
recommendations to the cantons, not binding legislation. In the Landsgemeinde 
cantons, for example, the sovereign body of citizens had the ultimate right to accept 
or reject decisions reached by the Diet. 101 The cantons only obeyed the Diet 's 
resolutions when it suited them. 102 
Although the meaning of the term is different, the name referendum is derived from 
the Confederation's ad audiendeum et referendum practice. A transitional form 
between this ancient referendum and the modern legislative referendum was 
constituted by the long established referendum in the canton of the Grisons where 
decisions did not take effect until after referred to and approved by a majority of the 
communes. Instead of voting in a single popular assembly, as was done in the 
Landsgemeinde cantons , the inhabitants of the Grisons gave their decision upon 
communal affairs in numerous village assemblies. t03 Before the French Revolution, 
the government in the Grisons consisted of leagues of over 200 sovereign communes 
united in a central Diet which referred to the communes almost every issue of 
substance. The commune was the repository of legal sovereignty. 104 
Despite the difficulties produced by the absence of an effective central government, 
the confederates gradually developed a sense of community and a patriotism common 
to all. They identified themselves as Swiss . Upon conclusion of the Thirty Years 
War, the contracting powers formally recognised the sovereignty of the Swiss 
Confederation in the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. Although lacking a unified 
97Salis , above n 4 , 25 . 
98Yincent, above n 1, 19. 
99Steinberg, above n 3, 35; Oechsli , above n 2, 405; Deploige, above n 1, 52. 
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political and legal system, the Swiss, as result of their common history and common 
interests, felt unified in politics and sentiment. 105 
However, this unity was more cultural than structural. Initially, the actual bond of 
union, owing to the pressure of circumstances, was greater than written agreements. 
Until the Reformation had introduced religious schism between the states, the 
presence of powerful enemies on every side kept fresh the sense of mutual 
dependence; the confederates often rose above the letter of their constitution. But 
when the Confederation had passed through the struggle for existence, and the 
principle of state-rights no longer found any impediment in its way, the weakness of 
the central government became apparent. The situation was similar to that of the 
United States under its Articles of Confederation after the war of independence, 
except that the disintegration of interests was more marked in Switzerland than in 
America because of religious conflict. 106 
By the 1700s, only the possession of subject lands held the Swiss Confederation 
together. In this respect they were like shareholders in a multinational corporation. 
At one stage almost the only questions upon which the Diet could act in concert were 
those related to the inspection of accounts and other affairs connected with the subject 
territories. The profits derived from these common properties were all that prevented 
complete rupture on several critical occasions. 107 
Taken together, the differences between the rural and urban cantons, the schism 
created by the Reformation, the emphasis on local sovereignty, and the absence of a 
centralised governing body, meant that the Confederation was ill-prepared to 
withstand the storm unleashed by the French Revolution. 108 It swept the 
Confederation aside and ushered in a host of constitutional changes which resulted in 
the creation of the modem Swiss state, complete with its system of direct democracy. 
III BIRTH OF THE MODERN SWISS STATE (1798 to 1891) 
Arriving in the wake of the Enlightenment, the French Revolution triggered a series 
of events in Switzerland which eventually produced the modem Swiss state. The 
Constitution of 1848, and its subsequent revision in 1874, was essentially a 
compromise between centralists and those who wanted to preserve the sovereignty of 
105Salis, above n 4, 25-26. For a detailed study of the development of direct democracy in the Grisons, 
a region which constituted a mini-federal state for most of its existence, see generally Barber, above n 
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the cantons. The inclusion of the constitutional initiative and the legislative 
referendum in the Swiss constitutional system was fundamental to this compromise. 
The excesses associated with representative democracy during the industrial revolution 
coupled with the ancient Swiss desire for local autonomy all but ensured that pure 
representative democracy could not endure in Switzerland, especially once direct 
democracy proved to be a practical means by which to allow Swiss electors to 
participate directly in the exercise of governmental power despite being part of a large 
and geographically dispersed population. 
A Effects of the Enlightenment 
The Enlightenment profoundly affected Switzerland's political development. When 
Swiss scholars began to plunder the wealth of old chronicles which had been 
accumulating in Swiss cities since the 1200s, they aroused a proud interest in the 
constitutional liberties of their forbears. The scholars painted an inspiring portrait of 
Swiss heritage: Swiss history began with an uprising of yeomen against lords and 
knights, a struggle against aristocratic society launched by simple peasants and hard-
working burghers. This scholarship ignited a Swiss patriotism grounded in freedom, 
liberty, and republican ideals symbolised by the legendary Wilhelm Tell and 
supported by the theories of Jean Jacques Rousseau. 109 
1 The legend of Wilhelm Tell 
Swiss legend portrays Tell as a simple mountaineer whose individual defiance of 
Hapsburg authority led to the creation of the Swiss Confederation. One day Tell 
refused to do honour to the hat of the domineering Hapsburg bailiff in the square of 
Altdorf. For this insult, Tell received a death sentence, a fate he could escape only by 
piercing an apple sitting on his child's head with a bolt fired from his crossbow. 
Miraculously, he passed the ordeal. Later, Tell saved the bailiff from drowning only 
to kill him. The legend concludes that Tell's exploits led Uri, Schwyz, and 
Unterwalden to create the Confederation to throw off the yoke of Hapsburg 
domination. 110 
During the Enlightenment, this legend came to represent the attitude of the Swiss 
toward their own past: Switzerland came into being out of a skilful and persistent 
local struggle against unjust and foreign domination. Whether Tell ever existed is 
irrelevant; the legend encapsulates the communal tradition by which the Swiss have 
I09Kohn, above n 38, 23-24; Steinberg, above n 3, 19; see also generally J Rousseau On the Social 
Contract with Geneva Manuscript and Political Economy (trans, St Martin's Press, New York, 1978). 
1I0E Fritz European Switzerland: Historically Considered (Fretz & Wasmuth Ltd, Zurich, 1951) 7-8. 
62 
defmed their public values. 111 The Swiss whom Tell symbolised were exceptionally 
sensitive to even the slightest interference in their affairs. For this reason, Rudolf of 
Hapsburg and his bailiffs went down in Swiss history as tyrants although their rule 
was regarded as mild and beneficent elsewhere. 112 Even today the Swiss justify and 
sanction their institutions not by any 'ism' but by their history alone.113 
2 Rousseau and his influence 
The symbolic importance of Tell grew as Rousseau's ideas spread throughout 
Europe. 114 Born and raised as a citizen of Geneva,115 Rousseau was deeply influenced 
by Switzerland's political traditions. His works reveal that he was passionately 
attached to Switzerland's natural landscape and intimately acquainted with its heroic 
age, including the principles for which Wilhelm Tell stood: the superiority of the 
simple and pristine nature of local autonomy over the complex and often corrupt 
administration of a distant, centralised, and hierarchical authority .116 
Rousseau's most famous and influential work, The Social Contract (1762), owes a 
great debt to Switzerland's political heritage, particularly the Landsgemeinde. In The 
Social Contract, Rousseau argued that sovereignty was held exclusively by the people, 
that is, those individuals who had decided to live together as a society. Since 
sovereignty was vested in the people, it could not be delegated, divided, alienated, or 
restricted. More importantly, no laws could be made without the consent of the 
sovereign, that is, the people. II? 
As a consequence, Rousseau reasoned that a democratically constituted government 
possessed only executive and judicial powers; only the people, in accordance with the 
'general will', were entitled to exercise the power of legislation. Rousseau argued 
that the general will could only be determined when the people were assembled in 
person at a centralised location within their state where they could discuss matters 
IIlSteinberg, above n 3, 19; Address by Ambassador Michael von Schenck, Switzerland's Ambassador 
to New Zealand, entitled 700 Years of Swiss Democracy, Institute of International Affairs (Shell House, 
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together and decide whether to make or unmake any of their laws. This criteria for 
determining the general will is nothing more than a defInition of the Landsgemeinde. 
In Rousseau's model government, the people, not their representatives, were to 
assemble and sanction their own laws: 118 
The sovereign having no other force but the legislative power, acts only by the laws; 
and the laws being only the authentic act of the general will, the sovereign can never act 
but when the people are assembled. 
Rousseau regarded representative government as a sign of political degeneracy caused 
by patriotic decline, that is, people unwilling or disinclined to attend to their own 
affairs. He believed that the representative system was the product of an abuse of 
democratic government, not its natural out-growth. Rousseau also argued that 
representatives were not qualifIed to legislate on behalf of the people: 119 
The deputies of the people .. . are merely its agents. They cannot conclude anything 
deflnitely. Any law that the people in person have not ratifled is null; it is not a law. 
Rousseau disapproved of nations which delegated their sovereignty to representatives. 
He believed that the political inertia of the people and the concentrated influence of 
moneyed interests would lead soldiers to enslave the nation and representatives to sell 
it. Citing the English parliamentary system, Rousseau wrote: 120 
The English people thinks it is free. It greatly deceives itself; it is free only during the 
election of the members of Parliament. As soon as they are elected, it is a slave, it is 
nothing. Given the use of made of these brief moments of freedom, the people 
certainly deserve to lose it. 
Rousseau's ideas coincided with Swiss political values. 121 Rather than influence 
Switzerland's political development, he gave expression to a sentiment that all Swiss 
citizens shared. 122 As a citizen of Geneva, Rousseau felt he was a citizen "of a free 
state and a member of sovereign body." 123 Like Rousseau, the citizens of Swiss 
cantons believed they were sovereigns in reality as well as in legal theory. In 1789, 
for example, the Russian historian Kararnzin wrote that the citizens of Zurich were 
"as proud of the title [of citizen] as a king of his crown. For more than a 150 years 
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no foreigner has obtained the right of citizenship. 111 24 Although the functions of 
sovereignty in most Swiss cantons had fallen into the hands of a few families by the 
late 1700s, this feeling did not disappear; instead, it led to the downfall of the 
aristocratic families. l25 While branded as radical and revolutionary in Russia, 
Germany, and France, Rousseau I s views were considered conservative in Switzerland, 
especially in the cantons where the Landsgemeinde flourished. 126 
Although Rousseau predates the Swiss initiative and referendum, he articulated the 
political values which led to their creation in Switzerland. Fundamentally, the Swiss 
do not believe in government by representation. Where it has proven inevitable they 
have introduced proportional representation as its least evil form. 127 The Swiss 
shunned the Anglo-Saxon concept of legislation by representatives in favour of the 
Rousseauan ideal of legislation by the people. The initiative and the referendum serve 
as a substitute for the Landsgemeinde in determining the general will of the people 
where geographical considerations and population size make popular assemblies 
impractical. 
3 Swiss political reality on the eve of the French Revolution 
Ironically Swiss political reality in the late 1700s ran counter to Swiss political ideals. 
Prior to the French Revolution, Swiss political and civic life had become frozen in 
obsolete forms and centred in the cantons . The Confederation was powerless, no 
more than a social club of sovereign cantons that were often deeply divided. In 
practice, all political rights were limited to hereditary castes: old established peasant 
families had regained control in the six rural democracies , wealthy guild-masters and 
merchants held the reigns of power in cities like Basle and Zurich, while small 
patrician aristocracies ruled cities like Berne and Lucerne. The ruling classes, 
especially in the city cantons, behaved no better than the French aristocracy of their 
age. They treated the surrounding rural populations , most of the burghers, and all of 
the people living in the subject territories as subjects without rights. In the process , 
they frequently violated old treaties and disregarded established liberties ; they also 
suppressed those who were bold enough to assert their rights. 128 
The unrest caused by this strife intensified with the spread of the Enlightenment and 
the subsequent outbreak: of the French Revolution. The fate suffered by the people of 
Stafa, a rural commune in the canton of Zurich, is illustrative. Inspired by the 
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historical record of their own ancient liberties and the Declaration of the Rights of 
Man, the people of Stafa, in 1794, petitioned the cantonal government for equality 
with the burghers of Zurich, the abolishment of serfdom, and the end of Zurich's 
commercial and industrial monopoly. The people of Stafa were not revolutionaries; 
they simply wanted the restoration of the rights to which ancient documents proved 
they were entitled but had long since been disregarded by the authorities. The 
authorities responded to their lawful demands by annulling the charters which 
provided for their rights and punishing those who were involved in the petition. 
Zurich, then the most progressive canton in the Confederation, treated the appeal to 
ancient Swiss liberties as a criminal offence. 129 
This policy exposed the hypocrisy of the ruling oligarchies. It also widened the gap 
between them and their subjects, which had a devastating effect on the Confederation 
when the winds of the French Revolution reached Switzerland. The French 
Revolution inspired Swiss malcontents to launch reform parties which caused 
confusion and weakness throughout the Confederation. 130 Young men in the cantonal 
capitals and country towns, who were raised on the ideals of the Enlightenment, came 
into conflict with the cantonal governments and privileged townsmen that supported 
the French monarchy and rejected the doctrine of Natural Law. 131 When Napoleon 
invaded Switzerland in 1798, the Swiss were too divided to resist. The Confederation 
simply collapsed. The ruling oligarchies had neither the courage nor the 
determination to unite and reorganise Switzerland. 132 The French took advantage of 
this political paralysis, particularly by exploiting the disadvantaged. To win support 
of Swiss peasants, for example, the French promised to abolish oppressive feudal dues 
without compensation. 133 
B Consequences of French Occupation 
The French occupation of Switzerland had paradoxical effects. Although the 
Confederation passed out of existence, it grew in importance as a symbol of Swiss 
liberty. In addition, the cantons responded to French attempts to centralise 
Switzerland by insisting on their full sovereignty. 134 While French efforts to centralise 
Switzerland rekindled the conflict between Swiss centralists and federalists, their 
occupation united Swiss revolutionaries and conservatives in their opposition to 
French rule.135 Nevertheless, Napoleon's solution to the problem of controlling 
129Kohn, above n 38, 32-33. 
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Switzerland provided the Swiss with an influential model for the Constitution of 1848. 
Despite the pan-European upheavals of the post-Napoleonic era and bitter struggles 
amongst themselves, the Swiss built a strong, modern democracy in the heart of a 
Europe made up of restored monarchies. Within 33 years of the demise of Napoleon, 
the Swiss had achieved liberty under the law and unity in diversity to a degree 
unknown to its neighbours. 136 The referendum and the initiative were an integral part 
of that achievement. 
1 The Helvetic Republic 
Power politics led France to invade Switzerland in 1798, but it also stymied its initial 
attempts to govern Switzerland effectively. Without considering local conditions or 
traditions, France adjusted Switzerland's territorial boundaries and constitutional form 
to meet its requirements. 137 The French and their supporters had planned to abolish 
Switzerland's "fantastic array of tiny republics, prince-bishoprics, princely abbeys, 
counties, free cities, sovereign cloisters and monasteries, free valleys, overlapping 
jurisdictions, guilds, oligarchies and city aristocracies. ,,138 To this end, the French 
revolutionaries foisted the Helvetic Republic on the Swiss on 12 April 1798. 
On paper the Helvetic Republic was a representative democracy with a constituent 
assembly. But in effect it was an attempt to abolish local autonomy and to concentrate 
the whole power of the state in the hands of a five member directory. The French 
matched the curtailment of local political rights with the introduction of a dazzling 
array of civil liberties derived from the ideology of the French Revolution and based 
on the fundamental doctrines of Natural Law. While many people in the urban 
cantons welcomed the freedoms of press, association, and petition, the centralisation 
of political power outraged the inhabitants of the Landsgemeinde cantons. 139 
They rejected the Helvetic Republic for one simple reason: it was un-Swiss. l40 The 
creators of the Helvetic Republic made the mistake of ignoring five centuries of Swiss 
history, particularly the innate orientation of the Swiss toward self-determination. 
They also incorrectly believed that a country so diverse in natural conditions, race, 
religion, customs, and language, could endure the imposed uniformity, dreary 
equality, and impersonal rigidity of a centralised bureaucratic state. 141 The attempt to 
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replace the vitality of local autonomy with the moribund administrative machinery of 
the Helvetic Republic resulted in chaos. 142 
However, French efforts to save the Helvetic Republic gave the Swiss their fIrst 
experience with a nationwide referendum. To give legitimacy to the regime, the 
French placed the text of the Helvetic Constitution before the Swiss for their approval 
in June 1802. The officials conducting the referendum announced before the 
referendum that abstentions would be considered as affirmative votes. Although some 
cantons had employed this kind of simple majority system, its use nationwide has 
remained confmed to the referendum on the Helvetic Constitution. Perhaps the Swiss, 
particularly those from the smaller rural Landsgemeinde cantons , never forgot the 
results produced by the system: the constitution won approval with 92,423 votes 
against and 72,453 in favour given 167 ,172 abstentions : 43 
Despite the referendum, or perhaps on account of it, the Helvetic Republic failed. 
The dramatic changes it attempted to impose on Switzerland were too alien to win 
broad support.l44 The French managed to prop up the Helvetic Republic with 
bayonets for fIve years. But from Napoleon's perspective, the reactionary indignation 
of the Swiss, which was exacerbated by political abuses , rendered Switzerland 
ungovernable. 145 
2 The Act of Mediation 
For military reasons, Napoleon needed stability in Switzerland, especially along th~ 
approaches to the Alpine passes. The armed resistance of the mountaineers to the 
Helvetic Republic stood between Napoleon and his objective. To restore order in 
Switzerland he summoned the representatives of the cantons and the Helvetic Republic 
to Paris in 1802 to work out a new constitution. Their deliberations produced the Act 
of Mediation, which took effect on 19 February 1803. 146 
The Act of Mediation broke from the unifying principles of the Helvetic 
Constitution. 147 It was a loose, federal constitution which effectively restored political 
sovereignty to the cantons , but retained a central government. 148 Each canton 
regained control over fInance , coinage, posts , customs , education, monasteries, and 
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certain monopolies. 149 Each canton was given a form of government, democratic or 
republican, suited to the habits and inclinations of its inhabitants. It restored the 
Landsgemeinde where it had existed but did not permit the restoration of the 
privileges that were rife in the patrician municipalities prior to the Helvetic 
Republic. ISO 
In addition, it preserved the Helvetic Republic's grant of sovereignty to the old 
Confederation's subject territories, which brought the number of cantons in 
Switzerland to 19. It also converted the assembly of the Helvetic Republic into a 
Diet, but regard was paid to population by giving two votes to those cantons having 
100,000 inhabitants or more. Six of the most important cantons, Fribourg, Berne, 
Solothurn, Basel, Zurich, and Lucerne were appointed Vororte to take turns at the 
head of affairs for one year at a time. During that year the capital of the Vororte 
became the seat of the Diet, and the chief magistrate became president. lSI The Swiss 
drew on these innovations when drafting the Constitution of 1848. 
Napoleon gave the Swiss what they wanted for several reasons. Primarily, he 
understood that a Switzerland divided into cantons that were individually dependent on 
France could never pose a serious threat to him. 152 But he was also predisposed 
towards the Swiss because they possessed a spirit of traditionalism which reminded 
him of his native island, Corsica. In addition, he was deeply influenced by Rousseau, 
who was not only Swiss but had repeatedly used Switzerland as a model for his 
political theories .153 Napoleon was impressed by the Landsgemeinde, even though it 
fell short of Rousseau's ideals at the time. It rarely reflected the general will because 
electoral bribery and corruption were common and because the copyholders had no 
vote at all. 154 But, as Napoleon knew, it was the system for which the mountaineers 
were willing to fight. 
The Act of Mediation lasted until the fall of Napoleon in 1815, a little over a 11 
years. During that time it gave Napoleon the measure of control he required over 
Switzerland's armies, territories, external relations, commerce, and industry. 155 At the 
same time, it provided the Swiss with an acceptable level of local autonomy. 
Although Swiss liberty was sharply limited, particularly during the Napoleonic Wars 
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of 1805 and 1809, the Swiss were not hostile toward Napoleon. He was widely 
regarded as almost a second Wilhelm Tell. 156 
However, the Act of Mediation accentuated several problems in Switzerland. During 
the Napoleonic era, intellectual, artistic, and economic life were entirely cantonal. 
This, along with the terms of the Act of Mediation, prevented the Diet from bringing 
about the unification of coinage, the standardisation of weights and measures, and the 
establishment of a reliable and affordable postal system. The Act of Mediation 
allowed the customs system to relapse into its old localism. Internal duties and tolls 
proliferated and transit traffic dwindled. Even the rights of freedom of settlement, 
trade, and industry were constantly endangered by local action. 157 These economic 
woes turned many patriotic minds toward the benefits of greater national unity. 158 
C Founding the Modem Swiss State 
The Act of Mediation disappeared with Napoleon. However, the French occupation, 
which coincided with the influential work of Johann Pestalozzi, left a lasting 
impression. Both factors gave rise to Swiss nationalism, which eventually produced 
the modern Swiss state. Although Switzerland won recognition at the Second 
Congress at Paris on 20 March 1815,159 the Swiss had to weather 33 years of internal 
turmoil before fmding a constitutional structure which would preserve cantonal 
autonomy yet leave Switzerland united and well-governed. The inclusion of direct 
democracy in this structure was vital to its initial acceptance and to its subsequent 
success. 
1 Restoration 
The turmoil began as the French were withdrawing. On 29 December 1813, Zurich 
and Basle, on behalf of the progressive cantons, proposed a union which would 
consolidate old federal ties and provide for absolute equality between the old and new 
cantons. The older cantons rejected the proposal, and threatened to go to war if the 
pre-occupation Confederation were not restored, along with their former privileges. 
Specifically, they demanded that "the old subject territories give up their newly 
acquired cantonal sovereignty and return to their condition of servitude." 160 
Napoleon's victors, the Four Powers, objected and forced the old cantons to join the 
Pact of 1815 on 7 August 1815, which when sanctioned by the Congress of Vienna, 
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become Switzerland's federal constitution. It also added Geneva, Valais, and 
Neuchatel to the Confederation, which brought the number of cantons to 22.161 
The Pact of 1815, however, was not a true federal constitution; it was merely an 
alliance of sovereign states. 162 It was a political expediency foisted upon the Swiss by 
the Four Powers to ensure the region's neutrality. The Pact's absence of an amending 
clause, that is, a legal means by which to alter the constitution, was intentional. 163 It 
was an agreement between governments, not one reached by the people of 
Switzerland; they were not consulted or asked to approve the agreement. 164 
In practice, the 'new confederation' operated like the previous one. Federal power 
was vested once again in a Diet of ambassadors from each canton, who voted 
according to the instructions of their governments. Each canton had one vote. Unlike 
its predecessor, it could declare war if three-fourths of the cantons approved; 
decisions regarding other matters within its competence carried on the basis of simple 
majority vote. However, the Diet had no means by which to enforce its decisions;65 
and no independent means of fmance. 166 The cantons retained control over custom 
duties and tolls, and each canton coined its own currency. 167 These factors expedited 
the new confederation's eventual demise. 
No longer faced with an external threat, the cantons began to focus on internal issues, 
largely unencumbered by the Diet. Although the privileged classes never regained the 
position they enjoyed before the Helvetic Republic, they reasserted many of their 
rights. In the process, they managed to curb religious liberty, the right of assembly, 
and the freedom of the press, particularly with respect to governmental matters which 
were largely entrusted to the old ruling families. 168 Essentially, the new confederation 
"was a reactionary triumph which delayed for nearly half a century the development 
of the country. ,,169 
2 Pestalozzi IS influence 
During this period, however, due in a large part to Pestalozzi, a sense of national 
consciousness began to develop.170 When the Swiss Confederation collapsed in 1798, 
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the Swiss found solace in Johannes von Muller's History of the Swiss Confederation. 
Muller's depiction of the heroic struggle of the old cantons revealed the vitality and 
uniqueness of Switzerland; he surprised his readers by presenting Switzerland as a 
nation. Combined with the long French occupation, Muller's work sparked a 
profound nostalgia for and awareness of the ancient strength of Swiss governmental 
traditions. 171 
No one expressed the spirit of this Swiss nationalism better than Pestalozzi. He 
argued that the chief purpose of civil power is the "constitutional safeguard of the 
citizen from the unlawful usurpation of power by supreme authority, be [it] called 
King, Parliament or National Convention. ,,172 Although civil power can protect civil 
liberty, he reasoned that the power of the state is always the potential enemy of civil 
liberty because human nature tends to domination: all forms of government are 
subject to corruption by their trend toward power; therefore, only the strength of the 
moral freedom of the individual can limit the danger or the abuse of power and can 
protect civil liberty and individual independence. 173 
Pestalozzi stressed the individual, not the interests of the community, as the true 
foundation of education and of political life. His view was based on his belief that all 
social organisations from the family to the state are determined by the quality of those 
who compose them. As a result, he argued that a state which promotes the 
individuality and autonomy of its citizens assures the strongest and most enduring 
basis for its own existence. Pestalozzi believed that the individual possesses a 
potential faculty for liberty, that is, a self-reliant and autonomous existence, which 
enables him to resist the temptation of his natural being and of society. As a result, 
he argued that true civic education has to develop the faculty of individual liberty, 
which meant it had to oppose collectivistic and nationalistic designs that subjugated 
the interests of the individual to those of the state. 174 
Pestalozzi's philosophy helped Switzerland to emerge successfully from its post-
Napoleonic turmoil. 175 Coupled with Swiss moderation and common sense, it restored 
the balance between local tradition and federal unity, and between individual and 
nation; the balance was based on the respect for autonomy and diversity which 
Pestalozzi held in high regard. 176 He provided the intellectual framework by which to 
weld a nation out of a people who valued local autonomy above national unity; his 
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principles gave Switzerland I s constitutional framers the tools they needed to create an 
effective governmental system which united the cantons while minimising their loss of 
autonomy. In Switzerland, the initiative and the referendum are monuments to how 
well the Swiss managed to adhere to Pestalozzi I s precepts. 
3 Regeneration 
Pestalozzi accurately predicted that the Restoration would be short-lived. 177 With the 
industrial revolution, the wealth of the traditional ruling classes began to decline 
relative to those engaged in trade and industry. Those aristocrats who used their 
privileges for commercial advantage provoked criticism, which added to the 
resentment that many felt toward an aristocracy whose position had been restored and 
vouched-safe by foreign powers. 178 Further, the new confederation was ill-equipped to 
deal with the changes brought about by the industrial revolution,179 particularly as the 
cantons, as a result of their independence, often gave their ambassadors instructions 
that differed widely from each other. 180 Its extreme localism was a burden to those 
engaged in commerce. Internal custom barriers, for example, brought international 
traffic to a virtual standstill. 181 These and other legal restrictions hampering industry 
eventually gave rise to demand for a unified state, with "one citizenship, one 
administration, one commercial and tariff policy." 182 
In addition, the advent of a middle class, consisting of lawyers, teachers, doctors, 
industrialists, businessmen, retailers , and wealthy farmers coincided with the founding 
of cantonal banks, which shifted personal dependence on landlords to impersonal 
dependence on banks. These factors greatly weakened the power and the prestige of 
the ruling families. As an economically secure and educated group, the growing 
middle class began to take an active interest in governmental affairs. 183 Many began 
to view the aristocracy as a "political party which had illegally arrogated itself 
exclusive power in the state," rather than as a ruling caste appointed by God. 184 
The fall of the Bourbons in the French Revolution of July 1830 triggered the demise 
of the Swiss Restoration and ushered in the Swiss Regeneration. 185 It brought a 
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demand for personal and political freedom. 186 It also unleashed a demand for greater 
popular representation in the legislative and executive branches of government. 187 The 
chief proponents of these views, the Liberals, argued that the power of the state 
should no longer be exercised by a small elite but by the people as a whole. 188 The 
desire for freedom was accompanied by a desire for participation in governmental 
affairs; liberty became identified with democracy, and the people with sovereignty. 189 
Nationalists joined the Liberals in the formation of the Radical Party which 
campaigned for centralised federal power, economic unification, and popular rule. 190 
The Regeneration began in the larger and economically more dynamic cantons. 191 
Shortly after the French Revolution of 1830, the Radical Party gained control of 
Aargau, Vaud, Fribourg, and Schaffhausen without bloodshed when the people 
marched on the capitals of these cantons. By 1831 , 12 Cantons , including Berne, 
Zurich, Lucerne, Solothurn, St Gall , and Thurgau, had joined the Radical fold and 
adopted liberal constitutions either peacefully or by revolution. 192 Most of these new 
constitutions proclaimed the people sovereign, guaranteed the rights of the individual , 
and were approved by government controlled referendums .193 This practice gave rise 
to the principle that proposed changes to constitutions must be submitted to and 
approved by the electors to take effect. 194 
By and large, these new constitutions established representative democracy throughout 
urban Switzerland,195 but were largely irrelevant to the older rural cantons which 
continued to govern themselves via the Landsgemeinde.196 Under these new 
constitutions , legislative power typically resided in a Great Council, which was 
composed of representatives elected by the electors within the canton. The 
representatives would elect an executive, which was responsible for administering the 
laws. The officials serving the executive, however, depended on the Great Council 
for their position and terms of employment. Although these systems proclaimed the 
people sovereign, the Great Councils , with the exception of the one in St Gall , 
initially possessed exclusive control over the legislative process. 197 The electors were 
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not consulted regarding legislation or other matters. Their role was confmed to voting 
for representatives and on constitutional amendments. 198 
4 St Gall and the spread of direct democracy 
In 1831, as a compromise between those who strove for pure direct democracy and 
those advocating pure representative democracy, the framers of St Gall's new 
constitution established the legislative referendum. 199 Within 45 days of the Great 
Council promulgating a law, the individual communes within the canton had the right 
to submit the proposal to referendum. If a majority of the electors voted against the 
law, it was annulled. 2OO Although regarded as an unenviable aspect of St Gall's 
constitutional system, the device slowly won acceptance throughout Switzerland, fIrst 
in rural Basal in 1832, then Lucerne in 1841, Thurgau in 1849, Schaffhausen in 
1852,101 and eventually in the rest of the cantons. Vaud considered adopting the 
legislative referendum in 1845, but rejected it as negative in character. Instead it took 
the innovative step of introducing the legislative initiative, an institution which had 
previously been restricted to the Landsgemeinde cantons. However, it could be used 
to repeal laws. 202 
The legislative referendum became increasingly attractive as the shortcomings of 
representative democracy became more and more apparent. Democratic elements in 
the Radical Party came to the conclusion that elected representatives were more 
attuned to class interests than the general will, particularly when levying taxes. 203 
These elements also concluded that giving the electors the power to veto legislation 
would be an effective check on the legislative power of the Great Councils. 204 
Consequently, they began to support the legislative referendum as a means "to recover 
for the people the right to that direct share in legislation which they had lost when 
government by representation alone was established in most of the cantons. ,,205 By 
1839, the Conservatives, both Protestant and Catholic, who had opposed the 
regeneration from its onset, also began to support the "cause of democraticness," 
when they concluded that "there lurked behind the enfranchised notables a substantial 
array of simple people who were by no means liberal in their political opinions, and 
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whose unfalsified vote would ensure power for the conservatives of a religious 
tinge. ,,206 
Ironically, the older rural cantons led the Conservatives in opposing the regeneration, 
which was largely an urban phenomenon. The older cantons, which were small in 
size and population, viewed the regeneration, with its emphasis on a strong central 
government, as a threat to their sovereignty , their influence in federal matters, and 
their religious and political traditions .207 Uri, Schwyz, and Unterwalden, the three 
rural cantons which founded the Swiss Confederation, were ironically :208 
irreconcilable leaders in the struggle against any reform. .. . They upheld their 
ancient liberties against modem nationalism and middle class ideas, with which they had 
upheld them against the feudal lords of the Middle Ages. 
They successfully resisted initial attempts to reform the constitutional arrangements 
underpinning the new confederation, in part because the larger, more populous, 
liberal cantons refused to provide "the considerable revenues that a new Bund would 
require unless they secured a proportionate increase in their own political 
influence. ,,209 Although Liberals, Democrats, and Radicals of various shades 
governed a majority of the population, the Conservatives controlled a majority of the 
cantons. Consequently, the new confederation remained "a loose alliance of tiny 
sovereign states, jealous of their independence ,,210 until the brief civil war of 1847, 
which ushered in the Constitution of 1848 and laid the foundations of the modern 
Swiss state.2I1 
5 Constitution of 1848 
Switzerland was nearly torn asunder in the 1840s, a period in which religious, 
constitutional, and economic conflicts intermingled to produce political and armed 
strife.212 Younger Radicals began to step up the demand for the abolition of local 
customs barriers and tolls , and the unification of post, coinage, and weights and 
measures. They believed that a unified state based on a liberal constitution would 
eliminate the economic chaos plaguing the new confederation. However, their use of 
terrorism provoked bitter opposition.213 In addition, Lucerne outraged the Radicals 
when it recalled the Jesuits and gave them the right to teach higher education in 
20~ughes, above 103, 129; see also Adams, above n 1, 77-78. 
207Herold, above n 5,40; Kohn, above n 38, 85, 88 . 
208Kohn, above n 38, 7l. 
209Bonjour, above n 1, 257 . 
210Kohn, above n 38, 69. 
21lBonjour, above n 1, 273 . 
212Kohn, above n 38, 84. 
213Bonjour, above n 1, 257-267. 
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response to Aargau's secularisation of a number of convents.214 The Radicals viewed 
the action as a declaration of war because they considered the Jesuits to be the avowed 
enemies of progress. 215 
The Radical's hostile reaction caused the Catholic cantons of Lucerne, Uri, Schwyz, 
Unterwalden, Zug, Fribourg, and Valais to form a defensive alliance called the 
Sonderbund in 1845 against the anti-Jesuit cantons controlled by the Radicals. On 20 
July 1847, shortly after the Radicals had secured a majority in the Diet, the Diet 
ordered the dissolution of the Sonderbund. The members of Sonderbund refused to 
obey the order, which promoted the Diet on 4 November 1847 to order the federal 
army to enforce the order. The ensuing 25 day civil war was a farce but a political 
triumph for the Radicals, as their victory gave them a free hand to redraft the new 
confederation's constitution, particularly as the Four Powers were too preoccupied 
with troubles of their own to intervene.216 The Swiss civil war was closely followed 
by liberal or radical uprisings in France, Italy, Austria, Hungary, Prussia, Ireland, 
and Romania in 1848, the same year in which Karl Marx published The Communist 
Manifesto. 217 
The task of redrafting the new confederation's constitution went to a handful of far-
sighted moderates, who laid aside party feeling to serve their country: Ulrich 
Ochsenbein, Joseph Munzinger, J Conrad Kern, Henri Druey, Jonas Furrer/18 and 
Johann Rittimann.219 As a group, they understood that the political and economic 
turmoil in Switzerland was caused by the conflicting claims of large and small 
cantons. They were also familiar with the United States Constitution, especially as 
Troxler, a Lucerne philosopher, had drawn attention to America's bicameral system 
as early as 1832 as the only way to reconcile the interests of large and small 
cantons.220 Rittimann, who had supported the bicameral solution in the press, was 
particularly knowledgeable in this regard as he was the author of several important 
works on the American constitutional system. 221 Munzinger was also an influential 
advocate of bicameralism. 
21~erold, above n 5,40-41; see also Kohn, above n 38, 86-87. 
215Bonjour, above n 1, 257-267. 
216Above; Kohn, above n 38, 99-103; Herold, above n 5, 40-41. The Confederation lost 78 lives, the 
Sonderbund even fewer. In addition, the victors were not particularly vindictive, limiting their 
response to the expulsion of the Jesuits for all time, the levy of flnes, and the revision of the federal 
constitution. Above. 
2170 Robinson, T Fergus, and W Gordon An Introduction to European Legal History (Professional 
Books Ltd, Abingdon, Oxon, 1985) 440. 
218Bonjour, above n 1, 267. 
219Kohn, above n 38, 108. 
220See Oechsli, above n 2, 396. 
221Kohn, above n 38, 108. 
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Despite initial opposition to bicameralism, the Revision Commission accepted the 
concept on 23 March 1848 when its members concluded that Troxler was right. 222 It 
offered the only way to reconcile the wish for centralised authority with the existence 
of cantonal sovereignty. The bicameral solution required creating a two House 
legislature, one which would represent the Swiss nation as a whole on the basis of 
population and the other which would represent the cantons on a one-to-one basis. 
The solution provided the Commission with a means by which to make acceptable 
inroads into cantonal sovereignty while enhancing the power of the confederation,223 
that is, "to accommodate the needs of national unity with the survival of the 
sovereignty, traditions and rights of the individual cantons. ,,224 
Accordingly, the Commission proposed a constitution that clearly delineated federal 
and cantonal competencies. In addition, it would "establish one Swiss citizenship, 
one Swiss foreign policy, one customs union, one national economy," and provide 
identical political and civil liberties for all Swiss who would also have the right to live 
and work in any canton.225 To further the process of harmonisation of laws and 
rights, the Commission also proposed that cantons be required to ask the federal 
government to guarantee their constitutions. 226 The federal government would only 
guarantee a cantonal constitution if it had been ratified by the electors and it contained 
a clause which would allow the electors to revise it. 227 The Commission extended the 
revision requirement to the proposed constitution, which effectively introduced a 
cumbersome version of the constitutional initiative. Using it to add, delete, or modify 
a provision could only be achieved through the fiction of revising the entire 
constitution, which required dissolving the legislature and holding fresh elections. 
The text read as follows: 228 
The Federal Constitution may be amended at any time. Amendment is secured through 
the forms required for passing federal laws. When either council of the Federal 
Assembly passes a resolution for the amendment of the Federal Constitution and the 
other council does not agree, or when 50,000 Swiss voters demand a revision, the 
question whether the Federal Constitution ought to be revised is, in either case, 
submitted to a vote of the Swiss people, voting Yes or No. If, in either case, the 
majority of the Swiss citizens who vote pronounce in the affirmative, there shall be a 
new election of both councils for the purpose of preparing a draft of the revised 
constitution. The revised Federal Constitution shall come into force when it has been 
adopted by the majority of Swiss citizens who take part in the vote thereon and by a 
majority of the states. 
2220echsli, above n 2,396-397. 
223Bonjour, above n 1, 268-269; see also Adams, above n 1, 22. 
2~ohn, above n 38, 111. 
225Above. 
226See Martin, above n 2, 226. 
227Deploige, above n 1, 80 (quoting Article 6). 
228Above (quoting Articles 111, 112, 113, 114). 
78 
In keeping with the ratification process developed in the cantons during the 
Regeneration, the Diet submitted the Commission's proposed constitution to the 
cantons for approval. The cantons were given two months to decide whether to 
approve or reject it. With the exception of Fribourg, the issue was decided in each 
canton by the electors, who overwhelmingly embraced the proposal: 15.5 cantons 
approved, 6.5 disapproved; 1,897,887 electors voted for it, 293,371 voted against 
it. 229 Unlike the Swiss Confederation or its restored counterpart, the legitimacy of the 
new federal constitutional system rested upon the electors rather than the cantons. Its 
approval "was a national act which had the people behind it. ,,230 By requiring the 
approval of the electors and including a means by which they could call for its total 
revision, the Constitution of 1848 acknowledged the sovereignty of the people. Any 
rewrite of the Constitution would have to be submitted to and approved by the electors 
before taking effect. 23l Further, the electors, for the first time, had the means to 
revise the federal constitution. 
6 Constitution of 1874 
The Constitution of 1848 laid the foundations for a permanent solution to the problem 
of national unity and local autonomy. It also created a representative democracy more 
attuned to the aspirations of the Swiss. However, it did not fully account for an 
important aspect of Swiss political culture; that is, its long term experience with direct 
participation in the exercise of governmental power, particularly in the 
Landsgemeinde cantons. Eventually, under the leadership of the Swiss Democrats, a 
group which grew out of the Radical Party due to the abuses associated with 
representative democracy, 232 the cantons adopted the initiative in addition to the 
legislative referendum. This movement set the stage for the revision of the 
Constitution of 1848 and led to the adoption of the legislative referendum on the 
federal level in 1874 and a more flexible version of the constitutional initiative in 
1891. 
229Bonj our , above n 1, 269-272; see also Oechsli , above n 2, 399. The number of electors voting 
appears large when compared to the number voting on the Constitution of 1874. See below text 
accompanying note 278. However, both Bonjour and Oechsli use these figures . The variation could be 
attributed to looser electoral practices in 1848 than in 1874, particularly regarding the criteria used, if 
any, for determining who might have been eligible to vote. 
230Bonjour, above n 1, 269; see also Steinberg, above n 3, 35. 
23l Adams, above n 1, 77. 
232E Gruner and K Pitterle "Switzerland's Political Parties" in H Penniman (ed) Switzerland at the 
Polls: The National Elections of 1979 (American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 
Washington, DC, 1983) 37; Oechsli, above n 2, 407 . 
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(a) The rise of the Swiss Democrats 
Between 1848 and 1874, due largely to the excesses of elected representatives or those 
perceived to be influencing them,233 the demand for greater participation in the 
exercise of cantonal and federal governmental power grew. 234 The Great Council in 
Neuchatel, for example, outraged its electors by granting "a very high subsidy ... to 
a railway of merely local importance," which forced it to adopt a law in 1858 which 
required "every loan or fmancial undertaking exceeding the sum of 500,000 francs [to 
be] submitted to the people for their ratification. ,,235 By the 1860s, however, the 
ruling classes in rural districts and urban areas were generally well-to-do. They used 
the economic freedom created by the Constitution of 1848 and their offices in cantonal 
governments to strengthen their positions as leaders of commerce and industry . 
Business interests came to dominate administrative and legislative decisions, and 
"[p]olicy was in the hands of a few. ,, 236 
The domination of the political system by "prosperous industrialists and city bosses" 
was repugnant to a growing middle class whose access to formal education and a free 
press made them far more politically sophisticated than previous generations. 237 The 
industrial revolution also created problems which ruling elites were unable or 
unwilling to resolve. The peasantry and artisan classes, for example, were in want 
and often starving. They increasingly called upon their governments to improve their 
condition by alleviating the burden of military duty, improving access to and the 
quality of education, reducing the price of salt, imposing taxes equally, and creating 
cantonal banks.238 The working class , which came into being as a consequence of 
shorter hours and better conditions than those 
Eventually, people from these non-privileged 
industrialisation,239 "pressed for 
provided under existing laws. ,,240 
classes, with the support of some self-styled intellectuals and left-wing elements 
within the Radical Party, began to organise themselves as the Swiss Democrats.241 
They were united in their "fierce opposition to the old rulers of the moneyed 
aristocracy" and their belief that the power of the state should be placed into their 
hands. 242 
233See Bonjour, above n 1, 300-301. 
234See Thurer, above n 2, 118; see also generally Deploige, above n 1, 82-123. 
235Deploige, above n 1, 82. Berne was also forced to adopt the fmancial referendum in the late 1860s 
due to a railway funding scandal which broke after the Radicals controlling the cantonal legislature 
"voted subsidies to new railways which had exceeded the ordinary revenue of the state." Deploige, 
above n 1, 83. 
236Bonj our , above n 1, 299; see also Thurer, above n 2, 120. 
237Thurer, above n 2, 120. 
238K Dandliker A Short History of Switzerland (Swan Sonnenschein & Co Ltd, London, 1899) 284. 
239Martin, above n 2, 235. 
240Thurer, above n 2, 120. 
241Above; Gruner, above n 232,37. 
242Bonjour, above n 1, 300; see also Thurer, above n 2, 120. 
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In 1845, Vaud amended its constitution to provide for the legislative initiative. Under 
this system, 8,000 (subsequently 6,000) electors could present legislative proposals to 
the electors for their approval. This position was reached after Henri Druey, the 
president of Vaud's Great Council and subsequently one of the authors of the 
Constitution of 1848, proposed that all laws and decrees be submitted to the electors 
for approval. In 1852, Aargau established a legislative initiative which could be 
triggered by 5,000 electors. Outside of the Landsgemeinde cantons, these systems 
were the ftrst of their kind in Switzerland. 243 
No doubt influenced by these examples, the Swiss Democrats and their supporters 
"pinned their hopes on having a direct say in legislation. ,,244 Accordingly, "they 
worked tirelessly throughout Switzerland to establish popular control over local and 
national government through the introduction of the initiative, the referendum, and 
direct election of the executive. ,,245 Widespread mistrust of government, believed to 
be harnessed to economic interests, fuelled the success of the Swiss Democrats. 246 
Between 1860 and 1874, they managed to incorporate direct democracy devices into 
the constitutions of 20 cantons. 247 
(b) Rural then urban victories 
The Swiss Democrats won their ftrst victory m Rural Basel in 1863, under the 
leadership of Christopher Rolle. 248 Inspired by the introduction of mandatory fmancial 
referendums in Neuchatel in 1858 and Vaud in 1861, which gave the electors the right 
to approve "extensive new schemes of expenditure," Rural Basel introduced a 
mandatory referendum for all laws and generally binding decrees passed by the Great 
Council. 249 Rolle and his supporters also managed to secure the introduction of the 
initiative.250 The electors in this canton were effectively transformed into law-makers 
akin to the full citizens of the Landsgemeinde cantons.251 The original Swiss 
conception of self-government, as initially manifested in the ancient alpine popular 
assemblies in the 1230s, had at long last found a modern form. Through its 
2430echsli, above n 2, 406-407; Deploige, above n 1, 76-77, 81. 
244Thurer, above n 2, 120. 
245Gruner , above n 232, 37. 
246Bonjour, above n 1, 300-301. 
247Gruner, above n 232,37. 
248Dandlik:er, above n 238, 285. 
2490echsli, above n 2, 406; Deploige, above n 1, 83. It took 1,500 electors to trigger the legislative 
referendum in Rural Basel. Above . 
25oDandlik:er, above n 238, 285; Thurer, above n 2, 120-121. They also instituted the direct election of 
the executive and the judiciary. Dandlik:er, above n 238,285. 
25 I Thurer, above n 2, 121. According to Oechsli, the constitutional initiative predates the legislative 
initiative, which is logical given the prior existence of the constitutionally required referendum; 
however, he does not supply any supporting evidence (dates or cantons). See Oechsli, above n 1, 406-
407. Further, Basel adopted the legislative initiative in 1863. The device only required 1,500 citizens 
to trigger. Oechsli, above n 1, 407. 
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introduction of the initiative and referendum, Rural Basel had succeeded in extending 
the participatory principles of the Landsgemeinde to larger and more geographical 
dispersed populations. It would only be a matter of time before the idea would fmd 
its way into the federal constitution. 
A few years later, Zurich provided the Swiss Democrats with their fIrst urban and 
most crucial test. In many respects, the struggle anticipated the battle that would be 
waged between the Progressives and the Southern PacifIc Railroad in California 
between 1890 and 1911.252 The Liberals accepted the Constitution of 1848, but joined 
the Catholics in opposition to the Radical Party when it came to defending what 
remained of cantonal sovereignty. Under the leadership of Alfred Escher, a Zurich 
banking and railroad magnate, the Liberals effectively governed Switzerland.253 
Escher, who had studied law in Germany, was from a wealthy family; he was also 
extremely well connected. By the age of 29, he was burgomaster of Zurich, and its 
dominate personality. At 30 he was President of the National Council, a position he 
held on three other occasions.254 When Jakob Stamflil, an advocate for state 
intervention, led the Radicals in a campaign to nationalise Switzerland's growing 
railroad network, Escher managed to block the move .255 The obvious nexus of 
Escher's business interests and his politics caused resentment, and his "critics assailed 
him bitterly as the 'banklord' and 'railway king'. ,, 256 
The Swiss Democrats used this resentment to win support in Zurich, as Escher 
personifIed Zurich's representative democracy system and all that the Swiss 
Democrats found wrong with it. 257 By 1867 public antipathy toward Escher was 
overwhelming. The Swiss Democrats capitalised on it by organising huge public 
meetings in Zurich, Uster, Winterthur, and Bulach on 15 December 1867. Despite 
bad weather, the Swiss Democrats collected approximately 26,500 signatures in 
favour of a constitutional revision, nearly three times the 10,000 required under 
Zurich law to revise the constitution. A constitutional council drew up a new 
constitution, which was submitted to the electors for ratifIcation in 1869.258 The 
constitutional council produced a document which was faithful to the credo of the 
Swiss Democrats. Article one stated: 259 
The power of the state rests on the people as a whole. It is exercised directly through 
the citizens, and only indirectly through the authorities and officials . 
252See generally chapter five, below. 
253See Gruner, above n 232, 36. 
254Thurer, above n 2, 121. 
255Gruner, above n 232,37. 
256Thurer, above n 2, 121. 
257See above; see also Dandliker, above n 238, 285. 
258Thurer, above n 2, 121; Dandliker, above n 238,285 . 
259Thurer, above n 2, 121. 
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Accordingly, the document incorporated a mandatory legislative referendum, which 
required all legislative enactments to be submitted to the electors every spring and 
autumn. In cases of urgency, the legislature could hold an extraordinary referendum. 
Further, all annually recurring items of expenditure over 20,000 francs and every 
single capital expenditure item over 200,000 francs had to be referred to the electors 
for approval. In addition, it incorporated the initiative, which could be triggered by 
the signatures of 5,000 electors supporting any proposal for the enactment, 
modification, or repeal of a law. 260 
The electors approved the revised constitution by an overwhelming majority in 1869. 
On a turnout of 90 percent, approximately 50,000 voted for it and 7,300 voted against 
it. 261 Escher's vaulted position in the canton collapsed with the disintegration of the 
political machine he had controlled.262 The Great Council of Zurich shed its 
authoritarian character and became a consultative institution.263 Zurich's example was 
influential because it showed that institutions which had previously been limited to 
small rural cantons could be used successfully in large urban cantons.264 Thurgau, 
Aargau, Solothurn, Lucerne, and Berne adopted similar constitutions in the same 
year. 265 Gradually all of the cantons, in one form or another, adopted the initiative 
and referendum. 266 
(c) Revising the Constitution of 1848 
More importantly, the victory in Zurich gave the Swiss Democrats the momentum 
they needed to win support for the revision of the Constitution of 1848. As in the 
period leading up to the Constitution of 1848, constitutional change in the cantons 
eventually produced constitutional change on the federal level. 267 By 1874, after 
rejecting proposals in 1866 and 1872 as too centralist in character, 268 the electors were 
2600echsli, above n 2, 407. In each case, the vote had to be yes or no, and effected by ballot cast in the 
elector's commune on a day appointed by the commune under the supervision of the electoral bureau. 
Above. The new constitution also provided for free education, created a cantonal bank, and abolished 
the death penalty, imprisonment of debtors, and the holding of offices for life. Thurer, above n 2, 121; 
Dandliker, above n 238,285. 
261 Thurer , above n 2, 121; Dandliker, above n 238, 285. 
262Bonjour, above n 1,301. 
263Thurer, above n 2, 121-122. The dire predictions made by dethroned magnates and bureaucrats were 
not fulfilled. Above. 
264See Martin, above n 2, 235. 
265Above; Thurer, above n 2,121-122; Dandliker, above n 238,285; Bonjour, above n 1,301. 
266Bonjour, above n 1, 301 (Fribourg held out until 1921); see also Adams, above n 1, 80. In some 
cantons all laws and important fmancial matters must be submitted to the electors, but in others a 
certain number of electors must sign a petition requesting a legislative referendum. Oechsli, above n 2, 
408. 
267Bonjour, above n 1, 299; see also Dandliker, above n 238, 285. 
268See Adams, above n 1, 21; see also Dandliker, above n 238, 285-286; Kohn, above n 38, 113. The 
electors, however, did approve a constitutional amendment in 1866 which granted political rights to 
Jews. Above. The central authorities put forward this constitutionally required referendum "after 
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disposed to ratify a total revision of the Constitution of 1848. The Swiss Democrats 
were aided in their cause by the national concern generated by the pan-European 
fallout of two events which occurred in 1870: the unification of Germany under 
Bismarck, which led to the Franco-Prussian War, and the declaration of papal 
infallibility.269 
Although German and French populations would have been expected to divide in their 
appreciation of Bismarck's Kulturkampj,270 they were united in their fear of his 
aggressive expansionism especially given the weakness of the federal military 
structure,271 which gave centralists their "one law, one army" slogan.272 Although the 
papal infallibility declaration gave Protestants and Catholics new grounds upon which 
to oppose one another, it ironically brought them closer together as the Protestants 
viewed the dogma as arrogance and the old Catholics perceived it as inconsistent with 
their traditional faith, which provided centralists, who stood for the supremacy of 
secular power, with additional support. 273 
These two events, along with a desire for a greater say in the exercise of federal 
governmental power, convinced the electors that revision of the Constitution of 1848 
was necessary despite the increased centralisation it would bring. 274 The 1872 
revision, which was rejected by a majority of the electors (261 ,072 to 255,609) and a 
majority of cantons (13 to 9), included both the legislative referendum and a flexible 
form of the constitutional initiative. 275 To ensure cantonal support, the drafters of the 
1874 revision made a number of compromises to appease the French-speaking Swiss 
who had been unwilling to relinquish any more cantonal autonomy and who were 
worried about being dominated by German-speaking Swiss. 276 In the process, the 
initiative provision was dropped from the 1874 revision. However, the 1874 revision 
retained the direct democracy devices introduced with the Constitution of 1848 and 
France had said it would conclude a trade treaty only if all French residents in Switzerland were 
guaranteed these rights, irrespective of their religion. " Thurer, above n 2, 119; see also Deploige, 
above n 1, 91-93 . 
269Hughes, above n 103, 106; Kohn, above n 38, 113; Thurer, above n 2, 123; Martin, above n 2,235. 
270The term can be translated literally as "culture battle," but in this context it was understood to mean 
"Germanification. " 
271See Thurer, above n 2, 123; Hughes, above n 103, 106. 
272Martin, above n 2, 235 ; Thurer, above n 2, 123 . 
273See Thurer, above n 2, 123. 
274See Oechsli, above n 2, 409; Thurer, above n 2, 123. The revision of 1874, for example, 
established the principle of freedom of conscience and of religion in all the cantons, which depoliticised 
religion and ended the long conflict between Protestants and Catholics. Kohn, above n 38, 113-114. 
275Deploige, above n 1, 110-111; J Aubert "Switzerland" in Butler and Ranney, above n 30, 50; 
Thurer, above n 2, 123 (but stating incorrectly that a majority of the electors supported the 1872 
revision, 256,000 to 216,(00). 
276Above. 
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added the legislative referendum, which could be triggered by 30,000 electors or 8 
cantons.277 
On 19 April 1874, the electors (340,199 to 198,013) and the cantons (14.5 to 7.5) 
approved the total revision of the Constitution of 1848/ 78 which established the 
legislative referendum on the federal level. The Constitution of 1874, as amended, is 
still in effect; it is the foundation upon which the modern Swiss state rests. 279 Soon 
after the Constitution of 1874 came into being, a number of cantons which had not 
adopted direct democracy proceeded to introduce the initiative, the referendum, or 
both. For example, Baselstadt followed in 1875, Schaffhausen in 1876, Geneva in 
1881, Neuchatel in 1882, and Ticino in 1883 .280 Fribourg managed to hold out until 
1921.281 Today, each canton allows its electors to participate in the exercise of 
governmental power in one way or another. 
From 1874 onwards, due to continual pressure for centralised action of one kind or 
another, the electors gradually transformed the Constitution of 1874 by ratifying 
constitutionally required referendums. The electors acquired direct control over this 
revision process with the inclusion of a more flexible form of the constitutional 
initiative in the Constitution of 1874 on 5 July 1891 that could be used for partial 
revisions. Like the total revision version, it could be triggered by 50,000 electors. 282 
However, it provided greater flexibility as it eliminated the need to dissolve the 
legislature and hold fresh elections. More importantly, it gave the power to draft 
specific amendments to those who use it, which meant they no longer had to rely on a 
reconstituted legislature to draft and put forward their proposal. The device received 
the support of 18 cantons and 60.3 percent of those voting (181,882 to 120,372) on a 
turnout of 49.3 percent. 283 In 1961, it was used to propose the introduction of the 
legislative initiative. However, the proposal was rejected by all the cantons and 60.1 
percent of those voting on a turnout of 40.1 percent. 284 
277Adams, above n 1, 77; Dandliker, above n 238,288. 
278Thurer, above n 2, 124; Bonjour, above n 1, 269-272; J Aubert "Switzerland" in Butler and Ranney, 
above n 30, 50; Kohn, above n 38, 113 (stating in contradiction to the preceding authorities that the 
cantonal result was 13.5 to 8.5); Deploige, above n 1, 116-117 (same). 
279Bonj our , above n 1, 269-272. 
280Dandiiker, above n 238, 285. 
281Bonjour, above n 1, 301. 
2820echsli, above n 2, 414; see also Thurer, above n 2, 119-120; Martin, above n 2, 237 (stating also 
that all international treaties of certain duration became subject to the referendum in 1921). 
283Deploige, above n 1, 123; J Aubert "Switzerland" in Butler and Ranney, above n 30,51 
284J Aubert "Switzerland" in Butler and Ranney, above n 30, 59; see also Steinberg, above n 3, 76. 
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IV ASSESSMENT 
Although its contemporaries believed the importance of the Constitution of 1874 
concerned its readjustment of the distribution of governmental power between federal 
and cantonal authorities, its most significant and enduring innovation has proven to be 
the introduction of direct democracy on the federallevel. 285 The Constitution of 1848 
was based on a "strict and inflexible division of state competencies between 
confederation and cantons. ,,286 However, the Constitution of 1874 "completely 
changed the situation by introducing a convenient means for modifying it at any 
moment. ,,287 
The framers of the Constitution of 1848 had intended to install a pure liberal 
representative democracy in Switzerland modelled after the United States 
constitutional system.288 The purity of their experiment, however, was short-lived, 
largely because it ignored native and long-standing experience with direct democracy. 
Given the ideals, traditions, and legends which had shaped Swiss constitutional 
development, pure representative democracy could only persist in Switzerland as long 
as direct democracy remained impractical, especially during periods in which 
economic and social uncertainty coincided with a widespread belief that elected 
representatives were serving the interests of privileged elites rather than giving effect 
to the general will. 
The Swiss Democrats came into being during such a period. Well-to-do members of 
the ruling Radical-Liberal grouping controlled nearly every representative legislature 
in Switzerland. Their brief was self-serving, particularly with respect to advancing 
the economic interests of their class, which deprived them of the ability to deal 
adequately with the dislocation and hardship caused by the industrial revolution. The 
Swiss Democrats, who represented the interests of the non-privileged classes, grew 
out of this grouping. Initially a protest party, the Swiss Democrats eventually became 
an extremely influential and successful reform party. Their success was founded on 
promoting a means by which to bring direct democracy to large geographically 
dispersed populations. 
By doing so, they found a way to limit the legislative power of representative 
assemblies and to satisfy an ancient Swiss desire for localised self-rule. The 
legislative referendum gave the electors the means to veto legislation passed by their 
representatives; the initiative gave the electors the power to enact laws should their 
285Martin, above n 2, 237. 
286Above. 
287Above. 
288See Herold, above n 5, 161. 
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representatives prove to be unrepresentative or unresponsive. The Radicals believed 
that the Constitution of 1848 "meant the [mal realization of the liberties won by the 
Swiss in 1291. ,,289 However, this was not achieved until 1891 when the Constitution 
of 1874 contained both the legislative referendum and a flexible form of the 
constitutional initiative. At that moment, the Swiss completed the process of 
regaining the kind of democracy that had characterised the three original cantons (Uri, 
Schwyz, and Unterwalden) and the still older popular assemblies of Switzerland's 
ancient Teutonic invaders. 290 
Ironically, the process began when the French imposed a centralised form of 
government on Switzerland through the guise of a nationwide referendum on the 
Helvetic Republic. During the Regeneration, the legitimacy of cantonal constitutions 
was, as a matter of practice, established by submitting them to the electors. This 
practice was also used to establish the Constitution of 1848. In time, due mainly to 
the efforts of the Swiss Democrats, this practice was extended in the cantons to 
legislation and constitutional amendments in the form of the legislative referendum, 
the legislative initiative, and the constitutional initiative. Shaped by these 
developments, the Constitution of 1874 had, by 1891, incorporated the legislative 
referendum and the constitutional initiative. 
With these constitutional changes, both on the cantonal and the federal levels, pure 
representative democracy gave way in Switzerland to a hybrid form of democracy 
which combined elements of representative and direct democracy .291 In doing so, the 
Swiss Democrats replaced the liberal ideal of parliamentary sovereignty with the 
democratic ideal of sovereignty of the people. 292 The sovereignty of each canton 
resides in the people of each canton.293 The electors are the ultimate law-makers. 294 
As discussed in the next chapter, the constitutional system in which they participate is 
built from the bottom up. 295 Political and social order emanates first from the 
communes, then the cantons , and [mally from the federal government. The electors 
are ultimately responsible for legislative outcomes in Switzerland, as they are the 
ultimate authority . Switzerland's direct democracy devices , in effect, have made the 
electors the most important limitation on the legislative power exercised by their 
elected representatives . 
289Herold, above n 5, 4l. 
29OHerold, above n 5,41, 162; see also Bonjour, above n 1, 300; Oechsli, above n 2,405. 
291Por a discussion of Cronin's hybrid model of democracy, see section IV in chapter two. 
292See Bonjour, above n 1, 300, 30l. 
293 Adams, above n 1, 117. 
294Bonjour, above n 1, 300. 
295Steinberg, above n 3,27; see also Siegfried, above n 9, 142-143. 
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4 
ROLE OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN SWITZERLAND 
The role direct democracy plays in Switzerland's constitutional system reflects its 
origins. The Swiss embraced direct democracy to counter the excesses associated 
with representative democracy during the industrial revolution. They included the 
legislative referendum and the constitutional initiative in the Constitution of 1874 to 
curb the legislative power of elected representatives, primarily to prevent their 
representatives from depriving them of their rights, particularly regarding their local 
autonomy. By providing the electors with the means to propose, enact, and veto 
laws, these direct democracy devices ended Switzerland's brief, and largely un-Swiss, 
experiment with pure representative democracy. 
The Swiss constitutional system is built from the bottom up. In Diceyan terms, the 
electors are both the legal and political sovereign. Law and order emanates from 
them, first through the communes, then the cantons, and [mally the federal 
government. Direct democracy has made the electors responsible for legislative 
outcomes in Switzerland. The electors are the ultimate authority, and they have the 
governmental power to exercise that authority. However, this power, like that 
exercised by their representatives, is not unlimited. The legislative referendum and 
the constitutional initiative are subject to procedural safeguards which limit their 
majoritarian potential. 
This chapter examines the relationship between the cantons and the federal 
government, the structure of the federal government, particularly its legislative, 
executive, and judicial branches, and the constitutional initiative and the legislative 
referendum. Although the Constitution of 1874 is at the heart of the discussion, the 
works of Nicholas Gillett, Oswald Sigg, Jean-Francois Aubert, Erich Gruner, Jurg 
Steiner, George Codding, and Christopher Hughes provide useful insights into the 
actual operation of the system. I 
IN Gillett The Swiss Constitution: Can it Be Exported? (Yes Publications, Bristol, 1989); 0 Sigg 
Switzerland's Political Institutions (3 ed, Pro Helvetia, Zurich, 1988); J Aubert "The Swiss Federal 
Constitution" and E Gruner "The Political System of Switzerland" in Modem Switzerland (The Society 
for the Promotion of Science and Scholarship Inc, Palo Alto, 1978); J Aubert "Switzerland" in D Butler 
and A Ranney (eds) Referendums: A Comparative Study of Theory and Practice (American Enterprise 
Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington, DC, 1978); J Steiner Amicable Agreement Versus 
Majority Rule: Conflict Resolution in Switzerland (rev ed, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel 
Hill, 1974); G Codding The Federal Government of Switzerland (Houghton Mifflin Co., Boston, 1961); 
C Hughes Federal Constitution of Switzerland (Claredon Press, Oxford, 1954). 
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By examining the constituent parts of Switzerland's constitutional system and their 
relationship to the constitutional initiative and legislative referendum, this chapter 
provides a basis for understandin the role that these direct de r..y....devices..play iB-.. 
the safeguards built into these direct democr c e ative 
power the ive to the electors. Both insights provide the background for a 
comparative analysis in Parts III and IV of the role that direct democracy plays in 
California and New Zealand and the safeguards built into their respective direct 
democracy devices. In addition to demonstrating that direct democracy is integral to 
Switzerland's constitutional system, this chapter provides the basis for understanding 
the differences between the direct democracy systems that exist in Switzerland, 
California, and New Zealand. 
I RELATIONSHIP OF CANTONS TO FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 
As chapter three showed, the Constitution of 1874 is the product of a long and 
complex history focussed primarily upon a desire for local autonomy and a need to 
secure it through unity. The Swiss cantons came together out of economic and 
political necessity despite their heterogeneous composition. They united to preserve 
their sovereignty, not to relinquish it. 2 As Aubert has noted, the Swiss constitutional 
system is designed "to fortify the Swiss nation while guaranteeing the continued 
existence of the cantons. ,,3 Direct democracy is a vital component of this guarantee. 
A Division of Power 
Switzerland is a federal state consisting of 23 sovereign cantons, of which three are 
divided into half-cantons.4 The cantons exercise all the sovereign rights which the 
Constitution of 1874 has not explicitly or implicitly assigned to the federal 
government or which it has forbidden them to exercise.5 As Sigg has observed, they 
are not administrative regions in a central state, but "independent small states with 
their own political institutions. ,,6 With the exception of Jura, all of the cantons 
~ 
2See generally H Kohn Nationalism and Liberty: The Swiss Example (Greenwood Press, Westport, 
Connecticut, 1979); B Barber The Death of Communal Liberty: A History of Freedom in a Swiss 
Mountain Canton (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1974). 
3Aubert "The Swiss Federal Constitution" in Modern Switzerland, above n 1, 297; see also Fed Const 
Swiss, preamble, arts 1,2, 3, and 5. 
4Fed Const Swiss, art 1. For discussions of Swiss federalism, see M Frenkel "Swiss Federalism in the 
Twentieth Century" in Modern Switzerland, above n 1, 323; V Bogdanor, "Federalism in Switzerland" 
(1988) 23 Gov't & Opp 69. 
5 Aubert "The Swiss Federal Constitution" in Modern Switzerland, above n 1, 303. 
6Sigg, above n 1, 12. This arrangement melds well with popular sentiment, as most Swiss place more 
importance in their canton than in their country. Gillett, above n 1, 19. 
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predate the federal government. 7 From a cantonal perspective, federalism in 
Switzerland is a means of maintaining cantonal independence while promoting 
economic growth and securing territorial integrity through unity. 8 
n theory, the division of power between the cantons and the federal government falls 
roughly into four categories: areas in which the federal government is solely 
responsible, that is, customs, coinage of money and issue of bank notes, post and 
communications, and railways and shipping; areas in which the cantons are solely 
responsible, that is, police, social welfare, subsidised housing, and church affairs; 
areas in which the cantons execute legislation enacted by the federal government, that 
is, weights and measures, traffic regulations, military organisation, labour 
regulations, social security, and the civil and penal codes; and areas in which the 
cantons and the federal government share responsibility, that is, taxation, road-
building, hunting and fishing, health insurance, and education. 9 
In practice, the division of powers is more complex. In the area of education, for 
example, primary schooling is exclusively a cantonal concern, which has led to 
differences in primary education from canton to canton. Secondary education can 
also bear a cantonal stamp, which has led to different matriculation examinations 
qualifying students for tertiary education. This has caused problems for Switzerland I s 
universities and polytechnics, which depend upon a comparable level of qualifications 
to make their admission decisions. In 1972, the federal government put forward a 
constitutional amendment that would have unified the start of the school year, the 
period of compulsory school attendance, the school starting age, and the basic school 
text-books. to To win approval, all constitutional amendments, whether initiated by 
the federal government or the electors, require a double majority, that is, a majority 
of the electors who vote and a majority vote in the majority of the cantons.lI The 
amendment attracted a majority of the national vote, but it failed in a majority of the 
cantons. 12 However, in 1985, the electors and the cantons agreed to amend the 
Constitution of 1874 to unify the start of the school year. 13 
The cantons typically resist federal constitutional amendments that encroach upon 
their preserve in this fashion. As both Sigg and Aubert have observed, outright 
7 See below text accompany note 27. 
8See generally chapter two. 
9Sigg, above n 1, 13. 
tOSigg, above n 1, 14. 
IIPed Const Swiss, arts 120 and 121; see also Aubert "Switzerland" in Butler and Ranney, above n 1, 
41. 
12Tbe proposal attracted the support of 10.5 cantons and 52.8 percent of the electors on a turnout of 
27.5 percent. Aubert" Switzerland" in Butler and Ranney, above n 1, 61. 
13Sigg, above n 1, 14. 
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rejection is usually followed some years later by an acceptable compromise. 14 
Between 29 May 1874 and 31 December 1976, for example, the Swiss voted on 174 
amendments to the Constitution of 1874, of which they rejected 83 and accepted 88. 15 
Of those rejected, the federal government initiated 27 and the electorate initiated 56. 
Of those accepted, the federal government initiated 81, while the electorate initiated 
seven. 16 Most of the amendments that were accepted were rejected when they were 
flrst proposed,17 generally because they were considered too centralist in their original 
form, that is, the electors believed that they augmented federal governmental power at 
the expense of cantonal governmental power to an unacceptable degree. 
B Principle of Local Autonomy 
To an extent this cantonal resistance demonstrates the innate desire of the cantons to 
remain autonomous in their internal affairs. The electors, with a view toward 
preserving the sovereignty of their cantons, have consistently used direct democracy 
to prevent the federal government from introducing measures that would have given 
the federal government the power to deal with problems concerning regional 
development, economic growth, the media, education, and federal fmances. 18 
Ironically, however, most of the constitutional amendments that have won acceptance 
have actually extended the power of the federal government. 19 
This development is attributable to several factors. First, the federal government has 
been far more successful than the electorate in amending the Constitution of 1874 
because it generally proposes well-vetted proposals and counter proposals which are 
more attractive to electors as they enjoy the broad-based support of their elected 
representatives. In addition, constitutional initiatives put forward by the electors 
generally come from groups that have decided to appeal directly to the nation because 
they have failed to gain the support of a sufflcient number of their elected 
representatives, which means they tend to lack broad-based support.20 Second, the 
framers of the Constitution, when determining the competencies of the cantons and 
the federal government, were guided more by the principle of cantonal sovereignty 
than the practical considerations involved in running a modern state. 21 Experience has 
14Above; Aubert "The Swiss Federal Constitution" in Modern Switzerland, above n 1, 300. 
15 Aubert "The Swiss Federal Constitution" in Modern Switzerland, above n 1, 300. 
16Aubert "The Swiss Federal Constitution" in Modern Switzerland, above n 1, 302. 
17 Aubert "The Swiss Federal Constitution" in Modern Switzerland, above n 1, 300. 
18Sigg, above n 1, 14-15. 
19 Aubert "The Swiss Federal Constitution" in Modern Switzerland, above n 1, 300 (several concerned 
golitical institutions, and some dealt with personal freedoms and rights of the individual). 
oSee Aubert "The Swiss Federal Constitution" in Modern Switzerland, above n 1, 301. 
21See generally chapter three. 
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since revealed some areas which the cantons and the electors have agreed would be 
better served or dealt with by federal authorities . 22 
However, Switzerland's survival depends on the co-existence of its various linguistic 
and cultural groupings. 23 The need to maintain this co-existence is the overriding 
factor governing the relationship between the cantons and the federal government. To 
preserve their identity, the cantons must be in a strong position relative to the federal 
government. The Constitution is built upon this principle. Despite the centralising 
effects of constitutional amendments since 1874, this principle still constitutes the 
essence of Swiss federalism. 
C Role of Direct Democracy 
Direct democracy safeguards this principle. As Sigg has stated, "direct democracy .. 
. with its tendency towards autonomy, leads, by its very nature, to decisions being 
made by smaller units. ,,24 For example, the Constitution lists the cantons which make 
up Switzerland.25 This means that a canton cannot be created or eliminated without a 
formal revision of the Constitution. 26 The people of Jura, who had considered 
themselves a disadvantaged linguistic and denominational minority in the canton of 
Berne, waged a long and determined campaign for their autonomy. In 1978 they won 
the political support necessary to amend the Constitution of 1874 which allowed the 
canton of Jura to come into being. 27 Direct democracy provided a peaceful solution to 
a difficult minority problem in a way that was acceptable to the majority involved.28 
Direct democracy also plays a crucial role within the cantons. Like the federal 
government, each canton gives its citizens the right to initiate changes to the canton's 
constitution or to veto newly enacted legislation.29 Many cantons also offer their 
citizens the right to initiate legislation. In some cantons , governmental expenditures 
beyond a certain amount must be submitted to the electors for approval if requested 
by the cantonal parliament or a specified number of electors. These legislative 
initiative and "fmance referendum" devices do not exist on the federal level. 
Essentially, the legislative power in the cantons is exercised by elected representatives 
22See Aubert "Switzerland" in Butler and Ranney, above n 1, 50-64 (listing the type, subject, and 
results of all federal referendums in Switzerland from 1866 to 1978). 
23Sigg, above n 1, 16. 
24Sigg, above n 1, 13. 
25Fed Const Swiss , art 1. 
26Aubert "The Swiss Federal Constitution" in Modern Switzerland, above n 1, 302. 
27Sigg, above n 1, 16; see also Gillett, above n 1, 104-108; Supplementary Material from the New 
York Times and the Associated Press , The New York Times, New York, USA, 25 September 1978, 24 . 
28Sigg, above n 1, 17. 
29Sigg, above n 1, 20. 
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in collaboration with the electors who have their say through direct democracy 
devices.30 
The cantons exert a formative influence on the federal government. 31 Federal 
authorities closely monitor political developments in the cantons and continually 
adjust their policies and legislative programs in light of these developments to reduce 
the likelihood of legislative referendums and constitutional initiatives, and to minimise 
the risk losing them.32 If a cantonal innovation proves successful, it will be copied 
elsewhere in Switzerland. For example, proportional representation was introduced 
into the cantons before being adopted on the federal level. Extending the franchise to 
women came about in the same way. Essentially, the Swiss question the assumption 
that legislation should lead public opinion on the grounds that it leads to a lack of 
respect for the law. They prefer the slow and steady pace of persuasion to legislative 
coercion because it ensures that a strong body of opinion supports the law. 33 In 
addition, the cantons are directly represented in the Council of States, which is the 
upper house of the Federal Assembly. 34 They participate in the formation of all 
federal legislation and in the election of the Federal Council, which is the executive 
branch of the federal government. 35 
In almost every respect, the Swiss constitutional system is designed from the bottom-
up rather than from the top-down. For example, the crucial governmental power to 
levy taxes is divided among the federal government and the cantons in manner that 
ensures that the cantons cannot be dominated by federal authorities. 36 Cantonal taxes 
are based on income while the federal government levies indirect taxes such as custom 
30Sigg, above n 1, 19. In the cantons, executive power is exercised by an executive council whose 
members are elected by the people. Sigg, above n 1, 19-20. 
31 Sigg, above n 1, 20. 
32See generally Steiner, above n 1; J Steiner and R Dorff A Theory of Political Decision Modes: 
Intraparty Decision Making in Switzerland (University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1980); C 
Schmid Conflict and Consensus in Switzerland (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1981); see 
also R Katz "Dimensions of Partisan Conflict in Swiss Cantons" (1984) 16 Comp Pol Stud 505. 
33Gillett, above n 1, 31, 33. 
34For a discussion of the Federal Assembly, see below text accompanying notes 43-67. 
35Gillett , above 1, 23. For a discussion of the Federal Council, see below text accompanying notes 68-
102. 
36Gillett, above n 1, 32, 38. 
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duties and taxes on alcohol and tobacco. 37 The communes account for 50 percent of 
the tax take, the cantons 40 percent, and the federal government 10 percent. 38 
In addition, despite the trend toward increasing the jurisdiction of the federal 
government, governmental administration is, whenever possible, pushed down from 
the federal government to the cantons, which ensures that the electors are close to 
those who have political power. 39 They are likely to have relatives, friends, 
acquaintances, or neighbours who take part in government, either as officials or 
elected representatives.40 This intimacy, as Gillett has reasoned, avoids the 'us-
against-them' mentality predominant in larger democracies. 41 In addition to being 
highly participatory, the system gives the cantons and their electors the greater 
portion of governmental power, which goes a long way toward protecting their 
interests. 
II CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 
As the framers of Switzerland's constitutional system were faced with the problem of 
bringing sovereign cantons together into a workable and durable political and 
economic union, they used the United States Constitution as their mode1. 42 In doing 
so, they embraced its principle of separating governmental power into three distinct 
and independent, but interrelated, branches: the legislature, the executive, and the 
jUdiciary. In keeping with this principle, this section describes each branch of the 
federal government, that is, the Federal Assembly, the Federal Council, and the 
Federal Tribunal, and outlines their relationship to the constitutional initiative and the 
legislative referendum. 
37Gillett, above n 1, 32. The Constitution of 1874 allows the federal government to impose the 
following taxes: privilege tax on exemption from military service (art 18(4», import duties (art 29(1», 
export rates (art 29(2», manufacture and sale of liquor (art 32bis), old age retirement pension levy (art 
34), gambling tax (art 35), post and telegraph revenue (art 36), stamp duties on securities and insurance 
premium receipts, income tax on moveable capital, lottery prizes and insurance payments, raw and 
manufactured tobacco, special taxes on residents abroad (art 41bis), a special consumption tax on 
petroleum and natural gas, their products, and beer (art 4lter), and a national defence tax (transitional 
Erovision art 8(3». 
8Address by Ambassador Michael von Schenck, Switzerland's Ambassador to New Zealand, entitled 
700 Years of Swiss Democracy, Institute of International Affairs (Shell House, Wellington, 7 November 
1991). 
39Gillett, above n 1, 29. 
4OGillett, above n 1, 29, 31, 33-34; see also C Hughes "The Relationship of the Citizens to 'His' 
Member of Parliament in the Swiss system of Government" in V Bogdanor (ed) Representatives of the 
People? (Gower, Hartshire, 1985) 224. 
4l Gillett, above n 1, 29. This intimacy also explains why the turnout in Swiss referendums is low by 
New Zealand standards. Voting at each referendum is not vital if the outcome is generally in 
accordance with one's expectations. In addition, an objectionable result can always be challenged in a 
subsequent referendum. 
42J Steinberg "Imitation of Switzerland: Historical Reflections" 23 Gov't & Opp 13, 15; Aubert 
"Switzerland" in Butler and Ranney, above n 1, 39. 
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A Federal Assembly (Legislature) 
The Swiss federal legislature is called the Federal Assembly, which consists of two 
chambers, the National Council and the Council of States. Aside from enacting 
legislation, its most important function is to elect the members of the Federal Council, 
the executive. Subject to the direct democracy rights conferred upon the electors and 
the cantons, the Federal Assembly exercises "the supreme power" of the federal 
government. 43 Its legislative authority, however, is more limited than this 
constitutional phrase suggests, as the Constitution reserves a great deal of power to 
the cantons, severely limits the federal power to tax,44 and gives the electors the 
power to veto federal enactments or to enact constitutional amendments that can 
modify or restrict the power of the Federal Council. 45 Furthermore, its members are 
part-time, have little secretarial support, and a limited amount of time to legislate, as 
the Federal Assembly is only in session for periods amounting to three months of the 
year. 46 
1 National Council 
The National Council has 200 representatives, who are distributed among the cantons 
in proportion to each canton's total population.47 In 1903, the Swiss overwhelmingly 
rejected a constitutional initiative that proposed to distribute representatives on the 
basis of the total number of Swiss citizens in each canton. 48 Each canton or half-
canton constitutes an electoral district. 49 Each canton is guaranteed at least one 
National Councillor. 50 
National Councillors are elected to serve a four year term. 51 The Swiss extended their 
term from three years in 1931, when they approved a constitutionally required 
referendum that proposed the extension. 52 Initially, the Swiss had multi-member 
districts, in which candidates were elected to the National Council by a simple 
majority, which typically required a second ballot. 53 Since 1919 they have used an 
43Ped Const SWISS, art 71. 
44Gillett, above n 1, 21-22; see also above note 37. 
45Ped Const Swiss, arts 89, 89bis, 120, and 121. 
46Gillett, above n 1, 20. 
47Ped Const Swiss, art 72. 
48Gillett, above n 1, 20. The proposal attracted the support of four cantons and 24.4 percent of the 
electors on a turnout of 53.3 percent. Aubert "Switzerland" in Butler and Ranney, above n 1, 53. 
49Ped Const Swiss, art 73. 
50Ped Const Swiss, art 72. 
5lCodding, above n 1, 74. 
52The proposal attracted the support of 13.5 cantons and 53.9 percent of the electors on a turnout of 
53.4 percent. Aubert "Switzerland" in Butler and Ranney, above n 1, 55. 
53See Codding, above n 1, 75. 
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open party list system of proportional representation. 54 As with many other national 
political institutions, this system was adopted after successful usage on the cantonal 
level. The campaign for proportional representation took more than 20 years to 
succeed and required three constitutional initiatives. 55 
2 Council of States 
The Council of States has 46 representatives, two from each canton and one from 
each half-canton. 56 Cantonal law governs the election of State Councillors. 
Originally, they were all elected indirectly by their respective cantonal assemblies or 
parliaments. Now most are elected directly by the electors. Most serve four year 
terms, although a few serve shorter terms.57 
The membership of the Council of States is very stable, well-educated, and well-
versed in cantonal matters. 58 As a general rule, only those who have proved their 
worth in cantonal affairs, usually through experience in the cantonal executives and 
legislatures, are elected. Most State Councillors hold elective office at the cantonal or 
communal level as well, which is also the case with the National Councillors.59 Most 
are re-elected for as long as they wish to serve. 60 Consequently, cantonal concerns 
are well-known and well-represented in the Federal Assembly. 
3 Legislative process 
Bills generally originate from the Federal Council, the executive, as they are usually 
based on a government department's recognition that some change is needed. 61 The 
president of the National Council and the president of the Council of States decide 
which Council will consider the bill flrst. The selected Council sets up an ad hoc 
Commission consisting of members, experts, and interest group representatives to 
discuss the general principles underlying the bill. The Commission then sends the 
54Ped Const Swiss, art 72; Gillett, above n 1, 19. Por a brief description of the system, see Codding, 
above n 1, 76. 
55Codding, above n 1, 76. The first constitutional initiative for proportional representation was held in 
1900. The proposal attracted the support of 10.5 cantons and 40.8 percent of the electors on a turnout 
of 59 percent. Aubert "Switzerland" in Butler and Ranney, above n 1, 52. The second constitutional 
initiative was held in 1910. It attracted the support of 12 cantons and 47.5 percent of the electors on a 
turnout of 62.3 percent. The third was held in 1918. It attracted the support of 19.5 cantons and 68.8 
percent of the electors on a turnout of 49.6 percent. Aubert "Switzerland" in Butler and Ranney, above 
n 1, 52.53. 
56Ped Const Swiss, art 80; Sigg, above n 1, 35. 
57Codding, above n 1, 72. 
58Codding, above n 1, 73; Gillett, above n 1, 21. 
59Gillett, above n 1, 21. 
6OCodding, above n 1, 73. 
6lGillett, above n 1, 21. 
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bill, along with an explanation, to the selected Council. Each political party has 15 
minutes to make comments. The selected Council usually sends the bill back to the 
Commission for a less formal discussion of its detail and to propose amendments. 
The Commission then returns the bill to the selected Council, which almost always 
approves it before sending it to the other Council. The other Council repeats this 
entire process. If the two Councils have approved different versions of the bill, their 
Commissions work out a solution and a final vote is taken on the bill in each 
Council. 62 
The possibility of an unpopular bill passing unchallenged is remote. 63 First, groups of 
politicians, with the support of interest groups, may use the Commissions to alter the 
bill or may organise a legislative referendum on the legislation if it is enacted 
unchanged. 64 Second, individuals or groups outside of the legislative process may be 
able to trigger a legislative referendum to see whether a majority of the electors 
support the new law. Between 1848 and 1978, for example, the Swiss used the 
legislative referendum to reject 49 laws and decrees. 65 The rejected laws and decrees 
dealt with taxation, government expenditure, social policy, welfare, education, tariffs, 
town and country planning, defence, and the remuneration of elected representatives, 
among others subjects. 66 Many laws and degrees were reintroduced and passed in a 
more acceptable form at a later date. 67 To use Rousseau's vernacular, the federal 
government's legislative process is designed to reflect the 'general will', but in a 
manner that does not readily countenance simple majority rule, particularly as 
expressed through elected representatives or their parties. 
B Federal Council (Executive) 
The Swiss federal executive is named the Federal Council. It is the "supreme 
executive and governing authority" of the federal government.68 It is responsible for 
the conduct of foreign affairs, the preservation of both internal and external security, 
and the execution of decisions of the Federal Assembly and the decisions of the 
federal courtS .69 The Federal Council also directs the federal government's legislative 
62Gillett, above n 1, 20. 
63Gillett, above n 1, 21. 
64See Gillett, above n 1, 20. 
65 Aubert "Switzerland" in Butler and Ranney, above n 1, 44 (table) . For a discussion of the differences 
between a law and a decree, see below text accompanying notes 176-180. 
66See Aubert "Switzerland" in Butler and Ranney, above n 1, 50-64. 
67For example, the Swiss electors used the legislative referendum to reject legislation establishing a 
federal criminal code in 1884 and in 1922; however, they endorsed its establishment via the legislative 
referendum in 1938. The electors also used it to reject legislation taxing tobacco in 1931 , but they 
endorsed similar legislation in 1952. Above. 
68Fed Const Swiss, art 95. 
69Codding, above n 1, 1. 
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process. 70 Assisted by an expert staff, it drafts bills and presents them to the Federal 
Assembly, along with reports that describes their purpose and the reasons why they 
should or should not be enacted. As a rule, neither Council of the Federal Assembly 
initiates legislation. If they want to legislate on a particular topic, they formally ask 
the Federal Council to initiate the legislation. 71 The Federal Assembly rarely enacts 
legislation which has received an unfavourable report from the Federal Council. 72 
1 Composition 
The Federal Council consists of seven members who are elected by the Federal 
Assembly for four year terms from among those serving as State or National 
Councillors. 73 In 1900 and 1942, attempts were made to amend the Constitution of 
1874 to allow the direct election of Federal Councillors and to increase their 
number. 74 Both constitutional initiatives failed by wide margins. 75 Federal 
Councillors are generally re-elected for as long as they wish to serve. Most serve two 
or three terms, but many have served for 25 to 30 years,76 which is one of the reasons 
why the federal government is regarded as the most stable in the world. 77 As they are 
elected for a flxed term, Federal Councillors cannot be forced to resign if the Federal 
Assembly rejects their policies, that is, the Federal Council is not subject to a no 
confldence vote. 78 
Since 1959, the members of the Federal Council have been drawn from the four main 
political parties which have constituted the ruling coalition in the Federal Assembly, 
two each from the Radical Democrats, the Christian Democrats, and the Social 
Democrats, and one from the Swiss People's Party. As a matter of constitutional 
convention, Berne and Zurich, the two most populous German-speaking cantons, and 
Vaud, the most populous French-speaking canton, are always represented. To assure 
that minority language groups are represented, at least two Federal Councillors must 
be from one of Switzerland's linguistic minority regions (French, Italian, 
70Fed Const Swiss, art 102(4). 
7lCodding, above n 1, 92. 
72See above. 
73Codding, above n 1, 88, 90; Gillett, above n 1, 23. Unlike members of the Federal Assembly, 
members of the Federal Council work full-time. Codding, above n 1,87-98; Sigg, above n 1, 41. 
74Codding, above n 1, 99; Aubert "Switzerland" in Butler and Ranney, above n 1, 56. 
751n 1900, the proposal attracted the support of eight cantons and 35 percent of the electors on a turnout 
of 59 percent. Aubert "Switzerland" in Butler and Ranney, above n 1, 52. In 1942, the proposal 
attracted the support of zero cantons and 32.4 percent of the electors on a turnout of 61.9 percent. 
Aubert "Switzerland" in Butler and Ranney, above n 1, 56. 
76Codding, above n 1, 89. 
77Sigg, above n 1, 39. 
78Gruner "The Political System of Switzerland" in Modem Switzerland, above n 1, 340; Codding, 
above n 1, 88. 
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Romansch).79 None can be from the same canton. so This practice has reinforced the 
federal government's long tradition of government by consensus.81 
2 Operation 
The Federal Council acts as a collegiate body; its decisions always come from the 
body as a whole. 82 Each Federal Councillor heads one of the seven ministries and 
serves as the deputy head of another. 83 They allocate the ministries among themselves 
at the beginning of each term on the basis of seniority; the most senior has first 
choice. 84 As a general rule, each Federal Councillor retains the ministry that he or 
she happened to be allocated when originally elected to the Federal Council , which 
promotes continuity and expertise. 85 
Once a year the Federal Assembly elects a member of the Federal Council to serve as 
President and another to serve as Vice-President of the Federal Council. As a matter 
of convention, the Vice-President is elected President the following year. 86 The 
Constitution prohibits a Federal Councillor from serving as President for two years in 
succession. 87 The powers of the President are nominal; the most important functions 
are to chair the meetings of the Federal Council and to act as the Head of State at 
home and abroad. 88 
Federal Councillors are responsible for guiding bills through the legislative process. 89 
The Commissions of both Councils of the Federal Assembly examine bills in the 
presence of the Federal Councillors who are in charge of them. Federal Councillors 
give advice and make comments as a Commission proceeds with its work.9O When 
bills reach the Councils, Federal Councillors introduce them, explain them, and 
defend them if necessary. 91 In essence, they control the most important aspects of the 
legislative process, policy and procedure.92 
79Gillett, above n 1, 23; Sigg, above n I , 39; see also Codding, above n I , 88-91 , 117. 
SOSigg, above n I, 39; Codding, above n I , 88 . 
8lGillett, above n 1, 21; Codding, above n I, 113-124. 
82Gruner "The Political System of Switzerland" in Modem Switzerland, above n I , 339; Codding, 
above n I , 91. 
83Codding, above n I , 96. 
84Codding, above n I , 90. 
85See above. 
86Codding, above n I , 91. 
87Fed Const Swiss, art 98. 
88Codding, above n I , 91. 
89 Above. 
9OCodding, above n I, 92-93. 
91Codding, above n I , 93 . 
92Gruner "The Political System of Switzerland" in Modem Switzerland, above n I, 339; Aubert, above 
n I , 303; Codding, above n I , 93 . 
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The Federal Council's power has grown over the years to the point where it has 
become the dominant authority in the federal government,93 even though it does not 
have the power to veto decisions of the Federal Assembly. 94 The Federal Assembly, 
given its part-time nature, is dependent on the Federal Council's leadership.95 Due to 
the increasingly complex nature of federal governmental activity, the Federal 
Assembly has also given the Federal Council a great deal of administrative discretion. 
The Federal Assembly will typically state the intent of a law in general terms and 
grant the Federal Council the power to formulate and issue the necessary rules and 
regulations. These rules and regulations have the force of law and can be upheld in 
the courts. In emergencies, the Federal Assembly generally grants the Federal 
Council extensive regulatory power. 96 During the two World Wars, for example, the 
grant of regulatory power was so great that the Federal Council virtually displaced the 
Federal Assembly. 97 
More importantly, rules and regulations issued by the Federal Council are not subject 
to the legislative referendum. 98 However, the grant of regulatory power, if not passed 
as an urgency decree, is subject to the legislative referendum. During World War II, 
the Federal Assembly passed the grant in the form of an urgency decree, which had 
the effect of exempting the grant from the legislative referendum. 99 The only way the 
electors would have been able to use direct democracy to reach the matters covered 
by this grant would have been to use the constitutional initiative, which is a 
comparatively cumbersome, time-consuming, and generally unsuccessful method by 
which to reverse federal law-making decisions. 
When the Federal Council showed signs of continuing to govern under the exempt 
urgency decree grant in the period immediately following World War II, the electors 
and the cantons, contrary to the advice of the Federal Assembly, responded by 
endorsing a constitutional initiative in 1949 dubbed the "Initiative for the Return to 
Direct Democracy." lOO Essentially, the constitutional initiative amended the 
Constitution of 1874 to limit the period of validity of urgency decrees. If an urgency 
decree has a constitutional basis, it can be subjected to a legislative referendum a 
93Sigg, above n 1, 41. 
94Hughes, above n 1, 100. 
95Sigg, above n 1, 41. 
96Codding, above n 1, 95 . 
97See above; see also Hughes, above, n 1, 100-101. 
98Codding, above n 1, 95 . 
99See above. 
lOOHughes, above n 1, 103 . The initiative was held in 1949. It attracted the support of 12.5 cantons 
and 50.7 percent of the electors on a turnout of 42.5 percent. Aubert "Switzerland" in Butler and 
Ranney, above n 1, 57. The federal government won a counterproposal on the issue in 1939. The 
1939 proposal attracted the support of 21 cantons and 69.1 percent of the electors on a turnout of 46.6 
percent. Aubert "Switzerland" in Butler and Ranney, above n 1, 56. 
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year after its passage; if the vote is negative, the decree cannot be renewed. If an 
urgency decree does not have a constitutional basis, it has to be approved by a 
majority of the electors and the cantons within a year of its passage or it will lapse 
and cannot be renewed. In either case, the validity period of the urgency decree must 
be [mite. 101 According to Hughes, the impulse to pass this initiative was "a 
refreshing sign of the vitality of the spirit of liberty in Switzerland. ,,102 
C Federal Tribunal (Judiciary) 
The Federal Tribunal is Switzerland I s supreme court. It is located in Lausanne to 
demonstrate its independence from the Federal Assembly and the Federal Council, 
which are located in Berne. It also demonstrates federal solidarity with regions of 
linguistic minorities, as Lausanne is French-speaking and Berne is German-
speaking. 103 All Swiss languages, regions, political parties, and the Protestant and 
Catholic religions are proportionately reflected in the composition of the Federal 
Tribunal. 104 
1 Composition and structure 
The Federal Tribunal consists of 30 full-time federal judges and 30 alternates. 105 
They are elected by the Federal Assembly for six year terms. 106 Although federal 
judges are not nominated for life tenure, none has ever been denied re-election for 
political reasons. 107 Although any Swiss elector is eligible to be a federal judge, 108 
federal judges are generally elected from cantonal judges, law professors, or federal 
parliamentarians. 109 
The civil, criminal, or administrative courts of flrst and second instances are cantonal, 
while the Federal Tribunal is the court of the last instance. ItO The cantonal courts 
apply both federal and cantonal substantive law. III Almost all civil law is federal, as 
is most of the criminal law. Most of the administrative law is federal, while most of 
IOIFed Const Swiss, art 89bis. 
102Hughes, above n 1, 103. 
I03Sigg, above n 1, 42. 
100L Wildhaber "The Swiss Judicial System" in Modem Switzerland, above n 1, 316; Codding, above n 
1, 103. 
105Wildhaber "The Swiss Judicial System" in Modem Switzerland, above n 1, 316. 
I06Fed Const Swiss, art 107. 
107Wildhaber "The Swiss Judicial System" in Modem Switzerland, above n 1, 316. 
108Fed Const Swiss, arts 75 and 108. 
109Wildhaber "The Swiss Judicial System" in Modem Switzerland, above n 1, 316. 
lloWildhaber "The Swiss Judicial System" in Modem Switzerland, above n 1, 312; Sigg, above n 1, 42; 
Codding, above n 1, 110. 
IllWildhaber "The Swiss Judicial System" in Modem Switzerland, above n 1, 312. 
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the tax law is cantonal. Commercial law is federal and so is labour law as a rule. 112 
The procedural law, both criminal and civil, is exclusively cantonal, apart from the 
rules resulting from international treaties, which reflects the autonomy of the 
cantons. 113 
Lower courts are not bound by the decisions of higher courts, nor are courts bound 
by their own precedents. However, precedents are of immense importance in the 
daily routine of attorneys and the administration of the courts. The Federal Tribunal 
regularly invokes its own precedents and if, exceptionally, it departs from them, it 
explains such decisions thoroughly and at some length. The courts follow a rule of 
interpretation in which they interpret statutes and ordinances so as to conform to, and 
not thwart, either the Constitution of 1874 or internationallaw!14 The Constitution, 
however, prevents the Federal Tribunal from declaring international treaties or federal 
statutes unconstitutional. lIS 
2 Function and jurisdiction 
The Federal Tribunal's central function is to ensure the uniform application of the 
law,116 particularly federal civil, commercial, and criminal law. 117 The framers of the 
Constitution of 1874 justified this approach on the grounds that the benefits of a 
single standard of justice in these areas outweighed the infringement of cantonal 
authority. 118 They also gave the Federal Tribunal the jurisdiction to adjudicate 
disputes between the federal government and the cantons, between the federal 
government and corporations or private persons (in a matter of federal law if the 
federal government is the defendant), between cantons, between cantons and 
corporations or private persons (in a matter of federal law if both parties request it), 
and disputes concerning Swiss citizenship.119 
The Federal Tribunal must also consider other cases if both parties agree and it 
involves a question of law. 120 It also has original jurisdiction over several criminal 
112Wildhaber "The Swiss Judicial System" in Modern Switzerland, above n I, 313. 
113Wildhaber "The Swiss Judicial 'System" in Modern Switzerland, above n 1,312-313; Codding, above 
n I, 110. 
II~ildhaber "The Swiss Judicial System" in Modern Switzerland, above n I, 320. 
115See Fed Const Swiss, art 113(3) . 
116Sigg, above n I, 42; Switzerland: People State Economy Culture (Kummerly & Frey, Berne, 1989) 
41; see also Fed Const Swiss, art 106. 
117Codding, above n I, 110. 
118See Codding, above n I, 111. 
119Fed Const Swiss, art 110; see also A Haeflger "The Hierarchy of Constitutional Norms and Its 
Function in Protecting Human Rights" (1992) 13 Human Rights L J 81; F O'Brien "Swiss Law and 
Subversive Groups" (1967) 18 Northern Ireland Legal Q 302; F O'Brien "Baker v Carr Abroad: The 
Swiss Federal Tribunal and Cantonal Elections" (1962) 72 Yale L J 46. 
120Fed Const Swiss, art 111. 
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matters. 121 In addition, the Federal Tribunal adjudicates conflicts of competence 
between federal and cantonal authorities, disputes between cantons regarding matters 
of public law, complaints concerning the violation of the constitutional rights of 
citizens, and individual complaints concerning the violation of concordats and 
international treaties. 122 
The bulk of the Federal Tribunal's work concerns II constitutional complaints. 11123 Any 
person whose federal constitutional rights have been violated by any cantonal act or 
measure may bring a constitutional complaint before the Federal Tribunal. 124 A 
constitutional complaint may also be brought against cantonal laws which violate 
cantonal constitutions!25 However, the constitutional complaint can not be brought 
against federal acts. 126 
3 No power to declare federal acts unconstitutional 
The framers of the Swiss constitution chose not to give the Federal Tribunal the 
power to declare federal acts unconstitutional after studying the implications of the 
United States Supreme Court's 1803 Marbury v Madison decision. They decided that 
judges should not be in a position to substitute their interpretation of the Constitution 
of 1874 for that of the Federal Assembly. Most of all, they did not want to grant 
judges the power to invalidate a law which the people had previously approved by 
way of a constitutional initiative or a legislative referendum. Faced with a choice 
between the principle of democracy and that of the supremacy of the Constitution of 
1874 over federal laws, they chose the principle of democracy. 127 
I21Fed Const Swiss, art 112. 
I22Fed Const Swiss, art 113; Codding, above n 1, 111. 
123Wildhaber "The Swiss Judicial System" in Modem Switzerland, above n 1, 317. 
124Above; Aubert "The Swiss Federal Constitution" in Modem Switzerland, above n 1, 307; Codding, 
above n 1, 101, 112. 
I25Gillett, above n 1, 46. 
126Above; Wildhaber "The Swiss Judicial System" in Modem Switzerland, above n 1, 318; Aubert "The 
Swiss Federal Constitution" in Modem Switzerland, above n 1, 307; Codding, above n 1, 101. If other 
acts of the federal government, such as regulations, were to violate constitutional rights or any other 
federal law, it is possible to raise an "administrative complaint" before the Federal Tribunal. 
Wildhaber "The Swiss Judicial System" in Modem Switzerland, above n 1, 311. As a rule, however, 
acts of the Federal Council, including the regulations it promulgates pursuant to federal statutes , cannot 
be invalidated by the Federal Tribunal. Wildhaber "The Swiss Judicial System" in Modem 
Switzerland, above n 1, 318. Its acts and regulations are subject to the political supervision of the 
Federal Assembly . In the rare cases where regulations are challenged, they are only challenged with 
respect to the case before the court. Aubert "The Swiss Federal Constitution" in Modem Switzerland, 
above n 1, 307. 
127Aubert "The Swiss Federal Constitution" in Modem Switzerland, above n 1, 307; see Marbury v 
Madison 1 Cranch 137,2 L Ed 60 (1803); see also Fletcher v Peck 6 Cranch 87 (1810). 
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For this reason the Federal Tribunal does not have a status equivalent to the United 
States Supreme Court. 128 Although giving the Federal Tribunal the power to declare 
federal acts unconstitutional is a recurring theme in Swiss constitutional debate, the 
proposal has never enjoyed popular support. A constitutional initiative brought the 
proposal before the electors in 1939, but they rejected it decisively. 129 The proposal's 
opponents believe that such an extension of authority would be undemocratic and 
unnecessary. They prefer legislative supremacy in which no major law, given the 
legislative referendum, can come into existence without the tacit or express approval 
of the electors. 130 
III KEY DIRECT DEMOCRACY DEVICES 
The constitutional initiative and the legislative referendum play a crucial role in 
maintaining and adjusting the balance of power between the cantons and the federal 
government, primarily by providing the electors with the means to influence the 
structure of the federal government and its exercise of governmental power through 
elected representatives. The constitutional initiative has, for example, allowed the 
electors to bring in a four year term for members of the Federal Assembly, 
proportional representation for the National Council, and limits on the ability of the 
Federal Council to circumvent the legislative referendum. The electors have 
regularly used the legislative referendum to veto unacceptable laws enacted by their 
representatives. 
By providing the electors with legislative power, these direct democracy devices 
have, in effect, limited the legislative power of elected representatives. Elected 
representatives in Switzerland are unable to monopolise the legislative process or to 
ignore the electors to the extent allowed by Burke's theory of representation. 131 These 
devices have given the electors the means to redress the acts or omissions of their 
representatives that do not meet their expectations, particularly when they are 
inconsistent with their ancient desire for local autonomy. In theory and in practice, 
the constitutional initiative and the legislative referendum have made the electors both 
the legal and political sovereign. This sovereignty, however, is not without its 
limitations. Although controlled by the electors, these direct democracy devices are 
subject to procedural safeguards which neutralise their majoritarian potential. 
I 28Codding, above n 1, 112. 
129The proposal attracted the support of zero cantons and 28.9 percent of the electors on a turnout of 
46.6 percent. Aubert" Switzerland" in Butler and Ranney, above n 1, 56. 
130Codding, above n 1, 112. 
\3IFor a discussion of Burke's theory of representation, see section III.B.2(d) in chapter two. 
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A Constitutional Initiative 
Article 121 of the Constitution of 1874 establishes the constitutional initiative. It 
gives the electors the power to amend the Constitution. The constitutional initiative 
can take one of two forms: partial or total revision of the Constitution. Regarding a 
total revision, if one Council of the Federal Assembly passes a resolution that there be 
a total revision of the Constitution and the other Council does not assent to it, or if 
100,000 electors demand a total revision, then the question of whether there should be 
a total revision must be submitted to the Swiss electorate for determination. 132 In 
either case, if the majority of the electors taking part in the vote favour total revision, 
then both Councils must be elected anew to take up the work of total revision. 133 
When the text is ready, it is submitted to the electors and requires a double majority 
of the electors and the cantons to be accepted. 134 Only two total revisions have been 
attempted since 1874. Both failed. 135 
Attempts at partial revisions are far more common. However, their success rate is 
very low. From 1880 to 1978, for example, the Swiss have used the constitutional 
initiative 73 times. Only seven of the proposals managed to obtain the double 
majority necessary to amend the Constitution of 1874.136 Switzerland's diversity has 
contributed to this low approval rate. Any measure put before the electors must 
contend with the social, political, cultural, religious and regional differences that exist 
among Switzerland's four distinct ethnic groups (French, German, Italian, and 
Romansch). Proposals which are unable to satisfy Switzerland's complex mix of local 
interests and minority concerns are unlikely to win approval under this unique double 
majority requirement. 
The procedure for using the constitutional initiative to trigger partial revisions 
involves several stages. To begin the process, a proposal to introduce, set aside, or 
modify an article of the Constitution of 1874 must be signed by at least seven electors 
organised as an initiative committee and registered with the Federal Chancellery, 
which is the Secretariat of the Federal Council, along with the names and addresses of 
132Hughes, above n I, 133. 
133Fed Const Swiss, art 120. If the text is rejected, the Federal Assembly, presumably, works out a 
second one. Hughes, above n I, 134. 
134 Hughes, above n I, 134. 
135 A total revision was requested in 1880, when a partial revision was desired to article 39 regarding 
banknotes but only total revision was recognised. A total revision was also requested in 1935, when 
Swiss Nazis, right wing Catholics, and others proposed a totalitarian state. Hughes, above n I, 132; 
Aubert "The Swiss Federal Constitution" in Modern Switzerland, above n I, 300. Both proposals were 
rejected. The 1880 proposal attracted the support of 4.5 cantons and 31.8 percent of the electors on a 
turnout of 60.3 percent. Aubert "Switzerland" in Butler and Ranney, above n I, 51. The 1935 
proposal attracted the support of zero cantons and 27.7 percent of the electors on a turnout of 60.9 
r:ercent. Aubert "Switzerland" in Butler and Ranney, above n I, 56. 
36See Aubert "Switzerland" in Butler and Ranney, above n I, 50-64. 
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those who are part of the initiative committee. 137 The proposal may be in the form of 
a general directive, which would leave the details up to the federal government if 
approved, or a complete draft article, which can be as detailed and long as any bill. 
Due to the absence of a federal legislative initiative, constitutional initiatives tend to 
be specific rather than general. 138 
Once the proposal is registered, the Federal Chancellery publishes the title and the 
text of the constitutional initiative.139 Its proponents have 18 months from the date of 
publication to collect the signatures of 100,000 electors!40 Each part of the petition 
on which signatures are placed must contain the following information: the name of 
the commune in which the part is permitted to circulate, the purpose of the initiative, 
its title, and its date of publication, the conditions upon which its promoters may 
withdraw the initiative, the article of the Constitution of 1874 that it targets, and the 
names and addresses of those who are part of the initiative committee promoting the 
initiative. 141 Once the signatures have been collected, the whole petition is submitted 
to the Federal Chancellery, which checks to see if it conforms with these 
requirements. 142 
The signatures, however, are checked and authenticated by the communes where the 
signatories are resident,143 which is why each part of the petition is permitted to 
circulate in only one commune. Signatures which are illegible, unidentifiable, 
duplicates, false, not in handwriting, do not state the elector's full name, date of 
birth, or address, or belong to someone who is not eligible to vote are invalid!44 
Electors are considered eligible to vote if they were registered to vote on the day they 
signed the petition. 145 The Federal Chancellery calculates the total number of valid 
and invalid signatures and publishes the result. If the petition contains more than 
100,000 valid signatures, the federal government must place the proposal on the 
ballot, unless a majority of the initiative committee decides to withdraw the initiative, 
a right which is extinguished once the Federal Assembly sets a date for the electors to 
vote on the proposal. 146 
137Bundesgestz uber die politischen Rechte, s 68. 
138Aubert "Switzerland" in Butler and Ranney, above n 1, 42-43. 
139Verordnung uber die politischen Rechte, s 25. 
140Fed Const Swiss, art 120. 
141Bundesgestz uber die politischen Rechte, s 68. 
142Bundesgestz uber die politischen Rechte, s 69. 
143Sigg, above n 1, 30. 
144yerordnung uber die politischen Rechte, s 19; Bundesgestz uber die politischen Rechte, ss 61 and 62. 
145Verordnung uber die politischen Rechte, s 19 
146Bundesgestz uber die politischen Rechte, s 73. 
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The Federal Council states its opinion of the initiative, usually negative, and explains 
its attitude towards it in a comprehensive message to the Federal Assembly. 147 The 
Federal Assembly then decides whether to endorse or reject the initiative, or to put 
forward a counter-proposal.l48 If the initiative consists of a general proposal, and the 
Federal Assembly approves it, then the Federal Assembly prepares a draft article 
along the lines of the proposal and submits it to the electors for approval. If the 
Federal Assembly does not approve it, then the general proposal is submitted to the 
electors for approval. If it is approved, then the Federal Assembly must undertake 
the requisite revision in conformity with the decision of the electors. If the request is 
in the form of a complete draft article, or has been rendered in the form a complete 
draft article by the Federal Assembly, the draft article is submitted to the electors for 
approval or rejection. If the Federal Assembly does not approve of the complete draft 
article, it may prepare a counter-proposal or recommend the rejection of the proposed 
draft article. Its counter-proposal or recommendation of rejection is submitted to the 
electors with the proposed draft article. 149 
The Federal Council, as often happens, will submit a counter-proposal, or present 
opposing arguments to the electorate through the voter information pamphlets it 
prepares if it considers a constitutional initiative to be badly timed or unnecessary. 
According to Gillett, the Federal Council is not above wording the arguments for and 
against proposals in the pamphlets in a manner designed to encourage the electorate to 
reject the initiatives it opposes. In any case, drafting a question to put to the electors 
is difficult, as Gillett has noted, "since it is well known to those who conduct opinion 
polls that it is easy to change the outcome by rewording a question." ISO In addition, 
drafters face the complication of expressing their proposal in four languages (German, 
French, Italian, and Romansch) without changing what is implied by the proposal. lSI 
Undeterred by these considerations, the electorate supplements its understanding of 
proposals with a careful study of the recommendations made by the Swiss media, 152 
which is more diversified and localised than in most other countries . If the federal 
government puts forward a counter-proposal, the electors cannot accept both 
proposals. They must accept one or the other or reject both. 153 
If the proposal is accepted by a double majority, that is, a majority of all the electors 
and a majority of those voting in a majority of the cantons, then the appropriate 
147Sigg, above n 1, 30. 
148See above. 
149Fed Const Swiss, art 121. 
150Gillett, above n 1, 42. 
15lAbove. 
152Gillett, above n 1, 44. 
153 Aubert "The Swiss Federal Constitution" in Modem Switzerland, above n 1, 301; see also Codding, 
above n 1, 62-63. 
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change to the constitution comes into force even if it is against the wishes of their 
elected representatives. 154 This double majority rule prevents a majority of small 
cantons from being overruled by a simple majority in the large cantons. 155 This check 
on the majoritarian character of direct democracy serves to sustain the importance of 
the cantons by providing some measure of protection against proposals originating 
elsewhere that may be contrary to their interests, particularly their autonomy and 
independence. 
Constitutional initiatives, while frequently unsuccessful, often pave the way for 
similar political solutions at a later date. Some trigger an immediate response from 
the federal government in the form of a counter-proposal, which, in ideal 
circumstances, forms a common denominator of the views of the Federal Assembly, 
the Federal Council, and those petitioning for the change. Between 1891 and 1988, 
for example, only eight constitutional initiatives have been approved; however, in the 
same period 14 counter-proposals have also been approved. 156 According to Aubert, 
the most successful constitutional initiatives are those which do not take place; that is, 
they are withdrawn as a result of favourable governmental action. 157 
The constitutional initiative is very popular. 158 However, federal authorities and some 
political parties, especially the bourgeois parties, are not particularly enthusiastic 
about it,159 as well-organised interest groups can use it to prompt governmental 
action. 16O Essentially, the device forces elected representatives to deal with quite 
specific political questions which they may not otherwise regard as having top 
priority. 161 In addition, as Gruner has observed, a constitutional initiative can be II a 
vehicle for concretizing proposals which are not yet broadly anchored within the 
general public." 162 Consequently, the influence of a proposal can outlive its rejection 
at the polls, as it can make an important contribution to the crystallisation of public 
opinion. 163 Furthermore, initiatives rejected by small majorities, such as the anti-
depression initiative of 1935 and the anti-foreign worker initiative of 1970, may force 
154See Sigg, above n I, 30. 
155Gillett, above n I, 41-42. 
156Sigg, above n I, 32. The vast majority of changes to the Swiss constitution have been the product of 
constitutionally required referendums triggered by the federal government's desire to change the 
Constitution of 1874. Aubert "The Swiss Federal Constitution" in Modem Switzerland, above n I, 300; 
see also Aubert "Switzerland" in Butler and Ranney, above n I, 50-64; Codding, above n I, 65-66. 
157 See Aubert "Switzerland" in Butler and Ranney, above n I, 48-49. 
158Sigg, above n I, 32. 
159 Above. 
160 Aubert "Switzerland" in Butler and Ranney, above n I, 48-49. 
161 Sigg, above n I, 33. 
162Gruner "The Political System of Switzerland" in Modem Switzerland above n I, 349. 
163See above. 
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the Federal Council to change its policy. 164 According to Gruner, the device acts like 
a barometer that warns of crisis, 165 since constitutional initiatives generally increase in 
times of difficulty as was the case at the end of WWI, during the Great Depression, 
and during the oil shocks of the 1970s. 166 
The single subject rule is the only substantive limitation on the constitutional 
initiative. 167 Consequently, its scope is dramatic. For example, the Swiss used the 
constitutional initiative in 1922 and 1977 to extend the principles of direct democracy 
to treaties. 168 Any treaty that involves joining a collective security organisation, like 
the UN, or a supranational community, like the EEC, is subject to a constitutionally 
required referendum. 169 To win approval, the referendum must meet the double 
majority requirement. 170 Treaties which are of an unspecified duration, provide for 
adherence to an international organisation, or entail a multilateral unification of the 
law are subject to the legislative referendum. 
Despite its virtually unlimited potential to bring radical change, the Swiss electorate 
has used the constitutional initiative in a manner that reflects, rather than rejects, its 
basic conservatism in governmental affairs. As Codding has written: 171 
Very few "radical" or frivolous initiatives have been submitted to the referendum. 
Those that have, such as those offered by certain right wing political groups just before 
WWII, were rejected by substantial majorities. 
As a general rule, basic changes to the Constitution of 1874 are rarely approved by 
the Swiss electors on the first attempt even when initiated by the federal 
government. 172 
164 Above. The 1935 proposal attracted the support of four cantons and 42.8 percent of the electors on a 
turnout of 84.4 percent. Aubert "Switzerland" in Butler and Ranney, above n 1, 55. The 1970 
proposal attracted the support of seven cantons and 46 percent of the electors on a turnout of 74.1 
~ercent. Aubert "Switzerland" in Butler and Ranney, above n 1, 61. 
65Gruner "The Political System of Switzerland" in Modem Switzerland above n 1, 349. 
166Gruner "The Political System of Switzerland" in Modem Switzerland above n 1, 349-350; see also 
Aubert "Switzerland" in Butler and Ranney, above n 1, 50-64. 
167Ped Const Swiss, art 121(3). 
168Aubert "Switzerland" in Butler and Ranney, above n 1, 41, 55, 63 . In 1977, the federal 
ft0vernment's counterproposal won. Aubert" Switzerland" in Butler and Ranney, above n 1, 63. 
69 Aubert "Switzerland" in Butler and Ranney, above n 1, 41. 
170Ped Const Swiss, art 123. 
171Codding, above n 1, 66. 
172Por example, the Swiss electors and their cantons approved a constitutionally required referendum 
that amended the Constitution of 1874 to extend the franchise to women on the federal level in 1971. 
The proposal attracted the support of 15.5 cantons and 65.7 percent of the electors on a turnout of 1. 7 
percent. Aubert "Switzerland" in Butler and Ranney, above n 1, 61. However, the federal 
government, given the peculiarities of Switzerland's political heritage (where the right to vote was 
traditionally equated with military service), made its flrst attempt to extend the franchise in 1959, which 
failed by a wide margin. The proposal attracted the support of three cantons and 33.1 percent of the 
electors on a turnout of 66.7 percent. Aubert "Switzerland" in Butler and Ranney, above n 1, 59. 
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B Legislative Referendum 
Article 89 of the Constitution of 1874 establishes the legislative referendum. It gives 
the electors the power to veto legislation enacted by the Federal Assembly. All newly 
enacted federal laws and decrees are subject to the legislative referendum. The 
Swiss, for example, can use the legislative referendum to veto laws and decrees that 
impose federal taxes,173 a right which is consistent with the long struggle to preserve 
cantonal sovereignty. 174 The legislative referendum is also applicable to international 
treaties which are of unspecified duration and cannot be denounced, provide for 
adherence to an international organisation, or entail a multilateral unification of the 
law. 175 
According to Hughes, "[t]here used to be a distinction between laws and [decrees], 
but since 1874 it has disappeared. ,,176 Nevertheless, decrees have a procedural 
advantage over laws, as all laws are subject to the legislative referendum, but decrees 
that the Federal Assembly declares to be urgent are not.177 However, as mentioned 
previously, the validity period of an urgency decree is limited. Furthermore, an 
urgency decree with a constitutional basis is subject to the legislative referendum a 
year after its enactment. If it does not have a constitutional basis, it must be approved 
by a double majority within a year of its enactment or it will lapse. l7B The 1949 
"Initiative for the Return to Direct Democracy" brought in these limitations on 
urgency decrees to counteract the Federal Assembly's growing practice of avoiding 
the legislative referendum by passing its enactments in the form of urgency decrees .179 
As discussed above, the legislative referendum cannot be used to veto regulations and 
rules promulgated by the Federal Council pursuant to laws or decrees that grant the 
173Aubert"Switzerland" in Butler and Ranney, above n 1,42. 
174The framers of Switzerland's federal constitution had to decide many issues related to the extent of 
local sovereignty. In the end, they decided that the cantons are sovereign insofar as their sovereignty is 
not limited by the Constitution of 1874, which means they may exercise all rights which are not 
entrusted to the federal government. See Fed Const Swiss, art 3. Regarding taxation, the defInitive 
governmental power, the cantons and their communes retained the greater revenue power. The 
communes account for 50 percent of the tax take in Switzerland, the cantons account for 40 percent, 
and the federal government accounts for the remaining 10 percent. Address, above n 38. For a list of 
permissible federal taxes, see above note 37. The limited nature of federal taxation may explain why 
the Swiss did not exempt taxation from the legislative referendum or the constitutional initiative. A 
more likely explanation, however, is the lack of subject matter exemptions on the cantonal level. In 
addition, since the movement toward democratisation in the 186Os, every canton has had budgetary 
referendums in addition to the usual array of direct democracy devices. Aubert "Switzerland" in Butler 
and Ranney, above n 1, 40. 
175 Adherence to collective security organisations or to supranational bodies require a majority of the 
electors and the cantons. Fed Const Swiss, art 89(5). 
176Hughes, above n 1, 100. 
177Above. 
178Fed Const Swiss, art 89bis. 
179Codding, above n 1, 64. 
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Federal Council regulatory power, which is an increasingly common practice. l80 
However, the law or decree granting the power, if not passed as an urgency decree, is 
subject to the legislative referendum. 
The procedure for using the legislative referendum is somewhat different from the 
procedure for using the constitutional initiative. Once the Federal Assembly has 
published notice of a newly enacted law or a decree, those opposing it have 90 days 
before it comes into force to collect the signatures of 50,000 electors, which are 
required to trigger the legislative referendum. 181 They approach the Federal 
Chancellery, which provides a petition free of charge in all official languages. 182 
Each part of the petition on which signatures must be placed must contain the 
following information: the name of the commune in which the part is permitted to 
circulate, a reference to the law or decree enacted by the Federal Assembly, and a 
statement of the effect of the legislative referendum if successful, that is, whether the 
entire law or decree will be vetoed or whether the offensive part will be deleted. 183 
According to Hughes, "the signatures are now often collected by sending reply-cards 
through the post to the voters, who merely need to sign and drop the card into a letter 
box. ,,184 
Once the signatures have been collected, the whole petition is submitted to the Federal 
Chancellery. 185 The signatures, however, are checked and authenticated by the 
communes where the signatories are resident,186 which is why each part of the petition 
is permitted to circulate in only one commune. Signatures which are illegible, 
unidentifiable, duplicates, false, not in handwriting, do not state the elector's full 
name, date of birth, or address, or belong to someone who is not eligible to vote are 
invalid. 187 Electors are considered eligible to vote if they were registered to vote on 
the day they signed the petition. 188 The Federal Chancellery calculates the total 
number of valid and invalid signatures and publishes the result. If the petition 
contains more than 50,000 valid signatures, the federal government must submit the 
law or decree to the electors for their approval. 189 
180See above text accompanying notes 100-101. 
181Ped Const Swiss, arts 89 and 89bis; see also Switzerland, above 116, 34; Sigg, above n 1, 33; 
Hughes, above n 1, 101. 
182Yerordnung uber die politischen Rechte, s 18. 
183Bundesgestz uber die politischen Rechte, s 60. 
I 84Hughes , above n 1, 101. Hughes also notes that people who sign petitions asking for a legislative 
referendum often vote in favour of the law or general decree being challenged. Above. 
185Yerordnung uber die politischen Rechte, s 20. 
186Sigg, above n 1, 30. 
187Yerordnung uber die politischen Rechte, s 19; Bundesgestz uber die politischen Rechte, ss 61 and 62. 
188Yerordnung uber die politischen Rechte, s 19. 
189Ped Const Swiss, arts 89 and 89bis. 
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A law or decree subjected to a legislative referendum only comes into force if it is 
approved by a majority of the electors voting on the referendum. l90 In effect, the veto 
occurs the moment the signature threshold is met, which would not be the case if the 
law or decree were permitted to remain in effect until the electors disapproved it. 
Accordingly, the federal government, or those who lobbied for the law or decree, 
have the burden of convincing the electors to vote in favour of the law or decree. In 
this sense, legislative referendum is a negative device. It acts as a brake on, or 
regulator of, the exercise of legislative power by elected representatives. Although 
the electors can use the device to delay reform or the conferral of new rights, they 
cannot use it to deprive persons or groups of their existing rights, which means that 
the majoritarian potential of the device is virtually non-existent. Gruner sums up its 
effect as follows: 191 
The main effect of the referendum consists in the prevention of undesirable laws. 
Because of the possibility that parliamentary decision-making may afterward be 
submitted to a popular vote, one tries to obtain the consensus of all interest groups 
concerned with a particular bill as early as possible. Por it is precisely the interest 
groups - with their mass support and their good [mancial resources - who may endanger 
any legislation that is a potential instigator of a referendum. 
Consequently, as Gillett has noted, the most important influence of the legislative 
referendum is invisible: 192 
Some legislation such as taxation is always unpopular but always necessary, so the 
reconciliation of taxation with democracy is beset with difficulties. As a bill is drafted 
or discussed with the relevant 'interests' in a Commission there is at the back of the 
minds of those involved the possibility that a referendum may be demanded and that the 
'Sovereign People' may reject it. The threat of a referendum is a moulding influence in 
all that takes place. 
This threat has influenced the standard, the content, and the manner of the federal 
legislative process. 193 Proposed legislation is carefully drafted to avoid triggering a 
referendum. Elected representatives, and the officials who assist them, are 
accustomed to consulting a wide range of groups, organisations, and experts with the 
aim of achieving a political consensus before legislating. They also closely monitor 
local political activity to gauge the electors' reaction to federal legislative proposals; 
the outcome of cantonal debates often determines the direction of federal policy. 194 
I90Sigg, above n I, 33; Hughes, above n I, 101. Eight cantons joining together may also invoke the 
ler.islative referendum, but this procedure is yet to be used. Ped Const Swiss, arts 89 and 89bis 89(2). 
19 Gruner "The Political System of Switzerland" in Modem Switzerland, above n I, 348-349. 
192Gillett, above n I, 44; see also Sigg, above n I, 33. 
193Por an in depth issue-specific study on the effects of the initiative and referendum on party policy and 
elite decision-making see Steiner, above n 1. 
194Por example, youth riots in Zurich between 1980 and 1982 caused millions of dollars of property 
damage to shops along the famous Balmhofstrasse. "Rioting Zurich Youths Attack Elegant Shopping 
Area" The New York Times, New York, USA, 6 September 1980, 3; "Youths Smash Windows Along 
Main Zurich Avenue" The New York Times, New York, USA, 3 November 1980, 5; P Hofmann "The 
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The legislative referendum has made the Federal Assembly highly sensitive and 
responsive to the desires of the electors . 195 
In addition, the legislative referendum serves as a means of expressing dissatisfaction 
in a constitutional system whose legislative process provides virtually no other 
opportunity to oppose or challenge legislative proposals or enactments. According to 
Gillett, "[i]t is sometimes used to avoid conflict within government circles, but more 
characteristically to settle major decisions. ,,196 The legislative referendum also plays a 
large role in separating personalities and issues. As ultimate responsibility for 
enactments lies with the electors, the standing of an elected representative or his or 
her party is not at stake whenever a bill is introduced. In essence, elected 
representatives or their parties do not sponsor bills ; they merely speak to them. They 
are personally involved only to the extent that they pride themselves on being able to 
predict the outcome of a legislative referendum. 197 
More importantly , the legislative referendum has enabled the electors to protect their 
local autonomy. As Hughes has observed, the direct effect of the legislative 
referendum is conservative, mainly because it is a device which gives the electors the 
opportunity to preserve the status quO. 198 Essentially, it sets local interests against the 
policy objectives of federal government. 199 In this context, the electors have regularly 
used the device to limit the legislative power of their elected representatives. 
Between 1874 and 1978, for example, the Swiss used it 85 times; they rejected 
approximately 59 percent of the laws and decrees subjected to the legislative 
referendum. 2°O The frequent use of the legislative referendum in Switzerland can be 
attributed to the ancient Swiss desire to preserve cantonal autonomy. Jealous of their 
local political rights and freedoms , the electors are likely to veto federal government 
legislation if it strengthens the federal government at the expense of the cantons. 
Consequently, as Gillett has noted, the device is popular among conservatives as well 
as those who see it as an advanced democratic practice. 201 
Swiss Reputation for Clockwork Perfectionism is Being Disrupted by Young Rioters Discontented with 
the Country's Materialism" The New York Times Magazine, New York, USA, 8 February 1981, 35. 
On 6 June 1982 the federal government presented amendments to the Swiss penal code to the electors 
for ratification. The electors approved the amendments , which made public incitement to damage-
causing demonstrations punishable by three years ' imprisonment and allowed federal authorities to 
bring criminal charges against participants in demonstrations that cause property damage or physical 
injury even if the victims do not file complaints. "Swiss Voters Approve Antiriot Measures" The New 
York Times , New York, USA 7 June 1982, 5. 
195J Steinberg Why Switzerland? (University of Cambridge Press , Cambridge, 1976) 77-78. 
196Gillett, above n 1, 44. 
197 Above. 
198Hughes, above n 1, 101. 
1995ee above. 
200Aubert "Switzerland" in Butler and Ranney, above n 1, 43-44. 
201Gillett, above n 1, 43 . 
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IV ASSESSMENT 
Direct democracy is integral to the Swiss constitutional system. Both the 
constitutional initiative and the legislative referendum give the Swiss electors the 
power to counteract federal government policy, which, given the brand of coalition 
politics produced by proportional representation in Switzerland, is relatively 
unaffected by election results. 202 The same coalition has controlled the federal 
government since 1959. Election results, as a general rule, do not transfer 
governmental power from one party to another. Furthermore, as the parties which 
participate in the "magic coalition" are not and cannot be held responsible for federal 
government policy as a whole, they cannot be punished or rewarded at the polls for 
the federal government's failures or successes. 203 Consequently, the Swiss electors, 
through the organisational resources of parties and interest groups, use the legislative 
referendum and the constitutional initiative to hold the federal government 
accountable. These devices are the only constitutional means by which the electors 
may oppose or challenge the decisions made by their elected representatives, as the 
federal legislative process deliberately integrates the resolution of interest group 
conflict and laws204 and the courts cannot declare federal laws or decrees 
unconstitutional. 205 
The legislative referendum has had a relatively conservative influence, acting as a 
brake on the legislative process.206 It brings legislation that has weathered the 
refmement of the full legislative process to the electors for their approval. If elected 
representatives propose or ratify a law contrary to the wishes of the electors, the 
electors can challenge their action by threatening to trigger, or triggering, a legislative 
referendum. In a sense, the legislative referendum allows the electorate to 
reconstitute itself as a third chamber of the Federal Assembly with an absolute power 
of legislative veto. Consequently, the legislative referendum is not susceptible to 
many of the traditional arguments against direct democracy, like poor drafting, lack 
of deliberation, lack of consultation, lack of consensus, lack of compromise, or lack 
of protection of minority rights. While it can upset or delay the federal government's 
legislative timetable or influence its political agenda or the content of its enactments, 
202See Gruner "The Political System of Switzerland" in Modem Switzerland, above n 1, 348. For 
discussions of Swiss federal elections, see H Penniman (ed) Switzerland at the Polls: The National 
Elections of 1979 (American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington, DC, 1983); 
C Church "The Swiss Way of Change: Politics Since the 1987 Election" (1989) 45 The World Today 
117; see also D Sidjanslci "The Swiss and Their Politics" (1976) 11 Gov't & Opp 294. 
203See Gruner "The Political System of Switzerland" in Modem Switzerland, above n 1, 348. 
204See Gruner "The Political System of Switzerland" in Modem Switzerland, above n 1, 348-349. 
205See above text accompanying notes 127-130. 
206Gruner "The Political System of Switzerland" in Modem Switzerland, above n 1, 348; Sigg, above n 
1,33. 
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the legislative referendum cannot change the eXlstmg constitutional system or 
undermine the constitutional principles underlying the system, including those 
protecting existing rights. As Sigg has noted, "there is nothing revolutionary about 
it. ,, 207 
The veto threat posed by the legislative referendum is not without its criticism. For 
example, Hughes , writing from a Westminster perspective, has argued that responsive 
government comes at the price of responsible government, as ultimate responsibility 
for legislation rests with the electorate, which is "an anonymous shifting 
abstraction. ,, 208 He also argues that the legislative referendum encourages the federal 
government to fmd ways to put its policies into practice without exposing them to the 
legislative referendum, thereby encouraging illegality. 209 
However, as Hughes readily admits, these arguments do not undermine the 
underlying justification for the legislative referendum, which is the moral value it 
gives to legislation approved by the electors / IO particularly in a constitutional system 
which lacks any other viable or formal means of opposing federal government policy. 
As a means of legitimising legislation proposed by the Federal Council and enacted by 
the Federal Assembly, the legislative referendum is unequalled. As the sole means of 
counteracting the legislative power of the Federal Assembly, it is indispensable. 
According to Hughes, "[t]he stability of Swiss institutions and the most exaggerated 
self-respect of the Swiss people owe much to the noble and not unsuccessful 
experiment of the legislative challenge. ,, 21 1 
In contrast to the legislative referendum, the constitutional initiative has revolutionary 
potential. In Gruner's words, it "acts as a driving wheel in a decision-making process 
which is geared toward consensus and which is therefore time-consuming. ,,212 For 
example, the electorate used the constitutional initiative to overcome the refusal of the 
federal government to consider abolishing the Swiss army, one of Switzerland's most 
sacred institutions . While the initiative failed at the polls, it gathered enough support 
to prompt the federal government to embark on a serious program of reform, 
ostensibly to avoid giving the initiative's proponents the basis for a successful retrial 
of the issue at the polls . 213 An unsuccessful constitutional initiative put forward to 
207Sigg, above, n1, 33. 
208Hughes, above n 1, WI. 
209 Above. 
210See Hughes, above n 1, 102 
211Above. 
212Gruner "The Political System of Switzerland" in Modem Switzerland, above n 1, 342. 
2l3Por discussions of this issue, see eg D Benjamin "The Swiss Army Gets Knifed" Time, 11 December 
1989, 61 ; "What, Leave the Alps Naked?" The Economist, 25 November 1989, 60; A McGregor 
"Swiss Debate Scrapping Their Army" The Times, London, England, 20 November 1989, 12; "The 
Secret of Switzerland" National Review, 10 October 1986, 47; T Netter "Swiss Coalition Presents 
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deal with the question of the number of foreigners in Switzerland also prompted a. 
previously disinterested federal government to act, in this case in a manner which 
defused the issue. 214 Although the device can create a tension-ftlled voting atmosphere 
and push democratic discussion to its limits, as it did in these two cases, it has, 
according to Sigg, "achieved neither decidedly conservative nor decidedly progressive 
results. 11215 
This ambivalent character of the constitutional initiative is attributable to two factors. 
First, extreme measures, whether radical or reactionary, have virtually no chance of 
being accepted by the Swiss electorate. Second, the double majority rule assures that 
any proposed constitutional amendment must have not only the support of populous 
urban centres, but also the support of those living in more remote and less populated 
parts of the country. As values and interests range from region to region, the double 
majority rule insists that any proposed constitutional change must, in effect, be 
endorsed by a wide demographical cross-section of the Swiss electorate, which 
explains why only a handful of constitutional initiatives have been approved. In this 
manner, minority rights, especially as reflected in local autonomy, are protected. 
Arguably, this safeguard surpasses the protection afforded minority rights in 
Westminster parliamentary systems, given the legal supremacy of ordinary legislation, 
the limited time available for deliberation, and the typically unrepresentative 
demographic composition of legislatures in such systems. 
Regarding both devices, Hughes suggests that the high cost of securing the requisite 
signatures confmes their use to corporate bodies like political parties, trade unions, 
Petition on Referendum to End Army" The New York Times, New York, USA, 14 September 1986, 6; 
"Swiss Voters Uphold National Conscription" The New York Times, New York, USA, 27 February 
1984, 5; "Swiss Voters Turn Down Proposals on Military Exemptions and Taxes" The New York 
Times, New York, USA, 5 December 1977, 10; "Swiss Voters Weigh Alternative Service for 
Conscientious Objectors" The New York Times, New York, USA, 4 December 1977, 20. 
214For discussions of this issue, see eg "Immigrants Rushing to Beat Swiss Deadline" The New York 
Times, New York, USA, 20 December 198725; A Naef "Legacy of Mistrust of Foreigners" The New 
York Times, New York, USA, 3 May 1987, 2; T Netter "Swiss Voters Back Curb on Refugees" The 
New York Times, New York, USA, 6 April 1987, 11; "Swiss Asylum Limited By Vote in Parliament 
The New York Times, New York, USA, 5 June 1986, A5; "Geneva Rightest Party Gains No Council 
Seat" The New York Times, New York, USA, 12 November 1985, A7; "Anti-Immigrant Group on Rise 
in Geneva" The New York Times, New York, USA, 10 November 1985, 8; "Right-Wing Party Gains In 
Geneva Election" The New York Times, New York, USA, 16 October 1985, A7; H Kamm "Pope Asks 
Swiss to Welcome the Foreign Workers" The New York Times, New York, USA, 17 June 1984, 14; 
"Swiss Reject Plan to Enhance Foreign Workers' Status" The New York Times, New York, USA, 6 
April 1981, 2; "1,389 Applied for Swiss Asylum" The New York Times, New York, USA, 7 February 
1979,5; "Swiss Vote on Proposal to Set Limit on Foreigners" The New York Times, New York, USA, 
13 March 1977,4. 
215Sigg, above n 1, 33-34. 
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and interest groups, which "increases their already strong influence on policies. ,,216 
Marjorie Mowlam goes further by concluding that;217 
. . . the existence of direct democracy reinforces the power not only of the Federal 
Councillors but also the established interest group leaders. The benefit direct 
democracy offers to specific groups within the Swiss political system does not support 
the conclusion that the existence of popular referenda and initiatives increases elite 
responsiveness to public demands. Rather, it takes power away from the public and the 
elected representatives of the smaller political parties. Power is partially transferred by 
the existence of referenda and initiatives to established interest group leaders who are 
responsible to no one. Specific interest groups are given a virtual representational 
monopoly within their respective categories in return for select controls over 
articulation of demands and supports. 
Both Hughes and Mowlam, however, fail to acknowledge the continuous and vital 
role that interest groups play in all representative democracies. Interest groups, be 
they parties, unions, clubs, socIeties, charities, churches, or single issue 
organisations, are the principal means by which people organise themselves to realise 
shared aspirations and to accomplish shared goals. In democracies, they constitute 
the primary vehicle by which people influence policy and legislation. Interest group 
leaders, contrary to Mowlam's supposition, are accountable to their members, that is, 
to the people they serve as representatives.218 
In addition, Hughes' concern regarding the signature requirements for the 
constitutional initiative and the legislative referendum in Switzerland appears to be 
overstated when compared to the signature requirements in California and New 
Zealand, which are more onerous. Furthermore, the Swiss electors dislnissed 
Hughes' concern in 1977 when they approved, by comfortable margins, two 
constitutionally required referendums that raised the signature levels required for the 
constitutional initiative from 50,000 to 100,000 and for the legislative referendum 
from 30,000 to 50,000, respectively.219 
216Hughes, above n 1, 102; see also A Eschet-Schwarz "La democratie semi-directe en Suisse: entre la 
theorie et la realite: 1879-1987" (1989) 22 Revue canadienne de science politique 739, 762-764 
(arguing that the high frequency of referendums has reduced turnout, thereby giving interest groups and 
marginal parties a freer reign to use direct democracy to influence the political agenda). 
217M Mowlam "Popular Access to the Decision-making Process in Switzerland: The Role of Direct 
Democracy" (1979) 14 Gov't & Opp 180, 195. 
218See K Jackson The Dilemma of Parliament (Allen & Unwin, Wellington, 1987) x; P Schlessinger and 
R Wright Elements of Government in California (Holt, Rinehart & Winston, New York, 1962) 24. 
219The proposal to raise the signature level for legislative referendums from 30,000 to 50,000 attracted 
the support of 18 cantons and 1. 8 percent of the electors on a turnout of 51. 6 percent. The proposal to 
raise signature level for the constitutional initiative from 50,000 to 100,000 attracted the support of 19 
cantons and 56.7 percent of the electors on a turnout of 51.6 percent. Aubert "Switzerland" in Butler 
and Ranney, above n I, 63. Eschet-Schwarz suggested in 1989 that the signature level for both devices 
should be raised even higher on the supposition that it would decrease the frequency and increase the 
importance of referendums in Switzerland, which would increase the participation of the electors. 
Eschet-Schwarz, above n 216, 764. The suggestion is ironic, as voting is compulsory in Switzerland. 
Nevertheless, the theory may have some merit as "voters participate in the initiative process in large 
numbers" in California where the signature levels are much higher. See E Lee "California" in Butler 
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Both the constitutional initiative and the legislative referendum have played and 
continue to play a vital role in development and operation of the Swiss constitutional 
system. As a matter of course, those involved in the Swiss legislative process accept 
that the ultimate responsibility for legislation lies with the electorate, which requires 
the electors to be reasonably well-informed. As most legislative proposals must be 
justified in public, the media has a greater role in Switzerland than elsewhere in 
keeping the electorate abreast of policy developments. 220 According to Gillett, the 
Swiss media actively supports the electors' sense of participation. 221 However, the 
most important agent of civic understanding and responsibility in Switzerland is 
participation. If not directly involved in communal and cantonal affairs, the typical 
elector is generally in close contact with someone who is. 
In a negative sense, the constitutional initiative and the legislative referendum can be 
characterised as a means to "paralyse or sabotage vital measures and thereby exercise 
a latent braking power against innovations. ,,222 However, as Gruner has noted, these 
devices "are quasi-substitutes for parliamentary votes of no confidence, for which no 
provision is made in the Swiss system. ,,223 As a result, these devices have had the 
positive effect of making the policies and legislative output of the federal government 
unusually sensitive to the wishes of the electors, especially as they are expressed 
through interest groups, which are a valuable and ubiquitous component of all 
representative democracies, and the cantons, which are unique in their capacity to 
bring local issues to the attention of the federal authorities. 
More importantly, these direct democracy devices, like those found in California and 
New Zealand, are a part of a constitutional framework that supports representative 
democracy, particularly its Madisonian role in protecting minority rights. Although 
the Swiss electors can use the legislative referendum to slow legislative reform, they 
cannot use it to impose any burdens or confer any benefits on any particular group or 
individual. The constitutional initiative, with its double majority rule, ensures that 
any constitutional change must have broad-based support across Switzerland before 
and Ranney, above n 1, 116. However, the high participation rate in California needs to be considered 
in the context of a comparatively much lower voter registration rate. In addition, Cronin has argued 
that deflning voter participation as a major problem is invalid and exaggerated as few advocates of 
direct democracy have claimed that everyone would vote and that the public would vote with equal 
levels of enthusiasm on all measures put before them; they merely want a safety valve process for those 
occasions when some electors come to the conclusion that their elected representatives are not fulfIlling 
their representative obligations . T Cronin Direct Democracy: The Politics of Initiative, Referendum, 
and Recall (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1989) 210. 
220Gillett, above n 1, 44. 
221 Gillett, above n 1, 45. 
222Gruner "The Political System of Switzerland" in Modem Switzerland, above n 1, 349. 
223Gruner "The Political System of Switzerland" in Modem Switzerland, above n 1, 343. 
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being accepted, a burden that is rarely met. From 1891 to 1994, the Swiss voted on 
112 constitutional initiatives but approved only 11 or 9.82 percent/24 which on 
average amounts to 1 successful constitutional initiative every 9.36 years. None of 
these constitutional changes have been upheld as examples of oppression by the 
opponents of direct democracy. On the contrary, use of the constitutional initiative to 
bring in proportional representation for the National Council, to rehabilitate the 
legislative referendum, and to create the canton of Jura are examples which support 
the conclusion that the device operates in Switzerland to enhance minority rights. 
By examining the constituent parts of Switzerland's constitutional system and their 
relationship to the constitutional initiative and legislative referendum, it has been 
possible to ascertain the role that these direct democracy devices play in limiting the 
legislative power of elected representatives in Switzerland. The exercise has also 
shown that these devices contain procedural safeguards which limit the legislative 
power they confer on the electors. Both insights, given the origin of direct 
democracy in Switzerland, provide the basis for understanding the direct democracy 
systems that exist in California and New Zealand and their differences. 
224For statistics on federal initiatives and referendums in Switzerland, see 100 Jahre Eidgenossische 
Volksinitiative (Swiss Federal Chancellery, Berne, 1991); Statistisches lahrbuch der Schweiz 1994 -
Separatdruck Kapital 17 PoUtik (Federal Office of Statistics, Berne, 1994); Statistisches lahrbuch der 
Schweiz 1993 - Separatdruck Kapital17 Politik (Federal Office of Statistics, Berne, 1993); Statistisches 
lahrbuch der Schweiz 1992 - Separatdruck Kapital 17 PoUtik (Federal Office of Statistics, Berne, 
1992). 
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PART III: CALIFORNIA 
120 
5 
ORIGIN OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN CALIFORNIA 
Direct democracy in California has indigenous as well as foreign sources. People 
living in New England towns have participated directly in deciding their affairs since 
the 1600s. Those living in the small communities leading the westward expansion did 
the same. Furthermore, all of the American states, with the exception of Delaware, 
have constitutions which were ratified by the electors. Many of these constitutions, 
including California's, contain clauses which require constitutional amendments to be 
approved by the electors. l However, as the United States grew in size and population, 
direct participation in the legislative process became increasingly impractical. This 
factor, in addition to a concern regarding the tyranny of the majority, led the 
Founcling Fathers to create a constitutional system based exclusively upon the 
principles of representative democracy. The success of their experiment stymied 
further development of indigenous forms of direct democracy. 2 
In the late 1800s, industrialisation was accompanied by economic turmoil, the 
concentration of wealth and political power, and widespread political corruption. 
These circumstances renewed interest in direct democracy. American reformers, 
inspired by Switzerland's example, seized upon direct democracy as a means to free 
legislatures from the grasp of political machines controlled by industrialists and 
fmanciers. These reformers, especially the Progressives, eventually succeeded in 
breaking the power of political machines throughout the United States. In a number 
of states, including California, they introduced direct democracy to ensure that 
political machines would never again be able to exercise absolute control over the 
legislative process. 
In California, the Progressives came to power as a result of the excesses of the 
Southern Pacific Railroad Company. Accordingly, this chapter begins with a history 
of the rise of the Southern Pacific and how it came to control the exercise of 
governmental power in California. It then discusses the factors which gave rise to the 
California Progressives and led them to campaign for direct democracy in California. 
In doing so, this chapter provides the basis for comparing the origin of direct 
democracy in California with its origin in Switzerland. A common thread is the 
coincidence of economic hardship and widespread disillusionment with representative 
lPor a discussion of constitutionally required referendums, see section I.A.1 in chapter two. 
2See generally E Oberholtzer The Referendum in America (Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1900); 
see also section III.B.2 in chapter two. 
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democracy. Like the Swiss Democrats in their reaction to Alfred Escher's subversion 
of representative democracy in Switzerland to further his railroad and banking 
interests,3 the California Progressives embraced direct democracy as a means to break 
the Southern Pacific's hold on elected representatives in California. They instituted 
the constitutional initiative, the legislative initiative, and the legislative referendum to 
reinvigorate representative democracy, not to displace it. They saw these devices as 
the means of preventing anyone group from acquiring complete control over the 
exercise of governmental power again, primarily by making the legislative process 
impossible to monopolise. 
Although histories of California abound, the origin of direct democracy in California 
is rarely considered. When it is discussed, it is usually dealt with in passing and in 
general terms. The League of Woman Voters of California appears to have produced 
the fullest account available. However, its brief outline is incomplete. It does not 
deal with the rise of the Southern Pacific, the manner in which it subverted 
representative democracy in California to further its own interests, the conditions 
which produced the California Progressives, or the events which brought direct 
democracy to their attention and encouraged them to campaign for it. 4 
This chapter examines the origin of direct democracy in California m this wider 
context. In doing so, it draws primarily on the work of David Lavender, Warren 
Beck and David Williams, Spencer Olin Jr, Robert Fogelson, Don Fehrenbach, and 
George Mowry. 5 By examining the factors which led the California Progressives to 
establish the constitutional initiative, the legislative initiative, and the legislative 
referendum, this chapter provides the background necessary to understand their role in 
the California constitutional system. In conjunction with chapter three, which 
discusses the origin of direct democracy in Switzerland, this chapter also provides the 
basis for understanding why reformers in New Zealand found direct democracy 
appealing. 
3See section III .C .6(b) in chapter three. 
4See League of Women Voters of California Initiative and Referendum in California: A Legacy Lost? A 
Study of Direct Legislation in California from Progressive Hopes to Present Reality (League of Women 
Voters of California, Sacramento, 1984 reprint 1987) 6-11. 
5D Lavender California: A Bicentennial History (W W Norton, New York, 1976); W Beck and D 
Williams California: A History of the Golden State (Doubleday, Garden City, New York, 1972); SOlin 
California's Prodigal Sons: Hiram Johnson and the Progressives, 1911-1917 (University of California 
Press, Berkeley, 1968); R Fogelson The Fragmented Metropolis: Los Angeles 1850-1930 (Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1967); D Fehrenbach A Basic History of California (Van 
Nostrand, Princeton, 1964); G Mowry The California Progressives (Quadrangle Books, Chicago, 
1963). 
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I THE RISE OF THE SOUTHERN PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY 
The California Progressives established direct democracy in California in response to 
the Southern Pacific's abuse of governmental power. The excesses of the Southern 
Pacific contributed to the rise of the California Progressives and created the conditions 
which made Switzerland's direct democracy system an attractive model for 
constitutional reform in California. To understand these conditions, it is necessary to 
trace the rise of the Southern Pacific, explain how it acquired control of governmental 
power in California, and examine some of the ways in which it abused its power. 
A Creation of the Central Pacific 
The history of the Southern Pacific begins with Theodore Judah. After building 
California's first railroad in the 1850s, a track from Sacramento to Folsom, the young 
New York engineer became obsessed with the idea of building a transcontinental 
railroad. He ardently lobbied Congress for funding, patiently explored the Sierras for 
a practical route, and regularly solicited investors for his project.6 In 1860, Judah 
won the support of four moderately wealthy Sacramento businessmen. Leland 
Stanford was a wholesale grocer and a candidate for governor who earlier had 
founded the California Republican Party. Charles Crocker earned a living as a 
drygoods dealer. Collis Huntington and Mark Hopkins were partners in a wholesale 
hardware business .7 Later known as the Big Four, they each invested $1,500. 8 
Judah used their fmancial commitment, plus funds he raised from miners living along 
the proposed route,9 to create the Central Pacific Railroad Company in 1861 .10 As 
part of the deal, Stanford became president of the Central Pacific, Huntington vice 
president, and Hopkins treasurer. II Later in the year Californians elected Stanford 
governor. 12 Coincidently, Americans triggered the Civil War by electing Abraham 
Lincoln president. 
B Passage of the Pacific Railroad Act 
The Civil War enabled Congress to pass the Pacific Railroad Act of 1862. Until then 
abolitionists and pro-slavery elements in Congress were unable to agree on a route for 
Judah's transcontinental railroad. Abolitionists wanted it in the North to prevent the 
6Pehrenbach, above n 5,45. 
7Beck, above n 5, 218-223. 
8Lavender, above n 5, 105. 
9Beck, above n 5, 218-223. 
IOPehrenbach, above n 5,45. 
"Beck, above n 5, 218-223. 
12Lavender, above n 5, 103 . 
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spread of slavery. Slavers wanted it in the South to restrict the North's industrial 
power. Unencumbered by southern opposition, Congress decided to route the railroad 
through northern states. 13 
The Act named the Central Pacific and the Union Pacific as the builders of the 
railroad. It provided the builders with loans and land grants to help fmance 
construction. The builders would receive $16,000 for every mile of track laid on 
level ground, $32,000 for semi-mountainous ground, and $48,000 for mountainous 
ground. The Act, as amended in 1864, secured these loans with a second mortgage at 
6 percent for 30 years over the assets of the builders. This arrangement allowed the 
builders to use the promise of first mortgage security to attract funds from other 
sources. The builders also received 20 alternating blocks of land a mile wide and 20 
miles in length for every 40 miles of rail they laid. This amounted to half of the land 
in a strip 40 miles wide along the entire length of the railroad. 14 The land gave the 
builders a means to meet some of their fmancial obligations. They sold most of it to 
speculators and settlers. 15 
C Effects of the Pacific Railroad Act 
The Act encouraged the Big Four to build as much of the railroad as they could as 
quickly as possible. However, it failed to provide them with any capital to begin 
construction. As a result, the Central Pacific began pressing for State and County aid 
in California. Governor Stanford openly supported its efforts. The Central Pacific 
also sought to sell its stock to the general public. 16 
San Francisco businessmen obstructed both fund-raising schemes to protect their 
investments. They viewed the Central Pacific as a threat to existing ocean, river, and 
stage coach transport operations. They also feared that San Francisco's pre-eminence 
as a wholesale market would be undermined by a transcontinental railroad terminus in 
Sacramento. 17 To counter the stock scheme, they began a whispering campaign, 
which was so effective that the Central Pacific only sold enough stock to cover the 
cost of building a bridge over the American river. To counter the aid scheme, they 
used the courts to challenge the legality of the bonds authorised by the state and the 
electors of the counties through which the railroad would pass. 18 
13Beck, above n 5, 218-223 
14Above. 
15Lavender, above 5, 123. 
16Lavender, above 5, 106. 
17Lavender, above 5, 104. 
18Lavender, above 5, 106. 
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Although the Central Pacific managed to negotiate compromises that gave it part of 
the authorised funding , the delays were costly . 19 A shortage of surplus labour 
compounded these costs. The Comstock Lode had lured many Californians to 
Virginia City .20 Initially, this deprived the Central Pacific of the hardworking, 
dedicated, reliable, and cheap labour it required to build the railroad. 
The Act also exacerbated the Central Pacific's fmancial woes by providing the loans 
in the form of federal bonds. This forced the Big Four to sell the bonds to eastern 
fmanciers at horrendous discounts for depreciated greenbacks, which were not legal 
tender in California. After converting the greenbacks into gold, the Central Pacific 
would receive 33 cents for every dollar it borrowed from the federal government. At 
one stage the Central Pacific had to use a federal bond with a face value of 
$1 ,250,000 to purchase supplies worth $400,000 in California, which included the 
high cost of shipping the supplies around the Horn.21 
The Big Four devised several strategies to solve their fmancial problems. First, they 
decided to build as fast as possible. However, this plan conflicted with Judah's desire 
to build a well-engineered railroad. Second, they managed to convince the federal 
government that the Sierras began 40 miles closer to Sacramento than previous 
surveys had indicated. Although Judah disapproved of the ploy , it gave the Central 
Pacific an extra $500,000 in loans. 22 
Finally , the Big Four formed their own construction company, Charles Crocker and 
Company, later known as the Contract and Finance Corporation, to which they 
eventually awarded the lucrative railroad construction contracts. 23 This development 
embittered Judah because it subordinated his dream to the fmancial interests of the Big 
Four. The company charged top dollar for its work and accepted stock as part of its 
payment. It also imported labour from China to keep its costs down.24 This strategy 
eventually gave the Big Four $58,000,000 for a construction project that cost them 
$14,000,000 to complete. 25 It also gave them control over 90 percent of the Central 
Pacific. 26 
19Above. 
20Lavender, above 5, 105. 
21 Lavender, above 5, 106. 
22Beck, above n 5, 218-223 . 
23Above. 
24Lavender, above n 5, 107. 
25Beck, above n 5, 218-223; see also League, above n 4, 7 (stating that the construction contracts were 
fraudulent). 
26Lavender, above n 5, 107. 
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These developments made Judah determined to buyout his partners . He travelled 
East to raise the necessary funds . On 1 November 1863, he died in New York of a 
fever he contracted in Panama along the way. 27 His death left the future of the Central 
Pacific in the hands of the Big Four. Crocker, a swaggering extrovert, took charge of 
construction. 28 Hardworking and energetic, he organised and drove his work force 
like an army. 29 Hopkins scrutinised expenditures30 and kept precise and detailed 
accounts. A conservative voice of reason, his opinion was valued by the others. 
Stanford, who was trained as a lawyer, served effectively as the Central Pacific's 
spokesperson; he dealt with officials, drew up useful legislation,31 and secured 
favourable treatment from the California legislature . He also looked after local 
financing. Huntington went to New York to raise money and to lobby Congress.32 
Astute , objective, realistic and ruthless , he also dealt with the Central Pacific's supply 
problems. 33 Together these men built the empire that generated the forces that 
brought the California Progressives to power and led to the establishment of direct 
democracy in California. 
D Creation of the Southern Pacific Transportation Monopoly 
Construction profit was the initial objective of the Big Four. However, long before 
the May 1869 meeting with the Union Pacific in Promontory, Utah,34 they had turned 
their attention to operating the Central Pacific profitably. This shift occurred when 
the Big Four discovered no one wanted to buy them out. 35 Potential buyers viewed 
the Central Pacific as an unattractive investment for three reasons: 1) its nominal 
value exceeded the value of its physical assets;36 2) it was riddled with debt,37 owing 
nearly $26,000,000 to the federal government alone;38 and 3) the Suez Canal, which 
opened in 1869, destroyed its hope of diverting the trade from Asia to Europe across 
its rails. 39 
Given these circumstances , the Big Four realised that their only recourse was to set 
shipping rates as high as possible. 40 They were also determined that all shipping, 
27Beck, above n 5, 218-223. 
28Fehrenbach, above n 5, 45. 
29Beck, above n 5, 218-223. 
30Fehrenbach, above n 5, 45 . 
31 Beck, above n 5, 218-223. 
32Fehrenbach, above n 5, 45. 
33Beck, above n 5, 218-223. 
3~eck, above n 5, 225. 
35Fehrenbach, above 5, 46. 
36Above. 
37Lavender, above n 5, 120. 
38Beck, above n 5, 218-223. 
39Lavender, above n 5, 120. 
4OFehrenbach, above n 5, 46. 
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foreign or domestic, would be over their rails.41 These two objectives meant the 
elimination of competition42 and the expansion of their railroad network. In 1865, the 
Big Four purchased the Southern Pacific Railroad Company43 to initiate their plan to 
monopolise railroad transportation in California.44 They eventually obtained control 
of every local railroad likely to enter into an alliance with out -of-state competitors. 45 
U sing the Southern Pacific's federal land grants for rails laid into Southern California, 
the Big Four expanded their lines to Arizona and Oregon to acquire control over all 
points of railroad entry into the State.46 This effort effectively prevented rivals from 
building railroads into California. 47 
By 1869 the Big Four controlled all rails into and out of San Francisco, then the 
largest metropolitan area in California. They also took over the Oakland water front 
and acquired steamboat and ferry operations in the area.48 This position gave them the 
clout to dictate rate agreements with the principal Panama steamship line, which 
eliminated the only transcontinental transportation alternative capable of undercutting 
the Big Four's predatory freight charges.49 
To finance the Southern Pacific's expansion, the Big Four used the Contract and 
Finance Corporation to bludgeon subsidies out of towns and counties en route by 
threatening to by-pass them. Los Angeles, for example, had to acquire the Los 
Angeles to San Pedro railroad and tum it over to the Southern Pacific together with a 
60 acre plot in the centre of town and $600,000 in cash to avoid languishing without a 
railroad. 50 The Big Four would condemn uncooperative towns to stagnation51 by 
routing the railroad through rival villages they would build nearby. 52 The Big Four 
also took full advantage of the Southern Pacific's federal land grant rights by 
rerouting existing lines. By 1871, for example, they had switched routes in Southern 
California from the coastal region to the inland valley. Although the move was 
unpopular with coastal residents, it gave the Big Four control of more public land. 53 
41Lavender, above n 5, 120. 
42Fehrenbach, above n 5,47. 
43 Above. 
440Iin, above n 5, 1. 
45Lavender, above n 5, 120. 
46Fehrenbach, above n 5,47. 
47Lavender, above n 5, 120. 
48Beck, above n 5, 225. 
49Fehrenbach, above n 5, 47. 
5°League, above n 4, 6. 
51Beck, above n 5, 225-226. 
52Lavender, above n 5, 123. 
53Beck, above n 5, 225. 
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These practices contributed to the spread of land monopoly in California. 54 The 
federal land grants alone gave the Southern Pacific ownership of some 10 million 
acres. 55 By the time the Central Pacific became a subsidiary of the Southern Pacific in 
1884,56 the Big Four had received more than 11 million acres from the federal 
government in California alone. To dispose of this land as quickly as possible, the 
Big Four favoured land speculators who were able to buy in quantity. 57 This practice, 
which contributed to land and water monopolies, disappointed many settlers who were 
lured to California during the depressions of the 1870s by the promise of inexpensive 
farm land. 
By the 1870s, the Big Four had a complete monopoly of railroad transportation in 
California.58 They used whatever means they could to increase their profit margins, 
which meant they charged shippers what they could bear. This practice gave the Big 
Four a generous portion of the profits of every business and industry in California for 
more than 40 years.59 To protect and further their interests, the Big Four used their 
transportation monopoly to acquire control of governmental power in California. 
E Southern Pacific Control of California 
Although closely aligned to Stanford I s Republican Party, the Southern Pacific pursued 
a bipartisan approach to politics. 60 Californian politics encouraged it. The 
Democratic and Republican Parties operated in a similar fashion. Each party divided 
the cities into wards and assigned a boss to each ward. Ward bosses created loyal 
followings by remembering names and birthdays, attending weddings and funerals, 
and passing out baskets of food at Christmas. They also helped people who were 
made homeless by fire or eviction, provided public-work jobs for the unemployed, 
and arranged bail for their constituents who were in legal trouble. 61 
The bosses received gratitude in return for their kindness. The men they befriended 
would vote for candidates they suggested. In this way, the bosses could determine 
who would attend city and county conventions. The men attending these conventions 
would select men, according to the instructions of city or county bosses, to be on the 
party I s state central committee or to attend the party I s state nominating conventions. 
54Lavender, above n 5, 123. 
55 Fehrenbach, above n 5,47. 
5601in, above n 5, 226. The Southern Pacific was incorporated under the laws of Kentucky which were 
comparatively lax. 
57Lavender, above n 5, 123. 
5801in, above n 5, l. 
59Beck, above n 5,256; see also League, above n 4, 6-7. 
6OBeck, above n 5, 339. 
6lLavender, above n 5, 148. 
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The men chosen to attend the state nominating conventions would choose candidates 
for state offices . 62 
Both parties fmanced this system in ways which impinged upon the interests of the 
Southern Pacific. Money came from the sale of utility franchises and public-works 
contracts, and from vice lords and businessmen who purchased benefits with their 
contributions. But it also came from elected representatives in the form of kickbacks. 
To enrich themselves, legislators proposed "cinch" bills against wealthy corporations, 
particularly the Southern Pacific. Although pitched as reform measures, these bills 
were actually a form of blackmail. To avoid cinching, the Southern Pacific would pay 
key legislators to drop the unwanted proposals. 63 
The process had the ironic effect of expanding the Southern Pacific's political power. 
Lawmakers who had accepted bribes from the Southern Pacific became vulnerable to 
threats of exposure,64 which encouraged them to look after the interests of the 
Southern Pacific. During the 1870s the Southern Pacific exercised enormous 
influence in the California Senate.65 It used its political power to resist state 
regulation of its rates, as high rates constituted the linchpin of the Big Four's 
commercial strategy. It used its economic power to capture and then maintain its 
control of the political parties. 
The Southern Pacific's excessive rates, coupled with its growing political power, 
aroused the opposition of populist groups , including the People's Independent Party, 
the followers of Dennis Kearney, and later the Grangers. Hostility toward the 
Southern Pacific intensified during the mid 1870s when California followed the nation 
into a deep depression.66 Bank failures, foreclosures, stagnation of trade, and 
mounting unemployment all contributed to a general mood of disillusionment and 
anger. 67 
The economic milieu gave the Granger movement an opportunity to take root in 
California. The Grangers , mostly farmers who viewed themselves as the victims of 
the "Robber Barons" of corporate America, had established railroad regulation as 
their top reform priority. At about the same time, Henry George, a San Francisco 
journalist, was writing his influential book, Progress and Poverty, in which he 
62Above. 
63Above. 
64 Above. 
650lin, above n 5, 2. 
66Mowry, above n 5, 18. 
67Fehrenbach, above n 5,48. 
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denounced land monopoly as the ultimate cause of all economic distress. 68 In 
California, the Southern Pacific was the embodiment of George's thesis, as many 
farmers in the San Joaquin Valley knew. 69 In addition, many unemployed 
Californians blamed the Chinese labourers imported by the Southern Pacific for their 
economic woes. 70 
These movements culminated in the revision of the California Constitution in 1879. 
Although largely neutralised by the party bosses, the reformers managed to establish a 
Railroad Commission with the power to regulate rates and to prevent discrimination 
between shippers.71 However, the Southern Pacific easily captured the Railroad 
Commission shortly after its creation.72 With the Railroad Commission and the 
legislature under its control, the Southern Pacific defeated all attempts to revise the 
generous rate schedules that had been written into law before the Civil War as part of 
the program to stimulate railroad construction. It even exceeded legal rates for small-
town merchants by carrying goods they had ordered from the East right through their 
towns to Sacramento and San Francisco; it would charge full short-haul rates for the 
extra miles involved in carrying the goods back to their towns. 73 
The political success of the Southern Pacific was guaranteed by five factors. First, 
California's population was relatively sparse and consisted mainly of newly arrived 
residents who lacked interest and influence in local and state politics. Second, by 
manipulation of freight rates, the Southern Pacific could make or break almost any 
merchant, industrialist, or agriculturalist in the state. Third, all candidates for public 
office were nominated by partisan conventions controlled by the Southern Pacific. 
FQurth, decisions handed down by the United States Supreme Court made judicial and 
legislative action to reduce railroad rates virtually impossible. 74 Fifth, the Populist 
reform movement lost momentum with the return of economic prosperity. 75 
68George began the book in 1878 based on his Our Land and Land Policy (1871), a 48 page monograph 
in which he advocated the destruction of land monopoly by shifting all taxes from labour and the 
products of labour to a single tax based on the value of land. George had trouble fmding a publisher 
for his book, as most found it unsafe and all believed it would not make any money. However, he 
struck a deal with D Appleton & Co in which he bore the main cost of publishing the book. 10 the 
United States and England, once Progress and Poverty was put out in paperback, it outsold the most 
popular novels of the day. It also ran serially in the columns of newspapers in both countries. It was 
also translated into the main European languages. Between its initial publication in 1880 and 1905, a 
conservative estimate states that more than two million copies of the book were printed. H George 
Progress and Poverty: An Inquiry into the Cause of Industrial Depressions and the Increase of Want 
with Increase in Wealth: The Remedy (25 ann ed, Doubleday, Page & Co, New York, 1925) viii-x. 
69See below text accompanying notes 82-87. 
70Above. 
71 Mowry, above n 5, 18. 
72Above; League, above n 4, 7. 
73Lavender, above n 5, 122. 
740lin, above n 5, 2-3 . 
75Mowry, above n 5, 18. 
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At the tum of the century, William Herrin, a gifted corporate lawyer, became general 
counsel for the Southern Pacific. While streamlining the Southern Pacific's 
operations, he created the Southern Pacific's efficient and effective Political Bureau.76 
The Bureau's purpose was to ensure that the Southern Pacific would avoid paying its 
share of taxes, escape state and local regulation, and expand its system unhampered by 
outside influence. 77 
The Bureau accomplished these goals by providing free passes to state and local 
legislative representatives, cash subsidies to friendly newspapers , campaign 
contributions to aspiring politicians , investment opportunities for officials, and rebates 
to co-operative shippers. 78 Assisted by a battery of the best legal talent in the state, 
these techniques enabled the Southern Pacific to dominate California's political and 
economic life.79 Eventually in a position to name virtually every candidate for every 
office, the well-fmanced and superbly organised Southern Pacific met with uncommon 
success in its efforts to attain continued economic prosperity and freedom from 
regulation. 80 California reached the point where it possessed only the shadow of 
representative government; the Southern Pacific wielded the real power. 81 
F The Southern Pacific's Abuse of Power 
Unrestrained by competition, government, or charity, the Southern Pacific easily 
abused its power. Between 1880 and 1906, the Southern Pacific was involved 
repeatedly in incidents which disturbed many Californians and prompted them to 
question the legitimacy of their constitutional system. The most widely publicised of 
these incidents were: 1) the Mussel Slough tragedy; 2) the Mary Ellen Colton suit; 3) 
the funding bill battle; 4) the free harbour fight; and 5) the Abraham Ruef scandal. 
1 The Mussel Slough tragedy 
While the Southern Pacific was engaged in the process of perfecting its title to barren 
land formerly held by Mexicans in the San Joaquin Valley, it encouraged farmers to 
settle in the area. By dint of hardwork, the settlers created productive farms by 
building 50 miles of irrigation ditches, homes, farm buildings, fences, wells, and 
orchards. When the Southern Pacific perfected its title, it requested payment for the 
76Lavender, above n 5, 158-159. 
7701in, above n 5, 3. 
78Beck, above n 5, 324. 
79 Above; Olin, above n 5, 1. 
8001in, above n 5,2; Fehrenbach, above n 5, 54. 
81Mowry, above n 5, 9. 
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land the settlers had improved. The settlers were willing to pay the price which they 
believed the Southern Pacific had agreed to accept before they improved the land, 
which was approximately $2.50 per acre. The Southern Pacific, however, denied this 
claim, and demanded payment at $25.00 to $50.00 per acre. 82 
Many of the farmers refused to pay on the grounds that the Southern Pacific was 
charging them for their improvements. The Southern Pacific responded by selling the 
land to outsiders. When the settlers resisted displacement, they fell afoul of the law. 
In 1880, armed with writs of ejectment, representatives of the Southern Pacific tried 
to evict the settlers who would not or could not pay its price. Seven men died in the 
shooting that ensued. Five settlers went to jail, but they were greeted as public heroes 
when they returned to Tulane County. 83 
Although the Southern Pacific subsequently had its way, its action alienated many 
Californians. On 9 August 1880, The Wasp, a San Francisco weekly, summed up the 
tragedy by publishing a cartoon which depicted the Southern Pacific as an octopus: the 
portraits of Crocker and Stanford shone from its glaring eyes; the homes, produce, 
and industries of California were ensnared in its tentacles. 84 Inspired by this cartoon, 
John Robinson, a long time opponent of the railroad, published a scathing, and often 
erroneous, attack on the Southern Pacific entitled The Octopus: A History of the 
Construction, Conspiracies, Extortions, Robberies and Villainous Acts of the Central 
Pacific, Southern Pacific . .. and Other Subsidized Railroads. 85 In 1901, Frank 
Norris used the metaphor to describe the Mussel Slough tragedy in his widely read 
naturalistic novel, The Octopus. 86 The term became a powerful weapon in the hands 
of the Southern Pacific I s opponents. 87 
82Beck, above n 5,257. 
83Above. 
84Lavender, above n 5, 152. 
85Above. 
86For a succinct overview of Norris' background and influences, the Mussel Slough tragedy, and his 
understanding of it and the liberties he took in fictionalising it, see 0 Cargill "Afterward" in F Norris 
The Octopus: A Story of California (New American Library, New York, 1964) 459-469. Norris had 
intended to write a one-sided attack on the Southern Pacific, exposing not a representative trust, but one 
of the most efficient political machines in America. However, after preparing to write his novel, his 
publisher was taken over by a group more sympathetic to the Southern Pacific's interests. His new 
publisher arranged for him to meet with Huntington to obtain the railroad's side of the story. 
Huntington not only intimidated him, but persuasively argued that the Mussel Slough settlers were not 
complete innocents. Norris also realised that the railroad was beneficial and might not have been built 
without the concentration of wealth made possible by excessive rates. Recently married, Norris may 
have also been concerned with job security, and thought that balancing the scales in his novel would 
please his publisher. These factors led Norris to "manufacture his exciting story of the 'equal' 
culpability of the ranchers." Cargill, above, 465. As this episode demonstrates, the influence of the 
Southern Pacific was enormous. 
87Lavender, above n 5, 152; see also League, above n 4, 7. 
132 
2 The Mary Ellen Colton suit 
The Mary Ellen Colton suit came on the heels of the Mussel Slough tragedy. In 
1878, David Colton, a political manipulator employed by the Big Four, died. The Big 
Four entered into an agreement with his widow, Mary Ellen Colton, to provide her 
with a $500,000 settlement. Unfortunately, Hopkins died later in the same year. 
When his estate was distributed, Mrs Colton noticed that his securities were valued 
differently than the ones the Big Four had given to her. Rebuffed in her request for 
more money, Mrs Colton decided to sue in 1883.88 
Although Mrs Colton lost her case after eight years of litigation, she placed into 
evidence more than 600 letters written by Huntington to her husband. Most of the 
letters began with a phrase like "burn after reading." These letters provided an 
alarming record of how the Big Four had used their money to influence congressmen, 
senators, judges, commissioners, cabinet ministers, and even a justice of the United 
States Supreme Court. Many newspapers, including the San Francisco Chronicle and 
the New York World, published each letter as it became available. The publicity 
increased the public's animosity toward the Southern Pacific. 89 
3 The funding bill battle 
During the Colton suit, the Southern Pacific attempted to refmance the federal loans 
the Big Four had used to construct the central pacific railroad. Given its connections, 
the Southern Pacific initially sought passage of a bill that would cancel the debt, 
which was $27,000,000 plus 6 percent per annum for 30 years ($75,600,000 in total). 
However, the strategy outraged many people, which gave the Southern Pacific's 
opponents the leverage they required to scuttle the effort. As a fall-back, the Southern 
Pacific sought passage of a bill that would refmance the debt at 2 percent over 75 
years. The Southern Pacific' opponents managed to defeat this effort as well. The 
battle ended in 1889 when the Southern Pacific agreed to repay $60,000,000 over 10 
years.90 
However, the settlement actually proved more costly. During the battle, William 
Randolph Hearst swelled the circulation of his newspapers by publishing the indicting 
prose of Ambrose Bierce and the thematic illustrations of Homer Davenport. Their 
coverage of the funding bill battle had a negative impact on the interests of the 
88Beck, above n 5, 321-322. 
89Beck, above n 5, 322; see also League, above n 4, 7 (discussing the Southern Pacific's political 
influence) . 
9OBeck, above n 5, 323-324. 
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Southern Pacific. 91 Although a federal matter, the battle's outcome marked the 
Southern Pacific's first serious set back at the hands of its opponents. 
4 The free harbour fight 
When California plunged into depression again in the 1890s, criticism of the Southern 
Pacific grew.92 The Los Angeles Times, the Fresno Republican, the Sacramento Bee, 
and the San Francisco Bulletin, Examiner, Call, and Chronicle were united in their 
denunciation of the railroad; they kept anti-railroad sentiment before the public.93 In 
particular, Harrison Otis of the Los Angeles Times supported a group that eventually 
gave the Southern Pacific its first significant defeat in California. 
For generations, San Pedro had served the Los Angeles region as a makeshift 
harbour. The Southern Pacific, like many southern Californians, had viewed San 
Pedro as the best site for the establishment of a permanent harbour. However, the 
Southern Pacific withdrew its support for the San Pedro site when it acquired a 
railroad joining San Monica to Los Angeles. The purchase gave the Southern Pacific 
control of large tracts of water front property. Aware of the advantages it enjoyed 
with its monopoly of the Oakland waterfront in northern California, the Southern 
Pacific tried to shift the site of the harbour development from San Pedro to the 
property it had acquired. 94 
This self-serving move united a number of non-governmental organisations against the 
Southern Pacific. Chief among them were the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce, 
the Santa Fe Railroad, and the Los Angeles Times. Many people who were not 
beholden to the Southern Pacific joined the group. They were also joined by rate 
payers, manufacturers, citrus growers, oilmen, maritime interests, and agriculturalists 
who had the strength and will to contemplate a fight with the Southern Pacific. 95 
In 1899, the group opposing the Southern Pacific won. The conflict produced by the 
"free harbour fight" had two dire consequences for the Southern Pacific: 1) it 
compounded its reputation as a grasping corporate entity which subordinated 
everything to its own interests; and 2) it increased and emboldened the enemies of the 
Southern Pacific who realised that its power was limited. 96 
91 Beck, above n 5,324. 
92Mowry, above n 5, 2l. 
9301in, above n 5, 5. 
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5 The Abraham Rue! scandal 
Seven years after the free harbour fight, the Southern Pacific outraged Californians 
again by its open domination of the Republican Party's 1906 state nominating 
convention. 97 Abraham Ruef, a brilliant lawyer who had used the Union Labor Party 
to take control of San Francisco, sold enough votes to the Southern Pacific to secure 
nomination for its gubernatorial candidate. The press circulated a picture of Ruef 
sitting at a table with the Southern Pacific's managers at the convention. It served to 
confirm reports that Ruef had sold his support to the Southern Pacific for $14,000 to 
$20,000.98 
The dismal performance of the 1907 legislature only fuelled the Abraham Ruef 
scandal. Elected representatives displayed "a cynical disregard for honesty, economy, 
and public welfare.,,99 One editor wrote, "[i]f we are fit to govern ourselves, this is 
the last time we will submit to be governed by the hired bosses of the Southern Pacific 
Railroad Company. ,,100 His words were prophetic. The political and economic 
excesses of the Southern Pacific created a backlash that swept the Southern Pacific out 
of power. In quick succession the Southern Pacific lost political control of Los 
Angeles then San Francisco to the California Progressives. By the end of 1910 the 
California Progressives had shattered the Southern Pacific's strangle-hold on the 
exercise of governmental power in California. 
II THE RISE OF THE CALIFORNIA PROGRESSIVES 
From 1880 until 1911, the Southern Pacific was the single most influential entity 
operating in California politics. 101 Its abuses outraged many Californians and had 
sparked several failed reform movements. The California Progressives capitalised on 
these earlier reform efforts, and aroused public opinion, to end the Southern Pacific's 
domination of state politics and to restore the legitimacy of California's constitutional 
system. 102 The move to adopt direct democracy in California was a revolt against the 
Southern Pacific's monopoly over the exercise of governmental power. 103 The 
97Fehrenbach, above n 5,57. 
98Above; Lavender, above n 5, 149, 161; see also League, above n 4,7. 
99Fehrenbach, above n 5, 57. 
looAbove. 
IOI 01in, above n 5, 2. 
102See Olin, above n 5, 55-56; see also generally R Hofstadter The Age of Reform: From Bryan to 
F.D.R. (Alfred Knopf, New York, 1956) (discussing the forces contributing to the passion for progress 
and reform in the Progressive era in America); A Ekrich Progressivism in America: A Study of the Era 
from Theodore Roosevelt to Woodrow Wilson (New Viewpoint, New York, 1974); R Current, H 
Williams, F Freidel American History: A Survey (Alfred Knopf, New York, 1961) 518-525, 604-610; 
see also generally below note 120. 
103E Lee "California" in D Butler and A Ranney (eds) Referendums: A Comparative Study of Practice 
and Theory (American Enterprise Institute, Washington, DC, 1978) 88. 
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California Progressives viewed the constitutional initiative, the legislative initiative, 
and the legislative referendum as instruments capable of neutral ising the power of 
special interest groups and of curtailing the effectiveness of California's political 
machines. 104 
A Earlier Reform Efforts 
Intense anti-railroad sentiment coincided with the economic depressions that lashed 
California in the 1870s and the 1890s.105 To survive these depressions, businessmen 
either cut costs by reducing wages or by replacing their employees with immigrant 
labour willing to accept sweatshop conditions. They also created monopolies through 
mergers or the elimination of competition. 106 In the 1870s these measures increased 
unemployment in an already overcrowded labour market. Upon completion of the 
transcontinental railroad, the Big Four contributed to the unemployment problem 
when they laid-off thousands of the workers they had imported from China. 107 
1 Keameyism 
In 1877, Dennis Kearney, a young San Francisco drayman, used the Workingmen's 
Party to channel the anger generated by high unemployment into political action. 
Kearneyites demanded Chinese exclusion acts, state regulation of the railroads and 
banks, equitable taxation, an eight-hour work day, abolition of contract labour for 
public works, compulsory education, and the direct election of United States 
senators. 108 
Kearney's success was as spectacular as it was short-lived. His party was able to elect 
one-third of the delegates to the state's constitutional convention of 1878-79. The 
delegates managed to win acceptance of their proposals to regulate big business, 
exclude the Chinese, and establish an eight-hour work day. But Kearney's quick 
success, coupled with rapid economic recovery, robbed his party of its purpose. By 
1885, the Workingmen's Party was a political non-entity. 109 
From the decline of Kearneyism to the rise of the California Progressives, the 
Southern Pacific held virtually uncontested control over California's political life. IIO 
I04Lee "California" in Bulter and Ranney, above n 103, 88-89. 
105Mowry, above n 5,21. 
106Lavender, above n 5, 154. 
107B Hyink, S Brown, and E Thacker Politics & Government in California (8 ed, Thomas Y Cromwell 
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108Hyink, above n 107, 63-64. 
100Hyink, above n 107, 64. 
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The Railroad Commission established by the constitution of 1879 quickly fell under 
the sway of the Big Four. 11 I The San Francisco Call, as late as 4 July 1908, reported 
that the Southern Pacific kept an expert political manager in each county to ensure that 
"the right men were chosen as convention delegates, the right kind of candidates ... 
elected, and the right things done by the men in office. ,,112 Kearneyism, however, had 
one important effect: it stirred up lasting resentment against the railroad machine. 113 
2 Populism 
Changing demographics and the return of economic hardship rekindled reform efforts 
in the 1890s. Although the United States was still predominantly rural in 1890, the 
number of people living on farms was declining rapidly. 114 Disastrous economic 
conditions compounded by denied credit, deeper debt, harsh taxation, and rising rail 
rates caused farm foreclosures to increase dramatically. 115 Although overproduction 
caused most of their problems;16 many farmers blamed self-serving urban financiers, 
venal city politicians, and industrial pirates for their woes. 117 
In the South and the Midwest, farmers formed the nonpartisan Farmers' Alliance to 
combat their distress!18 Labourers, merchants, socialists, miners, and Henry 
George's single taxers were also campaigning for reform!19 To varying degrees, 
these groups called for public ownership of the railroads and utilities. To break the 
power of party machines, they also advocated the introduction of the initiative, 
referendum, and recall. 120 
111 See above text accompanying notes 71-73. 
112Hyink, above n 107, 64. 
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The Peoples' Independent Party ("Populist Party") evolved out of these alliances 
when legislatures controlled by special interests proved unresponsive. 121 The Populist 
Party held its first national convention in Omaha, Nebraska in July 1892. The 
Populists passed resolutions calling for public ownership of the railroads and the 
introduction of the initiative and referendum. Most populists viewed direct 
democracy as a way to circumvent hostile legislatures and to enact laws beneficial to 
downtrodden farmers, debtors, or labours. 122 
3 The direct democracy movement 
While the Populist Party was emerging, books and pamphlets advocating the adoption 
of the initiative and referendum began to circulate. From 1883 to 1898 some fifteen 
books and more than fifty articles referring to or discussing Switzerland's direct 
democracy system were published in English; the output continued unabated until 
World War I. 123 For example, the popularly written The Swiss Confederation by 
Francis Adams and C Cunningham appeared in the United States in 1889. 124 It was 
followed in 1891 by John Vincent's State and Federal Government in Switzerland. 125 
Both works explained Switzerland's direct democracy system and provided some 
discussion as to why the Swiss Democrats put the system in place, that is, to break the 
monopoly enjoyed by powerful business magnates like Alfred Escher over the 
legislative process. 126 By 1892, reformers, such as Nathan Cree in his Direct 
Legislation by the People, began to argue that direct democracy would "break the 
crushing and stifling power of our great party machines, and give freer play to 
political ideas, aspirations, opinions and feelings of the people. ,,127 
In 1893, J W Sullivan, a respected labour leader, journalist, and social reform editor, 
who worked as a national lecturer for the American Federation of Labor, stirred the 
imagination of reformers with publication of his Direct Legislation by the Citizenship 
through the Initiative and Referendum. Prior to writing this book, Sullivan had 
can trigger a referendum on whether an elected official should be dismissed. Por a discussion of the 
recall device, see Cronin, above n 115, 125-156. 
12lCronin, above n 115,44, 129; see also Hofstadter, above n 102, 60-130. 
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travelled to Switzerland to observe the Swiss in their use of the initiative and 
referendum. He had also written a series of articles from 1889 about the initiative and 
referendum. Sullivan believed that these devices could eliminate distrust of 
government by increasing the participation of the citizenry. 128 Sullivan's work was 
extremely influential, as it was concise, complete, and clear. It circulated all over the 
United States and did more to give "definiteness and aim to the sentiment of the really 
democratic leaders ... than any other one thing. ,,129 
Although the principles of direct democracy can be traced to New England town 
meetings and Ancient Greece, its early supporters, and later the California 
Progressives, based their arguments in favour of direct democracy on the forms of 
direct democracy then in use in Switzerland. 130 However, because labour and socialist 
activists were the first to publicise the initiative and referendum, incumbent legislators 
initially rejected direct democracy as too radical and as the work of cranks. 
Nevertheless, the publicising efforts of the newly created National Direct Legislation 
League increased public interest in the constitutional initiative, the legislative 
initiative, and the legislative referendum. By the end of the 1890s, support for these 
devices had grown throughout the West. 131 
At the turn of the century, Sullivan carried his campaign for direct democracy to 
California. His ideas took root in Los Angeles, where the Direct Legislation League, 
founded and headed by Dr John Randolph Haynes, a prominent physician from 
Philadelphia with oil investments in the region, fought hard for the adoption of direct 
democracy devices on the local and then state level. 132 Haynes would later 
acknowledge the incomparable influence of Switzerland's direct democracy system on 
the development of democracy in the United States. 133 
128Cronin, above n 115, 48; see also Meier, above n 120, 18. 
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4 The Grangers 
Prior to these developments, the Southern Pacific's policy of selling its lands to 
speculators had earned the ire of many small farmers. To farm in California, a person 
had to either pay speculators their asking price for land and water or lease by the 
year. These practices helped to create a huge migrant farm labour system consisting 
largely of Chinese labour. To fight the degradation caused by high land costs and low 
produce incomes, small farm owners had created a statewide organisation called the 
Patrons of Husbandry or simply 'the Grange' .134 
Like Kearney, the Grangers had pushed for state supervision of the railroad in the 
1870s.135 They remained undaunted by the ineffectiveness of the Railroad 
Commission. Instead, like many other foes of the Southern Pacific, they grew in 
strength. 136 The growing migration of Midwesterners to California imported 
populism, Protestant morality, and then progressivism into the state. By 1890 
approximately 45 percent of California's population had come from the Midwest. The 
percentage of Midwesterners was approximately 50 percent in 1900 and 60 percent in 
1910. 137 
Unlike the former immigrant populations that had accepted the status quo, the 
Midwesterners became active in the political and economic life of California. 138 While 
newspapers were decrying the abuses perpetrated by the Southern Pacific, 139 
Californians witnessed the rise of new industrial and commercial interests. 140 In 
addition, Californians became involved with organisations opposed to the Southern 
Pacific: the Grange, the Southern California Fruit Growers Association, the 
Deciduous Fruit Protective League, the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce, and 
labour unions. 141 
On 11 April 1890, eleven Californians established the state's first Farmers' Alliance. 
Two years later, the Farmers' Alliance had 500 chapters throughout California, which 
were in close contact with alliances throughout America. 142 When their Midwestern 
and Southern counterparts transformed themselves into populists, their ideas were 
dissiminated throughout California, including their endorsement of direct democracy. 
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B California Progressivism 
The Progressive movement began at the turn of the century. The Populists, the 
Grangers, and social critics like Henry George, Edward Bellamy, and Henry 
Demarest contributed to its development, as did the previous four decades of labour 
unrest and farmer protest. 143 Together, organised business, labour, and agricultural 
interests might have been able to neutralise the Southern Pacific; however, they were 
too preoccupied by their specific economic interests to engage in concerted statewide 
action. 144 
Paradoxically, a group of well-educated individualists, brought together by their 
reformist zeal, seized leadership of the struggle against the Southern Pacific. 145 
Initially, they had only intended to win control of their city governments. 146 But by 
the time they had liberated Los Angeles and San Francisco, the California 
Progressives were determined to free the state government from the Southern Pacific I s 
influence. 147 To accomplish this goal , the California Progressives created and used the 
Lincoln-Roosevelt League to gain control of the Republican Party and then the state 
government. 148 During their first year in power, the California Progressives won the 
approval of the electorate to incorporate the constitutional initiative, the legislative 
initiative, and the legislative referendum into the California Constitution. 149 
The Progressive movement was part of a western European phenomenon in which 
western society began to shift from an agrarian social system to one based on 
industrialism and urbanisation. The moral, humanitarian, and democratic themes of 
this shift are found at the heart of progressivism. 150 In California, progressivism 
manifested itself as a militant middle class reaction against battening corporations and 
increasingly powerful labour unions . 151 California Progressives objected strongly to 
control when it emanated from a class above or below them. They attributed the 
problems of poverty and criminality to the classes below them; and, they blamed the 
classes above them for the problem of predatory wealth. 152 They were determined to 
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rescue themselves from the oblivion to which they, as individuals, had been consigned 
by the pervasive struggle for power between capital and labour. 153 
The leaders of the California progressive movement shared similar Protestant, upper 
middle class, urban backgrounds. They were generally economically well-off, over 
40, born in the Midwest or California, had northern European names, and came from 
old American stock. They typically earned a living as attorneys, journalists, 
independent businessmen, real estate brokers, doctors, bankers, and publishers. They 
were independent, enterprising, and highly literate. At its inception, three out of four 
members of the Lincoln-Roosevelt League had a tertiary education. 154 
Despite their urban origins, the California Progressives borrowed many of their ideas 
from the Grangers and the Populists. They argued that the prevailing nexus between 
business and government, and the growing nexus between organised labour and 
government, could only be broken by returning power to the electors through the 
initiative, referendum, recall, and direct primaries. 155 They believed that the electors 
would use these devices to purify political activity in California. 156 Once the electors 
destroyed the existing political machines, special privilege would be removed and the 
individual would again be supreme in California's political and economic life}57 
In essence, the California Progressives argued that the cure for the ills of 
representative democracy was more democracy. 158 The argument was based on their 
belief that a lack of democracy and the imperfections of representation had rendered 
the government unresponsive. 159 Both the initiative and the referendum were part of a 
reform movement "whose ideology include[d] broad popular participation and 
hostility towards parties, legislatures, and elected officials. ,,160 The aspirations of the 
California Progressives were based upon a profound belief in the fundamental 
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goodness of the individual and the Yankee-Protestant ideals of personal 
responsibility. 161 This belief contributed to their zealous affIrmation of democracy. 
Their faith in the democratic process separated them from conservative politicians 
who insisted upon "representative government" and held that "pure democracy" was 
dangerous. 162 
Their faith in the wisdom of the individual was accompanied by a distrust of formal 
party organisations, which they viewed as the spawning grounds of special-interest 
power. 163 Although repulsed by business immorality, the California Progressives 
admired the effIciency of corporations. 164 They were convinced that administrative 
efficiency and scientific management, coupled with more direct citizen participation in 
government, would expose political parties as both irrelevant and unnecessary. 165 
The California Progressives sought to recapture and reaffIrm the individualistic and 
moral values of an older America on all levels of political, economic, and social 
life,,66 They recognised law as that pertaining to the church-going middle class ; they 
were determined to apply it equally to the home, government, and business. 167 
Consequently, they were opposed to the impersonal, concentrated, and privileged 
property embodied in California's corporate giants ,,68 The Southern Pacific, because 
of its size, power, and visibility, became the focus of their campaign to win political 
control in California. 169 
C The Progressive Revolution in California 
The California Progressive movement originated in California's major cities . 170 Its 
early leaders were primarily interested in the legitimisation of local politics . 171 Their 
initial organisational efforts and political successes took place in Los Angeles and San 
Francisco. 
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1 The battle for Los Angeles 
Between 1865 and 1900, the most influential participants in Los Angeles politics were 
the water, gas, and electric companies, the street railway lines, and the Southern 
Pacific. Given the city council's power to regulate their businesses and to award 
lucrative contracts and franchises, these concerns had formed a political machine to 
promote their economic interests. 172 
The machine was responsible for choosing candidates and electing them to office. Its 
success guaranteed regional support for the Southern Pacific, favourable treatment for 
the businesses concerned, and long terms for its elected officials. 173 The Southern 
Pacific provided leadership; city employees donated the labour; money came from the 
corporate utilities, public works contractors, and vice lords. 174 The machine supported 
republicans and democrats alike. As long as successful candidates acknowledged their 
dependence on the machine, party affiliation was of little consequence. By dint of 
hardwork, the machine dominated the Los Angeles city council and effectively 
governed Los Angeles. 175 
However, serving the machine at the expense of campaign promises eventually 
aroused opposition. Los Angeles electors "found taxes outrageously high and services 
incredibly inadequate." Thinking "frugal administration compatible with liberal 
improvements," the electors blamed the situation on the machine. They believed it 
was exploiting them to "gain profits and win elections. ,,176 
Throughout the 1890s, Los Angeles reformers tried to rid the city council of machine 
contro1. 177 They formed the Municipal Reform Association and the League for Better 
City Government to sponsor reform-minded candidates. Although unsuccessful, these 
early efforts had three important consequences: 1) they brought together the 
businessmen and professionals who would launch the progressive movement in 
California; 2) they taught them that success depended upon organisational efficiency, 
dedicated leadership, and practical schemes to gain political power; and 3) they 
established reform as a non-partisan issue. 178 
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These consequences were not lost on Dr John Randolph Haynes. Haynes had moved 
from Philadelphia to Los Angeles in 1887.179 His medical profession and his oil 
investments freed him from economic dependence on the Southern Pacific. ISO His 
standing in the community also eliminated many of the obstacles that had prevented 
earlier, especially foreign, immigrants from participating in the political process. lSI 
This combination of economic independence and prominence was characteristic of 
California Progressives. 182 It gave them both the means and the desire to challenge the 
Southern Pacific. 
After observing Los Angeles politics,183 Haynes concluded that the Southern Pacific 
was responsible for Los Angeles' system of government. 184 He was convinced that the 
Southern Pacific made the final selection of public officials from village constable to 
governor. IS5 Haynes believed that the only way to achieve civic progress was to 
broaden participation in government by giving the electors the powers of the initiative, 
referendum, and recall. ls6 His solution was borne of confidence in the electorate and 
suspicion of elected representatives. 187 He believed that 'the happiness, wisdom and 
prosperity of a people bear a definite ratio to the extent of their power and 
participation in the business of government. "ISS 
In 1895, Haynes organised the Direct Legislation League to promote adoption of the 
initiative, referendum, and recall. The sole purpose of the League was to bring about 
a transfer of power from the machine to the electors. ls9 The League, together with 
other progressive groups, popularised its solution by pointing out that it was "simply 
the principle of the American town meeting applied to the conditions of city life. ,,190 
Persuaded by this argument, a Broad of Freeholders drafted a city charter amendment 
that provided for the initiative, referendum, and recall. Impressed by their capacity to 
restrain and remedy government malfeasance, the electors overwhelmingly approved 
17901in, above n 5, 6. 
lSOSee above text accompany note 132. 
lSI See above text accompanying note 74. 
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IS9Mowry, above n 5, 39; Olin, above n 5,6; League, above n 4, 8. 
190Fogelson, above n 5,212. 
145 
them in 1902.191 The state legislature, despite some hesitation, ratified Los Angeles' 
new city charter in January 1903. 192 
Initially, neither the chaos predicted by conservatives nor the sweeping changes 
expected by progressives materialised. 193 Although progressives were convinced that 
the electors had both the power and the means to purify city government and to 
achieve civic progress,194 the Southern Pacific initially retained its powerful influence 
in Los Angeles' political life. 195 Use of the initiative, referendum, and recall was 
cautious; 196 progress was slow.l97 In 1904, Los Angeles became the first American 
city to recall an elected official. 198 However, the machine continued to control the city 
council throughout the remainder of the decade. 199 
Nevertheless , the reform movement continued to grow in strength.2OO In 1906, the 
reformers gained several city council seats. Encouraged by the victory, they drafted 
amendments to the city charter in 1908 which provided for direct primaries and city-
wide nonpartisan elections.201 When the machine-controlled city council opposed the 
amendments, the Good Government League, under the leadership of Edward Dickson 
of the Los Angeles Express, 202 used the initiative to place them on the ballot in 1909. 
The electors approved both amendments by handsome margins. This ended the 
partisanship and localism that had characterised Los Angeles politics. It also 
strengthened the California Progressives' drive to win control of Los Angeles .203 
The reform meant that the mayor, council members, and appointive administrators 
would receive their authority from city-wide rather than ward constituencies. This 
destroyed the machine's traditional organisational devices; the bosses lost their means 
of reaching the electors and, as a result, their ability to influence government. 
Forcing candidates to appeal to the entire electorate strengthened metropolitan 
institutions such as newspapers, civic clubs, and commercial organisations while 
weakening local groups such as neighbourhood associations , ethnic minorities, and 
19lAbove; see also Olin, above n 5, 6; Beck, above n 5,337. 
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radical activists. Financing and publicity became more important than favours and 
familiarity. 204 
Los Angeles was not the only city where machine politics was under siege. However, 
endowed with a huge native-American majority, Los Angeles became the fIrst city to 
overcome it.205 San Francisco also overcame machine politics during this period, 
albeit in a more dramatic fashion. 
2 The fight in San Francisco 
San Francisco, then the largest metropolitan area in California, was important to the 
Southern PacifIc. The Big Four had won their fIrst victories there. The city's large 
immigrant population made it particularly vulnerable to machine politics. Under the 
shrewd leadership of Christopher Buckley, the machine in San Francisco consistently 
delivered what the Southern PacifIc wanted: freedom from state regulation. Although 
a democrat, he also engineered the arrangements that helped Stanford, president of the 
Southern PacifIc and a republican, maintain his seat in the United States Senate.206 
San Francisco felt the tremors of reform long before the earthquake of 1906. As early 
as 1894, Buckley and the concerns that used his services, particularly the Southern 
PacifIc, were under fue.207 The growing violence and politicalisation of the labour 
movement in San Francisco also shook the political establishment. Abraham Ruef 
took advantage of the unrest by using the Union Labor Party to gain control of San 
Francisco. 208 
Ruef's appetite for bribes was insatiable. It led to his downfall and sparked the state-
wide campaign against the Southern PacifIc that swept the California Progressives into 
power. In 1906 Patrick Calhoun, president of the United Railroad, San Francisco's 
dominant street car system, asked Ruef to grant him a franchise to expand his system. 
He wanted to use overhead trolley wires, which met with the opposition of civic 
leaders who wanted to preserve San Francisco's beauty; they demanded the use of 
underground wires, which was more expensive. 209 
204pogelson, above n 5,218. 
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Knowing that Ruef, rather than elected representatives, would make the decision, 
Calhoun's opponents realised that they had an opportunity to oust Ruef on charges of 
graft. They convinced President Theodore Roosevelt to assign Francis Heney and 
William Bums, the best investigators in the service of the federal government, to the 
task of gathering evidence against Ruef. After the 1906 earthquake struck, Ruef 
sprang the trap by giving Calhoun what he wanted. Shortly afterward, he attended the 
Republican Party's state nominating convention at Santa Cruz, where he outraged 
Californians by selling enough votes to the Southern Pacific to nominate its 
gubernatorial candidate. 210 
The convention debacle, coupled with the graft investigation, reversed Ruef's 
fortunes. Burns used the evidence he had collected and grants of immunity to 
encourage Ruef's underlings to testify against him. During Ruef's trial, which was 
marred by intimidation and disappearing witnesses, a venireman shot Heney, who was 
prosecuting the case. Hiram Johnson, whose father, State Senator Grover Johnson, 
was a staunch supporter of the Southern Pacific, took Heney's place and convicted 
Ruef. The case established Johnson's progressive reputation, and marked him for a 
leadership role in the upcoming campaign to wrest control of the state government 
from the Southern Pacific.211 
The Ruef case also contributed to the progressive sentiment that was growing in 
California. 212 Inspired by President Roosevelt's dynamic leadership, the crusade of 
the "muckrakers," and the success of reformers in Wisconsin and Oregon,213 
Californians were ready for a new political morality. 214 Reformers throughout the 
state were convinced that the structure of government had to change.215 As a result, 
the reform movements in Los Angeles and San Francisco coalesced into a statewide 
campaign to end California's subservience to the Southern Pacific.216 
3 The Lincoln-Roosevelt League 
Following Ruef's Santa Cruz deal, the 1907 state legislature underscored the need for 
reform by setting "a new record for wastefulness, unscrupulousness and subservience 
to the machine. ,,217 Edward Dickson, a reporter for the Los Angeles Express, and 
210 Above; see also above text accompanying note 98. 
211Lavender, above n 5, 161; see also League, above n 4, 8. 
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Chester Rowell , the editor of the Fresno Republican, covered the 1907 session.218 
Outraged by what they saw, they organised a statewide convention of dissatisfied 
republicans, which was held in Oakland in August 1907.219 
Thirty eight delegates attended the convention. Most were well-educated and engaged 
in a profession such as law, journalism, medicine, or business .22o Instead of 
establishing a new party, they decided to remake the California Republican Party 
along progressive lines.221 To facilitate this decision, they formed the Lincoln-
Roosevelt League and resolved to emancipate their party from the Southern Pacific IS 
domination. 222 
The League experienced its first electoral victories in 1908 when it gained several 
seats in the state legislature.223 By 1909, the League controlled as many seats in both 
houses as the machine. However, the reformers were too inexperienced and 
unprepared to capitalise on their success. Consequently, the machine easily out 
manoeuvred them. 224 
Nevertheless, pursuant to a constitutional amendment approved overwhelmingly by 
the electors in the 1908 election,225 the reformers managed to pass a bill requiring 
direct primaries in state elections . The abolishment of nominating conventions 
enabled candidates to appeal directly to their parties I rank and file for their 
nominations. This benefited the League by preventing the Southern Pacific from 
dictating the selection of candidates for all offices in the 1910 election.226 It gave the 
League an opportunity to displace the entrenched republican leadership .227 
The League persuaded Hiram Johnson to be its candidate for governor in 1910.228 
The League selected Johnson because of the name he had made for himself by 
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prosecuting Ruef. 229 The League was fortunate that he turned out to be an eloquent, 
combative, and tireless campaigner with progressive ideals. 230 Johnson identified 
himself with the insurgent republicans back East. In particular, he admired the work 
of La Follette in Wisconsin and of Cummins and Dolliver in Iowa. He believed that 
they were fighting his fight, "a fight against the interests and the system, and for true 
democracy. ,, 231 
4 The campaign for California 
Although he acknowledged the support of the League, Johnson thought that it could 
not wage an effective statewide campaign on his behalf. As a result, Johnson set up 
his own campaign organisation.232 Contrary to the League's advice, he built an 
aggressive campaign around one theme: "kick the Southern Pacific out of politics. ,, 233 
Johnson toured the state in an red, bell-equipped automobile, avoiding trains as if they 
were the plague. At street comers and cross roads , he rang his bell to attract crowds 
for his speeches, 234 in which he attacked the Southern Pacific's illegimate exercise of 
governmental power. 
Johnson's approach increased his fame, which improved his chances of winning the 
election. Johnson was victorious in the primaries for two reasons. First, the vote was 
divided between himself and three other candidates running for the republican 
gubernatorial nomination. 235 Second, he polled extremely well in Los Angeles 
County, which gave him his margin of victory. 236 
In the general election, Johnson ran against Theodore Bell. 237 Bell, a progressive 
democrat, had failed to win the governorship in 1906, even though he had run an anti-
railroad campaign. As both men were running on progressive and anti-railroad 
platforms , the campaign turned on their personalities. Bell "could not match 
Johnson's ability to delight crowds and to arouse enthusiasm among his supporters. " 
229Fehrenbach, above n 5, 57; Hyink, above n 107, 65 . "Conservative newspapers and periodicals were 
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As a result, Johnson was successful in his attacks on Bell. By repeatedly accusing 
Bell of accepting support from the Southern Pacific, Johnson was able to cast Bell as 
pliable and willing to placate the machine.238 The Southern Pacific inadvertently 
strengthened the credibility of Johnson's accusations when it came out in favour of 
Bell, which cost Bell thousands of votes. 239 
Johnson was also able to win the support of the large farmers and ranchers in 
California. He appealed to their hatred of the Southern Pacific 's unjust and excessive 
rates. Although they were prosperous, these "acquisitive agrarian entrepreneurs 
wanted more than anything to end the tapping of their incomes by a predatory 
railroad.,,240 Johnson held out the promise of bigger profits . They responded by 
providing him with valuable campaign funding and influential support in rural areas. 241 
Johnson won by a margin of 23 ,000 votes. 242 His campaign also swept a huge 
progressive republican majority into power?43 Until Johnson's victory, the Governor 
was a railroad man. Through the 1909 legislative session, the Southern Pacific 
controlled the state legislature. The machine administrated the state government 
primarily in the interest of the Southern Pacific. 244 Johnson's victory destroyed this 
practice.245 Once in office, the California progressives immediately began the process 
of fulfilling their party's campaign promises ,246 including adoption of the constitutional 
initiative, the legislative initaitive, and the legislative referendum. 247 
5 Establishing the main direct democracy devices 
During the 1910 election campaign, the Progressives promised to institute the 
initiative, referendum, and recall on the state level. As these devices had spearheaded 
their early victories, they held both practical and symbolic value to the Progressives. 
Between 1902 and 1910, Haynes and his associates had instigated the adoption of 
these devices in several cities, including Los Angeles and San Francisco.248 These 
battles had led to the formation of the Lincoln-Roosevelt League and its subsequent 
campaign to kick the Southern Pacific out of politics . 
2380Iin, above n 5, 31-32. 
239League, above n 4, 10. 
2400Iin, above n 5, 29. 
241 Above. 
242Beck, above n 5, 341. 
243Lavender, above n 5, 163 ; Fehrenbach, above n 5, 58. 
244Beck, above n 5, 338-340. 
245 ABeck, above n 5,344. 
246Beck, above n 5, 341. 
247See Hyink, above n 107, 66, 114. 
248Hyink, above n 107, 114. 
151 
Edward Dickson, one of the League's founders, was an ardent supporter of Haynes' 
Direct Legislation League.249 He was also Johnson's trusted travelling companion 
during the 1910 election campaign. Shortly before the election, Johnson realised that 
he might win, which prompted him to ask Dickson, "what in the world are we going 
to do after we do get in?,,250 Dickson suggested they institute a system of direct 
democracy on the grounds that when the Progressives eventually were defeated the 
machine could never again have the power it once enjoyed. Intrigued by his response, 
Johnson asked Dickson to explain how the initiative, the referendum, and the recall 
worked.251 Johnson must have been impressed by Dickson's explanation because he 
became a relentless advocate for the adoption of these devices once he became 
Governor.252 
Johnson had few specific reform ideas. Party insiders were worried that he would 
take office without a consequential program in place. After his election, Johnson 
travelled East to consult the leading reformers of the progressive era: Theodore 
Roosevelt, Robert La Follette, and Lincoln Steffens. While he was back East, 
California's Republican State Central Committee appointed subcommittees to draft 
measures honouring the party's campaign promises. In the week prior to the 1911 
legislative session, they presented their proposals, which included railroad regulation 
and a range of direct democracy devices, to the members of the new legislature at a 
general meeting. 253 
Although he disapproved of the Committee's course of action, particularly its failure 
to consult him, Johnson publicly supported the Committee's recommendations. 254 In 
his inaugural address of 3 January 1911, he declared:255 
A successful and permanent government must rest primarily upon the recognition of the 
rights of men and the absolute sovereignty of the people. 
He also stated:256 
In some form or other, nearly every governmental problem that involves the health, the 
happiness, or the prosperity of the state has arisen because some private interest has 
intervened or has sought for its own gain to exploit either the resources or the politics of 
the state. 
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Johnson argued that big business and the machine politician had prevented recognition 
of the sovereignty of the people. He also argued that those who employed the state 
for their own private gain were dangerous to the common welfare. Johnson proposed 
the destruction of vested interests by making the people and their agents supreme.257 
At the expense of corporate influence and machine politics, Johnson intended to 
"return government to the people. ,,258 He wanted to restore the legitimacy of 
California's constitutional system. 
To achieve this end, he recommended passage of the long list of reforms that the 
leaders of the Lincoln-Roosevelt League had written into the republican platform. 
These included a railroad act empowering a commission to fix absolute rates on the 
basis of physical evaluation, and the initiative, referendum, and recall.259 In his first 
message to the legislature, Johnson called for the passage of amendments to the 
California Constitution which would provide for the constitutional initiative, the 
legislative initiative, the legislative referendum, and the recall. Haynes and Dickson, 
at Johnson's request, had prepared the necessary amendments. 260 
The proposal to include these direct democracy devices in the California Constitution 
triggered the first bitter clash of opinion in the legislature. Conservative members 
labelled the devices as "socialist measures." Johnson's father, Grove Johnson, who 
had resigned from the legislature after his son's electoral victory, summed up the 
objections to the proposal. He argued that it constitute~ an attempt to substitute an 
"Athenian democracy for a representative form of government" which would remove 
stability and moderation from government. He based his argument upon a distrust of 
the electorate: "The voice of the people is not the voice of God," he declared, "for 
the voice of the people sent Jesus to the cross. ,,261 
The proposal also triggered conservative opposition throughout California. The Los 
Angeles Times, a strong opponent of the proposal, underscored Grover Johnson's 
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argument by "asserting that the 'ignorance and caprice and irresponsibility of the 
multitudes' would be substituted for 'the learning and judgment of the legislature. ",262 
The San Francisco Chronicle and the San Diego Union joined the Los Angeles Times 
in urging Californians to reject the initiative, referendum, and recall on the grounds 
that they undermined representative government. 263 Opponents also argued that 
agitators would use the proposal to produce radical legislation subjecting business and 
property rights to constant turmoil. 264 
Johnson, however, was not deterred. In sharp contrast to the conservatives, the 
California Progressives had faith in the electorate. They wanted to "return the 
government to the people" through the initiative, referendum, and recall in order to 
neutralise machine politics .265 Adoption of the proposal meant "the elimination of 
superstition, bigotry, intolerance, and ignorance from American politics . . . and end 
to boss rule and . . . to grafting from the public crib; and an end of fraud, 
pomposities, and political fakers. ,, 266 
The California Progressives also viewed the proposal as a means of providing for 
civic education on major policy issues and as a means of making the legislature more 
responsive to the electorate. If the legislature failed to act, the electors could bypass 
their representative political institutions altogether. 267 Empowered by these devices , 
California electors, as Dickson had explained to Johnson, would never again be 
subjected to abuse of governmental power that they had to bear under the Southern 
Pacific.268 
Johnson had placed the proposal in a "must pass class" and was prepared to use all of 
his power to obtain its passage. 269 Once the legislature had agreed upon the form of 
the constitutional amendments and passed them, they were submitted to the electors 
for approval in a special election held on 11 October 1911270 in accordance with the 
procedure for constitutionally required referendums. 
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During the two months prior to the special election, Johnson campaigned vigorously 
on behalf of the proposed direct democracy devices. 271 He virtually ignored all other 
issues.272 In one of his most effective speeches, Johnson, invoking the democratic 
spirit of Andrew Jackson, declared that the devices constituted an attempt to bring 
government close to the electors once again, "in the hope . . . that we may yet live in 
a free republic. ,,273 The electors rewarded Johnson's efforts by approving the 
initiative, referendum, and recall amendments to the California Constitution.274 The 
special election involved 220,000 electors.275 Although the constitutional initiative and 
legislative initiative, which were combined in one amendment, barely passed, the 
recall amendment, which included elected judges, was approved three-to-one. 276 
Ruef, Johnson's nemesis, unwittingly helped Johnson win adoption of direct 
democracy in California. Ruef had appealed his conviction to the California Supreme 
Court. As fate would have it, the appeal reached the Court prior to the special 
election. The possibility that Ruef might be freed by the Court prompted Californians 
to overwhelmingly endorse the recall amendment. This incident undoubtedly 
enhanced Johnson's case for the other direct democracy devices. 
Under Johnson's dynamic leadership, the 1911 legislature enacted a comprehensive 
reform program. 277 The program emphasised the democratisation of politics .278 
Adoption of the constitutional initiative, the legislative initiative, and the legislative 
referendum constituted one of the legislature's major achievements .279 Capitalising on 
previous reform efforts and on aroused public opinion, the California Progressives 
ended the Southern Pacific's domination of California's politics by building upon the 
idea that the electors would rule wisely if governmental power was placed in their 
hands. 280 They used the idea to challenge the Southern Pacific's control over the 
exercise of governmental power and then to break its monopoly over that power. 
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III ASSESSMENT 
Direct democracy in California fmds its origins in the forces that gave rise to the 
California Progressives. The Southern Pacific Railroad Company was largely 
responsible for producing those forces. In the course of its reign, it subverted the 
separation of powers doctrine underpinning California's constitutional system by 
acquiring control of each branch of government; legislators, governors, and judges 
were in its service. Consequently, the Southern Pacific completely dominated the 
legislative process in California. 
As in Switzerland during the heyday of Escher and his ilk, representative democracy 
in California was under the control of a few extremely wealthy individuals who used 
their power to further their personal economic interests. At the zenith of its power, 
the Southern Pacific had a·supporter in every office which could affect its interests. It 
used these offices, often with brutal efficiency, to advance and protect its interests. 
By doing so , the Southern Pacific was able to neutralise those aspects of early reform 
movements which were directed against its interests.28 1 
The California Progressives, however, could not be dealt with in the same fashion. 
Like the Swiss Democrats, they were, by and large, better educated, better informed, 
and better off than their predecessors, which gave them both the means and the 
inclination to be politically active. Both the Swiss Democrats and the California 
Progressives were part of demographic changes which had dramatically increased the 
numbers of those who loathed being marginalised by privileged elites and who 
idealised an earlier age uncorrupted by the negative aspects of industrialism. The 
Swiss Democrats drew upon the examples of the self-governing ancient mountain 
cantons and the virtue of the fair-minded and independent individual who had a say in 
the affairs of his or her community as symbolised by the legendary Wilhelm Tell. 
The California Progressives sought to recapture and reaffirm the individualistic and 
moral values of an older America in which those living in small settlements and 
pioneer towns had a say in the affairs of their communities and were rewarded for 
hardwork and honest living. Neither were prepared to accept the illegitimate use of 
governmental power. 
The impulse which drove the Swiss Democrats and the California Progressives was 
essentially the same. They were reacting to the colossal changes brought about by the 
industrial revolution, particularly the dehumanising consequences of its rapid and 
unprecedented concentration of economic and political power. It was no accident that 
the California Progressives embraced Sullivan's argument that California should adopt 
281 See League, above n 4, 7 
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Switzerland's direct democracy system. His accounts of Switzerland's direct 
democracy system provided the California Progressives with a concrete example of 
how they could break the Southern Pacific's stranglehold on the exercise of 
governmental power in California.282 Like the Swiss Democrats before them, the 
California Progressives were initially on the outside looking in. They wanted to 
participate in the exercise of governmental power to bring about the reforms that they 
considered necessary, but their access was effectively barred and their 
"representatives" unresponsive. Rather than abandoning their efforts, however, they 
persisted and continued to work within the existing constitutional framework to fmd 
ways to overcome the barriers erected by privileged economic interests. 
Like the Swiss Democrats, who began their push for direct democracy in the 
communes and the cantons, the California Progressives began their campaign on the 
local level, where they eventually won control of key city governments, most notably 
Los Angeles and San Francisco. Their success on the local level encouraged them to 
tum their attention to the state government, just as the Swiss Democrats had turned 
their attention to their federal government after their cantonal victories. Slowly, but 
surely, the California Progressives made the inroads necessary to enable them to wrest 
power from the Southern Pacific. 
When the California Progressives had [mally achieved their goal, they immediately 
took steps to entrench devices which would render any repetition of the excesses 
perpetrated by the Southern Pacific impossible. The constitutional initiative, the 
legislative initiative, and the legislative referendum were chief among those devices. 
The constitutional initiative and the legislative initiative would ensure that the 
electorate's desire for reform could not be easily frustrated by their elected 
representatives. The legislative referendum would give the electors the means to veto 
legislation enacted by their elected representatives which did not conform to their 
expectations. Both devices would increase the difficulty of enacting legislation 
contrary to their interests, even if a group were to acquire control over each branch of 
government as the Southern Pacific had during its heyday. Since the electors would 
have the means to challenge the acts or omissions of their elected representatives, the 
exercise of governmental power could no longer be monopolised by anyone group . 
Ultimately, and ironically, the California Progressives chose to remedy the defects of 
representative democracy by institutional ising direct democracy. Inspired by Hiram 
Johnson's energetic and eloquent leadership, and all too aware of the inglorious past 
of the Southern Pacific, the electors ratified the constitutional amendments that 
established California's direct democracy system. As in Switzerland, direct 
282See Meier, above n 120, 16, 18. 
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democracy was perceived as a means of improving, not displacing, representative 
democracy. The inclusion of the constitutional initiative, the legislative ini~iative, and 
the legislative referendum in the California Constitution have given Californians a 
constitutional system that combines the elements of representative and direct 
democracy.283 As the next chapter shows, these direct democracy devices have, in 
effect, limited the power of elected representatives by augmenting the legal 
sovereignty of the electors. 
283Por a discussion of Cronin's hybrid model of democracy, see section IV in chapter two. 
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6 
ROLE OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN CALIFORNIA 
The California Progressives drew on Switzerland's direct democracy system when 
establishing the constitutional initiative, the legislative initiative, and the legislative 
referendum in California. Inspired by the success of the Swiss Democrats, they 
embraced these devices as a means of breaking the hold that the Southern Pacific had 
on California's elected representatives. Their aim was to restore the legitimacy of 
their constitutional system. 
However, the role that these direct democracy devices play in California is different 
from the role they play in Switzerland. Switzerland, for example, does not have the 
legislative initiative on the federal level. In addition, the legislative referendum is 
used far more frequently in Switzerland than it is in California while the constitutional 
initiative is used far less frequently in Switzerland than in California. These 
differences are attributable to the procedural differences between Switzerland's and 
California's direct democracy devices and the legal implications of the results they 
produce. These factors are in turn largely a consequence of the differences between 
the Swiss and California constitutional systems, including California's subordinate 
status to the federal government of the United States of America. 
This chapter explores these procedural differences and legal implications by outlining 
California's constitutional system and comparing it to Switzerland's constitutional 
system. It begins by examining California's subordinate status to the federal 
government, which reveals that California's direct democracy devices cannot be used 
to propose, enact, or veto laws that are within the jurisdiction of the federal 
government. The chapter then dissects the component parts of California's 
constitutional system, namely, its legislative, executive, and judicial branches, and 
analyses their relationship to the constitutional initiative, the legislative initiative, and 
the legislative referendum. This exercise shows that the separation of powers 
principle is applied more strictly in California than in Switzerland, which explains 
why the California Judiciary, unlike its Swiss counterpart, has the power to declare 
initiative and referendum proposals, or their results, unconstitutional and, therefore , 
null and void. Although the discussion is based on the California Constitution, the 
California Election Code, and the relevant case law, the works of Eugene Lee, Philip 
Schlessinger and Richard Wright, The League of Women Voters of California, Clyde 
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Hardy, and Bernard Hyink, Seyom Brown, and Ernest Thacker provide useful 
insights into the actual operation of California's constitutional system. 1 
Despite the differences in the Swiss and California direct democracy systems, this 
chapter concludes that California's direct democracy devices, like Switzerland's, limit 
the legislative power of elected representatives in California by giving the electors the 
power to propose, enact, and veto laws. In addition, these devices, like those in 
Switzerland, have safeguards built into them that limit the legislative power they give 
to the electors. In Switzerland, however, the safeguards are only procedural. In 
California, the safeguards are both procedural and substantive, that is, California's 
direct democracy devices are subject to a host of subject matter limitations. These 
insights provide the basis for analysing New Zealand's Citizens Initiated Referenda 
Act 1993 in Part IV of this thesis. 
I RELATIONSIDP OF CALIFORNIA TO FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 
As a geographical, economic, demographic, and cultural entity, California is more 
like a nation than a state. 2 As a political entity, however, California holds roughly the 
same position in the United States of America as a canton does in Switzerland. 
Although California has far more economic, social, and cultural influence than a 
Swiss canton, both nationally and internationally, it has less political autonomy, 
particularly in the all important area of taxation. 3 Article VI, section 2 of the United 
States Constitution states: 
This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance 
thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United 
States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every State shall be 
bound thereby, anything in the constitution or laws of any State to the contrary 
notwithstanding. 
lLeague of Women Voters of California Initiative and Referendum in California: A Legacy Lost? A 
Study of Direct Legislation in California from Progressive Hopes to Present Reality (League of Women 
Voters of California, Sacramento, 1984 reprint 1987); E Lee "California" in D Butler and A Ranney 
(eds) Referendums: A Comparative Study of Practice and Theory (American Enterprise Institute, 
Washington, DC, 1978); C Hardy California Government (4 ed, Canfield Press , San Francisco, 1973); 
B Hyink, S Brown, and E Thacker Politics & Government in California (8 ed, Thomas Y Cromwell 
Company, New York, 1973); P Schlessinger and R Wright Elements of Government in California 
(Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York, 1962). 
2Lee "California" in Butler and Ranney, above n 1, 87; Hyink, above n 1, to-15 . 
3For example, on 9 September 1850, the United States Congress enacted "An Act for the Admission of 
California into the Union," which contains specific provisions concerning federal lands, taxation, and 
navigable waters which may not be altered by California. Constitution of the State of California 
(California State Senate, Sacramento, 1961) 311; see also Schlessinger, above n 1, 8. 
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The Tenth Amendment, however, provides an important qualification to this statement 
of federal constitutional power: 
The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it 
to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people. 
Article I, section 8 of the United States Constitution enumerates the powers delegated 
to the federal government, which consist of the essential attributes of traditional 
governmental sovereignty, that is, the power to coin money, to tax, to provide for the 
national defence, and to regulate foreign and interstate commerce. Article I, section 
10 specifically prohibits the states from making treaties, coining money, and enacting 
any bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, or laws impairing the obligation of 
contracts. In addition, the states require the consent of the United States Congress to 
levy duties on exports and imports, form interstate compacts, and wage war. In areas 
of concurrent jurisdiction, like taxation, Article VI, section 2 ensures that federal law 
prevails if it conflicts with state law. 
Article I, section 3 of the California Constitution expressly recognises the State's 
subordinate status: 
The State of California is an inseparable part of the American Union, and the 
Constitution of the United States is the supreme law of the land. 
With two important exceptions, California has exclusive jurisdiction in those areas 
which are not expressly delegated to the federal government. The first exception is 
the Full Faith and Credit clause in Article IV of the United States Constitution. Under 
this clause, California must recognise the public acts, records, and judicial 
proceedings of other states. Its courts, for example, must enforce judgments in civil 
cases rendered by courts in other states. The second exception is a matter of practical 
politics. Over the years, increasing reliance on conditional grants from the federal 
government and federal solutions to problems that were once in California's exclusive 
domain has effectively reduced California's political autonomy.4 In essence, 
California governs itself subject to federal restrictions and the requirements of sister 
state reciprocity. 5 
Furthermore, California cannot enact laws that proscribe or circumvent the rights 
guaranteed under the United States Constitution, particularly those set out in the Bill 
of Rights. For example, as Hyink, Brown, and Thacker have noted: 6 
4Hardy, above n 1, 22. 
5Hardy, above n 1, 23. 
6Hardy, above n 1, 26-27. For a discussion of the federal constitutional constraints on the initiative and 
referendum (particularly substantive and procedural due process, and equal protection grounds), see D 
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Within twenty years after becoming a state, California, like all other states, was 
obligated by the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to provide equal protection of its 
laws and the right to vote to all citizens, regardless of race or color, and was also 
prohibited from abridging the privileges and immunities of United States citizens or 
from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. The 
Supreme Court subsequently indicated (through a long line of decisions) that the 
immunities with which a state may not interfere are basically the same ones which the 
Bill of Rights prohibits Congress from violating. 
Both the California and the federal courts have used the United States Constitution to 
invalidate, in whole or in part, laws produced by constitutional initiatives in 
California. For example, the California Legislature passed fair housing legislation in 
1963 that prohibited realtors and owners of apartment houses and homes built with 
public assistance from discriminating on racial grounds. 7 The Citizens League for 
Individual Freedom tried to use the legislative referendum to veto the enactment, but 
it failed to gather the requisite number of signatures within the 90 day deadline. 8 
Undeterred, the League then sponsored a constitutional initiative that was designed to 
give private property owners the absolute right to sell or lease or refuse to sell or 
lease to whomever he or she chose,9 which effectively repealed the fair housing 
legislation when approved by the electors by a two to one margin in 1964.10 
However, the California Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court struck 
down the initiative as being contrary to the equal protection guarantees in the United 
States Constitution in Reitman v Mulkey. II The federal government also enacted fair 
housing legislation,12 which, given the superiority of federal law, would also have 
rendered the initiative null and void. 13 
Due to the superior status of the United States Constitution and the clear dominance 
of the federal government in the key areas of traditional governmental sovereignty, 
direct democracy in California is far less powerful and · important than it is in 
Jordan "Constitutional Constraints on Initiative and Referendum" (1979) 32 Vand L R 1143 . For a 
discussion of the limitations which should be applied to direct democracy if adopted on the federal 
level , see J Synder "The Proposed National Initiative Amendment: A Participatory Perspective on 
Substantive Restrictions and Procedural Requirements" (1981) 18 Harv J Legis 429. 
7r Cronin Direct Democracy: The Politics of Initiative, Referendum, and Recall (Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge, 1989) 94 . 
8The League needed 292,633 signatures but gathered approximately 245 ,000. Hardy, above n 1, 80. 
9G Walker Initiative and Referendum: The People's Law (The Centre for Independent Studies Ltd, St 
Leonards, 1987) 71. 
IOHardy, above n 1, 80; Cronin, above n 7,94. 
"413 P2d 825,64 Cal2d 529,50 Cal Rptr 881 (1966) af!'d 387 US 369 (1967); see also Hardy, above 
n 1, 80; Walker, above n 9, 71. 
12Hardy, above n 1, 80. 
I3For another example, see Weaver v Jordon 411 P2d 289, 64 Cal 2d 235,49 Cal Rptr 537 cert denied 
385 US 844 (1966) (holding an initiative banning pay television unconstitutional on the grounds that it 
impaired the freedom of speech as guaranteed by both the California Constitution and United States 
Constitution) . 
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Switzerland. In Switzerland, the judiciary cannot invalidate federal law, especially 
federal laws enacted by the Swiss electorate through use of the constitutional 
initiative. The California electors, however, cannot use the constitutional initiative, 
the legislative initiative, or the legislative referendum to propose, amend, or veto laws 
that pertain to matters within the jurisdiction of the federal government or that would 
abridge the rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution. 
II CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF CALIFORNIA GOVERNMENT 
California I S Constitution, like Switzerland 's, is based on the United States 
Constitution. 14 However, the California constitutional system has taken a more 
formalistic approach to the separation of powers principle than the Swiss 
constitutional system. In Switzerland, for example, members of the executive are 
elected by and from members of the legislature. The judiciary does not have the 
power to invalidate legislation enacted by the legislature. In addition, the executive 
effectively controls the legislative process. Furthermore, elections have not shifted 
governmental power from one party to another since 1959. As a consequence, the 
direct democracy devices in Switzerland constitute the only constitutional means by 
which to challenge the exercise of governmental power. 
In contrast, California has a plural executive whose officers are directly elected by the 
electors. As a consequence, executive power is often divided among competing 
political parties. In addition, the Governor, the executive officer who has the power 
to veto legislation, often belongs to a party that does not control the California 
Legislature. The California Judiciary, unlike its Swiss counterpart, has the power to 
invalidate legislation enacted by the Legislature. Furthermore, elections often shift 
control of the California Executive, particularly the governorship, and the California 
Legislature from one party to another. Consequently, the direct democracy devices in 
California constitute one of several constitutional ways by which to challenge the 
exercise of governmental power. 
To ensure that "no governmental agency can be dictatorial and successfully refuse to 
serve the will of the people, "IS the framers of the California Constitution chose to 
divide governmental power among three separate branches: the Legislature, the 
Executive, and the Judiciary. 16 This division failed to prevent the Southern Pacific 
from acquiring and exercising virtually unchallengeable governmental power 
irrespective of "the will of the people." However, this failure led to the introduction 
14Schlessinger, above n 1, 12; Hyink, above n 1, 23; Hardy, above n 1, 18,29. 
15 Constitution, above n 3, 351. 
16Cal Const, art III, S 1. 
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of the constitutional initiative, the legislative initiative, and the legislative referendum, 
which has affected each branch of the California constitutional system. 
11 iSegislature 
In theory, the primary purpose of the California Legislature is to act as "the people's 
bulwark against executive tyranny. "17 The Legislature can discharge this function in 
several ways. First, it has the power to make and unmake laws, which means that it 
can authorise or forbid executive action. Second, it has the exclusive power to 
sanction taxation and expenditure, which means that if it disagrees with executive 
policy, it can simply refuse to raise or appropriate the funds necessary to implement 
that policy. Third, it can impeach executive officers if they fail to discharge their 
duties. IS 
1 Senate and Assembly 
Like the Swiss Federal Assembly, the California Legislature is bicameral. It has a 40 
member Senate and an 80 member Assembly. 19 Assemblymen serve two-year terms 
and Senators serve four-year staggered terms. 20 Senators from even-numbered 
districts are elected at gubernatorial elections, the remainder at presidential 
elections / I so half are elected every two years. 22 Assemblymen and Senators are 
elected in even-numbered years, except those chosen in by-elections to fill 
vacancies. 23 
The electoral system is a "first-past-the-post" system, that is , the candidate with the 
most votes in an electoral contest is declared elected. If the party that wins control of 
the Legislature also wins control of the Executive, election results can produce a 
Westminster-style political environment, in which the majority party runs the 
governmental system and the minority party assumes the role of critic. 24 If one party 
captures the Executive and another the Legislature, which cannot happen in 
Switzerland, governing proceeds on the basis of compromise between the two 
branches. As in the Swiss constitutional system, the Westminster no-confidence 
convention is nonexistent. Defeat of an executive proposal in the Legislature or the 
17 Schlessinger, above n 1, 11. 
ISSee Hardy, above n 1, 24. 
19Cal Const, art IV, s 2(a) . 
2°Hardy, above n 1, 29; Schlessinger, above n 1, 12, Hyink, above n 1, 142. 
21Cal Const, art IV, s 2(a); Schlessinger, above n 1, 12. 
22Hyink, above n 1, 142. 
23Schlessinger, above n 1, 12 
24Hardy, above n 1, 73 . The California governmental system is, for the most part, a two-party one, in 
which the Democrats and the Republicans compete for power. 
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veto of a legislative enactment by the Executive simply means the death of the 
proposal or enactment. 
Turnover is generally very low in the Assembly and the Senate.2S In the 1990 
California state elections, for example, incumbents out-spent challengers by an 8-to-1 
margin, winning re-election in 92 percent of the races. 26 This electoral invulnerability 
bred complacency and a disregard for the wishes of the electors, who, angered by the 
unresponsiveness of their elected representatives, approved a constitutional initiative 
in the same year that set term limits for their Assemblymen and Senators. 27 The 
rationale for the change, which is set out in Article 4, section 1.5 of the California 
Constitution, amounts to a rejection of the Burkeian theory of representation: 
The people find and declare that the Founding Fathers established a system of 
representative government based upon free , fair, and competitive elections. The 
increased concentration of political power in the hands of incumbent representatives has 
made our electoral system less free , less competitive, and less representative. 
The ability of legislators to serve unlimited number of terms, to establish their own 
retirement system, and to pay for staff and support services at state expense contribute 
heavily to the extremely high number of incumbents who are reelected. These unfair 
incumbent advantages discourage qualified candidates from seeking public office and 
create a class of career politicians, instead of the citizen representatives envisioned by 
the Founding Fathers. These career politicians become representatives of the 
bureaucracy, rather than the people whom they are elected to represent. 
To restore a free and democratic system of fair elections, and to encourage qualified 
candidates to seek public office, the people fmd and declare that the powers of 
incumbency must be limited. Retirement benefits must be restricted, state-fmanced 
incumbent staff and support services limited, and limitations placed upon the number of 
terms which may be served. 
The initiative amended Article 4, section 2 of the California Constitution to provide 
that "[n]o Senator may serve more than 2 terms" and "[n]o member of the Assembly 
may serve more than 3 terms." In an effort to preserve their long-term career 
prospects, legislators challenged the initiative in the courts as unconstitutional. 
However, the California Supreme Court upheld the initiative. 28 The electorate's 
2SSee Hardy, above n I , 29. 
26Corvitz "Lawmakers Sue for Their Jobs - Another Reason for Term Limits" The Wall Street Journal, 
New York, USA, 19 June 1991, 15. 
27 Above; Raine "Can Voters Set Political Term Limits?: California Supreme Court Ready to Hear 
Proposition 140 Challenge Seeking Curbs on Legislature" San Francisco Examiner, San Francisco, 
USA, 8 September 1991, 1. 
28"State Constitutional Law - Constitutional Revisions - California Supreme Court Upholds Term 
Limitation Initiative - Legislature of California v Eu, No. SoI9660, 1991 Cal. LEXIS 4529 (Oct. 10, 
1991)" (1992) 105 Harv L Rev 953; see also Corvitz, above n 26; Chiang and Gunnison "State High 
Court OKs Term Limits for Legislators: Judges Rule that Prop 140 Initiative Protects Against 
'Entrenched, Dynastic Bureaucracy'" San Francisco Chronicle, San Francisco, USA 11 October 1991 , 
1; "A Victory for Term Limits and California Voter Initiative Limiting Legislators' Terms is Upheld" 
Wall Street Journal, New York, USA, 11 October 1991; D DeBenedictis "Voters Limit Politicians ' 
Terms" (January 1993) ABA J 26; see also K Bhatia "Republican Reform of Government" (1993) 
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approval of this initiative indicates that elected representatives are further removed 
from the electors in California than they are in Switzerland, which is consistent with 
California's larger size and population. It also suggests that direct democracy is less 
useful in California than it is in Switzerland as a means of encouraging the Legislature 
to give expression to "the will of the people," which may be due to the rare use of the 
legislative referendum in California. 
2 Legislative procedure 
A bill may be introduced in the Assembly by an Assemblyman or the Senate by a 
Senator. It is given its first reading, then assigned to a relevant committee of the 
House in question for detailed consideration. Of the 5,000 or so bills introduced each 
legislative session, approximately two-thirds die in committee. 29 If the bill is reported 
back, it is submitted to a second reading in the House in question, at which time 
members may propose amendments to the bill. If the bill survives its second reading, 
it is submitted to a third reading. If the bill passes its third reading, it is sent to the 
other House, which repeats the process. If the other House passes the bill without 
change, the bill goes to the Governor to be signed into law or vetoed. The Governor 
vetoes 9 to 10 percent of the bills sent to him or her each year. 30 If the other House 
changes the bill, it goes to conference where the two Houses attempt to reach a 
compromise. 31 If a compromise is struck, it is sent to the Governor. If the bill is 
rejected at any stage in the process, it is dead. 
With the exception of bills with urgency clauses, the Legislature cannot enact bills 
after 2 Octobef2 and each bill must come into force on 1 January. 33 In effect, most 
enactments are suspended for 90 days to allow the electors the requisite time period to 
invoke the legislative referendum. The Legislature can only place an urgency clause 
in a bill if the bill and the clause, in separate votes, are approved by a two-thirds vote 
of each House, that is, 54 Assembly votes and 27 Senate votes.34 Bills with urgency 
clauses take effect as soon as the Governor signs them. Enactments subject to a 
legislative referendum cannot become effective until the electors approve them at the 
next general election. 35 
Colum L R 1300 (reviewing G Will Restoration: Congress, Term Limits and the Recovery of 
Deliberative Democracy (The Free Press, New York, 1992». 
29Hyink, above n 1, 153 (sessions are two years in length) . 
30See Hardy, above n 1, 75. 
31See Hardy, above n 1, 78-79; Hyink, above n 1, 151-152. 
32Hyink, above n 1, 151. 
33Hardy, above n 1, 80; see also Schlessinger, above n 1, 31. The January-October timing rules have 
created a strong incentive to enact legislation before 2 October, as a bill missing this deadline will have 
to wait over a year to be implemented. Hardy, above n 1, 80. 
34Hyink, above n 1, 151. 
35Hardy, above n 1, 80. 
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Aside from the budget bill, each bill must relate to a single subject, which precludes 
adding unrelated riders to bills , particularly those which would not pass on their 
own. 36 If the Legislature wants to issue a bond to raise money or amend the 
California Constitution, it must submit the appropriate legislation to the electors for 
their approval. 37 In either case, the electors must approve the legislation before it can 
take effect. 
The Assembly and Senate committees make their decisions on bills based on a variety 
of factors. 38 At public hearings, advocates , which include legislators, administrators, 
and lobbyists, present arguments calculated to win support for a particular bill . 
Opponents will do the opposite, often providing the valuable service of pointing out 
flaws in the bill. Although interest groups are not invited to sit on the committees of 
the Legislature, as they are in Switzerland,39 their well-fmanced persistence, specialist 
knowledge, and expertise make them extremely influential. 
Outside the hearings, advocates and opponents will bombard committee members with 
mail, phone calls , and personal contact. Committee members balance these views 
with advice from legislative aides, particularly the Legislative Counsel,40 who 
prepares opinions on the effect of pending legislation. Other sources of information 
and opinion include consultants, executive secretaries, committee assistants , 
experienced officials, the state library, the legislature reference library, the Institute 
of Governmental Studies at the University of California at Berkeley, the Bureau of 
Governmental Research at Los Angeles, the League of Cities, and the County 
Supervisors Association. However, as Hardy has noted:41 
Possibly the most important is the exchange of ideas among legislators themselves. 
Since no one legislator can be familiar with the merits of all bills or resolutions, he 
must rely upon the knowledge of his peers. Informal give-and-take plays a crucial role . 
The sheer volume of legislation, irrespective of its complexity or relevance to a 
legislator's constituency, makes specialisation by Senators and Assemblymen and 
their reliance on specialists inevitable. This fact highlights the importance of interest 
groups in the legislative process. 42 It also belies the Burkeian myth that all decisions 
36Schlessinger, above n I, 26. 
37See Hyink, above n 1,149; Schlessinger, above n 1, 33-34. 
38Hardy, above n 1, 77 . 
39See section II.C in chapter four . 
40The Legislative Counsel is also responsible for drafting the bills introduced in the Legislature. 
41Hardy, above n 1, 77-78. 
42Hardy, above n 1, 83; Schlessinger, above n 1, 23. 
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taken by elected representatives are deliberative or made by the exercise of 
independent judgment. 43 
B Executive 
The California Executive is a plural executive,44 as the Governor must share executive 
power with other officials elected to executive office, namely, the Lieutenant 
Governor, the Secretary of State, the Controller, the Treasurer, the Superintendent of 
Public Instruction, and the Board of Equalization (4 members). 45 As these positions 
are elected, executive officers can, and often do, belong to different parties. The 
Governor cannot select or remove them. Both of these factors can create serious 
policy conflicts within the Executive. 46 
1 Role of the Governor 
The Governor serves a four year term,47 but may not serve more than two terms due 
to the successful 1990 constitutional initiative on term limits .48 The Legislature may 
remove the Governor from office if a majority of the Assembly votes to impeach and 
two-thirds of the Senate votes to convict, in which case the Lieutenant Governor 
would become Governor. 49 When the Governor is absent from the State, the 
Lieutenant Governor becomes acting Governor, which can, in the absence of an 
agreement between the two, create difficulties if each is from a different party. 50 
Aside from heading the Executive, the Governor is required to submit a budget to the 
Legislature each fiscal year (1 July to 30 June).51 The Legislature's role is to consider 
and approve the budget, which it eventually does, but generally only after making 
significant changes, especially if the Legislature is dominated by an opposing political 
party. However, approval of the budget must be by two-thirds vote of each House. 
43For a discussion of Burke's theory of representation, see section III.B.2(d) in chapter two. 
44Hyink, above n 1, 159. 
45Hardy, above n 1, 32; see also Hyink, above n 1, 158-159; Schlessinger, above n 1, 36. 
46Hyink, above n 1, 159. 
47Hyink, above n 1, 170; Hardy above n 1, 32. 
48Cal Const, art V, s 2. Prior to the advent of the two term limit, no one had served more than two 
terms as Governor. Hyink, above n 1, 170. The offices of Lieutenant Governor, Attorney General, 
Controller, Secretary of State, and Treasurer are also subject to the same four year two term limit. 
Cal Const, art V, s 11. 
49Hardy, above n 1, 33. Elected officials are also subject to recall in California. Above. The recall 
device is a device by which the electors can trigger a referendum on whether an elected official should 
be dismissed. For a discussion of the recall device, see Cronin, above n 7, 125-156. 
50Hardy, above n 1, 33; see also Hyink, above n 1, 171. 
5lHardy, above n 1, 97; Hyink, above n 1, 160. The Department of Finance, which is directly 
responsible to the Governor, prepares the budget. Above. 
168 
Since the party controlling the Legislature rarely has the requisite majority, it must 
bargain with minority parties or independent factions within the Legislature. 52 
When the Legislature sends a bill to the Governor, the Governor has 10 days, 
excluding Sundays, to sign the bill into law, veto it entirely, or veto an item in it. 53 
The 'item veto' is particularly important in the context of the budget bill as it gives 
the Governor the means to sever, without jeopardising the entire bill, irresponsible 
vote-buying fmancial measures which may have been included during the approval 
process. 54 As Hyink, Brown, and Thacker have noted, "[t]he purpose of the item veto 
... was to strengthen the Governor's hand in the formulation of the State's fiscal 
program. "55 Although rarely used, it discourages legislators from adding unrelated 
riders to budget bills or other vital legislation. 56 The Legislature, however, can 
override both the veto and the item veto with a two-thirds vote in both Houses. 
However, this is seldom done. If the Governor does not sign or veto a bill within 10 
days of its presentation, it automatically becomes law. 57 
The Governor has had occasion to veto efforts on the part of the Legislature to restrict 
the electorate's access to California's direct democracy devices. Although the right to 
the constitutional initiative, the legislative initiative, and the legislative referendum 
are entrenched in the California Constitution, most of the administrative specifics for 
these devices are set out in the California Election Code, which is ordinary 
unentrenched legislation. In March 1984, the Legislature passed a bill which called 
for an increase in the initiative filing fee from $200 to $1,000, while still providing 
for a full refund if the measure qualified for the ballot or a refund of $800 if it 
attracted at least 25,000 signatures . According to the League of Women Voters of 
California: 58 
Governor George Deukmejian vetoed the measure, stating that it "would make it more 
difficult for people to exercise their constitutional rights under the initiative process" 
and would have a "potential chilling effect . .. on those who seek redress by use of the 
initiative. " 
52Hardy, above n 1, 98. 
53Hardy, above n 1, 88,90. 
54See Hardy, above n 1, 90. The Governor may only use the veto power to negate bills or provisions in 
bills; he or she cannot use it to increase expenditure. Hyink, above n 1, 162-163. 
55Hyink, above n 1, 163. 
56Above . 
57See Hardy, above n 1, 88; Hyink, above n 1, 162. 
58League, above n 1, 38; see also Hyink, above n 1, 131 (quoting Governor Edmund Brown's 1965 
message to the Legislature: "I will not support any bill that would restrict the value of the initiative"). 
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2 Use of initiative by executive officers 
Members of the Executive are not above using the initiative process to further their 
policy objectives or political careers. For example, Jerry Brown, as Secretary of 
State, helped to draft an initiative which, when approved by the electorate, became 
the Political Reform Act of 1974.59 He built his successful "Mr Clean" gubernatorial 
campaign around the measure. Brown's predecessor, Governor Ronald Reagan, 
strengthened his credentials as a republican presidential candidate by proposing a tax 
limitation measure in 1973.60 
The initiative process, given its statewide publicity value, has also appealed to those 
aspiring to become part of the Executive. For example, Tom Bradley, then Mayor of 
Los Angeles, tried using the initiative process to boost his ill-fated gubernatorial 
campaign. He helped to place a strict toxics regulatory measure on the 1986 general 
election ballot in the vain hope that it would attract more electors to the polls who 
would also vote for him. 61 
3 Effect of devices on the Executive and the Legislature 
Unlike the executive in Switzerland, the California Executive is formed independently 
from the Legislature. Accordingly, the effect of the legislative referendum on the 
Executive, assuming one of its proposals is at stake, is the same as the Legislature's 
refusal to enact legislation necessary for the Executive to carry out its policy 
objectives, which is a frequent occurrence in the normal legislative process. The 
effect of the legislative referendum on the Legislature, assuming that one of its 
measures is at stake, is the same as if the Governor had vetoed it. Constitutional and 
legislative initiatives by-pass the legislative process altogether, which means that the 
Governor cannot veto initiatives approved by the electorate. 
For the most part, however, the constitutional initiative, the legislative initiative, and 
the legislative referendum are the nemesis of the Legislature rather than the 
Executive. The California Progressives brought them in "foremost as a means for 
citizens to regain an element of control from unresponsive legislatures over the scope 
59League, above n 1, 36; see also Cal Gov't Code, s 81000 et seg. The Political Reform Act of 1974 
was sponsored by the Peoples Lobby, Inc, Ralph Nader's California Citizens Action Group, and 
California Common Cause. It ranks as one of the most comprehensive legislative amendments in 
California history. E Steck, Jr. "California Legislation: Sources Unlimited" (1975) 6 Pac L J 536, 
545-546; see also N Brestoff "The California Initiative Process: A Suggestion for Reform" (1975) 48 
So Cal L Rev 922,947-951. 
6°Lee "California" in Butler and Ranney, above n 1, 99. 
61L Berg and C Holman "The Initiative Process and its Declining Agenda-setting Value" (1989) 11 L & 
Pol'y 451,462. 
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and nature of basic public policy. 11 62 Although the power of incumbency and the 
successful push for term limits indicate that elected representatives may not be any 
more responsive to the electorate than they were during the heyday of the Southern 
Pacific, these direct democracy devices ensure that no one interest group can achieve 
the same level of control over the exercise of governmental power. Rival interest 
groups can always use the devices to protect or advance their interests irrespective of 
the disposition of the group controlling the Legislature or the Executive. 
C Judiciary 
The California Judiciary, unlike its Swiss counterpart, has the power to rule acts of 
the Executive and the Legislature unconstitutional. If an executive act has breached 
either the California Constitution or United States Constitution, the Executive must 
discontinue the action. Legislation found to breach either constitution is declared null 
and void. This judicial power ensures that neither the Executive nor the Legislature 
can act in a manner that is inconsistent with either constitution, particularly their 
respective bills of rights. The laws produced by direct democracy in California are 
also subject to this safeguard, as they are subject to the review of both the California 
and federal courts. 63 
1 Structure 
The California Judiciary is a pyramidal structure that consists of four levels. The 
municipal courts and justice courts make up the first level. They deal with minor 
offences and small claims. The judges for both courts are chosen for six year terms 
by the electors residing within their geographical jurisdiction in nonpartisan 
elections. 64 Superior courts occupy the second level. They are the general trial courts 
of the State. Each county has one. Superior courts exercise appellate jurisdiction 
over all cases originating in the municipal and justice courts. 65 Superior court judges 
are elected in the same manner as municipal and justice court judges. Most 
incumbents are re-elected automatically. 66 
The district courts of appeal make up the third level. Their jurisdiction is strictly 
appellate. They review cases tried in the superior courts and decisions made by 
quasi-judicial agencies located in their respective districts. 67 District court judges are 
62Berg, above n 61 , 451. 
63See League, above n 1, 38. 
64Hyink, above n 1, 184. 
65Hyink, above n 1,181; Schlessinger, above n 1, 64. 
66Hyink, above n 1, 185. 
67Hyink, above n 1, 182. 
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elected to serve staggered 12 year terms. 68 However, the elections are not contested. 
If a district court judge runs for re-election, his or her name, without opponents 
appears on the general election ballot. If an incumbent decides not to seek re-
election, the Governor, with the consent of the Commission on Judicial 
Appointments, nominates a candidate to appear on the ballot. 69 If a judicial candidate 
is not approved, the Governor, with the approval of the Commission, appoints some 
else to serve until the next election, at which time that appointee is treated as an 
incumbent. 70 
The California Supreme Court sits on top of this pyramid. Its jurisdiction is both 
appellate and original. However, most of its work is appellate. Nearly every case 
reaching the Court on appeal originates in a superior court and has been reviewed by 
a district court of appeal. As a general rule, its decisions are fmal and cannot be 
appealed unless the United States Supreme Court believes it has made a decision that 
violates the United States Constitution. The California Supreme Court is composed 
of six associate justices and one chief justice. 71 They are elected for 12 year terms in 
the same manner as district court judges. 72 
California's judicial system, unlike Switzerland's, is based on the doctrine of stare 
decisis, that is, the observance of binding precedent as established by previous 
decisions. 73 California courts are bound by the decisions of higher courts, including 
the United States Supreme Court. However, they are not bound by their own 
decisions and can be freed from precedent by new legislation. Appellate decisions, 
both state and federal, interpreting California legislation are as much a part of the law 
as the legislation itself. The Attorney-General also issues opinions, which, unless 
upset by judicial decisions or new legislation, are also authoritative. The opinions are 
prepared upon request from any State agency, including members of the Legislature, 
seeking the legal basis for taking or not taking action. 74 
68Hyink, above n 1, 185; see also Schlessinger, above n 1, 64. 
69The Commission on Judicial Appointments consists of the Chief Justice of the California Supreme 
Court, the presiding judge of the District Court of Appeal, and the Attorney General. Hyink, above n 
1, 185. 
70Hyink, above n 1, 186. 
7lHyink, above n 1, 182. 
72The electors can remove any justice or judge by recall as they are elected officials. For a definition 
of the recall device, see above note 49. One student commentator has suggested that elective judges 
subject to recall will interpret initiatives in accordance with the prevailing majority view rather than in 
a way that protects minority rights. C Fountaine "Lousy Lawmaking: Questioning the Desirability and 
Constitutionality of Legislating by Initiative" (1988) 61 So Cal L R 733, 748. However, the suggestion 
is inconsistent with the Judiciary's very low tolerance for unconstitutional initiatives. See eg below text 
accompany notes 153-155. 
73Schlessinger, above n 1, 67-68. 
74Schlessinger, above n 1, 68. 
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2 Power to invalidate initiatives and referendums 
The California and federal courts can invalidate acts of the Executive or strike down 
laws enacted by the Legislature if they are unconstitutional, that is, if they conflict 
with the provisions of the California Constitution or the United States Constitution. 
They can also strike down legislative initiatives as unconstitutional for the same 
reasons. However, with a few exceptions, the California Judiciary can only 
invalidate constitutional initiatives if they infringe the United States Constitution, 
which is logical as the purpose of a constitutional initiative is to amend the California 
Constitution. If a conflict arises between an old provision in the California 
Constitution and a new one approved by the electors, the new one prevails. 
Legislative referendums are not subject to constitutional scrutiny as to their substance 
because they serve to reject rather than to produce law. The result of a successful 
legislative referendum is a vetoed law, that is, a legal nullity which is not required to 
meet any constitutional norms. 
The California Judiciary seldom deals with the content of a constitutional or 
legislative initiative proposal before its adoption. However, the courts can review its 
constitutionality or its qualifying process before it is placed on the ballot. 75 If they 
find the initiative unconstitutional they can keep it off the ballot. 76 The courts are 
usually called upon to rule upon the constitutionality of initiatives after the electors 
have approved them. 77 In addition, the courts settle challenges to initiatives on the 
basis that they violate the single subject rule in Article II, section 8 of the California 
Constitution, which states: "An initiative measure embracing more than one subject 
may not be submitted to the electors or have any effect. "78 The courts will also 
75See eg League, above n 1, 39; see also D Michael "Preelection Judicial Review: Taking the Initiative 
in Voter Protection" (1983) 71 Cal L Rev 1216 (arguing in favour of pre-election judicial review); M 
Collins "Judicial Intervention in the Preelection Stage of the Initiative Process: A Change of Policy by 
the California Supreme Court" (1984) 15 Pac L J 1127 (criticising the principles underlying the 
California Judiciary's pre-election review of initiative measures); C Hunting "Pre-Election Review of 
Voter Initiatives - American Federation of Labour-Congress of Industrial Organisations v Eu, 36 Cal. 
3d 687, 686 P2d 609, 206 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1984)" (1985) 60 Wash L Rev 911 (discussing a pre-election 
judicial review case in depth). 
76See eg McFadden v Jordon 196 P2d 787, 32 C2d 330 cert denied 69 S Ct 640, 336 US 918, 93 LEd 
1080 (1948) (keeping the "California Bill of Rights" initiative off the ballot on the grounds that it 
amounted to a constitutional revision, not an amendment); Legislature v Deukmejian 669 P2d 20, 24 
Cal 3d 666, 194 Cal Rptr 784 (1983) (removing a electoral district reapportionment initiative from the 
ballot on the grounds that it was unconstitutional); see also S Mosk "Raven and Revision" (1991) 25 
UC Davis L Rev 1. 
77See League, above n 1, 39-40; D Magleby Direct Legislation: Voting on Ballot Propositions in the 
United States (John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1984) 52-53, 203; see also eg J Castello "The 
Limits of Popular Sovereignty: Using the Initiative Power to Control Legislative Procedure" (1986) 74 
Cal L R 491 (discussing the California Judiciary's decision to hold most of Proposition 24 
unconstitutional after it was approved by the electorate in 1984). 
78See eg Perry v Jordon 207 P2d 47, 24 C2d 87 (1949) (establishing the "reasonably germane" single 
subject test); Brosnahan v Brown 651 P2d 274, 32 C3d 236, 186 Cal Rptr 30 (1982) (holding that the 
"Crime Victims' Bill of Rights" met the "reasonably germane" test). For arguments in favour of the 
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invalidate legislative referendums that are attempts to veto administrative rather than 
legislative acts. 79 
3 Illustration 
The long running debate in California regarding representation illustrates the use of 
direct democracy and the power of the courts to act as a countervailing force. Since 
1965, representation in the Assembly and the Senate has been based on population, as 
it was prior to 1926. Assembly and Senate districts are redrawn every 10 years 
following the United States census to account for population shifts.80 This system of 
representation took several ballot measures and a few court cases to develop. 
In 1926, the electors approved a constitutional initiative which created a system of 
representation based on the system used by the federal government; it retained 
population as the basis of representation in the Assembly but provided for geographic 
representation in the Senate. 81 The initiative required the Legislature to draw up 
electoral districts for 40 Senators divided over 58 counties in accordance with the rule 
that no county can have more than one Senator and no Senator can represent more 
than one district. 82 This rule caused huge discrepancies. For example, the Senator 
from Los Angeles county represented over 6.5 million people while the Senator from 
District 28, which included three counties, represented fewer than 15,000.83 
In 1927, opponents of the system drafted by the Legislature invoked the legislative 
referendum to prevent the legislation from going into effect. However, in 1928 the 
electors approved the legislation. 84 In 1931, after reapportionment of the electoral 
districts under the system, a group circulated a petition for a constitutional initiative 
to protest the allocation of Senate seats, but it failed to gather the signatures required 
to place the measure on the ballot. In 1948, a constitutional initiative was proposed 
currently permissive "reasonably germane" single subject test, see D Lowenstein "California Initiatives 
and the Single-Subject Rule" (1983) 30 UCLA L R 936; for arguments in favour of a stringent 
interpretation of the single subject requirement, see S Ray "The California Initiative Process: The 
Demise of the Single-Subject Rule" (1983) 14 Pac L J 1095. 
79See D Greenberg "The Scope of the Initiative and Referendum in California" (1966) 54 Cal L Rev 
1717, 1734 (citations omitted); S Ballew "The Constitutionality of Budgeting by Statewide Statutory 
Initiative in California" (1978) 51 So Cal L Rev 847, 857. For arguments in favour of abandoning the 
legislative-administrative test, see M Wilmar "Judicial Limitations on the Initiative and Referendum in 
California Municipalities" (1966) 17 Hastings L J 805, 806-810, 815. 
8°Hardy, above n I, 25; Hyink, above n I, 133, 134, 140-141. 
81Hyink, above n I, 133, 135. 
82Hyink, above n I, 134; see also Hardy, above n I, 24-25. 
83Hyink, above n I, 135. 
84The electors approved the enactment by a vote of 692,000 to 570,000. Above. 
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that would have moved in the direction of restoring apportionment of the Senate on 
the basis of population. 85 However, the electors rejected this proposal. 86 
In 1960, southern California interests sponsored a constitutional initiative known as 
the Bonelli Plan. This plan would have allocated 20 senators to 13 southern counties 
and 20 senators to the remaining 45 northern counties, which was the formula adopted 
by the Legislature for the allocation of state highway funds. Of the eight seats to be 
shifted to southern California, six would go to Los Angeles. Northern Californians 
denounced the plan as a power grab by Los Angeles. The electors voted against the 
plan by a margin of two to one, Los Angeles being the only county to give it a 
majority. Undeterred, the same group placed another constitutional initiative on the 
1962 ballot, which proposed a different allocation plan. This plan would have 
increased the Senate to 50 members and assigned five of the additional seats to Los 
Angeles. Opponents attacked the plan on the same grounds as the first. The measure 
carried in Los Angeles and Orange counties but failed elsewhere. 87 
In 1964, the United States Supreme Court ruled that the districts in both houses of 
state legislatures must be "substantially equal" in population. In a special session held 
in 1965, the California Legislature passed the Reapportionment Act of 1965, which 
drew the 40 Senate districts on a population basis and realigned the 80 Assembly 
districts. The Supreme Court's decision forced the California Legislature to disregard 
the provisions in the California Constitution concerning electoral districts. 88 In effect, 
it overruled the constitutional initiative approved by the electorate in 1926. 
Essentially, the courts have a tremendous influence on the scope of California's direct 
democracy devices.89 As another example, the California Supreme Court, in Citizens 
for Jobs & Energy v the Fair Political Practices Commission,9O struck down the 
campaign fmancing limits for ballot measures imposed by the initiative that brought in 
the Political Reform Act of 1974 on the grounds that it impaired the freedom of 
85Above. 
86The electors rejected the proposal by a vote of 2,252,000 to 1,070,000. Hyink, above n 1, 136. 
87The electors rejected the measure by 300,000 votes out of more than 4,000,000 cast. Above. 
88Hyink, above n 1, 140. The electors have also approved constitutional amendments that have 
reorganised the session times of the Legislature and made them two years in length. Hardy, above n 
1, 26-27; Schlessinger, above n 1, 26. They have also modified the veto power. Hyink, above n 1, 
27-28. In addition, they have allowed the legislators to give themselves salary hikes not exceeding 5 
percent per 2 year session. Hardy, above n 1, 28-29; Hyink, above n 1, 142, 156. 
89Greenberg, above n 79, 1747. 
9016 Cal3d 671 (1976); see also Buckley v Valeo 424 US 1 (1976) (ruling that campaign fmancing 
restrictions violate the freedom of expression as guaranteed by the First Amendment of the United 
States Constitution). For critical analyses of the Buckley decision, see Symposium on Campaign 
Finance Reform (1994) 94 Colum L R 1125, particularly V Blasi "Free Speech and the Widening Gyre 
of Fund-Raising: Why Campaign Spending Limits May Not Violate the First Amendment After All" at 
1281. 
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speech. In Hardie v Fong EU,91 the Court ruled that limiting the amount that could be 
spent in circulating initiative petitions also amounted to a violation of free speech. 
The United States Supreme Court extend this free speech protection to the campaign 
contributions made by corporations in First National Bank of Boston v Bellotti. 92 
The courts have not allowed California's direct democracy devices to reach their full 
majoritarian potential. The courts are steadfast in their refusal to accept any incursion 
on the fundamental rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution. Although the 
constitutional initiative could be used to revoke most of the individual rights 
guaranteed in the California Constitution, it cannot reach any of the individual rights 
guaranteed by the United States Constitution. Furthermore, these devices cannot 
reach any matter within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal government. In this 
respect, initiative measures, whether legislative or constitutional, face the same 
constitutional restraints as any measure enacted by the California Legislature. 93 The 
legislative referendum does not raise the same constitutional concerns, as it functions 
as a veto of legislative action, not as an agent of change with the potential to 
circumvent existing constitutional rights. 
III KEY DIRECT DEMOCRACY DEVICES 
In Switzerland, the constitutional initiative and legislative referendum play a vital role 
in maintaining and adjusting the balance of power between the cantons and the federal 
government by giving the electors the means to influence the structure of the federal 
government and its exercise of governmental power.94 In California, the 
constitutional initiative, the legislative initiative, and the legislative referendum cannot 
affect the federal government or its exercise of governmental power. However, these 
direct democracy devices have given the California electors the means to influence the 
structure of the California constitutional system and its legislative output. 
As in Switzerland, these direct democracy devices have, in effect, limited the 
legislative power of elected representatives by providing the electors with legislative 
power. Elected representatives in California, like those in Switzerland, are unable to 
91556 P2d 301 , 18 C3d 71, 134 Cal Rptr 201 cert denied 97 S Ct 1652, 430 US 969, 52 L Ed 2d 360 
(1976); see also Citizens Against Rent Control (CARC) v City of Berkeley 614 P2d 742, 27 Cal3d 819, 
167 Cal Rptr 84 (1980)probjuris noted 101 S Ct 1344 (1981) (No. 80-737). 
92435 US 765 (1978). For an analysis of the Bellotti decision, see S Richman "Election Law: Political 
Expression by Artificial Persons in Referendum Campaigns" (1979) Ann Survey Am L 285; see also J 
Shockley "Direct Democracy, Campaign Finance, and the Courts: Can Corruption, Undue Influence, 
and Declining Voter Confidence Be Found?" (1985) 39 U Miami L R 377; "Notes: State and Local 
Limitations on Ballot Measure Contributions" (1981) Mich L R 142l. 
93See Ballew, above n 79,559. 
94Switzerland does not have a legislative referendum on the federal level. See section III in chapter 
four. 
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monopolise the legislative process or to ignore the electors to the extent allowed by 
Burke I s theory of representation. 95 The electors have the means to counteract the acts 
or omissions of their representatives that do not meet their expectations. As in 
Switzerland, California I s direct democracy devices have made the electors both the 
legal and political sovereign in theory and in practice. Their sovereignty, however, is 
not unlimited. The constitutional initiative, legislative initiative, and legislative 
referendum are subject to procedural and substantive safeguards which counteract 
their majoritarian potential. These safeguards explain why the constitutional initiative 
is used more frequently and the legislative referendum less frequently in California 
than in Switzerland. 
A Constitutional Initiative 
Article IV, section 1 of the California Constitution states: 
The legislative power of this State is vested in the California Legislature which consists 
of the Senate and Assembly, but the people reserve to themselves the powers of 
initiative and referendum. 
This provision is important because it implies that the source of legislative power is in 
the people, rather than the Legislature ,96 an implication which is supported by Article 
I, section 2, which states that "all political power is inherent in the people." As a 
matter of right, the electors have the power to make laws independently of their 
elected representatives , which explains why the courts ~ave struck down 
governmental attempts to curtail the initiative power. Article II, section 8(a) of the 
California Constitution defines the constitutional initiative as "the power of the 
electors to propose . . . amendments to the Constitution and to adopt or reject them. " 
Although the Constitution outlines the procedure for the constitutional initiative, 
article II, section lO(e) grants the Legislature the power to "provide the manner in 
which petitions shall be circulated, presented, and certified, and measures submitted 
to the electors." The provisions regulating the constitutional initiative process are set 
out in the California Election Code. 97 
1 Procedure 
The constitutional initiative process begins when the proponents of a particular idea 
draft the text of their proposal. This is often done in consultation with constitutional 
lawyers to minimise the risk of a constitutional challenge. They can also use the 
95For a discussion of Burke's theory of representation, see section III.B.2(d) in chapter two. 
96K Christenson "Interpreting the Purposes of Initiatives: Proposition 65 " (1989) 40 Hastings L J 1031 , 
1033. 
97Cal Elec Code, ss 3500-3579, 29710-29795. 
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services of the Legislative Counsel , who will draft the text if the proponents present a 
request signed by 25 or more electors and if the proposal is likely to be submitted to 
the electors. 98 Once the proposal is drafted, it is submitted to the Attorney General 
along with a written request for a title and summary, 99 which is to appear on each 
page of the petition used to collect signatures, loo and a $200 fee , which is refundable 
if the proposal qualifies for the ballot. 101 
As a general rule, the Attorney General has 15 days to prepare the title and summary, 
which together cannot exceed 100 words. 102 If the proponents submit substantive 
amendments to the text of the proposal within the 15 day period, the Attorney General 
is allowed a renewed period of 15 days after receiving the submissions ,,03 If the 
measure requires a fiscal assessment, the Attorney General is given another 25 days 
to obtain a fiscal analysis from the Joint Legislative Committee and the Department of 
Finance. 104 The result is included in the summary . 105 Accordingly , the Attorney 
General could have up to 55 days to prepare the title and summary. 
Once the Attorney General completes the title and summary , he or she sends copies of 
it the Secretary of State, the Senate, and the Assembly. 106 The Legislature may 
conduct public hearings on it, but cannot amend it or prevent it from being used. 107 
When the Attorney General sends a copy to the proponents, this marks the date the 
Secretary of State uses to begin tolling the 150 day period in which the proponents 
must collect the signatures to qualify the proposal for the ballot. 108 For a 
constitutional initiative to qualify for the ballot, its proponents must present to the 
Secretary of State: 109 
a petition that sets forth the text of the proposed . . . amendment to the Constitution and 
is certified to have been signed by electors equal in number to . . . 8 percent . . . of the 
votes for all candidates for Governor at the last gubernatorial election. 
98League, above n 1, 20. 
99Cal Elec Code, s 3502; see also Cal Const, art II, s lO(d). 
100Cal Elec Code, s 3507. 
IOI Cal Elec Code, s. 3503. 
102Cal Elec Code, ss 3502, 3503. 
103Cal Elec Code, s 3503 
I04Above. 
IOSLeague, above n 1, 20. 
I06Cal Elec Code, ss 3503, 3505 
107Cal Elec Code, s 3505 . 
108Cal Elec Code, s 3513 . 
I09Cal Const, art II, s 8(b) . 
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The number of signatures required to qualify a constitutional initiative for the ballot 
has grown from 30,857 in 1914 to 615,958 in 1992.110 However, proponents 
generally aim to collect more than one million signatures to increase their chances of 
passing the signature verification process and for the publicity that gathering a million 
signatures usually generates. 111 If the signature requirement is met, the Secretary of 
State must place the proposal on the ballot of "the next general election held at least 
131 days after it qualifies or at any special statewide election held prior to that general 
election. "112 If the Secretary of State receives a qualifying petition within 130 days of 
a general election, he or she places the proposal it supports on the ballot at the next 
general election. 113 The purpose of this system is to minimise cost by holding 
constitutional initiatives in conjunction with general elections. The Governor, 
however, can order the proposal to be presented to the electors prior to the next 
general election at a special statewide election. 114 
The California Election Code imposes criminal penalties for abusing the signature 
collection process. 115 For example, petition circulators are forbidden to misrepresent 
the purpose or content of a petition to potential signatories or to refuse to allow them 
to read the proposal, its summary, or the petition. 116 Although proponents may 
withdraw their petition before it qualifies for the ballot, it is illegal to induce the 
proponents to withdraw their petition, either by means of fraudulent promises or 
fmancial incentives. 117 Only registered electors are allowed to sign petitions, and they 
may only sign petitions circulated in the county in which they are registered to vote. 118 
It is illegal to sign a petition more than once. 119 It is also illegal to misuse campaign 
funds, particularly for personal use or for purchasing signatures. 12o Although the 
courts have ruled campaign expenditure limits unconstitutional, committees 
supporting or opposing the proposal must file campaign disclosure statements under 
the Political Reform Act of 1974. Each contribution or expenditure over $500 must 
be documented and reported, as must total expenditures over $500 made during 
specified periods. 121 
IIOMagleby, above n 77, 41 , 67 ; Lee "California" in Butler and Ranney, above n 1, 92-93 ; Bancroft 
"S.F. Lawyer's Initiative: Long Vacations - By State Law" San Francisco Chronicle, San Francisco, 
USA, 29 July 1991 , 1. 
I 11 See Brestoff, above n 59,926 n.32. 
112Cal Const, art II , s 8(c) . 
I13Hyink, above n 1, 117. 
114Cal Const, art, II, s 8(b). 
115See generally Cal Elec Code, ss 29710-29795. 
116Cal Elec Code, ss 29720, 29721. 
I17Cal Elec Code, s 29740, 29741 , 29742. 
I18Cal Elec Code, ss 3514,3517. 
119Cal Elec Code, S 29732. 
120Cal Elec Code, S 29795. 
12lLeague, above n 1, 22. 
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Each part of a petition must be filed at the same time with the County Clerk or 
Registrar of Voters in the county in which the part was circulated. Within five 
working days, the Clerk or Registrar must determine the total number of signatures 
on the part of any petition he or she has received and report the total to the Secretary 
of State. The Secretary of State adds up the totals in each report. If the total number 
of signatures on the whole petition is less than the number of the signatures required 
for the proposal to qualify for the ballot, the petition fails , and the Secretary of State 
notifies the Clerks and Registrars of the result. If the petition bears the required 
number signatures or more, the Secretary of State informs the Clerks and Registrars 
who then have 15 days to verify the signatures. 122 
If a Clerk or Registrar has more than 500 signatures, he or she uses a random 
sampling technique to verify the signatures . The sample must include 500 signatures 
or five percent of the signatures on hand, depending on whichever figure is greater. 123 
If 75 percent of the sample contains the signatures of registered electors , for example, 
then 75 percent of the signatures being sampled are deemed to be valid. 124 
The results are reported to the Secretary of State, who determines the statewide total. 
If the total is less than 95 percent of the valid signatures required, the petition fails . 
If the total is greater than 110 percent of the valid signatures required, the proposal 
qualifies for the ballot. If the total is between 95 and 110 percent, the Clerks and 
Registrars must, within 30 days , determine the validity of every signature on the 
petition. 12S If the petition fails, the Secretary of State informs the proponents . If it 
succeeds, he or she informs the Legislature, which may hold public hearings on the 
proposal, but not within 30 days of the election. The Legislature has no authority to 
alter the proposal or to prevent it from being placed on the ballot. 126 
Prior to the election, the Secretary of State prepares an elector information pamphlet 
which provides the title and summary of any proposal placed on the ballot, their full 
text along with arguments for and against, and a fiscal assessment of each proposal. 127 
Proponents and their opponents may submit their arguments no later than 131 days 
before the election. If the proponents do not submit any arguments, other electors 
may submit supporting arguments within 120 days of the election. The Secretary of 
122Cal Elec Code, s 3520. 
123Above. 
1 24League , above n 1, 21. 
I2SCal Elec Code, s 3521. 
1 26League , above n 1, 22. The Legislature rarely takes the opportunity to hold hearings on measures 
after they have qualified for the ballot. League, above n 1, 37. 
127See eg California Ballot Pamphlet: General Election, November 3, 1992 (1992) (consisting of 95 
pages, covering two bond measures, four constitutionally required referendums, and seven initiatives); 
see also Hyink, above n 1, 116. 
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State sends copies of the arguments for and against to the opposing parties so that 
they may prepare rebuttals to each other's arguments for the pamphlet. If the 
Secretary of State receives more than one set of arguments for or against an initiative, 
he or she chooses the arguments to be printed, giving priority to the petition's 
proponents, followed in order by bona fide associations of electors and then 
individual electors. At least 20 days before the pamphlet goes to the printers, draft 
copies must be made available for public examination. Any elector can obtain a court 
order to amend any portion of the text found to be false, misleading, or in violation of 
the law, provided it will not substantially interfere with the pamphlet's printing and 
distribution. 128 
Constitutional initiatives approved by majority vote take effect the day after they are 
approved, unless they specify otherwise. 129 If two or more proposals approved at the 
same election conflict, the measure with the highest number of affirmative votes 
prevails. 130 The Legislature can only amend or repeal a provision put in place by a 
constitutional initiative if it puts a proposal to that effect on the ballot and wins the 
approval of the electorate. 131 Constitutional initiatives are, therefore, more secure 
than ordinary legislation. Although legislation enacted through the legislative 
initiative also cannot be amended or repealed by the Legislature without reference to 
the electorate, unless the legislation expressly gives the Legislature the right to do 
SO, 132 a legislative initiative, unlike a constitutional initiative, is subordinate to any 
provision in the lengthy and complex California Constitution. To avoid running afoul 
of its provisions, groups using direct democracy generally use the constitutional 
initiative instead of the legislative initiative, as it allows them to overcome any 
unforeseen conflicts with the Constitution. 133 In addition, as Lee has noted, "there is 
no bar to proposing detailed legislation - statutory in character - for inclusion in the 
Constitution. " 134 
2 Use and effects 
The constitutional initiative is used more frequently than the legislative initiative and 
the legislative referendum in California. 135 However, the number of constitutional 
128See League, above n 1, 22. 
129Cal Const, art II, s lO(a). 
130Cal Const, art II , s 1O(b). 
13ISee Cal Const, art II , slO(c) . 
132Above. 
I33See Hyink, above n 1, 118; see also Lee "California" in Butler and Ranney, above n 1, 92; 
Christenson, above n 96, 1033-1034; Hardy, above n 1, 23-24 (stating that once an initiative proposal 
becomes part of the Constitution it is difficult to remove, which is one reason why it has become a 
favoured device) . 
134Lee "California" in Butler and Ranney, above n 1, 92. 
135Hyink, above n 1, 118. 
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amendments placed on the ballot by the electors pales in comparison to the number 
sponsored by the Legislature. 136 For example, out of 737 referendums submitted to 
Californians between 1912 and 1976, 543 came from the Legislature in the form of 
constitutionally required referendums, of which 300 were approved by the electors. 137 
In comparison, the electors placed 93 constitutional initiatives on the ballot from 1911 
to 1980 and approved 27 of them. 138 In Switzerland, the constitutionally required 
referendum is also used more frequently than the constitutional initiative. From 1848 
to September 1978 the Swiss voted on 297 referendum questions, 212 of which were 
constitutionally required. 139 In comparison, the Swiss electors used the constitutional 
initiative 73 times from 1880 to May 1978, of which seven were approved. 140 Hyink, 
Brown, and Thacker have attributed the California Legislature's frequent recourse to 
the ballot to the lengthy and detailed nature of the California Constitution as drafted 
in 1879,,41 To facilitate significant legislative reforms, the Legislature is often 
obliged to amend the Constitution. 
The signature requirement combined with the 150 day collection period constitutes the 
most significant hurdle in the constitutional initiative process. From 1962 through 
1975, for example, the Secretary of State titled 114 initiative petitions, but only 22 
qualified for the ballot. 142 Although the number of initiatives qualifying for the ballot 
has increased in recent elections, the percentage of initiatives qualifying for the ballot 
has declined dramatically since 1960. 143 One reason for the decline may be the 
increased size of the California electorate, which has made the signature requirement 
more difficult to meet. 144 Another reason is subject matter. Many proposed initiatives 
fail to qualify because they are based on interests that are too narrow to attract the 
resources necessary to gather the required signatures. 145 
Access to the constitutional initiative is generally limited either to groups that can 
finance the necessary logistical support or to grassroots organisations that can draw 
on their membership to supply it. 146 As Lee has observed, "the groups employing the 
device do not differ significantly from those lobbying before the Legislature. "147 
These groups cite the following reasons for using the device: 1) the Legislature has 
136See Hyink, above n 1, 124-125. 
137Lee "California" in Butler and Ranney, above n 1, 89 
138Magleby, above n 77, 7l. 
139J Aubert "Switzerland" in Butler and Ranney, above n 1, 43. 
140See J Aubert "Switzerland" in Butler and Ranney, above n 1, 50-64. 
141Hyink, above n 1, 124-125. 
142Steck, above n 59, 545 (the figures appear to include both constitutional and legislative initiatives). 
143Magleby, above n 77, 67 
144Magleby, above n 77, 66. 
145Magleby, above n 77,68. 
146See Magleby, above n 77, 76; Lee "California" in Butler and Ranney, above n 1, 96-97. 
147Lee "California" in Butler and Ranney, above n 1, 96. 
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refused to pass the measure they want enacted; 2) it removes the measure from the 
Legislature's power of amendment and repeal; 3) it gives the measure constitutional 
status; and 4) the campaign has educational value, regardless of its electoral outcome. 
For example, as Lee has noted: 148 
Groups, like that proposing to decriminalize marijuana in 1972, may not anticipate 
victory at the polls. Instead, they hope that enlightened public opinion, stimulated by 
the campaign, will lead to subsequent legislative action, which in this instance did result 
in more liberal marijuana laws. Indeed, the organizational effort involved in the 
campaign - even in a losing cause - strengthened the effectiveness of the group in its 
subsequent lobbying activities. 
Although failed campaigns can lead to subsequent legislative action, they can also 
have the opposite effect. For example, Cesar Chavez, the leader of the United Farm 
Workers, inadvertently undermined political pressure to strengthen California's laws 
on collective bargaining for farm workers when he sponsored an ill-fated proposal 
promoting farm labour unionisation. Subsequently, opponents of farm labour 
unionisation in the Legislature used the result to slow down legislative action in this 
area. 149 Nevertheless, threatened campaigns, as in Switzerland, often spark a positive 
response from the Legislature. For example, a proposal to alter the taxation of banks 
and insurance companies prompted the Legislature to submit a constitutional 
amendment to the electorate in 1974. In 1981, the Legislature persuaded a group to 
abandon its initiative petition drive to outlaw the personal use of campaign funds by 
passing a bill that ended the practice. 150 
In addition to its procedural hurdles, the constitutional initiative has several 
substantive limitations. First, the California Constitution forbids initiatives that 
embrace more than one subject. 151 Second, it also forbids naming any individual to 
office by initiative or the naming of any private corporation in any initiative. 152 
Third, the courts will strike down any constitutional initiative which violates the 
United States Constitution. Essentially, the Californian electors cannot use the 
constitutional initiative to encroach upon the powers reserved to the federal 
government. This removes subjects like defence, foreign affairs, interstate 
commerce, and federal taxation from their reach; it also cannot be used in any way 
that impinges upon the rights protected by or granted pursuant to the United States 
Constitution,153 including the Bill of Rights. The courts have a very low tolerance for 
148Lee "California" in Butler and Ranney, above n 1, 97. 
149Lee "California" in Butler and Ranney, above n 1, 98. 
15°League, above n 1, 37. 
151Cal Const, art II, s 8(d). The Swiss Constitution has a single subject limitation as well. Fed Const 
Swiss, art 121(3). 
152Magleby, above n 77, 46. 
15358 Ops [Cal] Atty Gen 830 (6 November 1975). 
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unconstitutional initiatives. For example, they struck down, in whole or in part, six 
of the ten initiatives that the California electorate approved from 1960 to 1980. 154 For 
this reason, successful constitutional initiatives are almost always challenged in the 
courtS. 15S 
3 Illustration 
Proposition 13 remains the most conspicuous illustration of the power of the 
constitutional initiative to overcome inaction on the part of the LegisiaturelS6 as well 
as opposition by the Executive. ls7 Inflationary pressures in California during the 
1970s caused property values to rise dramatically, which increased the property tax 
burden of most home owners, I S8 and threatened to increase them further still. I S9 
Meanwhile, the State had accumulated a $5 billion surplus l60 and a reputation for 
funding wasteful and bureaucratic programs. 161 Despite calls for reform, the 
Legislature lacked the political will to tackle these problems. 162 On the strength of 
popular dissatisfaction with this state of affairs , Howard Jarvis and Paul Gann formed 
the Taxpayers Association, which, with the help of thousands of volunteers, qualified 
Proposition 13 for the June 1978 ballot. 163 
Proposition 13 proposed reducing property taxes to one percent of a property's 1975 
assessed market value and only permitting increases in a property's value for tax 
purposes of two percent per annum. l64 If a property were sold, the tax would be 
reassessed at one percent of its current market value. The Legislature initially tried to 
appease the Taxpayers Association by promising to enact what it considered to be a 
less drastic measure. When its appeasement strategy failed, the Legislature placed its 
own proposal, Proposition 8, on the ballot as an alternative to Proposition 13 .16s 
Proposition 8 proposed a split tax roll in which owner-occupier residences would be 
IS4Magleby, above n 77, 52-53, 203 (the figures appear to include both constitutional and statutory 
initiatives) . 
I SSMagleby , above n 77, 53 . 
I S6Magieby , above n 77, 35. 
IS7See Walker, above n 9, 78. 
IS8See above. 
IS9See V Kershner "U.S. High Court Agrees to Rule on Proposition 13" San Francisco Chronicle, 
California, USA, 4 June 1991, 1. 
16OAbove. 
16lCronin, above n 7, 87. 
162Walker, above n 9, 78 . 
163See Magleby, above n 77, 64; Lee "California" in Butler and Ranney, above n 1, 101. 
164Cal Const, art XIIIA, ss. 1-2; see also Walker, above n 9, 78; Kershner, above n 159; V Kershner 
"Fate of Prop. 13 Remains with Supreme Court" San Francisco Chronicle, California, USA, 13 June 
1991, 1; V Kershner "Supreme Court Agrees to Rule on Prop. 13" San Francisco Chronicle, 
California, USA, 10 August 1991 , 1; B Inman "Juggling with the Legality of Prop. 13" San Francisco 
Examiner, California, USA, 10 November 1991, F5. 
165See League, above n 1, 35. 
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taxed at far lower rates than other properties. l66 The Executive, with the support of 
the Legislature, orchestrated an enormous campaign against Proposition 13, 
predicting inaccurately that its passage would result in drastic cuts in public 
services. 167 The electorate was not persuaded by the campaign. It rejected 
Proposition 8 as too complicated and as a detriment to business,168 and approved 
Proposition 13 by a two to one margin. 169 As Cronin has noted, the electors 
understood the argument against Proposition 13, but they were unprepared to forgive 
the Legislature's persistent inaction: 170 
Voters understood the trade-off; fewer government services in exchange for tax relief. 
The two thirds who voted yes wanted to send a message as well as secure economic 
benefits for themselves. That message was at least twofold: give us back some of the 
revenue surplus the state is sitting on, and cut out waste and needless bureaucratic 
programs. 
Essentially, Proposition 13 has forced the Legislature to reconsider its spending 
priorities and the administrative efficiency of the services it has chosen to deliver, 
particularly as Proposition 13 has survived a number of challenges as to its 
constitutionality. 171 In this respect, the constitutional initiative has enormous potential 
as a means of enabling the electorate to influence the political agenda. 172 Provided it 
does not violate any of the rights guaranteed under the United States Constitution, the 
electors, or the interest groups that win their support, can use the constitutional 
initiative to by-pass an unresponsive Legislature. 
B Legislative Initiative 
Article II, section 8(b) of the California Constitution states: 
An initiative measure may be proposed by presenting to the Secretary of State a petition 
that sets forth the text of the proposed statute or amendment to the Constitution and is 
certified to have been signed by electors equal in number to 5 percent in the case of a 
statute, and 8 percent in the case of an amendment to the Constitution, of the votes for 
all candidates for Governor at the last gubernatorial election. 
Aside from the lower signature threshold, the procedural requirements for the 
legislative initiative are exactly the same as the constitutional initiative. If the 
166Above; G Devine "State's Taxation System May Already Be in Jeopardy" San Francisco Chronicle, 
California, USA, 22 October 1991. 
167See Walker, above n 9, 79, 92. 
1 68Devine, above n 166. 
1 69Walker, above n 9, 78. 
170Cronin, above n 7, 87. 
I7ISee Kershner, above n 159. 
I72D Magleby "Legislatures and the Initiative: The Politics of Direct Democracy" (1986) 59 J State 
Gov't 31,37. 
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electorate approves legislation put forward by the legislative initiative, it takes effect 
automatically, thereby circumventing the Governor's veto power. As discussed 
above, legislation enacted through a legislative initiative is immune to the 
Legislature's ordinary amending and repealing powers unless the legislation expressly 
permits the exercise of these powers without the electorate's approval. 173 In the 
absence of such a provision, the Legislature must refer its proposal to amend or 
repeal legislation enacted through a legislative initiative to the electorate. As 
Switzerland does not have the legislative initiative on the federal level, a comparison 
is not possible. 
Despite the procedural advantage of a lower signature requirement (393,835 as 
compared to 630,136), the legislative initiative is used less frequently than the 
constitutional initiative. From 1911 to 1976, for example, the Californian electors 
have voted on 69 legislative initiatives,174 and approved 19 of them. 175 In comparison, 
the electors placed 93 constitutional initiatives on the ballot from 1911 to 1980 and 
approved 27 of them. Compared to the constitutionally required referendum, the 
legislative initiative and constitutional initiative have very low approval rates. The 
constitutionally required referendum has an approval rate of 56 percent. The rate of 
approval for the constitutional initiative and the legislative initiative is approximately 
27 percent. 176 
Although they have nearly identical approval rates, the legislative initiative has not 
kept pace with the constitutional initiative in terms of usage in California. The gap 
has been widening for several reasons. First, the high signature requirement has 
made qualifying a proposition for the ballot very difficult. Collecting the required 
signatures now requires an organisational effort that can only be supplied by large 
volunteer grassroots organisations or paid professionals. 177 Once the organisational 
hurdle is cleared, the difference between collecting 630,136 as opposed to 393,835 
signatures becomes less significant given the 150-day signature collection period. 
Second, legislative initiatives are legally less secure than constitutional initiatives. 178 
As a matter of principle, constitutional law overrides any conflicting legislative 
I73Cal Const, art II 2, s lO(c). 
174Lee "California" in Butler and Ranney, above n 1, 90. 
175Above. 
176Magleby, above n 77, 71. In general, a legislative or constitutional initiative needs to be well 
understood and widely supported to win the approval of the electors. See Magleby, above n 77, 168-
170; Cronin, above n 7, 84-87 . Constitutionally required referendums are more likely to succeed 
because they must be approved by two-thirds of the full membership of both houses of the Legislature 
before being put to the electors. Lee "California" in Butler and Ranney, above n 1, 89. This 
procedure ensures their widespread political support and informs the electors at the same time. 
177See Cronin, above n 7,62-66; Magleby, above n 77,61-65. 
178Magleby, above n 77,72. 
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enactment. As the legislation produced by legislative initiatives is subordinate to the 
provisions of both the United States Constitution and the California Constitution, it is 
more vulnerable to constitutional challenge. Given the length and complexity of the 
California Constitution, legislative initiatives are far more likely than constitutional 
initiatives to run afoul of one of its provisions. 
Third, the legislative initiative has more subject matter limitations than the 
constitutional initiative. In addition to those limitations that apply to the constitutional 
initiative, the legislative initiative cannot be used as an indirect legislative referendum 
on matters not subject to the legislative referendum. The courts, for example, will 
strike down any legislative initiative that amounts to "backhanded" legislative 
referendum on tax levies. 179 It also cannot be used to rescind the Legislature's 
ratification of a federal constitutional amendment. 180 Furthermore, regarding the 
reversal of governmental action, legislative initiatives can only affect legislative acts. 
Acts by the Executive that are predicated on a purely constitutional basis are beyond 
their reach. Due to these procedural and substantive limitations, the legislative 
initiative is used less frequently than the constitutional initiative. 
C Legislative Referendum 
The legislative referendum operates in California as it does in Switzerland. As stated 
in Article II, section 9(a) of the California Constitution: 
The referendum is the power of the electors to approve or reject statutes or parts of 
statutes except urgency statutes, statutes calling elections, and statutes providing for tax 
levies or appropriations for usual current expenses of the State. 
1 Procedure 
A legislative referendum is triggered by presenting to the Secretary of State, within 
90 days of the enactment date of a statute, a petition certified in the same manner as a 
legislative initiative, that is, signed by electors equal in number to five percent of the 
votes for all candidates for Governor at the last gubernatorial election. 181 The petition 
must specify the statute or part of the statute to be submitted to the electors. 182 
179See eg Dare v Lakeport City Council 91 Cal Rptr 124, 12 CA3d 864 (1970); Myers v City Council of 
City of Pismo Beach 50 Cal Rptr 402, 241 ACA 316 (1966). 
180See 58 Ops [Cal] Atty Gen 830 (6 November 1975). 
181Cal Const, art II, s 9(b). For a discussion of the 90 day suspension rule, see above text 
accompanying note 33. 
182Cal Const, art II, s 9(b). 
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If the signature threshold is met, the Secretary of State must place the statute before 
the electorate for its approval at the next general election held at least 31 days after it 
qualifies or at any special statewide election held prior to that general election. ls3 If 
the Secretary of State receives a qualifying petition within 30 days of a general 
election, he or she places the statute on the ballot at the next general or special 
election. ls4 If the electorate approves the statute, it becomes law, but only after 
considerable delay and public debate. If the electorate rejects the statute, it does not 
come into force . ISS In effect, rejection of the statute by the electorate is equivalent to a 
Governor's veto that the Legislature has no power to override. The California 
Constitution, however, does not prohibit the Legislature from revisiting the issue. 
Donald Greenberg has argued that the Judiciary should not allow the Legislature to 
re-enact a statute too soon after its defeat in a legislative referendum on the grounds 
that it "would have a crippling effect on the referendum power." IS6 His argument is 
yet to be tested in the courts. 
2 Limitations 
The legislative referendum, like its Swiss counterpart, cannot be used to veto 
legislation which contains an urgency clause,ls7 that is, newly enacted statutes 
necessary for the immediate preservation of public peace, health, or safety . ISS To be 
enforceable, an urgency clause must state the reasons for the urgency. In addition, 
both the urgency clause and the bill that contains the clause must be approved in 
separate votes by two-thirds of each House of the Legislature. Urgency bills become 
law as soon as they are signed by the Governor. IS9 According to Lee, the "power to 
declare a statute urgent is liberally utilized and has reduced the potential of 
referendums as an instrument of direct legislation." 190 During the Great Depression, 
for example, as many as 11 to 14 percent of the laws the Legislature passed were 
exempt as urgent. 191 The Judiciary has held that: 192 
[T]he determination of the existence of a public necessity for the enactment of an 
urgency measure rests upon the judgment of the Legislature. It is a legislative question, 
IS3Cai Const, art II, s. 9(c) . 
IS4See Hyink, above n 1, 117. 
ISSSee Hyink, above n 1, 116; Schlessinger, above n 1, 33-34. 
IS6Greenberg, above n 79, 1745-1746 (suggesting that a least a year would be appropriate) . 
IS7Cal Const, art II , s 9(a). 
IssLee "California" in Butler and Ranney, above n 1, 100; see also "Limitations on Initiative and 
Referendum" (1951) 3 Stan L R 467; C Lowe "Public Safety Legislation and the Referendum Power: 
A Reexamination" (1986) 37 Public Safety Legis 591 . 
IS9Hardy, above n 1, 80; Hyink, above n 1, 115. 
190Lee "California" in Butler and Ranney, above n 1, 100. 
191Hyink, above n 1, 115 n.3. 
1925tockburger v Jordon 10 Cal2d 636, 642, 76 P2d 671 , 673-674 (1938); see also Hollister v 
Kingsbury 129 Cal App 420, 425, 18 P2d 1006, 1008 (1933). 
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the determination of which will not be interfered with by the courts, save in those few 
exceptional cases where it appears clearly and affmnatively from the Legislature's 
statement of facts that a public necessity does not exist. 
As the courts are "extremely reluctant to interfere with [the Legislature' s urgency] 
determinations, "1 93 the restriction may be, as Greenberg has noted, "correspondingly 
greater than it necessarily would have to be. "194 In addition, legislation with urgency 
clauses are not of limited duration as they are in Switzerland. 195 Even if Lee's 
observation regarding the liberal use of urgency clauses is exaggerated, the fact 
remains that the California Legislature has the means to deny the electors the right to 
veto legislation that it considers essential. The only limitation on its use of urgency 
clauses is the difficulty it faces in obtaining the necessary two-thirds of both Houses, 
the degree of which can change from issue to issue and from election to election. 
Unlike in Switzerland, tax levies or appropriations for the usual current expenses of 
the State are also exempt from the legislative referendum. 196 To qualify for 
exemption, appropriations must be for current expenses. However, whether tax 
levies must be for current expenses appears to be an open question, as the California 
Supreme Court has indicated that this might not be the case and that it might be open 
to an argument that all tax levies are exempt. 197 Whether the Judiciary would review 
a legislative declaration that a tax or appropriation measure is designed to meet 
current expenses is also uncertain, although Greenberg has argued that the courts 
would take the same approach it has with respect to urgency declarations. 198 
In addition, as in Switzerland,199 the California legislative referendum is limited to 
legislative acts . As a result, it cannot be used to refer administrative acts to the 
electors for their approval. 200 Furthermore, the electors would not be able to use it to 
rescind the Legislature's ratification of a federal constitutional amendment. 201 
As Hardy has noted, the legislative referendum was designed "to allow citizens to 
stop hasty, ill-advised legislation. 11 202 However, its procedural and substantive 
193Greenberg, above n 79, 1740. 
194Greenberg, above n 79, 1739. According to Greenberg, the courts may not have the jurisdiction to 
review urgency determinations as the phraseology of the California Constitution appears to allow the 
Legislature to "deem" when a matter is necessary to preserve public health, safety or peace. 
Greenberg, above n 79, 1739, 1740. 
1955ee sections II.B.2 and III.B in chapter four. 
196Cal Const, art II , s 9(a) ; see section III.B in chapter four. 
1975ee Geiger v Board o/Supervisors 48 Cal2d 832,836 n.1 , 313 P2d 545 , 547 n.1 (1957) . 
198Greenberg, above n 79, 1743. 
I99Aubert "Switzerland" in Butler and Ranney, above n 1, 41-42. 
200See eg Collins v City & County 0/ San Francisco 247 P2d 363, 112 CA2d 719 (1952); Fishman v 
City 0/ Palo Alto 150 Cal Rptr 326, 86 CA3d 506 (1979) . 
20158 [Cal] Atty Gen 830 (6 November 1975). 
202Hardy, above n 1, 80. 
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limitations, many of which do not apply to initiatives, explain why the legislative 
referendum has fallen into disuse in California. The electors have taken part in 39 
legislative referendums, 35 between 1912 and 1952, and four in 1982, which was the 
last time the device was used. The electors have vetoed 64 percent of the acts 
subjected to the legislative referendum. 203 In roughly the same period, the Swiss have 
used the legislative referendum more frequently and regularly. Between 1912 and 
1978, for example, the Swiss have had 52 legislative referendums, 28 between 1912 
and 1952, and 24 between 1952 and 1978. They rejected approximately 58 percent 
the acts subjected to the legislative referendum. 204 
Lee attributes the disuse of the legislative referendum in California to the difficulty 
involved in obtaining the required signatures, more than 393,835, in 90 days. 205 The 
League of Women Voters of California has pointed out that the requirement takes a 
high degree of involvement and organisation to meet. 206 Lee concurs with this 
observation, noting that the legislative referendum is limited to those groups that are 
"able to mount a quick, substantial, and costly circulation drive. "207 
Another reason the device is rarely used can be attributed to the 1966 revision of the 
California Constitution. Since then, the Legislature has met almost continuously, in 
contrast to its previously limited biannual sessions. Consequently, as Lee has 
observed, groups now have "more opportunity to seek amendments to statutes within 
the regular legislative process, rather than oppose them in costly and uncertain 
referendums. "208 Another significant factor is the relative impermanence of the 
solution afforded by the legislative referendum, as the Legislature is free to re-
legislate a statute vetoed by the electorate at a later date. 
IV ASSESSMENT 
Lee has concluded that direct democracy in California "has become an integral part of 
the strategy of law making. 11209 However, due to the differences between the 
Californian constitutional system and the Swiss constitutional system, the strategy in 
California is fundamentally different from the strategy in Switzerland. In 
Switzerland, the relatively frequent use of the legislative referendum applies a 
continuous pressure on the Swiss legislature to take into consideration the views of 
203Lee "California" in Butler and Ranney, above n 1, 90, 92, 100. Hyink, above 1, 116; League, 
above n 1, 36. 
204 Aubert" Switzerland" in Butler and Ranney, above n 1, 43-44. 
205Lee "California" in Butler and Ranney, above n 1, 92, 99, 100; see also League, above n 1, 21. 
206League, above n 1, 36. 
207Lee "California" in Butler and Ranney, above n 1, 99. 
208Lee "California" in Butler and Ranney, above n 1, 100. 
209Lee "California" in Butler and Ranney, above n 1, 98 . 
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interested parties. As the legislative referendum is a rare occurrence in California, 
the California Legislature is less susceptible to this kind of pressure. 
Consequently, in California, interested parties have come to rely on the constitutional 
initiative and the legislative initiative as a means to encourage the Legislature to act. 
If action is not forthcoming or it is unsatisfactory, each device can be used to bring 
the issue directly to the electors. As Hyink, Brown, and Thacker have noted, the 
initiative process has been instrumental in achieving needed reforms in the face of 
governmental inaction:210 
Noteworthy examples are the merit system for government employees, a centralized 
executive budget, coastline conservation, and permanent voter registration. Were it left 
to the legislature, these reforms might never have come about. 
In many cases, the threat of starting or actually starting an initiative campaign has 
been sufficient to prod the Legislation into action. 211 In addition, the lengthy and 
detailed nature of the California Constitution often requires the use of the 
constitutional initiative to bring about a desired reform. Frequently, even when the 
Legislature has been cooperative, a reform can only be achieved by reference to the 
electors because it requires an amendment to the California Constitution. 
The legislative referendum, like its Swiss counterpart, is conservative in its effect. If 
successfully employed, the enactment subject to its operation is vetoed, which results 
in the preservation of the status quo. While the device can be used to veto new 
enactments, it cannot be used to eliminate any pre-existing statutory or constitutional 
rights. The constitutional initiative and the legislative initiative, however, are 
potentially more dangerous in this respect as it gives the electors the power to propose 
and enact laws directly without recourse to their elected representatives212 or exposure 
to the moderating influence of the legislative process.213 However, the constitutional 
initiative is subject to the substantive limitations imposed by the United States 
Constitution and a range of important procedural limitations. The legislative initiative 
is subject to the substantive limitations imposed by both the United States Constitution 
and the California Constitution and the same range of procedural limitations. 
210Hyink, above n 1, 131-132. 
211League, above n 1, 34; see also L Whitehall "Direct Legislation: A Survey of Recent Literature" 
(1985) 5 Legal Reference Services Q 3, 28-32. 
212Collins, above n 75, 1127. 
213See Collins, above n 75, 1127 n.l. 
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Nevertheless, Derrick Bell has argued that direct democracy could become a barrier 
to racial equality. 214 Although Bell alludes to California's 1964 constitutional 
initiative regarding the California Legislature's 1963 'fair housing' legislation,215 his 
argument is primarily based on 10 local body legislative referendums on local fair 
housing ordinances, of which all but one were rejected at the polls.216 His argument 
is based on the unsupported assumption that the electorate's veto of enactments 
providing for low-income housing constitutes racial discrimination. As Cronin has 
noted, Bell does not admit that the referendums held on low-income housing have 
involved factors other than racial prejudice, such as the effect on appreciation and 
resale values, population density, and traffic flow. 217 Furthermore, Walker disputes 
that the referendum results that Bell relies on support the conclusion that they were an 
expression of racial discrimination, primarily because: 
Black American economist Thomas Sowell [has pointed] out that building low income 
housing (for blacks) in middle class neighbourhoods has been bitterly opposed by blacks 
already living in such neighbourhoods. 
In addition, Bell does not discuss the differences between the constitutional initiative, 
the legislative initiative, and the legislative referendum, or whether their differing 
array of safeguards would make any difference to his analysis. The courts are likely 
to strike down as unconstitutional any law put in place by a constitutional initiative or 
a legislative initiative that created barriers to racial equality as a violation of the 
214D Bell "The Referendum: Democracy's Barrier to Racial Equality" (1978) 54 Wash L R 1; see also 
L Sager "Insular Majorities Unabated: Warth v Seldin and City of Eastlake v Forest City Enterprises, 
Inc." (1978) 91 Harv L R 1373; M Slonim and J Lowe "Judicial Review of Laws Enacted by Popular 
Vote" (1979) 55 Wash L R 175; P Gunn "Initiatives and Referendums: Direct Democracy and 
Minority Interests" (1981) 22 Urban L Ann 135. For a brief account of Professor Bell's controversial 
career and his criticism of American civil rights policies, see S Goldberg "Who's Afraid of Derrick 
Bell? A Conservation on Harvard, Storytelling and the Meaning of Color" (Sept 1992) ABA J 56. 
Although Bell is generally cited as the leading proponent of the view that direct democracy could 
become a barrier to racial equality, Malani Kotchka concluded in an earlier article that the United 
States Supreme Court has endorsed the use of direct democracy regardless of the discriminatory impact 
it may have by upholding its use as a neutral democratic process by which to deal with land-use 
regulation. M Kotchka "Residential Zoning by Voter Participation: A Democratic Means to an 
Inequitable Result" (1977) 46 Cinn L R 539, 552. 
215For a discussion of California's 1964 fair housing initiative, see above text accompanying notes 7-13 . 
216Bell , above n 214, 15 n.54 (stating that "between 1963 and 1968, 10 cities and the state of California 
conducted open housing referenda. All were initiated by opponents of fair housing measures who were 
successful in every case until 1968, when the Flint, Michigan, ordinance was upheld by a paper-thin 
margin on recount"). 
217Cronin, above n 7, 94. For discussions of the use of direct democracy to resolve land use and zoning 
issues, see C Oren "The Initiative and Referendum's Use in Zoning" (1976) 64 Cal L R 74 (concluding 
that the use of direct democracy in zoning is compatible with the constitutional, statutory, and common 
law limitations on its scope); K Bachman and L Goldberg "Property: Land Use Decision-Making" 1977 
Ann Survey Am L 399 (reviewing judicial decisions upholding zoning by direct democracy); J Paris 
"The Proper Use of Referenda in Rezoning" (1977) 29 Stan L R 819 (arguing that permissive 
referendums are preferable to mandatory referendums regarding zoning matters); P Glenn "State Law 
Limitations on the Use of Initiatives and Referenda in Connection with Zoning Amendments" (1978) 51 
So Cal L R 265 (evaluating the doctrines of state law that the courts have used to validate zoning 
amendments enacted via the use of direct democracy) . 
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federal constitutional right of equal protection. As for the legislative referendum, 
Bell's argument ignores the implications of its limited reach. The legislative 
referendum can only be used to veto legislative enactments. If the Legislature were 
passing legislation to repeal a law that supported racial inequality, the law being 
repealed should be subject to challenge in the courts as being unconstitutional on 
equal protection grounds. As the courts can invalidate laws promoting racial 
inequality, the legislative referendum is extremely unlikely to perpetuate racial 
inequality. Walker, in fact, concludes that direct democracy has not produced racial 
inequality in practice.218 
Bell's argument is also problematic in two other respects. First, it implies that the 
electors are fundamentally intolerant. However, the California electorate has opposed 
initiatives that have threatened minority rights. In 1978, for example, led by then 
retired Governor Ronald Reagan, the electors rejected an initiative which would have 
given school boards the power to dismiss any teacher who advocated, solicited, 
encouraged, or promoted public or private homosexual activity. 219 In 1986, the 
electorate rejected an initiative that sought to add AIDS to California 's list of 
communicable diseases which would have empowered health authorities to quarantine 
those with AIDS. 220 
Second, Bell's concern implies that elected representatives are fundamentally more 
tolerant than the electors. However, Bell does not test this notion by comparing the 
results of the local fair housing referendums he considered with the proceedings of the 
relevant local bodies that produced the ordinances that the electors rejected. 221 This 
failure is significant primarily because elected representatives in the United States 
have perpetrated some notable racial injustices. During World War II, for example, 
they enacted laws that forced at least 120,000 Japanese Americans into "relocation" 
camps although not one Japanese American was ever charged or convicted of 
espionage or sabotage. 222 
In addition, the force of both of these implied arguments is undermined by the 
procedural and substantive safeguards that limit California's direct democracy 
devices. In the event that the electorate were to approve a proposal that deprived a 
group of their constitutional rights, as may have been the case in November 1994 
218Walker, above 9, 83 ; see also C Gillette "Plebiscites, Participation, and Collective Action in Local 
Government Law" (1988) 86 Mich L R 930, 936-937 (rejecting Bell 's arguments as "contradictory" 
and "largely overstated"). 
219Cronin, above n 7, 96. 
22°Above. 
221See generally Bell, above n 214. 
222Cronin, above n 7, 92. 
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when it approved an initiative to prevent illegal aliens from receiving state funded 
education and medical care, the courts are extremely likely to invalidate the proposal 
as unconstitutional. 223 
Given the logistical requirements involved in using California's direct democracy 
devices, a more credible inequality argument concerns access rather than race. 
California is much larger in size and population than Switzerland. The number of 
signatures required to trigger California's direct democracy devices is also much 
higher than it is for Switzerland's direct democracy devices, both in absolute and 
relative terms.224 As a consequence, using California's direct democracy devices 
requires substantially greater resources than using Switzerland's direct democracy 
devices, either in the form of money or large, broad-based, well-organised, volunteer 
organisational support. According to Hyink, Brown, and Thacker, "the expense of 
petition circulation and ballot proposition campaigns discourages all except highly 
organized interest groups from using the direct legislation approach. "225 As a result, 
it is not surprising that: 226 
the most active organisations sponsoring or opposing ballot propositions in recent years 
have been well-fmanced pressure groups representing oil producers, the trucking 
industry, liquor interests, real estate associations, the medical profession, 
manufacturers' associations, and labor unions . 
Lee concurs with this assessment: 227 
while a few groups outside the main political stream occasionally try to employ the 
initiative process, the main actors are those who regularly do battle in legislative 
223 Approximately 20 suits were lodged against this initiative the day after the electorate approved it. 
224In Switzerland, to trigger a legislative referendum, the signatures of 50,000 electors must be 
collected within 90 days; to trigger a constitutional initiative, the signatures of 100,000 electors must be 
collected within 18 months. As the population of Switzerland is approximately 6,820,000, the signature 
requirement amounts to 0.73 and 1.47 of the general population respectively. See "Switzerland" in 
Book of the Year: Events of 1991 (Encyclopedia Britannica, Chicago, 1992) 708. If the 1,066,139 
resident aliens are deducted, the percentages rise to 0.87 and 1.74, respectively. However, they still 
end up being less onerous than the corresponding unadjusted figures for California and New Zealand. 
In California, to trigger a legislative referendum, the signatures of approximately 393,835 electors must 
be collected within 90 days; to trigger a constitutional initiative requires the signatures of approximately 
630,136 electors. As the population of California is approximately 30,380,000, the signature 
requirements amount to 1.29 and 2.07 percent of the general population, respectively. See "United 
States of America" in Book of the Year, above, 725. To trigger a citizens initiated referendum in New 
Zealand, the signatures of approximately 232,000 electors are required to be collected within 12 months 
out of a general population of 3,432,000, which amounts to 6.76 percent of the general population. See 
"New Zealand" in Book of the Year, above, 670. 
225Hyink, above n 1, 128. For discussions of the amounts and uses of money involved in California 
initiative campaigns, see J Moore "Election Day Lawmaking" (17 Sept 1988) 20 Nat'l J 2296; P 
Schrag "California II: Initiative Madness" (22 August 1988) 199 The New Republic 18; Whitehall, 
above n 211, 12-20. 
226Hyink, above n 1, 131. 
227I:,ee "California" in Butler and Ranney, above n 1, 99. 
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corridors or in campaigns for elective office. For these groups, the initiative is mainly 
another weapon - or hurdle - in the contest for political power and influence. 
Although money can make California's direct democracy devices more accessible, the 
expenditure of money cannot guarantee a desired result. For example, as Lee has 
noted: 228 
Opponents of the coastal conservation act in 1972 outspent proponents by more than 
three to one, yet the initiative passed. In contrast, state employees spent $1.8 million in 
the same election attempting to secure passage of a salary measure , against the 
minuscule $38,000 spent in opposition, but the initiative failed. The opponents of 
marijuana liberalization spent only $5,000 but were able to offset expenditures by its 
supporters amounting to $214,000. In general, opponents of initiatives who spent the 
most tended to be successful in defeating the measure; on the other hand, high-spending 
advocates most often found their cause go down in defeat. 
Cronin reached a similar conclusion in his nationwide study. The only established 
correlation between expenditure and results is negative, that is, "the evidence suggests 
that the wealthier side has about a 75 percent or better chance of defeating [a 
proposal]" if the wealthier side is opposing a poorly funded proposal. 229 However, 
large, broad-based, well-organised, volunteer organisations promoting proposals can, 
and have, overcome the overwhelming [mancial superiority of their opponents. The 
success of the Coastal Alliance in winning the California electorate's support for the 
Coastal Conservation Act, despite being outspent by more than three to one, is an 
example.230 
Although California's direct democracy devices may be less effective in curbing the 
power of interest groups than the Progressives had hoped, they have eliminated the 
possibility of one group gaining control over the exercise of governmental power to 
the extent managed by the Southern Pacific Railroad prior to the advent of direct 
democracy in California. The very existence of California's direct democracy 
devices, whether used or not, have influenced the behaviour of elected 
representatives,231 primarily by breaking their monopoly over the legislative process 
by providing the electors with the power to propose, enact, or veto laws. 
However, the legislative power that the constitutional initiative, the legislative 
initiative, and the legislative referendum give to the California electors is limited. In 
comparative terms, the legislative power that they confer on the California electors is 
less than the legislative power that constitutional initiative and the legislative 
referendum confer on Swiss electors. California's direct democracy devices are 
228Lee "California" in Butler and Ranney, above n 1, 105 . 
229Cronin, above n 7, 109. 
23°Lee, "California" in Butler and Ranney, above 1, 102, 105. 
23 1Lee, "California" in Butler and Ranney, above 1, 119. 
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subject to a host of procedural and substantive limitations, while Switzerland's are 
only subject to a few procedural limitations. These differences are attributable to the 
differences in the Swiss and California constitutional systems. The Swiss 
constitutional system was designed to preserve local autonomy. Switzerland's direct 
democracy devices are consistent with and integral to this design. The California 
Constitution is subordinate to the United States Constitution. California 's direct 
democracy devices reflect this subordinate status. Although not integral or native to 
the California constitutional system, the devices are, as Lee has noted, "so deeply 
rooted in the political culture of the State that no public figure in memory has 
suggested that [they] be eliminated - or even substantially modified - and none is 
likely soon to do so. "232 
Despite these differences , the forces which led to the establishment of Switzerland's 
and California's direct democracy devices were essentially the same. In Switzerland, 
during the economic turmoil of the industrial revolution, powerful industrialists and 
[manciers, like Escher, were able to further their interests by using their wealth and 
position to control nearly every representative legislature in Switzerland. In 
California, the industrial revolution had the same effect. Representative democracy 
fell under the control of a few extremely wealthy individuals who used their power to 
further their interests. The combination of economic uncertainty with the widespread 
belief that elected representatives were serving the interests of privileged elites led 
both the Swiss Democrats and the California Progressives to embrace direct 
democracy as a means to restore the legitimacy of their constitutional systems. 
Essentially, the direct democracy devices in Switzerland and California reflect the 
constitutional systems that produced them. As these systems are different, the direct 
democracy devices found in Switzerland and California are different, particularly in 
terms of their legal effect. However, these devices came into being during periods of 
economic upheaval as a means to improve, not displace, representative democracy. 
The call for direct democracy in New Zealand and the subsequent enactment of the 
Citizens Initiated Referenda Act 1993 is consistent with this pattern. 
232Lee, "California" in Butler and Ranney, above I , 120; see also Whitehall, above n 211 , 40 (stating 
that most scholars predict that popular enthusiasm for direct democracy will continue and that any 
attempts to reform the process will be slow, and predicting that its expansion is more likely than its 
restriction). For a discussion of ill-fated proposals to change California's direct democracy process, 
see League, above n I , 61-74. 
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PART IV: NEW ZEALAND 
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7 
ORIGIN OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN NEW ZEALAND 
New Zealand's Citizens Initiated Referenda Act 1993 (CIR Act) came into being as a 
reaction to the policies of the Fourth Labour Government (1984-1990). The Fourth 
Labour Government moved rapidly after being elected in 1984 to dismantle the 
welfare state created by the Liberals in the 1890s and augmented by the First Labour 
Government in the late 1930s, ostensibly because it was no longer sustainable. Its 
approach included reducing benefits through the introduction of means testing and the 
imposition of user charges, reforming taxation, selling state assets, and deregulating 
the economy, particularly its financial markets. These structural changes were 
bewildering to many, particularly as they created levels of unemployment comparable 
to those experienced in New Zealand during the Great Depression, and fuelled a 
speculative stock-market boom, which, following developments in overseas markets, 
crashed in October 1987. The crash caused many companies to fold and thousands of 
people to lose a great deal of money. It also increased unemployment. I 
New Zealanders, who had been sheltered from the spectre of unemployment since the 
Great Depression by government largesse and intervention, found themselves exposed 
to the cold winds of market forces . Their elected representatives had chosen, more 
out of necessity than design, to tackle New Zealand's growing fiscal and trade 
deficits. However, they lacked a specific electoral mandate to carry out this 
decision. 2 As Robert Chapman has noted, the Fourth Labour Government's structural 
changes were initiated "without manifestos, without informed electoral choice, 
without the concurrence of party organisations and despite a check from its prime 
minister. ,,3 Regardless of the merits of this decision, the change in direction was 
fundamental and contrary to the electorate's expectations. 4 The economic shock was, 
therefore, accompanied by a psychological one, which produced an overwhelming 
demand for constitutional reform. The electorate felt that elected representatives were 
to blame, and something had to be done to make them more accountable and 
responsive. 
lK Sinclair "Hard Times (1972-1989)" in Oxford Illustrated History of New Zealand (Oxford University 
Press, Auckland, 1990) 361-364; L Barber New Zealand: A Shon History (Century Hutchinson NZ 
Ltd, Wellington, 1989) 68, 208-211. 
2See section III .B.2(b) in chapt.~r two. 
3R Chapman "A Political Culture Under Pressure: The Struggle to Preserve a Progressive Tax Base for 
Welfare and the Positive State" (1992) 44 Pol Sci 1, 27. 
4See generally T Simpson A Vision Betrayed: The Decline of Democracy in New Zealand (Hodder and 
Stoughton, Auckland, 1984); see also B Jesson Fragments of Labour: The Story Behind the Labour 
Government (Penguin Books, Auckland, 1989) 14-21. 
198 
A host of constitutional reforms were put forward during this period, including 
proposals for various direct democracy devices. Direct democracy advocates have 
existed in New Zealand since at least 1893. However, as in Switzerland and 
California, their success would ultimately depend on a sustained period of economic 
stress coinciding with a prolonged period of profound disillusionment with 
representative democracy. The crash brought about this coincidence, and the 
surprising decision of the subsequent National Government to "stay the course" taken 
by the Fourth Labour Government, particularly with respect to superannuation, 
compounded this effect. 
The lengthy period of hardship and disappointment gave New Zealand's direct 
democracy groups an opportunity to thrive and to build support for direct democracy. 
People who would otherwise have no interest in reforming the constitutional system 
were receptive to their message as they were actively seeking a means to eliminate the 
hardship and disappointment they were experiencing. Merv Rusk, then a well-
established and long serving member of the National Party, and his supporters were 
among those who picked up the message. His decision to embrace direct democracy 
as a necessary constitutional reform to curb the excesses of representative democracy 
brought the direct democracy debate into the political mainstream. His campaign 
within the National Party for a binding system of direct democracy resulted in the 
inclusion of a promise to introduce a non-binding system in the National Party's 1990 
election manifesto. This promise would eventually be enacted in the form of the eIR 
Act, due to the combined efforts of the direct democracy groups, Merv Rusk, and his 
supporters. 
This chapter documents the events leading up to the National Party's pledge to 
introduce a non-binding system of direct democracy. It traces New Zealand's long-
running direct democracy debate, identifies the main direct democracy groups and 
their contribution to the debate, and examines the forces which led the National Party 
to make its election manifesto promise. The following chapter documents the 
legislative history of the CIR Act, which is necessary as New Zealand's direct 
democracy advocates, unlike their counterparts in Switzerland and California, failed 
to secure control of the legislative process. Both chapters examine the factors which 
determined the form and content of the CIR Act, which provides the basis for 
understanding, in chapter nine, the differences between New Zealand's direct 
democracy system and those in Switzerland and California. 
These tasks have not been undertaken previously. Providing a full and accessible 
record of the origin of the CIR Act, given the extensive use of primary sources, has 
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made this chapter and the following chapter relatively lengthy. As a consequence, 
however, they not only provide an insight into the forces that gave rise to the CIR 
Act, but they also describe in detail the path that an idea for constitutional reform can 
take before it becomes law in New Zealand, which is a subject that has previously 
escaped comprehensive treatment. Taken together, these two chapters provide a 
practical example for those who wish to promote legislative change or constitutional 
reform. 5 More importantly, they provide the basis for comparing the origin of direct 
democracy in New Zealand with its origin in California and Switzerland. 
I CALL FOR DIRECT DEMOCRACY BEFORE THE 1987 CRASH 
New Zealand's direct democracy debate began in 1893 with the introduction of the 
Referendum Bill. 6 Although the Bill only provided for non-binding government 
controlled referendums,? it involved the country in the same debate that the California 
Progressives had started in California, that is, whether Swiss-inspired direct 
democracy should be made part of the established constitutional framework. The 
debate owed its origins to the effects of the Industrial Revolution. 8 Monopolistic 
practices in an unregulated economic environment, combined with an unprecedented 
cycle of boom and bust between 1870 and 1900, brought calls for reform from every 
unprivileged quarter in Europe and America. 9 No country, least of all New Zealand, 
was immune to the political turmoil and intellectual fervour of the age. to The New 
Zealand direct democracy debate would ebb and flow for a century, fmding advocates 
for direct democracy within the Liberal Party, the early Labour Party, the 
Constitutional Society, and the New Zealand Democratic Party (originally the Social 
Credit Political League) before the crash. After the 1987 crash, various direct 
SThe growing body of "lawyer as lobbyist" literature generally assumes its readers know how the New 
Zealand legislative process works and what they can do to bring about or forestall change. See eg M 
Chen "The Introduction of Mixed-member Proportional Representation in New Zealand - Implications 
for Lawyers" (1994) 5 Public L R 104; G Palmer "Lawyer as Lobbyist: The Role of Lawyers in 
Influencing and Managing Change" (March 1993) NZU 93; "Lawyer as Lobbyist" in 1993 New 
Zealand Law Conference: Law and Politics Papers, Vol 2, 267-335 (March 1993); G Palmer "The 
New Public Law: Its Province and Function" (1992) 22 VUWLR 1. 
6NZPD, vol 80, 358, 2 August 1893. 
?See Bills Thrown Out (1893). 
8See G Mowry The California Progressives (Quadrangle Books, Chicago, 1963) 88. 
9See eg 0 Robinson, T Fergus, and W Gordon An Introduction to European Legal History (Professional 
Books Ltd, Abingdon, 1985) 440; B Hyink, S Brown, and E Thacker Politics & Government in 
California (8 ed, Thomas Y Cromwell Company, New York, 1973) 63-64; D Lavender California: A 
Bicentennial History (W W Norton, New York, 1976) 124; K Dandliker A Short History of Switzerland 
(Swan Sonnenschein & Co Ltd, London, 1899) 284-289; E Bonjour, HOffler and G Potter A Short 
History of Switzerland (Oxford University Press, London, 1952) 299-343; G Thurer Free and Swiss: 
The Story of Switzerland (adapted & trans, Oswald Wolff, London, 1970) 120; W Martin Switzerland: 
From Roman Times to the Present (Ekek Books, London, 1971) 235. 
JOEven Great Britain, a country of time honoured political traditions, participated in the debate, with the 
ruling Liberals against the adoption of direct democracy and the out-of-power Tories for it. L Watt, 
The Referendum: Its Uses and Abuses (MA thesis in political science held by Victoria University of 
Wellington, 1956) 15; see also NZPD, vol 87, 642 (17 July 1895). 
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democracy groups and the party wing of the National Party began to call for the 
establishment of direct democracy in New Zealand. 
A The Liberals 
The Liberals came to power in 1891 toward the end of a lengthy economic 
depression. Most of the people in New Zealand were immigrants who had left Great 
Britain "in search of a better life, with a higher standard of living away from the 
appalling conditions of nineteenth century industrial towns. "II Instead they found low 
paid "sweatshop" work or unemployment. During the late 1880s, conditions were so 
poor that the number of emigrants exceeded immigrants by thousands. Employers 
easily put down strikes over working conditions by offering work to the unemployed. 
The depression and the strikes produced hostility between rich and poor, and divided 
public opinion into two camps, conservative and liberal. The Liberals, who promised 
land and labour reforms, secured the support of unionists and won the December 
1890 election. 12 
The Liberals built their reform program around a self-serving deftnition of 
democracy , mainly to restrain those in their midst who favoured radical reform. 
Most of their leaders "insisted that reform should proceed only as fast and as far as 
public opinion would allow. ,,13 The Liberal Government's Prime Minister, Richard 
Seddon, argued: 14 
The statesman who desires to help his country must keep in touch with the feelings of 
the country. He must not go ahead of what he is supported in by public or popular 
opinion. We can only legislate, and our legislation can only stand, if our people are 
educated to the point of demanding that certain legislation shall be passed. 
Seddon used arguments of this kind to avoid making decisions on controversial issues, 
such as prohibition and bible-reading in school, by suggesting that they be referred to 
the electors in national referendums . This stratagem shifted responsibility for making 
controversial decisions away from Seddon to the electors. However, as his 
government "did not in fact promote the idea of referenda with any real vigour," 15 
Seddon was able to defer deciding controversial issues indeftnitely. 
11K Sinclair The Liberal Government, 1891-1912: First Steps Toward a Welfare State (Heinemann 
Educational Books, Auckland, 1967 reprint 1972) 1. 
12Sinclair, above n 11 , 1-6; see also D Hamer The New Zealand Liberals: The Years of Power, 1891-
1912 (Auckland University Press, Auckland, 1988) 24-26. 
13Hamer, above n 12, 46-47. 
I~amer, above n 12, 47. 
15Above. 
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Nevertheless, to give the argument substance, Seddon and his colleagues regularly 
introduced the Referendum Bill knowing full-well that their supporters in the 
Legislative Council, the then existing second chamber of the General Assembly, 
would veto the Bill. I6 When initially introduced on 2 August 1893, the Bill was two 
pages long and consisted of 10 clauses. It provided for a permanent government 
controlled referendum system in which the government could refer questions on 
specified topics to the electors if the majority of both the House of Representatives 
and the Legislative Council agreed or if three-fifths of all the members of either 
chamber passed a resolution to that effect. By 1905, the Bill was five pages long, 
consisted of 19 clauses, and no longer had any subject matter limitations.17 The 
Legislative Council repeatedly rejected it, primarily on the grounds that its opponents 
would use it to abolish the Council. 
Despite the "understanding" Seddon had with the Legislative Council, the long 
running debate was spirited and at times fierce. It drew exclusively upon the Swiss 
direct democracy system, primarily as it was the only one of note in existence. The 
works Simon Deploige, Francis Adams, Ellis Oberholtzer, and A V Dicey informed 
both sides of the debate. IS During the course of the debate, a number of 
parliamentarians advocated going further than the Bill provided, that is, called for 
establishing the legislative initiative and the legislative referendum. The debate 
[mally fizzled out on 12 September 1906 when Seddon's successor, Joseph Ward 
indicated that the General Assembly was too preoccupied with more important work 
to bother reintroducing the Referendum Bill. 19 
16See Watt, above n 10, 34-35 (arguing that Seddon could have successfully steered the Referendum 
Bill through the Legislative Council had he desired its passage). The Hansard record for the 
Referendum Bill supports Watt's argument. See generally below note 19. 
I7Por copies of the different versions of the Referendum Bill, see Bills Thrown Out (1893-1905). 
ISSee eg Deploige: NZPD, vol 117,2,30 July 1901; vol 122, 579, 24 September 1902; vol 127, 555, 
13 November 1903; vol 128, 117, 1 July 1904; NZPD, vol 131, 493, 496, 27 October 1904; Adams: 
NZPD, vol 80, 567, 10 August 1893; vol 116, 224, 9 July 1901; Dicey: NZPD, vol 80, 567, 10 
August 1893; vol 85, 281, 29 August 1894; Oberholtzer: NZPD, vol 85, 281, 29 August 1894; vol 
128, 117, 1 July 1904. Por the works in question, see S Deploige The Referendum in Switzerland 
(trans, Longmans, Green & Co, London, 1898); P Adams and C Cunningham The Swiss Confederation 
(Macmillan & Co, London, 1889); E Oberholtzer The Referendum in America (Charles Scribner's Sons, 
New York, 1900); A V Dicey "Ought the Referendum be Introduced into England?" (1890) 57 
Contemp R 489; see also A V Dicey "The Referendum and Its Critics" (1910) 212 Q R 538. 
19Por the Hansard record of the Referendum Bill, see NZPD, vol 80, 358, 2 August 1893, 564-569, 10 
August 1893; vol 85, 274-303, 29 August 1894; vol 87, 16, 21 June 1985,642-664, 17 July 1895; vol 
93, 437-443, 23 July 1896; vol 105, 145, 19 October 1898, 768, 4 November 1898; vol 106, 156, 30 
June 1899; vol 112, 67-68, 20 July 1900; vol 116, 212-225, 9 July 1901,266-268, 10 July 1901, 363-
364, 12 July 1901, 393, 16 July 1901, 491, 18 July 1901, 495-507, 19 July 1901, 669-671, 26 July 
1901; vol 117, 1-12, 30 July 1901, 79-81, 31 July 1901, 139-143, 1 August 1901, 174-175, 2 August 
1901; vol 122, 571-601, 24 September 1902; vol 127, 311-312, 3 November 1903, 352-372, 4 
November 1903, 550-571, 13 November 1903, 715, November 1903, 1052, 24 November 1903; vol 
128, 41, 30 June 1904, 106-121, 1 July 1904; vol 129, 460, 16 August 1904; vol 131, 249-250, 19 
October 1904, 373-374, 24 October 1904, 424-428, 25 October 1904, 468-474, 26 October 1904, 486-
519,27 October 1904, 643-651, 1 November 1904; vol 133, 543, 9 August 1905, 724, 17 August 1905; 
vol 136, 502, 12 September 1906. 
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B The Early Labour Party 
During the fIrst decade of the twentieth century, a militant trade union movement, 
reflecting developments in the United States and Australia, had come into being. 20 
Ironically, the leaders of this movement were impressed by the political success of the 
Progressives in the United States, despite their antipathy towards organised labour. 21 
Like the California Progressives, unionists in New Zealand insisted that Parliament 
was under the control of vested economic interests, particularly the country's 
employers.22 While the argument may have been self-serving, it generated support for 
direct democracy. In 1911, the same year that the California Progressives established 
direct democracy in California, the First Labour Party promised in its manifesto to 
establish the initiative and the referendum. 23 The promise also appeared in the 1913 
manifesto of the Social Democratic Party, which was part of the labour movement. 24 
Acting on these promises, James McCombs, a member of the Social Democratic 
Party,25 introduced the Popular Initiative and Referendum Bill in 1918 and 1919. Had 
it been enacted, the Bill would have given the electors the means to subject any bill or 
act to a referendum, regardless of when it came into existence. It also would have 
created an indirect initiative system, which would have given Parliament an 
opportunity to enact a petition proposal in lieu of placing it before the electors. If 
Parliament failed to act, the proposal would have gone to the electors. If Parliament 
passed a substantially altered version of the proposal, the electors would have been 
given an opportunity to decide which version would become law. Either device could 
only be triggered by a petition signed by 10 percent of registered electors. 26 
McCombs' Bill went nowhere. Of the 80 seats available in the General Assembly, 
the Social Democratic Party held only two and the Labour Party four. 27 In addition, 
although the members of the Legislative Council were repeatedly criticised for self-
serving decisions/s representative democracy in New Zealand had not acquired the 
20Barber, above n 1, 63. 
21See section II.B in chapter five. 
22Barber, above n 1, 63 . 
23W McIntyre and W Gardner Speeches and Documents on New Zealand History (Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 1971) 221. 
2~cIntyre, above n 23, 228. 
25M Bassett Three Party Politics in New Zealand: 1911-1931 (Historical Publications, Auckland, 1982) 
66. 
26See Bills Thrown Out (1918-1919) (the Bill was 21 pages long and consisted of 80 clauses). For the 
Hansard record of the Popular Initiative and Referendum Bill, see NZPD, vol 182, 204, 13 April 1918, 
214, 15 April 1918; vol 184, 320-328, 9 September 1919. 
27Bassett, above n 25, 66. 
2SSee generally K Jackson The New Zealand Legislative Council (University of Otago Press, Dunedin, 
1972). 
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same nefarious reputation as it had in Switzerland during the rise of the Swiss 
Democrats or in California during the rise of the Progressives. 29 In these 
circumstances, despite the view of unionists , the argument in favour of direct 
democracy was ineffective. 
C The Constitutional Society 
In 1960, the Constitutional Society for the Promotion of Economic Freedom and 
Justice in New Zealand Incorporated submitted a proposed written constitution to 
Parliament in the form of a parliamentary petition signed by 13 ,489 people.30 The 
Constitutional Society, concerned by the abolition of the Legislative Council in 1950, 
which it viewed as a "bulwark against hasty , radical and ill-conceived legislation," 
promoted its proposed constitution as a means of establishing rules , where none 
existed, "to restrain Parliament from any action which would infringe the rights of the 
people. ,, 31 Aside from creating a senate to replace the abolished Legislative Council , 
the proposed constitution outlined a host of fundamental rights and gave the courts the 
power to declare legislative enactments unconstitutional. It also rendered the theory 
of parliamentary sovereignty inapplicable by expressly declaring that Parliament did 
not have the power to make laws inconsistent with the provisions of the proposed 
constitution. 32 
The proposed constitution, which had to be approved by the electors to come into 
force , could only be amended by reference to the electors . A referendum on an 
amendment to the constitution could take place if the Head of State received advice to 
hold such a referendum from both Houses of the legislature or a petition signed by 
30,000 electors requesting that such a referendum be held. 33 Essentially, the proposed 
constitution established both the constitutionally required referendum and the 
constitutional initiative. In this respect, the influence of Switzerland's Constitution of 
1874 is unmistakable. 34 The proposed constitution did not, however, specify whether 
the electors or parliamentarians would control the drafting of constitutional 
amendments submitted to the electors for their approval. The Public Petitions M to Z 
Committee, which "carefully considered [the] petition," effectively killed the 
proposed constitution by reporting to the House of Representatives on 8 November 
1961, without elaboration, that it had "no recommendation to make. ,, 35 
29See generally chapters three and five . 
30Report of Public Petitions M to Z Committee 1961 [1961] AJHR L2A, 3. 
3lReport, above n 30, 4. 
32Por a copy of the proposed constitution, see Report above n 30, 5-23. 
33Report, above n 30, 20-21 (clauses 48 and 50). 
34See section lILA in chapter four. 
35Report, above n 30, 3. 
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D The Democrats 
A few years after the Constitutional Society I s proposed constitution withered on the 
vine, the Democrats began to take an interest in direct democracy. The New Zealand 
Democratic Party (NZDP) is the evolutionary child of the New Zealand Social Credit 
Political League, which came into existence in 1953.36 Between 1982 and 1985 the 
League styled itself the Social Credit Party. The League changed its name to the 
NZDP in 1985.37 The NZDP stands for a comprehensive array of social and 
economic reforms based on the social credit principles originally advanced in the 
1920s by Major Clifford Hughes Douglas.38 For the sake of convenience, those who 
acted under the banner of the League, the Social Credit Party, or the NZDP are 
referred to as the Democrats. 
1 Initial support for direct democracy 
The Democrats initially advocated the wider use of government controlled 
referendums in the late 1960s. 39 Their stance coincided with a generalised feeling of 
powerlessness, particularly among the young, and it appealed to groups unable to 
secure parliamentary approval for their causes. By the time the Democrats included 
the idea in their 1975 election manifesto, it had won support among a majority of 
National, Labour, and Values voters. 40 
The reasons for this wide-spread support were identical to those underlying the call 
for direct democracy in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In their 1976 study on the 
role of the referendum in New Zealand politics, Steven Levine and Alan Robinson 
indicated that many electors felt excluded from the political process, dissatisfied with 
a parliamentary system that appeared to be unrepresentative and unresponsive, and 
frustrated by the lack of adequate opportunities to participate in the shaping of public 
policy. Levine and Robinson concluded that "many New Zealanders would 
36NZDP NZ Democrats: Opportunity with Justice (NZDP, Auckland, 1985) 5. 
37Letter from Chris Leitch, President of the NZDP, to Mark Gobbi (24 May 1991); see also NZPD, vol 
467, 7750 (5 November 1985). 
38For a discussion of the political and economic theories of Major Douglas, see C Douglas Social Credit 
(rev 3 ed, Eyre Spottiswade, London, 1937). For a discussion of Social Credit as articulated by the 
New Zealand Social Credit Political League, see C Evlidge What is Social Credit? A Background to 
Financial Policy (rev ed, NZSCPL Publications Committee, Social Credit Information Centre, 
Auckland, 1981) . 
39Leitch, above n 37. 
40See S Levine and A Robinson The New Zealand Voter - A Survey of Public Opinion and Electoral 
Behavior (Price Milburn, Wellington, 1976) 102, 107. This was also the year in which the United 
Kingdom held its government controlled referendum on whether to remain a member of the European 
Community. See generally eg D Butler and U Kitzinger The 1975 Referendum (Macmillan Press, 
London, 1976). 
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appreciate institutional arrangements which gave them the opportunity to participate 
more frequently and more vigorously in the political life of their country. 1141 
2 The 1978 election manifesto promise 
Apparently, the Democrats had come to the same conclusion. In their 1978 election 
manifesto, they promised to introduce a modified form of Switzerland's direct 
democracy system. Under the proposed system, the government would be required to 
hold a referendum on any matter if 100,000 electors signed a petition to that effect.42 
However, the proposal did not specify whether the results of a national referendum 
initiated by the electors would be binding on the government. With reference to this 
proposal, Geoffrey Palmer stated:43 
New Zealanders may reduce the grip of executive government and be more satisfied 
with public decision if a general statute were passed allowing for referenda to be held 
on important public questions where 100,000 qualified electors so petitioned. 
Although Palmer indicated that more frequent use of referendums could weaken 
ministerial responsibility and pose some operational concerns, he concluded:44 
Nevertheless, referenda really are democratic. They do give every one a chance to 
have his or her voice heard. And they must reduce the level of public dissatisfaction 
with some types of decisions. They are fairer than a free vote in parliament. 
3 The Popular Initiatives Bill 
Aware of Palmer's endorsement,45 the Democrats began an ill-fated attempt to 
establish a non-binding citizens initiated referendum system. On 9 December 1983, 
Gary Knapp, the Democratic MP for East Coast Bays, motioned for the introduction 
of a private member's bill entitled the Popular Initiatives Bill.46 The Bill had two 
policy objectives: to increase the participation of the electors in the decision-making 
process, and to make Government more responsive. 47 The system proposed in the 
Bill would have required the signatures of 100,000 electors to trigger a referendum 
and had no subject matter limitations. However, the wording of questions would be 
41Levine and Robinson, above n 40, 108. 
42Social Credit Party Social Credit '78 Election Manifesto: Bold New Polices to Get New Zealand 
Working towards a Better Tomorrow (1978) 50. California's famous Proposition 13 was held in the 
same year. See section III.A.3 in chapter six. 
43a Palmer Unbridled Power? An Interpretation of New Zealand's Constitution and Government 
(Oxford University Press, Wellington, 1979) 149. 
44Palmer, above n 43, 148-149. 
45NZPD, vol 455, 4752, 4756 (9 December 1983). 
46NZPD, above n 45,4746. 
47NZPD , above n 45,4746, 4747,4756. 
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determined by a committee of the House of Representatives, and the results would be 
non-binding.48 
During the course of the debate, the Democrats discovered that both the National 
Government and the Labour Opposition opposed the Bill in principle. 49 However, the 
Opposition voted in favour of its introduction. Whether Labour's reluctant support 
resulted from the influence @ Palmer, who was then Deputy Leader of the 
Opposition, or from the institutionalised practice of the Opposition voting against the 
Government as a matter of principle, is uncertain. Regardless of Labour's 
motivation, the National Government managed to block the introduction of the 
Popular Initiatives Bill by one vote.50 
Encouraged by this narrow vote and Labour's subsequent victory in the 1984 snap 
election, Knapp and the Democrats decided to try again on 6 November 1984.51 Once 
again, both Labour and National opposed the Bill in principle during the debate.52 
Nevertheless, even though it involved an appropriation, the Labour Government 
decided to allow the Bill to be introduced and referred to the Electoral Law Select 
Committee. 53 Knapp attributed the Bill's progress to the influence of Palmer, then 
Deputy Prime Minister. 54 
The Electoral Law Select Committee reported its [mdings to the House of 
Representatives on 5 November 1985, a year after the Bill's introduction. On the 
strength of three meetings, involving just over two hours of hearings and three 
submissions, it recommended that the Government should not allow the Bill to 
proceed. Although the Select Committee found the Bill difficult in a number of 
respects, it reached its recommendation based on two factors: the lack of submissions 
on the matter, and the existence of the Royal Commission on Electoral Reform. 55 
48For a copy of the Popular Initiatives Bill, see Bills Thrown Out (1984) (the Bill was five pages long 
and consisted of 10 clauses). 
49Jim McLay, then Minister of Justice, and D Jones spoke against the Bill on behalf of the National 
Government. Michael Cullen spoke against the Bill on behalf of the Labour Opposition. Gary Knapp 
and Bruce Beetham, both Democrats, spoke in favour of the Bill . See NZPD, above n 45,4746-4757. 
50NZPD, above n 45,4757. 
51 NZPD, vol 458, 1313 (6 November 1984) . 
. 52Cullen, Richard Northey, and Bill Dillon spoke against the Bill on behalf of the Fourth Labour 
Government. Ruth Richardson spoke against the Bill on behalf of the National Opposition. Knapp and 
another Democrat, Neil Morrison, spoke in favour of the Bill. See NZPD, above n 51, 1313-1325. 
53NZPD, above n 51, 1313, 1315, 1319, 1324-1325. 
54NZPD, above n 51, 1324. 
55NZPD, vol 467, 7746-7748 (5 November 1985). Palmer waited until 25 July 1985 to ask the House 
to refer the Popular Initiatives Bill to the Electoral Law Select Committee. See NZPD, vol 464, 5971-
5972 (25 July 1985). 
207 
4 The Royal Commission on Electoral Reform 
The Labour Government had created the Royal Commission earlier in 1985 to 
investigate, among other things, "the use of referenda." The Royal Commission's 
term of reference regarding referendums was as follows: 56 
To what extent referenda should be used to determine controversial issues, the 
appropriateness of provisions governing the conduct of referenda, and whether 
referenda should be legislatively binding. 
To avoid pre-empting this term of reference, the Electoral Law Select Committee 
proposed termination of the Bill's progress and suggested that the Bill be brought to 
the attention of the Royal Commission. 57 Knapp criticised the Select Committee's 
rationale on the grounds that it reached its determination before the creation of the 
Royal Commission and without seriously considering the difficulties mentioned in the 
Committee's report.58 Irrespective of his arguments, both Labour and National voted 
against the Democrats, 74 to 2, on the motion to table the Committee's report.59 
Rather than voting on the Second Reading of the Popular Initiatives Bill, the 
Government relied upon a procedural tactic to terminate the Bill's progress. On 13 
November 1985, the Speaker of the House ruled the Bill out of order for a Second 
Reading on the grounds that it involved an appropriation. 60 
The Democrats, anticipating the fate of the Popular Initiatives Bill, decided to bring 
their proposal to the attention of the Royal Commission on Electoral Reform shortly 
after its creation. In July 1985, they presented a comprehensive submission, along 
with a copy of the Bill, to the Royal Commission that addressed each of the 
Commission's terms of reference. 61 Aside from Professor Geoffrey Q de Walker's 
submission, which was a copy of the manuscript for his influential book Initiative and 
Referendum: The People IS Law, 62 the Democrats presented the only pro-direct 
56Report o/the Royal Commission on the Electoral System (Government Print, Wellington, 1986) 167. 
57NZPD, above n 55, 7748. Pursuant to the Committee's recommendation, the House of 
Representatives sent a copy of its report and a copy of the Popular Initiatives Bill to the Royal 
Commission on the Electoral System after the Committee tabled its report on 5 November 1985. The 
Royal Commission mistakenly stated that it received the report and the Bill following a recommendation 
of the Committee tabled on 3 July 1985. Report, above n 56, 171. What it received in July 1985 was a 
submission from the NZDP, which included a copy of the Bill. See 1-7 New Zealand: The Royal 
Commission on the Electoral System: Submissions (1986), Submission 742. 
58NZPD , above n 55, 7748. 
59NZPD , above n 55, 7751-7752. 
6ONZPD , vol 467, 8069 (13 November 1985); see also above text accompany note 53 . 
61Submission 742 in Submissions, above n 57. 
62Submission 801 in Submissions, above n 57. This particular submission was 333 pages in length. The 
Royal Commission decided not to include a copy of it in its bound record of the submissions. Instead it 
placed a copy on me with Paul Harris in the Department of Political Science at Victoria University of 
Wellington. Harris served as the Commission's research officer, and was appointed in 1994 to head the 
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democracy submission that canvassed the main arguments both for and against direct 
democracy.63 Predictably, they argued that the Popular Initiatives Bill overcame the 
standard arguments against direct democracy. 64 Ironically, their submission was 
influential. The Royal Commission provided a description of the Popular Initiatives 
Bill in its Report, but did not comment on it. Most of the Democrats' arguments 
against direct democracy found their way into the Report, but very few of their 
arguments in favour met with the same success.65 The Royal Commission's 
conclusion that "initiatives and referenda are blunt and crude devices, ,,66 was no doubt 
inspired by the Democrats' statement that "[t]he referendum is a blunt instrument," 
which occurred in the course of their discussion of arguments against direct 
democracy.67 
The Royal Commission received 805 written submissions, of which 198 (24.59 
percent) dealt with "the use of referenda." The submission presented by the 
Democrats was one among 48 (5.96 percent) that dealt specifically with direct 
democracy devices that could be triggered by the electors. 68 Inexplicably, the Royal 
Commission reported that "about 30 percent of the submissions received dealt with 
referenda. ,,69 The overall low response to the term of reference on "the use of 
referenda" can be attributed to the relative importance of the other terms of reference 
at the time, particularly those concerning proportional representation and Maori 
representation. The poor response regarding direct democracy devices that could be 
initiated by the electors can be attributed to the imprecise phrasing of the term of 
reference on "the use of referenda. ,,70 Specifically, the term of reference did not 
new Electoral Commission created under the Electoral Act 1993. The Act put in place a version of the 
Eroportional representation electoral system recommended by the Royal Commission. 
3See generally Submissions, above n 57. 
64See Submission 742 in Submissions, above n 57. 
65Compare Report, above n 56, 172-175 with Submission 742 in Submissions, above n 57, 2-4. 
Ironically, Walker's extensive and publishable submission did not merit the same consideration. The 
Royal Commission neither mentioned nor commented on his work in its Report. Walker had anticipated 
that his submission might be treated in this manner: "I realise that submissions to a New Zealand Royal 
Commission that originate in Australia may provoke less than unanimous enthusiasm." In spite of this 
realisation, Walker made his submission in the hope "that if the matter can receive consideration on its 
merits in New Zealand, my [Australian] compatriots might be more inclined to give it serious attention 
themselves." Submission 801 in Submissions, above n 57. 
66Report, above n 56, 175. 
67Submission 742 in Submissions, above n 57,3. However, the Department of Justice, in the "pro" part 
of its pro/con discussion regarding the "use of referenda," argued that "[t]he nature of Parliamentary 
elections means that they are a rather blunt instrument for determining the feeling of the electorate on 
individual issues." Submission of the Department of Justice to the Royal Commission on the Electoral 
System (October 1985) (concluding that a binding system of direct democracy should not be 
established) . 
68See generally Submissions, above n 57. 
69Report, above n 56, 171. 
70Hugo Hoffmann, the draftsman of the term of reference, stated that he strove for vagueness in the 
phrasing to encourage a wide range of responses. He also stated that the term of reference on 
referendums was an after thought, a matter ancillary to the primary purpose of the Royal Commission, 
which was to study reform options for New Zealand's electoral system. The term of reference was 
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draw a distinction between government controlled referendums and other kinds of 
referendums. It also did not mention devices which could be triggered by the 
electors. This fact, coupled with New Zealand's exclusive past use of government 
controlled referendums on the national level, explains why the number of submissions 
dealing with direct democracy devices that the electors could trigger was so low. 
The Royal Commission carried this imprecision into its 1986 Report. After stating 
the term of reference, the Royal Commission briefly acknowledged several kinds of 
direct democracy devices. However, when the Royal Commission began to discuss 
the arguments for and against these devices, it lumped them together under the 
heading of "initiatives and referenda," which had the effect of rendering the 
Commission's assessment of each device impossible to evaluate.71 This imprecision, 
coupled with the poor response to the vaguely worded term of reference on "the use 
of referenda," cast doubt on Palmer's assertion that "the views of the Royal 
Commission are likely to settle the question of the future use of referenda. ,,72 The 
subsequent passage of the CIR Act invalidated his assertion as the Royal Commission 
had concluded that "there should be no provision for public petitions to compel 
referenda. ,,73 
included as one of several interesting items somewhat related to the primary purpose of the Royal 
Commission. The Royal Commission's study simply provided an opportunity to explore a few more 
issues. This, in itself, explains the superficial treatment given to the subject of referendums in the 
Royal Commission's Report. Interview with Hugo Hoffmann, Senior Legal Adviser, New Zealand 
Department of Justice, Wellington (19 May 1992). 
71See Report, above n 56, 172-175. 
72G Palmer Unbridled Power: An Interpretation of New Zealand's Constitution and Government (2 ed, 
Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1987) 258. In this second edition, Palmer rewrote his discussion of 
"referenda." In doing so, he deleted his first edition reference to the Democrats' direct democracy 
proposal and his assessment that "New Zealanders may reduce the grip of executive government and be 
more satisfied with public decision if a general statute were passed allowing for referenda to be held on 
important public questions where 100,000 qualified electors so petitioned." See Palmer, above n 43, 
149. The choice appears to be ironic as Palmer changed the title of his book from a question, Unbridle 
Power?, to a statement, Unbridled Power. However, he was a university lecturer when he published 
the first edition and Deputy Leader of the Fourth Labour Government when he published the second 
edition. Further, the Democrats and others kept citing his earlier endorsement as an argument to win 
the Fourth Labour Government's support for direct democracy. See eg, NZPD, above n 45, 4752, 
4756; Petition of the Coalition of Concerned Citizens (Eketahuna) to the House of Representatives 
(undated), EL/88/730, Box 1988/15. Having to explain the position to his parliamentary colleagues, 
who had fmally reached the Treasury benches after three terms of National Party rule, may have been 
sufficiently irritating to encourage him to water down his conclusion with his uncritical reference to the 
Royal Commission's view on direct democracy. Palmer has also subsequently republished the Royal 
Commission's fmdings on "the use of referenda" verbatim without analytical comment. See M Chen 
and G Palmer Public Law in New Zealand: Cases, Materials, Commentary and Questions (Oxford 
University Press, Auckland, 1993) 719-723. 
73Report, above n 56, 176, 181. 
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II CALL FOR DIRECT DEMOCRACY AFTER THE 1987 CRASH 
Although the Royal Commission sounded the death knell of the Democrats' Popular 
Initiatives Bill, the political wing of the National Party resurrected the proposal 
embodied in the Bill after the 1987 crash. Public admiration for parliamentarians 
began to decline under the "belligerent and divisive leadership style" of Robert 
Muldoon,74 Prime Minister of the National Government from 1975-1984, which was 
the period in which the Democrats renewed the call for direct democracy in New 
Zealand. The Fourth Labour Government exacerbated the trend by deciding to 
reduce the size and role of the welfare state when forced to deal with the budget and 
trade deficits caused by Muldoon's unsustainable economic and fiscal policies. From 
1975 to 1989, for example, the approval rating of parliamentarians had slid from 33 
percent to 4 percent. 75 
The 1987 crash accentuated the economic and political turmoil caused by the Fourth 
Labour Government's so-called 'quiet revolution. ,76 These conditions produced a 
deluge of proposals for constitutional reform,77 including a stronger and more credible 
call for direct democracy. In 1987, Geoffrey Q de Walker, Professor of Law and 
Dean of the University of Queensland School of Law, published his influential book, 
Initiative and Referendum: The People's Law, the first Australasian tract in favour of 
direct democracy.78 Walker's book presented direct democracy as a means of making 
elected representatives more responsive and accountable to the electorate, which 
appealed to New Zealanders disillusioned with their elected representatives, 
74Barber, above n 1, 203. 
75p Joseph Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (Law Book Co. Ltd, Sydney, 1993) 
285; see also K Jackson The Dilemma of Parliament (Allen & Unwin, Wellington, 1987) 42. 
76For an account of the quiet revolution, see C James The Quiet Revolution: Turbulence and Transition 
in Contemporary New Zealand (Allen & Unwin/Port Nicholson Press, Wellington, 1986). 
77The proposals included calls for the reduction in the size of Cabinet, loosening of the Whip system, 
establishment of a second chamber, and the introduction of proportional representation, as well as for 
various forms of direct democracy. See eg H Clark "No to PR, Yes to Parliamentary Reform" The 
Evening Post, Wellington, New Zealand, 6 January 1992 (Cabinet and whip system); "What's Wrong 
with Parliament?" The Case for Parliamentary Reform: A Backbencher's Lament, Address by Michael 
Laws MP, Commonwealth Press Editors' Conference, Wellington (6 June 1991) (same); Report, above 
n 56, 208-282 (second chamber); P Downey "A Second Chamber" (December 1990) NZU 421 (same); 
Letter from Jim Bolger, Leader of the Opposition, to J Wright (18 July 1989) and to B Daly (11 July 
1989) (stating that the introduction of an elected Second Chamber of Parliament was his preferred 
constitutional reform); C Clark, "Proportional Representation Abolishes 'Elected Dictators'" The 
Evening Post, Wellington, New Zealand, 16 January 1992, 7 (proportional representation); "Peters 
Wants Poll Reform by 1993" The Dominion, Wellington, New Zealand, 1 June 1991 (same); Report, 
above n 56 (same). 
78See generally G Walker Initiative and Referendum: The People's Law (The Centre for Independent 
Studies Ltd, St Leonards, 1987); see also G Walker The People's Law: Initiative and Referendum: 
University of Queensland Inaugural Lecture (delivered 3 June 1987, University of Queensland Press, St 
Lucis, 1988); G Walker "The People's Law: Initiative and Referendum" (1988) 15 U Queensland L J 
33. 
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particularly their inability or unwillingness to live up to the electorate's expectations. 79 
The book was particularly attractive to groups outside the political mainstream as it 
was based on the theory that governmental power is controlled by self-serving elites 
determined to keep the masses out of the legislative process. Although unable to 
attract support for direct democracy from the main political parties, these groups, 
played an indispensable role in educating the wider community about direct 
democracy. They also paved the way for Merv Rusk's successful direct democracy 
campaign within the National Party. 
A Main Direct Democracy Groups 
The main direct democracy groups were Freedom And Individual Responsibility, the 
One New Zealand Foundation, Voters' Voice, the New Zealand Citizens Movement, 
the Coalition of Concerned Citizens, and the New Zealand Superannuitants 
Federation. With the exception of the New Zealand Superannuitants Federation and 
the Coalition of Concerned Citizens, these groups came into being after the 1987 
crash. However, the New Zealand Superannuitants Federation and the Coalition did 
not express an interest in direct democracy until after the crash. For various reasons, 
these groups preferred to work on their own and outside the existing political parties. 
Although in regular contact with one another, their attempts to work together were 
belated and largely unsuccessful. Their primary contribution to New Zealand's direct 
democracy debate was to disseminate information in favour of direct democracy 
throughout the country by holding seminars, giving lectures, writing articles and 
letters to editors, using talkback radio, publishing pamphlets and newsletters, writing 
to MPs, making public submissions to parliamentary select committees, producing 
audio tapes, and giving interviews. In this effort, most of the groups established 
contact with Walker and relied heavily on his book. Despite the political 
establishment's attempt to marginalise these groups,so they managed to broaden 
support for direct democracy in New Zealand. 
79See eg Letter from Merv Rusk to Mark Gobbi (15 August 1991) (discussing Rusk's work promoting 
direct democracy). At the time of the letter, Rusk was a member of the National Party's Auckland 
Division Committee, Chairman of the National Party's Hobson electorate, and had been a member of 
the National Party for 31 years. He resigned from the National Party in 1994 when Ross Meurant, the 
MP for Hobson quit the National Party to form his own political party, the Right of Centre Party 
(ROC). Telephone interview with Merv Rusk (19 October 1994). 
soSee eg L Crisp "Harvest of Hate" The Bulletin (4 April 1989) 42. Jim Bolger, as Leader of the 
National Party Opposition, used this article to imply that the direct democracy movement was the work 
of "far right organisations that propound racist or neo-nazi views." Letter from Jim Bolger to FAIR 
(17 May 1989). Ruth Dyson, then President of the New Zealand Labour Party, stated that the Labour 
Party had discussed direct democracy, but shied away from it because it was usually advanced by non-
party people, independents, or extremists of the left or the right who were interested in direct 
democracy alone. Telephone interview with Ruth Dyson, President of the New Zealand National Party 
(3 May 1991). 
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1 Freedom And Individual Responsibility 
Leo Gilich, Thea Gilich, M Keane, and Mike Houlding founded Freedom And 
Individual Responsibility (FAIR) in October 1987. Jean Kissling of Switzerland 
introduced the idea of direct democracy to Leo and Thea Gilich in the 1970s. 
Inspired, they began to bring direct democracy to the attention of others, 
recommending them as tools to check the "dictatorial trend" in New Zealand's party 
political system. FAIR, which was based in Auckland, evolved out of this effort. 81 
FAIR had one objective. It wanted to establish the legislative referendum and the 
legislative initiative in New Zealand's constitutional system as fundamental rights. Its 
founders declared that the organisation would disband once it achieved this objective. 
They also decided that FAIR would not be affiliated with any political or religious 
organisation but would welcome direct democracy supporters from any organisation. 82 
FAIR was active nationally and regularly shared information, as well as views , with 
the other direct democracy groups in New Zealand. FAIR also maintained contact 
with Walker, and often relied on his advice. For example, Walker suggested that 
FAIR prepare for distribution a short and punchy two page leaflet that introduced 
people to direct democracy to promote FAIR's objective. FAIR produced the leaflet 
in August 1988 and distributed it in its flrst newsletter in September 1988. The 
response increased its membership . 83 
Convinced that it could not secure the support of either the Labour Party or the 
National Party for its direct democracy proposals without widely promoting and 
explaining its proposals to the electors, FAIR consistently reached out to the 
electors. 84 In this respect, FAIR played an indispensable role in educating New 
Zealanders about the advantages of direct democracy, which generated some media 
support for direct democracy. For example, on 8 June 1988, the New Zealand Herald 
stated in an editorial entitled "Execution by Referendum" that it has always favoured 
the increased use of referendums but argued that some issues, such as abortion and 
capital punishment, were too complex to be framed in a referendum. 85 However, on 
81 Letter from Leo Gilich, National Coordinator of FAIR, to Mark Gobbi (30 April 1991); L Armiger, 
FAIR Chairman's Report (22 February 1991); FAIR Newsletter No. 1 (September 1988); see also L 
Gilich Citizens Initiative But What About Referendum? (27 September 1989) (a reply to J Bolger "Case 
for Citizen's Initiative" New Zealand Herald, Auckland, New Zealand, 26 September 1989); FAIR 
Newsletter No. 7 (December 1989); Letter from Leo Gilich to Jim Bolger, Leader of the Opposition (17 
July 1989). 
82Armiger, above n 81 ; M Keane, FAIR Chairman's Report (10 April 1989). 
83Keane , above n 82. 
84See above. 
85Editorial "Execution by Referendum? " New Zealand Herald, Auckland, New Zealand, 9 June 1988, 
8. 
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14 March 1989, only nine months later, the same paper published an unqualified 
endorsement for direct democracy in an editorial entitled "An Admission in Fear" 
which argued that "the enormous power of New Zealand's executive" would be 
curbed if the electors "had the power to compel a referendum on issues which move a 
significant proportion of the electorate." It concluded that "governments which fear 
referendums raise questions about their right to rule. ,, 86 FAIR attributed this change 
in attitude to the letters written to editors and the calls made to talkback shows by its 
supporters.87 
2 One New Zealand Foundation 
The One New Zealand Foundation (ONZF) came into existence in 1988 through the 
efforts of Peter Clark and others in Tauranga. It became an incorporated society 
registered in Hamilton in May 1989.88 Clark served as chairman of the ONZF before 
founding Voters' Voice Tauranga,89 which grew out of internal wrangling within the 
ONZF. Wally Boyd of Foxton then became president of the ONZF. 90 
The ONZF was non-sectarian and professed to be non-political. Nevertheless it had 
three declared objectives: 1) the elimination of racial tension; 2) the withdrawal of all 
racially discriminatory legislation; and 3) the establishment of direct democracy. 
Essentially, the ONZF wanted "one law for all New Zealanders ,,91 and a political 
system which is a democratic instrument of the electors, not an "elected 
dictatorship. ,, 92 Like FAIR, the ONZF derived from, and credited to, Walker many 
of its arguments for direct democracy. 93 The ONZF decided that one of its most 
important functions would be to inform its membership and the public about direct 
democracy. 94 Like FAIR, the ONZF supported the adoption of the legislative 
referendum and the legislative initiative. 95 
86Editorial "An Admission in Fear" New Zealand Herald, Auckland, New Zealand, 14 March 1989, 8. 
87Keane , above n 82. 
88Letter from Wally Boyd, President of the ONZF, to Mark Gobbi (9 July 1991); Telephone interview 
with Wally Boyd (24 July 1991). 
89See ONZF Press Release (13 November 1989). 
9OBoyd Interview, above n 88. 
9lAbove. 
92Letter from Boyd, above n 88 ; see also Submission from the ONZF (Nelson Branch) to the National 
Party Caucus Committee on Electoral and Parliamentary Reform (May/June 1991) (stating that "[w]hen 
used with the party system, [direct democracy] replaces the party clobbering, whipping machine which 
destroys and humiliates MPs to the point of exasperation. [Direct Democracy] can produce correction 
to abuse of power and also prevent it. "). The ONZF also argued that direct democracy would render a 
bill of rights or a written constitution unnecessary. Above. 
93See eg ONZF What Is Voters Referendum (undated) 1 (citing Walker's work as informative) . 
94Letter from Boyd, above n 88. 
95What, above n 93; Press Release, above n 89. 
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3 Voters' Voice 
Voter's Voice came into existence after the ONZF split into two factions, one based 
in Tauranga under the leadership of Clark and the other eventually based in Foxton 
under the leadership of Boyd.96 The split had as much to do with control over the 
ONZF as with the pursuit of its objectives. Although a founding member of the 
ONZF, Clark wanted to. emphasise the ONZF's direct democracy objective at the 
expense of its other objectives. 97 Clark also helped to form several other autonomous 
Voters' Voice groups. Of these subsequent groups, Voters' Voice Auckland appeared 
to be the most active. 
Clark promoted direct democracy in two innovative ways. First, he distributed 
17,000 copies of a tape entitled Voters' Voice,98 which was an adapted version of a 
tape produced by an Australian Christian organisation called the Logos Foundation 
entitled Voters' Veto: Power to the People. 99 His organisation had also obtained 
permission to include a recording of Walker on the other side of the tape.100 The tape 
decried the abuse of executive power, the rapid growth of government, broken 
promises, the party whip system, and self-serving representatives who were 
unresponsive to the general will of the electors. It presented the legislative 
referendum as a solution to a litany of problems attributed to governments that have 
increasingly operated beyond the scope of their electoral mandates. 101 Second, 
Voters' Voice experimented with the idea of starting its own political party by 
sponsoring an unsuccessful candidate, Clifford Enemy, for the Tamaki by-election in 
1992.102 
96Letter from Vere Harvey-Brain of Voter's Voice to Mike Houlding of National Reform (21 June 
1991). 
97Boyd Interview, above n 88. 
98Above . 
99See Harvey-Brain, above n 96. Howard Carter, a former New Zealand Baptist Minister, founded the 
Logos Foundation in 1966, two years before moving to Australia. H Carter Voters' Veto: The Voice of 
the People (Logos Forum, Toomwoomba, Queensland, 1988) 1; Crisp, above n 80, 46. The Logos 
Foundation is a "Christian organisation committed to the maintenance of the historic Judeo-Christian 
values as the basis for individual, family, ecclesial, economic and civil spheres." Carter, above, 4. In 
1989 its direct mailing list included more than 30,000 people from various churches and Christian 
activist organisations. The list includes ministers, politicians, business people, and "ordinary" people 
seeking to reestablish the traditional Judeo-Christian value system. Crisp, above n 80, 46. The Logos 
Foundation allowed Voters' Voice to use its tape on the condition that it acknowledge the Logos 
Foundation. The acknowledgment has, on occasion, led to the mistaken conclusion that Voters' Voice, 
as well as the ONZF, is part of the Logos Foundation. Harvey-Brain, above n 96. 
looHarvey-Brain, above n 96. 
101 Voters , Voice Voters' Voice (Citizens Initiated Referendum) (undated) . 
I02Enemy placed eighth in a field of 14 candidates. He received 47 out of the 16,307 votes cast. "By-
Election Results" The Evening Post, Wellington, New Zealand, 17 February 1992, 3. 
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Given the level of interest in direct democracy in Tauranga, fIrst from the ONZF, 
then Voters' Voice, and later National Reform and the National Party Tauranga 
Electorate leadership,103 it was only a matter of time before Winston Peters, MP for 
Tauranga, would respond to the campaign for direct democracy. His circumspect 
support was soon to follow. Although many of his parliamentary critics believed that 
his interest in direct democracy was another example of Peters' opportunistic political 
style, his calls for a binding system of "citizen's initiated referendum" were more or 
less a genuine expression of what many of his more active and supportive constituents 
wanted. His national profIle also gave the campaign for direct democracy a boost. 
4 New Zealand Citizens Movement 
The New Zealand Citizens Movement (NZCM) came into being in 1989. It consisted 
of a "small handful of dedicated persons" who carried the fmancial burden of its 
activities. However, for all practical purposes, Cliff Tait ran the NZCM from 
Hamilton where it was most active. The NZCM came into existence because of 
frustration stemming from the abuse of governmental power. It saw direct democracy 
as a means of curbing the abuse and giving New Zealand a "government for the 
people by the people. ,,104 
Like Voters' Voice, the NZCM argued that direct democracy is the only means of 
making elected representatives accountable to the people they claim to represent. It 
viewed direct democracy, like the California Progressives, as a means of 
counteracting the loyalty of representatives to the "party machine" and the "dictatorial 
system of government" in which representatives primarily represent the interests of 
their parties. 105 According to Tait: 106 
New Zealanders everywhere are becoming more and more disillusioned with politics. 
They are disenchanted with the growing trend for political parties to have themselves 
elected on one platform and reveal a totally different agenda the day after the election, 
leaving the voter, short of a revolution, powerless to do anything about it. When we go 
to the polls, the only aspect we are free to choose is which political party we are going 
to let rule us for the next 3 years. We do not even have a choice in selecting an 
individual representative because the party machine has already selected one for us . . . 
103Por an indication of The National Party Tauranga Electorate's support for binding citizens' initiated 
referendums, see D Blanshard "Nats Call for Binding Referendums" Bay of Plenty Times, Bay of 
Plenty, New Zealand, 18 May 1992. 
100NZCM Newsletter (June 1991); Letter from Cliff Tait to Andrew Ladley (10 June 1991); NZCM 
With Citizens Initiated Referenda This Stranglehold Will Be Broken (undated). The NZCM was initially 
known as the New Zealand Independents Movement. 
105Stranglehold, above n 104; Newsletter, above n 104; see also C Tait "Referenda the Solution" 
Waikato Times, Hamilton, New Zealand, 23 May 1991; C Tait "Leadersbip Questioned" Waikato 
Times, Hamilton, New Zealand, 22 March 1991. 
106 "Solution" , above n 105. Tail's observation is reminiscent of Rousseau's criticism of the English 
parliamentary system. See J Rousseau On the Social Contract with Geneva Manuscript and Political 
Economy (trans, St Martin's Press, New York, 1978) 102. 
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who will act in the party's interests, but not necessarily ours. . .. We may protest, but 
we are powerless to do anything about it. 
Given this perception of New Zealand's governmental system, the NZCM saw direct 
democracy as a way of giving the electors power to control their representatives once 
they were elected. 107 Accordingly, it considered direct democracy as a better and 
more effective constitutional reform than an electoral system based on proportional 
representation. 108 This idea would be used later by National Reform to present direct 
democracy as an alternative to proportional representation. Like FAIR, the ONZF, 
and Voters' Voice, the NZCM's primary objective was to bring direct democracy to 
the attention of the electors. Like the other direct democracy groups, the NZCM 
promoted Walker's book as an authoritative, "easy to read and unbiased" introduction 
to direct democracy. 109 It supported the adoption of both the legislative initiative and 
the legislative referendum. 110 
5 Coalition of Concerned Citizens 
The Coalition of Concerned Citizens (CCC) also lent its support to both the legislative 
referendum and the legislative initiative. The CCC's interest in direct democracy 
stemmed directly from its futile experience with organising the largest petition drive 
in New Zealand's history. III The CCC came into being in 1985 to coordinate 
opposition to the Homosexual Law Reform Bill. Keith Hay, an Auckland 
businessman, along with other campaigners, organised a petition drive against the Bill 
through local coalitions throughout New Zealand. The CCC evolved out of these 
local coalitions. During the 1987 general election it maintained a media office in 
Auckland and a head office in Christchurch. After the campaign, the CCC shifted its 
national headquarters to Lower Hutt. 112 
Although the CCC characterised itself as "non-political" in character, it was dedicated 
to upholding: 1) New Zealand's British institutions; 2) the basic Christian values 
which are the foundation of New Zealand society; and 3) New Zealand's traditional 
I07C Tait "Controlling Parliament" Waikato Times, Hamilton, New Zealand, 24 May 1991. 
108"Leadership Questioned", above n 105. 
109Tait, above n 104. 
1I0Stranglehold, above n 104; "Solution", above n 105. 
IIITbe petition actually consisted of four separate petitions, containing 581,280, 216,661, 17,312, and 
2,475 signatures, respectively, for a grand total of 835,728 signatures. Leading proponents of the Bill 
questioned both the authenticity of many of the signatures and the legitimacy of the methods used to 
collect many of the signatures. NZPD, vol 466, 6978 (24 August 1985), vol 467, 7732 (9 October 
1985); JHR (1984-1985) 1030; [1987] AJHR 1.27, 4-5; Interview with Fran Wilde, MP for Central 
Wellington, in Wellington (24 June 1991). 
I12"Serving Our Nation: Our People's Welfare is Our Concern - And Yours" Coalition Courier, Vol 5, 
No 2 (June/July 1990) 1; see also Submission of the CCC (NZ) to the National Party Electoral Law 
Reform Caucus Committee (15 May 1990); Submission of the CCC (NZ) to the Electoral Law Select 
Committee (29 April 1992). 
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links in the British Commonwealth and the ANZUS Alliance. It was also committed 
to promoting "the family unit, the sanctity of life, and the worth of every individual, 
with rights and responsibilities as a unique creation of God. ,,113 
After the 1987 general election, the CCC paused to evaluate its past activities and to 
formulate a plan of action. Frustrated by Parliament's decision to proceed with the 
Homosexual Law Reform Bill despite the CCC's enormous petition against it, and a 
growing list of broken election promises, the CCC decided that it should pursue 
measures that would give the electors more of a say in government. Consequently, it 
undertook a study of the merits of various measures, including citizens electoral 
councils, Christian political parties, proportional representation, and direct 
democracy. It concluded that "the promotion of a Swiss type system of Citizens 
Initiated Referendums, binding on Parliament, held the greatest promise of 
success. ,,114 
On 7 June 1988 Robert Capes, on behalf of the CCC (Eketahuana), petitioned the 
House of Representatives to give New Zealand citizens "the right to request that any 
issue of their concern be subject to a nationwide referendum with the requirement of 
50,000 petitioners. ,,115 The Electoral Law Select Committee referred the petition to 
the Fourth Labour Government for consideration. 116 The Government, relying on the 
Repon of the Royal Commission on the Electoral System, which recommended that 
"there should be no provision for public petitions to compel referenda," decided that 
no action should be taken in respect of the petition. 117 
Undaunted, the CCC turned its attention to organising support for direct 
democracy. 118 For example, on 21 May 1990 the CCC held a meeting in the 
Auckland Town Hall which was called by Voters' Voice and chaired by Paul Tairoa, 
the producer of the audio tape Voters' Voice - More Power to the People. 119 The 
meeting included the following speakers: 1) Henry Sigerist, a former Swiss citizen 
who had published a series of articles in the New Zealand Herald advocating the 
adoption of Swiss-style direct democracy in New Zealand;120 2) National MP Winston 
113Courier, above n 112, 1. 
114Above. 
115JHR (1987-90) 2418; Petition of the CCC (Eketahuna) to the House of Representatives (undated), 
EL/88/730, Box 1988/15. 
116JHR, above n 115; [1990] AJHR 1.17,3. 
117[1990] AJHR A.5 255; see also Report, above n 56, 176, 181. 
118See eg Courier, above n 112, 5, 8. For a discussion of the Logos Foundation, see above note 99. In 
addition to publishing a quarterly newsletter that carried features on its progress with direct democracy, 
the CCC sold and rented video and audio tapes that explained how direct democracy devices worked 
and why they should be adopted. See Courier, above n 112, 8. 
119Courier, above n 112, 5. 
120See eg H Sigerist "Two-Party System in a World of its Own" New Zealand Herald, Auckland, New 
Zealand, 6 June 1989; H Sigerist "Way Open for Minority Groups" New Zealand Herald, 12 June 
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Peters, who, with his usual circumspection, characterised non-binding referendums as 
farcical; and 3) a representative of FAIR, who spoke briefly on the need for 
Parliamentary reform, particularly in regard to giving electors the right to decide 
matters effecting their welfare. Raymond Souza of Auckland, an articulate and 
perceptive advocate of direct democracy, spoke on behalf of the CCC. 121 
The CCC came to the conclusion that direct democracy was "the only way to stop 
Government rule by executive decree, regardless of the will of the people. ,,122 In its 
view, the legislative referendum and the legislative initiative provided a means of 
ensuring that parliamentarians "remain conscious" of their role as representatives of 
the people and "do not function as an oligarchy and forget the principles of 
democracy. " 123 
6 New Zealand Superannuitants Federation 
As most parliamentarians were either not interested in or opposed to direct 
democracy,'24 FAIR, the ONZF, Voters' Voice, the NZCM, and the CCC wisely 
invested most of their resources into educating the wider community of the advantages 
of direct democracy. The investment paid dividends in 1991 when the New Zealand 
Superannuitants Federation (NZSF) decided to lend its support for direct democracy. 
This development helped to prevent the National Government from reneging on its 
promise to introduce and enact the CIR Act. 125 
Bob Hubbard and Ray Cody founded the NZSF in 1985 to oppose the Fourth Labour 
Government's surtax on superannuation. Since then the NZSF has, under the 
leadership of George Drain, taken on a watch-dog role to inform superannuitants of 
developments regarding superannuation. It has also become a formidable lobby group 
dedicated to the preservation of universal superannuation. 126 
. To capitalise on the NZSF's opposition to the Fourth Labour Government's decisions 
regarding superannuation, the National Party made its fateful, and widely publicised, 
1989; H Sigerist "Swiss Democracy Excellent Model" New Zealand Herald, Auckland, New Zealand, 
16 December 1989. 
12lCourier, above n 112, 5. Souza also spoke on behalf of the CCC submission on the Citizens Initiated 
Referenda Bill 1992 before the Electoral Law Select Committee on 10 June 1992. M Gobbi, Electoral 
Law Select Committee Proceedings Notes (10 June 1992). 
122Courier, above n 112, 5. 
123Submission to Caucus Committee, above n 112. 
124See Armiger, above n 81; Keane, above n 82. 
I25See generally chapter eight. 
126Letter from Fred Milner, President of the Auckland Provincial Council of Senior Citizens and 
Chairman of the Combined Committee of Retired Persons Organisation, to Mark Gobbi (14 May 
1991); see also "Superannuitants' Hope Rise" The Evening Post, Wellington, New Zealand, 21 October 
1991, 13; Submission from NZSF to the Electoral Law Select Committee (April 1992). 
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pre-election promise to abolish the surtax. For a variety of reasons, the National 
Government reneged on this promise. 127 Initially it attempted to replace the surtax 
with a means testing mechanism which would have instituted a steeper c1awback than 
the surtax. This proposal met with stiff resistance both from the NZSF and within the 
National Party Caucus!28 By October 1991, after nearly a year of acrimonious 
debate, the National Government abandoned its means testing plans and confIrmed its 
decision to stick with the surtaX!29 This policy reversal damaged the National 
Government's credibility. 130 
The policy reversal also contributed to the NZFS' s decision to join the call for direct 
democracy in New Zealand. During the superannuation debate, the Combined 
Committee of Retired Persons Organisation (CCORPO), which embraces most of the 
groups in the Auckland area concerned with the welfare of senior citizens, passed a 
resolution in favour of direct democracy. Its chairman, Fred Milner, predicted that 
the NZSF would eventually follow suit, which was virtually a certainty as several 
members of CCORPO also held positions within the NZSF. Shortly after the 
National Government announced its means testing plan, the NZSF passed a resolution 
of no confIdence in the National Government and voted to support the campaign for 
direct democracy. 131 The National Government would fmd this development 
impossible to disregard as it brought the call for direct democracy out of the political 
wilderness into the heartland of its electoral support. 
B Merv Rusk and the Origin of National's CIR Proposal 
The direct democracy groups played a vital role in promoting the advantages of the 
principal direct democracy devices, particularly the legislative initiative and the 
legislative referendum. Their educational efforts brought the idea to the attention of 
Merv Rusk, who used his position within the party wing of the National Party to 
127See M Munro "Caucus Revolt on Super Growing" The Dominion, Wellington, New Zealand, 7 
August 1991, 1; R Long "Cabinet Yielding to Super Pressure" The Dominion, Wellington, New 
Zealand, 6 June 1991, 1; R Long "U-Turn on Pensions Will Cost $200 Million" The Dominion, 
Wellington, New Zealand, 4 October 1991, 1; R Laugesen "Super Fiasco Blamed on the Balancing 
Act" The Evening Post, Wellington, New Zealand, 21 October 1991, 7; Editorial "Searching for a 
Super Policy" The Evening Post, Wellington, New Zealand, 8 November 1991. 
128Munro, above n 127; see also R Long and S Kilroy "Shipley 'Loser' in Caucus Briefmg" The 
Dominion, Wellington, New Zealand, 5 June 1991, 1; J Clifton "Pension Meeting Futile - Muldoon" 
The Dominion, Wellington, New Zealand, 15 June 1991, 1; "Superannuitants' Hopes Rise", above n 
126. 
129 "U-Turn" , above n 127; J Clifton "Pension Surtax May Rise Only 10%" The Dominion, Wellington, 
New Zealand, 5 October 1991, 1. 
130See eg Joseph, above n 75, 4, 45l. 
13lMilner, above n 126; see also Submission, above n 126; "NZ Political System in Chaos" The 
Dominion, Wellington, New Zealand, 28 August 1991, 13 (a political advertisement sponsored by the 
NZSF, the NZCM, and Voters' Voice seeking signatures and contributions in support of a petition 
against the National Government's superannuation policy and a petition in favour of direct democracy). 
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campaign for the establishment of direct democracy in New Zealand. The political 
wing of the National Party reacted negatively to Rusk's proposal, despite the support 
he was able to generate for it among the non-parliamentarian members of the National 
Party. The conflict between the party and political wings of the National Party 
regarding direct democracy produced the National Party's 1990 election manifesto 
promise to introduce a non-binding system of direct democracy. 
1 Merv Rusk 
Merv Rusk led the campaign to secure support for direct democracy within the 
National Party. He was a farmer in Hikurangi who been an active member of the 
National Party for more than 31 years. 132 During the height of the campaign, he 
served as chainnan of both the National Party's Hobson electorate organisation and 
the organisation's policy committee. He was also a member of the National Party's 
Auckland Division Policy Committee.133 
Rusk became interested in direct democracy in 1988 when he heard someone refer to 
"citizens initiative and referendum." Intrigued by the reference, he consulted his 
home encyclopedia, which erroneously stated that New Zealand had adopted the 
initiative and referendum in 1901. 134 He sought conflrmation from a parliamentarian, 
who informed him that the House of Representatives had passed a Referendum Bill in 
1901 but that the Legislative Council had allowed it to lapse. 135 In June 1988, an 
acquaintance of Rusk's, who attended an address given by Professor Walker at the 
New Zealand Centre for Independent Studies (NZCIS) entitled "Constitutional and 
I 32Rusk, above n 79. 
133See Submission from the Hobson Electoral of the New Zealand National Party to the National Party 
Electoral Law Reform Caucus Committee (1 June 1990); Submission from Merv Rusk to the Electoral 
Law Select Committee (April 1992). The Hobson electorate was a National Party stronghold. From 
1946 to 1993, National has lost the electorate only once. When the electorate elected Vern Cracknell as 
its MP in 1966, it earned the distinction of being the fIrst electorate in the country to elect a Social 
Credit Party candidate to Parliament. Although Cracknell received a little more than 50 percent of the 
vote, he lost his seat to National in the next general election. C Norton New Zealand Parliamentary 
Election Results, 1946-1987 (Occasional Publication No. 1, Department of Political Science, Victoria 
University of Wellington, New Zealand, 1988); see also Justice, above n 36, 5. This incident led the 
political wing of the National Party to form the view that the Hobson electorate is unusual . Interview 
with Wayne Eagleson, Director of National's Parliamentary Research Unit, in Wellington (23 March 
1991). 
134Rusk, above n 79; see E Griswold "Initiative and Referendum" The World Book Encyclopedia (Field 
Enterprise Educational Corp, 1974) 209. 
I 35Rusk, above n 79; see also JHR (1901) 1901. For the legislative history of the Referendum Bill, see 
above note 19. 
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Democratic Limits on the Role of Government, ,,136 introduced Rusk to Walker's direct 
democracy work. 137 
Direct democracy appealed to Rusk because it presented itself as a solution to a 
political problem he had identified. Prior to learning about direct democracy, he 
came to the conclusion that "[New Zealand's] parliamentary system has been totally 
perverted," largely because the government of the day can and does ignore the wishes 
of the electors and the decisions taken by its caucus. On the strength of his 31 years 
of experience in the National Party, Rusk decided that direct democracy offered a 
feasible means of improving the responsiveness of the parliamentary system. 
Consequently, he resolved to campaign within the National Party for its adoption in 
New Zealand. 138 
2 The campaign 
Rusk began his campaign in February 1989. In his capacity as a member of the 
National Party's Auckland Division Policy Committee, he sent a discussion paper he 
had written on direct democracy, entitled A Positive Strategy for National to Preserve 
Democracy, to National Party Headquarters . 139 At the time the National Party was 
accepting discussion papers for the purpose of developing policies for the 1990 
general election. 140 The paper discussed both the legislative initiative and the 
legislative referendum. It also contained supporting material, including Walker's 
NZCIS address and a Logos Foundation's booklet, Voters' Veto: The Voice of the 
People. 141 During 1989, Rusk printed 350 additional sets of his discussion paper and 
distributed them to key officers in the National Party, along with copies of Walker's 3 
June 1987 inaugural lecture at the University of Queensland, entitled The People's 
Law: Initiative and Referendum, which replaced the Logos Foundation booklet. 142 
Rusk quickly realised that the fate of his proposal would ultimately be determined by 
parliamentarians. He also realised that progress would only be made if his proposal 
was realistic, that is, based on principles familiar and acceptable to the political wing 
of the National Party. Consequently, Rusk simplified his proposal. Convinced that 
136Walker covered many of the issues he discussed in his 3 June 1987 inaugural lecture at the University 
of Queensland, which was entitled "The People's Law: Initiative and Referendum." See Lecture, 
above n 78 . 
1 37Rusk, above n 79. Leo and Thea Gilich of FAIR attended Walker's address as well. Keane, above n 
82; Letter from Geoffrey Q de Walker, Dean of University of Queensland School of Law, to Mark 
Gobbi (22 May 1991). 
138Rusk, above n 79. 
139 Above; M Rusk A Positive Strategy for National to Preserve Democracy (7 February 1989). 
14ORusk, above n 79. 
141 Strategy , above n 139; see also generally Carter, above n 99. 
142Rusk, above n 79. 
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the electors would derive more benefit from a device that allowed them to veto 
legislation rather than enact it, he decided to concentrate on securing the adoption of a 
binding legislative referendum system. He reasoned that he could win support for the 
legislative initiative once the legislative referendum was in place and a proven 
success. 143 
In March 1989, the National Party's Auckland Division Policy Committee began 
debating Rusk's discussion paper. 144 As a member of the Committee and the author of 
the paper, Rusk was in a position to discuss the merits of his proposal and his 
strategy. Although his paper did not provide details of his proposal, he initially 
envisioned a binding legislative referendum system in which referendums triggered by 
300,000 signatures (later reduced to 100,000) would be held once a year or on 
election day in the year of a general election. 145 After full deliberation, the 
Committee gave its unanimous approval to Rusk's recommendations. 146 
By April 1989, National Party remits supporting direct democracy had emerged from 
three Auckland electorates: Hobson, Onehunga, and Mount Albert. 147 During the 
same period, the Deputy Prime Minister, Geoffrey Palmer, announced that the Fourth 
Labour Government would hold a government controlled referendum on a four-year 
parliamentary term, but not on proportional representation, as Prime Minister David 
Lange had mistakenly promised before the 1987 general election. 148 
Several parliamentarians within the National Party took notice of these developments. 
Graeme Lee, MP for Coromandel, raised the issue of direct democracy at a National 
Party Caucus meeting and expressed his intention to develop it further. 149 Shortly 
afterward, Winston Peters, MP for Tauranga, seized upon the issue. In an address to 
the Otumoetai Baptist Church Congregation in Tauranga on 16 April 1989, he 
143Above. 
144Above. 
145See eg A Stone "Support for Voters' Veto Grows Among Nationals" New Zealand Herald, 
Auckland, New Zealand, 25 May 1989, 9; see also Submission (April 1992), above n 133. Later Rusk 
began to advocate a trigger of 100,000. See Rusk, above n 79; Submission (June 1990), above n 133; 
Submission (April 1992), above n 133. 
146Rusk, above n 79. The New Zealand Herald gave Rusk's campaign a boost when it published an 
editorial in favour of direct democracy. FAIR credited the positive tenor of this editorial to its 
p,romotional efforts. See above text accompanying note 87. 
47Rusk, above n 79; see also "National to Debate Northland Proposal for 'Voter Veto'" The Northern 
Advocate, New Zealand, 24 May 1989,2. 
148See eg Editorial "Parliament's Answer" New Zealand Herald, Auckland, New Zealand, 13 March 
1992; "Don't Bet the Farm on Electoral Change Yet" The Press, Christchurch, New Zealand, 26 
September 1992; Editorial "Mistaken Messages" The Evening Post, Wellington, New Zealand, 18 July 
1992, 6; see also generally Dugdale "Book Review" (1992) NZU 364; P Downey "Constitutional 
Arrangements" (1990) NZU 341. 
149"Peters Runs Ahead on Moral Issue" New Zealand Herald, Auckland, New Zealand, 17 April 1989, 
2. 
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suggested that moral issues resolved in the House of Representatives with conscience 
votes be subject to referendums. He also suggested that referendums could be 
extended to cover issues of major political importance, such as the ANZUS question. 
Although he described his views as "embryonic," he suggested that referendums could 
be triggered by the signatures of five percent of registered electors and held in 
conjunction with the general election. 
Peters offered the following justifications for his proposal: 1) the electors no longer 
trust their representatives; 2) Cabinet controls the parliamentary process to the 
exclusion of nearly 80 percent of parliamentarians; 3) a government can flout the 
public's concern with impunity, as it did when it ignored the parliamentary petition 
against the Homosexual Law Reform Bill; 4) New Zealanders are fit to decide issues 
of public morality; 5) political power in New Zealand has come to favour entrenched 
groups within the political process ("the tyranny of the few"); and 6) as the New 
Zealand electorate becomes more educated, more politically aware, and more 
responsible for its actions, the structures of society must adapt to meet its 
expectations. 150 
In May 1989, the Remit Committee at the National Party's Annual Auckland Division 
Conference unanimously endorsed a joint Hobson-Onehunga-Mount Albert remit, 
which read: 151 
That the next National Government legislate to provide for a system of "Citizen's 
Initiative and Referendum" whereby voters who do not accept a piece of legislation as 
beneficial for the well-being of the people of New Zealand can take up a petition to veto 
the legislation. 
The Conference delegates approved this remit calling for the adoption of a binding 
legislative referendum system without dissent; they voted unanimously to have it 
debated on the main floor of the National Party's Annual National Conference in 
Dunedin!52 On 14 August 1989, a large majority of the delegates to National's 
Annual National Conference endorsed the remit, complete with a signature trigger of 
300,000. 153 
150 Above; Address by Winston Peters "Church and State: The Quest for Balance", Otumoetai Baptist 
Church Congregation, Tauranga (16 April 1989). 
151Remit 2, Background Notes for Delegates to Remit Committee 4 (1989). 
152Rusk, above n 79; Stone, above n 145. However, lack of time prevented the full conference 
discussing the issue; consequently, it was deferred until the National Party's Annual National 
Conference in Dunedin in August 1989. 
153"National Endorses Hobson Proposal" The Northern Advocate, New Zealand, 14 August 1989,1; J 
Clifton "Referendum Call Tests Nat MPs on Policy" The Dominion, Wellington, New Zealand, 19 
August 1989, 2; A Stone "Voters' Veto Plan on Path for National Policy" New Zealand Herald, 
Auckland, New Zealand, 28 August 1989, 6; FAIR Newsletter No.6 (September 1989). 
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By any measure, the speed of Rusk's success in winning party support for direct 
democracy was astonishing. Although some credit for his success is attributable to 
the educative work of FAIR, the ONZF, Voters' Voice, and the Democrats, Rusk 
conducted his campaign within the National Party without seeking their support. He 
intentionally distanced himself from extra-party direct democracy advocates for three 
reasons: 1) the attitudes and actions of some the advocates hampered sensible 
discussion with his party's parliamentarians by providing them with convenient, and 
sometimes sound, reasons for rejecting direct democracy; 2) the members of his 
party, like those of all other parties, were sensitive about being manipulated by 
outside interest groups; and 3) he wanted his proposal to stand or fall on its own 
merits . 154 
His proposal had won widespread support among the National Party's non-
parliamentarian members. However, a crucial step remained. To incorporate his 
proposal into the National Party's 1990 election manifesto, Rusk had to win the 
endorsement of the National Party's Policy Committee!55 This entailed securing the 
support of the National Party's parliamentarians, particularly Jim Bolger, who, as 
Leader of the National Party, chaired the Policy Committee. If a dispute arose 
between the Committee's party wing and political wing members, Bolger's position 
would give him an additional vote to decide the issue. 156 
3 Political wing reaction and counterproposal 
Despite the party wing's overwhelming approval of Rusk's proposal for a binding 
legislative referendum, the political wing baulked at it. Ultimately, this prevented his 
particular proposal from becoming part of the National Party's 1990 election 
manifesto. Opposition to Rusk's proposal came from a small number of the National 
Party's leading parliamentarians, particularly Jim Bolger. 
(a) Bolger's opposition 
On 17 April 1989, the day after Winston Peters' Otumoetai address, Bolger began to 
position himself as an opponent of Rusk's proposal. After citing Graeme Lee as the 
source of Peters' suggestion that conscience votes be subject to referendums, Bolger 
stated that referendums were problematic because of the difficulty in framing simple 
questions to complex issues. He refuted Peters' remark regarding ANZUS by 
arguing that defence questions were unsuitable issues for a referendum and had to 
remain the policy of the government of the day . After reaffirming his long standing 
154Rusk, above n 79. 
155Stone, above n 153; Clifton, above n 153. 
156Stone, above n 153. 
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support for a senate, he attempted to undermine the credibility of Peters' remarks by 
suggesting that they would fmd support among the Democrats and their supporters. 157 
In June 1989, Bolger toured Europe on the traditional three to four week European 
travel grant given annually to the Leader of the Opposition. He spent two days of his 
general tour in Switzerland, where he discussed a range of issues with various 
officials!58 In July 1989, Bolger began to draw on his brief one-day visits to Zurich 
and Berne to express his pre-tour opposition to direct democracy: 159 
I have recently visited Switzerland to look at their system of initiative referenda. I 
returned home reinforced in my view that this system is not suitable for introduction in 
New Zealand. 
He also renewed his half-hearted campaign for his preferred constitutional reform: the 
senate. 16O Arguing that "the Executive has too much power and legislation is rushed 
through Parliament without time for adequate scrutiny by either the Opposition or the 
public," Bolger attempted to recast his senate proposal as a better solution than direct 
democracy to the problems plaguing New Zealand's political system: 161 
The loss of confidence in the current political system is directly attributable to the 
present Government's misuse of its powers. It is therefore understandable that some 
New Zealanders see initiative referenda as an opportunity to regain some influence in 
the system. A Second Chamber would, however, remedy the problem more effectively 
and allow the public a continuous opportunity to contribute to the political system 
without the need for regular referenda. 
On 19 August 1989, a week after the Dunedin Conference, Bolger began to attack the 
legislative referendum remit in public. Citing his discussions with the Swiss, he 
suggested that direct democracy is not as democratic as it appears in Switzerland 
because of the combination of a low trigger level and a low voter turnout. 162 
I57·Peters", above n 149. 
158Interview with Wayne Eagleson, Director of National's Parliamentary Research Unit, in Wellington 
(16 November 1992). 
159Letter from Jim Bolger, Leader of the Opposition, to J Wright (19 July 1989); Letter from Jim 
Bolger, Leader of the Opposition, to Bill Daly, National Director, New Zealand League of Rights (11 
July 1989); see also Clifton, above n 153. 
160 As a reaction to the recommendations of the Royal Commission on Electoral Reform, the Fourth 
Labour Government's re-election, and Palmer's proposed Bill of Rights, Bolger declared his support 
for the creation of a senate to act "as a check on the actions of the Executive to prevent the Government 
from acting in a manner which might abrogate Democratic rights." J Bolger "Upper House" Otago 
Daily Times, Dunedin, New Zealand, 19 September 1988; see also T McGovern Parliamentary Reform 
in New Zealand (BA (Hons) thesis in political science held by Otago University, 1990). 
16lLetters, above n 159. 
162Clifton, above n 153. Peters may have influenced Bolger's position. The day before, Peters had 
stated that his colleagues would be unwise to ignore the demand for a referendum policy and that he 
intended to continue his advocacy of referendums. 
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On the same day, Lee announced that he had drawn up a private member's bill 
dealing with referendums. His proposal differed significantly from Rusk's. Lee's 
proposal had the following features: 1) a signature trigger of 15 percent of registered 
electors, which at the time amounted to approximately 317,000 people; 2) a 
parliamentary select committee would vet proposals to screen out frivolous issues, 
and would determine the phrasing of referendum questions; 3) petitions approved by 
the select committee would be subject to referendum at the next general election; and 
4) the Speaker of the House would report the result of the referendum, which would 
be non-binding, to the House of Representatives for consideration. Lee defended the 
non-binding nature of his proposal by arguing that a government would fmd a 
referendum's result difficult to ignore and that future Parliaments should not be 
bound. 163 This proposal eventually formed the basis of the CIR Act. 
On 11 September 1989, Bolger presented yet another proposal. In a speech before 
the University of Canterbury Politics Club entitled Politics, Parliament and the 
People: A Case for Reform, he called for the creation of a "citizens initiative" as an 
alternative to Rusk's proposal. Effectively, he abandoned his effort to supplant 
Rusk's proposal with his senate proposal. Bolger's alternative amounted to a small 
change to the parliamentary petition process, which he described as a impotent 
institution. Essentially, he proposed the creation of a new, more important class of 
petitions. Petitions collected within a specified time and signed by a large number of 
electors would automatically be the subject of a parliamentary debate upon 
presentation. After initial debate, the citizens initiative petition would be referred to 
an appropriate select committee for more detailed consideration, which would invite 
submissions from the public and the petition's proponents. The select committee 
would report the results of its deliberations to the House of Representatives with a 
detailed recommendation as to any further action, if required and justified, to meet the 
concerns of those who signed the petition. 164 
163 Above. 
164 Address by Jim Bolger, Leader of the Opposition, University of Canterbury Politics Club (11 
September 1989); see also "Bolger Backs Petition Over Referendums" New Zealand Herald, 
Auckland, New Zealand, 12 September 1989; "Bolger Proposes Petition System" The Northern 
Advocate, New Zealand, 12 September 1989. In his address, Bolger stated that during the 1980s most 
parliamentary petitions only received government lip service and were rarely debated in Parliament. 
Although he stated that the government is obliged to respond to petitions, its petition reports are 
generally published after events have overtaken the petitions. He also inferred that the abolition of the 
Petitions Committee in 1985, the same year that petitioners opposed the Homosexual Law Reform Bill, 
had weakened the petition system. Later in the year, Kerry Burke, the Speaker of the House, 
inadvertently underscored Bolger's criticisms of the petitioning system as an effective method by which 
any New Zealander could present his or her view to Parliament for consideration. Concerned that 
certain lobbyists were abusing the petition system with a large number of petitions signed by a small 
number of people, the Speaker ruled that "[n]o member is obliged to present a petition to the House." 
NZPD, vol 502, 13500 (14 November 1989); see also Chaffers v Goldsmid [1894] 1 QB 186 (cited as 
authority for the proposition that there is no constitutional requirement for a member to present a 
petition to the House). 
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Bolger also attacked the Dunedin Conference remit by using his speech to reiterate the 
standard arguments against direct democracy: 1)" 'referenda are blunt and crude 
devices' for decision-making"; 2) "while appropriate to resolve major constitutional 
issues, ... [referenda] are less suitable for resolving policy issues"; 3) "governments 
are accountable [and fully responsible for their policies] to the public every three 
years at the general election"; 4) a government's responsibility for its policies "would 
be lessened if individual elements of a policy package could be defeated individually 
by way of a binding referendum"; 5) "[a binding referendum] could even place at risk 
the coherence of the Government's entire program to advance the country's interest"; 
6) "the scope of using referenda against minority groups is also a cause for concern"; 
7) "referenda, through its inherent defect of polarising the community into adopting 
one or other of a yes/no answer, has [sic] the potential to increase the already 
worrying level of intolerance we have for each others' divergent cultures, aspirations 
and views"; and 8) "many of the issues confronting modem society are too complex 
to be capable of answer by a simple yes or no. ,,165 
(b) Rusk's response 
Rusk criticised Bolger's proposal. He characterised it as an attempt to divert and 
water down the National Party's remit calling for the establishment of a binding 
legislative referendum. He also accurately described it as "a slightly improved way 
of petitioning Parliament." 166 In addition, Rusk argued that an improved petitioning 
system, given its non-binding nature, would be ineffective to check executive power, 
which was the purpose of the remit. 167 The New Zealand Herald accused Bolger of 
offering nothing but "muddled compromise in response to his party's support for 
binding referendums as a check on the powers of governments. ,,168 
Rusk also countered Bolger's attack on the party's remit. First, he reminded Bolger 
that the National Party had published its belief that "[the people] are better qualified 
to make the decisions concerning [their] future than any Government." Second, he 
argued that Bolger, by confusing the terms "initiative" and "referendum", had 
165 Address, above n 164. 
166Letter from Merv Rusk to Jim Bolger, Leader of the Opposition (undated). 
167 Above. The creation of a new and comparatively more important class of parliamentary petitions 
would also have reduced further the effectiveness of ordinary parliamentary petitions; parliamentarians 
would inevitably use the distinction to justify inaction with respect to ordinary petitions . 
168Editorial "Dithering on Referendums" New Zealand Herald, Auckland, New Zealand, 13 September 
1989, 8. The New Zealand Herald also asserted that "Bolger is no more inclined than most of the 
present Government to defer to the electorate on contentious decisions," which led it to question his 
endorsement for a "citizens' initiative." Above. For Bolger's response, see J Bolger "Case for 
Citizen's Initiative" New Zealand Herald, Auckland, New Zealand, 26 September 1989. In addition, 
the Democrats criticised Bolger's proposal as superficial. N McMillan "Bolger Wants Change" 
Northern Advocate, New Zealand, 4 October 1989, 13. 
228 
directed many of the standard criticisms of the initiative against the legislative 
referendum. Third, since the remit called for the legislative referendum, not the 
initiative, most of Bolger's arguments were irrelevant. Fourth, he argued that the 
possible disruption of a government's legislative program was not a criticism as the 
purpose of the legislative referendum was to provide a check on executive power. 
Fifth, regarding the difficulty of reducing complex issues to yes/no questions, Rusk 
argued that this criticism meant that either parliamentarians could not express 
themselves intelligently in their legislation or they believe that the electors are too 
dumb to understand their legislation. He also underscored the irony inherent in this 
criticism with an implicit reference to New Zealand's frequent use of government 
controlled referendums: "politicians are prepared to use referenda when it suits them 
but not when it suits the people. ,,169 
On 26 September 1989, Bolger softened his position. In response to the New Zealand 
Herald's criticism, he stated that his "citizen's initiative [was] not proposed as a 
replacement for the proposal for binding referendums," but as "another option 
available to the people." Bolger also stated that he "[did] not believe the concept of 
binding referendums should be rejected altogether." However, after reiterating the 
principle arguments against direct democracy, he concluded that "the resort to binding 
referendums should be rare." He also implied that binding referendums should have 
subject matter limitations. 170 
(c) Peters' counter-attack 
On 8 February 1990, Peters countered Bolger's campaign against direct democracy 
with the delivery of his widely quoted Taradale speech. In his speech, Peters 
articulated the reasons for the "crisis in confidence in New Zealand politics and its 
politicians." He concluded that the crisis could be solved if politicians "divest[ed] 
themselves of their obsessive belief that only politicians possess the combination of 
intellectual will, moral fibre and factual background to make the nation's key 
decisions." He then presented a combination of means by which "politicians [could 
share] their power with the people:" 1) a bill of rights; 2) an Australian-style senate; 
3) some form of proportional representation, either for the House of Representatives 
or a senate; and 4) direct democracy. 171 
Peters' direct democracy proposal took two forms. First, he called for "the 
immediate suspension of the 'conscience vote' ." As in his Otumoetai address, Peters 
argued that the electorate "must decide - again, by referenda, the nature of public 
169Rusk, above n 166. 
170Bolger, above n 168. 
171Address by Winston Peters, Member of Parliament, Taradale Rotary Club Dinner, Taradale Town 
Hall (8 February 1990). 
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morality." Second, he called for the introduction of referendums "to be activated by 
petition to Parliament with a base level of 100,000 electoral voters required to sign 
that petition - roughly five percent of New Zealand's electors." Peters stated that 
Parliament would be responsible for framing the format of the referendum and for 
providing background information to the electorate. He also stated that party whips 
should be removed to allow parliamentarians "to exercise their freedom of 
conscience. " 172 
Although Peters' speech attracted heavy criticism from his National Party Caucus 
colleagues,173 it had several important effects. It undermined Bolger's proposed 
alternatives by distinguishing direct democracy as a unique and discrete reform 
essential to the resolution of the crisis of confidence in the country's elected 
representatives, which re-animated New Zealand's direct democracy advocates. 174 
Their renewed pressure contributed to the reversal of a decision taken by the National 
Party Caucus not to support direct democracy in any shape or form. 175 
(d) Decisions of National's Caucus Committee 
In April 1990, the National Party Caucus appointed a special committee called the 
Electoral Law Reform Caucus Committee to launch "an inquiry into the need for 
reform of the New Zealand electoral and parliamentary systems." The Committee 
consisted of Bolger, Murray McCully (Chairperson), Bill Birch, Peters, Douglas 
Graham, Robin Gray, Robert Muldoon, and Robert Anderson. 176 Its primary purpose 
172Above. 
173Rusk, above n 79. 
174See eg Submission from Jim Tatham, National Party Delegate from the Bay of Islands, to the 
Electoral Law Reform Caucus Committee (25 May 1990) (expressing support for the policies advocated 
by Peters). The Auckland Policy Committee "fully supported [direct democracy] in preference to all 
other reform options" and "agreed unanimously to convey its clear preference for [direct democracy] to 
the [Electoral Law Reform Caucus Committee]." Rusk, above n 79. The 1990 Auckland Conference 
approved 112-72 a new remit calling for the adoption of direct democracy. Above. Tatham moved the 
remit. Submission, above . See also "Resolutions" Seminar on Parliament and Electoral Reform held 
for the Wellington Divisional Policy Committee at Wellington (13-14 April 1991) (resolving 11-8 to ask 
the Electoral Law Reform Caucus Committee to prepare legislation providing for direct democracy in 
the binding form as approved by the 1989 Party conference, along with the subject matter restrictions 
listed in the Hobson submission and a signature trigger of 100,(00). 
175See Letter from Murray McCully, MP for East Coast Bays, to Merv Rusk, Chairman Hobson 
Electorate Policy Committee (3 May 1990) (stating that Caucus had decided to revisit the issue of direct 
democracy); Letter from Wayne Eagleson, Private Secretary to Jim Bolger, Leader of the Opposition, 
to Merv Rusk, Chairman Hobson Electorate Policy Committee (30 April 1990) (advising that the 
Electoral Law Reform Caucus Committee would be considering the issue of direct democracy); Letter 
from Merv Rusk to Murray McCully (26 April 1990) (advising McCully that Rusk would inform the 
media if it were true that Bolger had decided to exclude direct democracy from the election manifesto 
prior to the deliberations of the Electoral Law Reform Caucus Committee); Letter from Merv Rusk to 
Jim Bolger, Leader of the Opposition (23 April 1990) (asking Bolger to confirm whether he had 
decided to exclude direct democracy from the election manifesto); Letter from Wayne Eagleson, 
Private Secretary to Jim Bolger, Leader of the Opposition, to D McKenna (23 January 1990) (advising 
that direct democracy would not be included the election manifesto). 
176Minutes of the Electoral Law Reform Caucus Committee (19 April 1990) [Bolger absent]. 
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was to determine which reforms, if any, should be included in the National Party's 
1990 election manifesto. 177 Ironically, this purpose required the Committee to 
examine all of the reforms outlined in Peters' Taradale speech. 178 Despite his 
opposition to direct democracy, "Bolger agreed that the use of referenda should be 
included in the terms of reference. ,,179 
The Committee's term of reference regarding direct democracy was slightly more 
specific than the Royal Commission's. It required the Committee to examine the 
extent to which issues determined by Parliament should be subject to referendums. It 
also required the Committee to decide whether referendums should be binding or non-
binding, and to determine the appropriate signature trigger for initiating 
referendums. ISO 
However, the Committee chose to use the Royal Commission's imprecise "use of 
referenda" phrasing in its extremely limited advertising for public submissions. 181 
The Committee had roughly $200 to fund public notices in the major metropolitan 
newspapers. 182 Accordingly, it decided to rely primarily on newspaper reports of its 
work to extend its advertising reach outside of the National Party. Within the Party, 
the Committee solicited submissions from all divisional policy chairpersons, including 
Rusk. It also brought its work to the attention of the National Party's National 
Executive. 183 
This selective advertising campaign had two effects. First, in comparison to the 
Royal Commission's work, it generated a disproportionate response from prominent 
members of the National Party. The Royal Commission received 805 submissions, of 
which only four that dealt with referendums came from officials in the National 
Party.l84 The Committee received approximately 350 submissions, of which 13 that 
177Report of the Electoral Law Reform Committee to Caucus (September 1990) I. 
I 78Minutes , above n 176. The terms of reference required the Committee to investigate the following 
reform options: 1) a senate; 2) reform of the House of Representatives; 3) proportional representation; 
4) referenda; 5) a bill of rights; and 6) a written constitution. Above. 
I 79McCully, above n 175. 
lSOMinutes, above n 176. For the Royal Commission's term of reference on the "use of referenda", see 
above text accompanying note 56. 
181 See Submissions to the Electoral Law Reform Caucus Committee (1990) (containing copy of undated 
newspaper notice calling for submissions on "the use of referenda" before 1 June 1990). 
I 82Minutes, above n 176. In contrast, the Royal Commission advertised far more extensively in the 
press. It also had the means to advertise on television and to travel around the country to collect oral 
submissions. See generally Submissions, above n 57. The Committee neither invited nor considered 
oral submissions. See generally Submissions, above n 18I. 
183Minutes, above n 176. 
184See Submissions, above n 57. The relevant submissions were: Submission 589 (the National Party's 
Gibome electorate stating that referendums should continued to be used sparingly in their current 
government controlled form); Submission 626 (the National Party's Waikaremoana electorate taking the 
same position); Submission 654 (the National Party's Clutha electorate stating that government 
controlled referendums should be held on a national basis only); and Submission 736 (the National 
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dealt with referendums came from officials in the National Party,,85 Second, it failed 
to attract submissions from any of the main direct democracy groups, which 
effectively excluded their direct input. 186 
Nevertheless, the submissions to the Committee would have disappointed opponents 
of direct democracy within the National Party's Caucus. First, the submissions 
revealed that support for direct democracy devices had grown substantially in the 
National Party since 1985. The four National Party submissions to the Royal 
Commission only supported the rare use of government controlled referendums for 
constitutional issues like the bill of rights or the term of Parliament. In comparison, 
11 of the 13 National Party submissions to the Committee specifically requested 
adoption of the legislative initiative or the legislative referendum. 187 
Party stating that government controlled referendums should be used rarely and only for constitutional 
issues like the term of Parliament or the Bill of Rights). 
I85See Submissions, above n 181. The relevant submissions were: Submission from Allan Anderson, 
Policy Chairman of National's Waitotara electorate (28 June 1990) (calling for the adoption of binding 
"citizens-initiated referendums" with a signature trigger of 100,000 electors); Submission from A 
Murphy, Policy Chairperson for National's Wairarapa electorate (15 June 1990) (discussing perceived 
difficulties with Swiss and Californian direct democracy and suggesting that legislation introducing 
direct democracy should account for these difficulties); Submission from the Hobson electorate of the 
New Zealand National Party, above n 133 (calling for the adoption of a binding legislative referendum 
with subject matter limitations and a signature trigger of 100,000 electors); Submission from Nick 
Smith, National Candidate for Tasman (25 May 1990) (calling for the legislative referendum with a 
signature trigger of 10 percent of the electorate to be collected in six months); Submission from Jim 
Tatham, above 174 (calling for the adoption of a binding legislative referendum system); Submission 
from Bruce Knowles, Chairman of National's Taranaki electorate (23 May 1990) (calling for the 
adoption of a constitutional initiative with a signature trigger of 300,000 electors and a legislative 
initiative with a signature trigger of 100,000 to 200,000 electors based on the Swiss and Californian 
direct democracy systems and expressing support for the 1989 National Party remit calling for a 
binding legislative referendum system); Submission from Carl Pfeifer, Publicity Officer and Campaign 
Chairman of National's Tauranga electorate (17 May 1990) (calling for referendums triggered by one 
percent of the electorate); Submission from Dr Bruce Alexander, Member of National Reform (15 May 
1990) (calling for the adoption of Swiss or Californian direct democracy); Submission from Barry 
Gustafson, Chairman of National's Auckland Divisional Policy Committee (26 April 1990) (stating that 
the Auckland Divisional Policy Committee voted 18 to 0 in favour of Rusk's motion that the Policy 
Committee convey its express support for direct democracy to the Caucus Committee and that it request 
the inclusion of the National Party's 1989 Annual Conference remit on direct democracy in National's 
1990 election Manifesto); Submission from Marlene Lamb, Policy Chairman for National's Waikato 
Division (undated) (discussing perceived difficulties with Californian direct democracy and 
recommending that petitions signed by 100,000 electors or more requesting that a referendum be held at 
the next general election be accompanied by the proposed law and that the proposed law and the 
arguments be sent to all electors before election day); Submission from the Waitotara electorate 
(undated) (calling for the adoption of a legislative referendum system triggered by the signatures of five 
percent of the electors that would be binding if the majority constitutes at least 40 percent of the 
electors); Submission from Ross Ireland, Chairman of the Tauraroa Branch of the National Party 
(undated) (calling for the adoption of a direct democracy system based on the Swiss model); Submission 
from A Quintus, President Pihama Branch of the National Party and Vice President of National's 
Taranaki Electorate (undated) (calling for the adoption of Swiss or Californian direct democracy). 
186See Submissions, above n 181. 
I87See above note 185. 
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Second, the submissions also revealed that support for direct democracy had increased 
substantially since 1985 among New Zealanders interested in constitutional reform. 
The Royal Commission received only 48 submissions that dealt specifically with the 
topic of direct democracy, of which 46 called for the adoption of the legislative 
initiative or the legislative referendum. 188 In comparison, the Committee received 283 
submissions that dealt with direct democracy, of which 273 called for the adoption of 
the legislative initiative or legislative referendum. 189 
Third, the submissions also revealed some organised support for the adoption of 
direct democracy in New Zealand. Several dozen of the submissions took the form of 
petitions, that is, standardised form letters signed by two or more people. l90 In all 
likelihood, these developments were the result of the nationwide educational efforts of 
the main direct democracy groups and Rusk's focused campaign. Although none of 
the groups made a submission to the Committee, they had helped to generate enough 
support for direct democracy to make its outright dismissal by the Committee 
politically unviable. 
This support for direct democracy emboldened several of the National Party's 
parliamentarians, particularly Hobson MP Ross Meurant and Tauranga MP Winston 
Peters. During a debate in Parliament, Meurant declared his support for direct 
democracy as a means to curb executive arrogance, primarily because some National 
Party MPs showed a penchant for continuing the Fourth Labour Government's 
executive arrogance. 191 Peters began to use his position on the Committee to advocate 
adoption of a binding "initiated referenda" system as a means "to truly deliver a 
public check upon the executive and legislative process of government. ,,192 
Consequently, the Committee shifted its attention from the issue of whether direct 
democracy should be included in the National Party's 1990 election manifesto to the 
issue of what form a pre-election promise for direct democracy should take. On 30 
May 1990, moments before Peters' tardy arrival, the Committee unanimously agreed 
to recommend a non-binding referendum system that would have a signature trigger 
188See above text accompanying notes 68-69. 
189See Submissions, above n 18l. 
190Above. 
191 NZPD, vol 507, 1873-1874 (30 May 1990); see also J Clifton "MP Sticks to Promise on Power 
Abuse" The Dominion, Wellington, New Zealand, 1 June 1990; "Meurant Appeals to MPs" Northern 
Advocate, New Zealand, 25 May 1990. 
192W Peters Paper on Initiative Referenda for the Electoral Law Caucus Committee (undated); see also 
Minutes of the Electoral Law Reform Caucus Committee (30 May 1990); Minutes of the Electoral Law 
Reform Caucus Committee (7 June 1990). At the same time, several of the main direct democracy 
advocates renewed their campaign for the adoption of direct democracy. See "Groups Supports Paper 
for Citizens' Referenda" Daily News , New Zealand, 2 June 1990; "Parliamentary Reform" Stratford 
Press, New Zealand, 6 June 1990. 
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of 15 percent of registered electors (ie, approximately 300,000 electors). The 
Committee reopened its direct democracy discussion when Peters arrived. Peters 
disagreed with the Committee's decision. He argued that the use of referendums 
should be increased and that their results should be binding. However, his support 
was qualified. Peters advocated a mechanism in which the government of the day 
would only be bound if a proposal was approved by 70 percent of those voting. In 
addition, he argued that the government should not be bound with respect to revenue 
and fiscal policy questions. 193 
Peters' objection served to delay the Committee's fmal decision on direct democracy, 
which had two important consequences. First, it gave him an opportunity to present a 
paper at the Committee's next meeting for use in its "final discussion and decision 
regarding the use of referenda. ,,194 Second, and more importantly, it allowed Rusk to 
present the influential Hobson electorate submission, which he had written, to the 
Committee before it reached its fmal decision. 195 
In his paper, Peters argued "the public have [sic] an incontestable right to oversee the 
activities of their elected representatives." 196 He also argued that a signature 
requirement should not be prohibitive in terms of nationwide organisation and 
economic outlay. 197 Accordingly, he called for a binding referendum system that 
could be triggered by the signatures of five percent of registered electors 
(approximately 100,000 electors).198 Peters argued that a non-binding system would 
be pointless as the recent history of New Zealand politics indicated that MPs would 
not necessarily feel morally bound to adhere to a decision of the electorate. He 
suggested that the signatures be collected within three months to prevent the process 
from dragging on too 10ng. l99 He also suggested that fmancial matters might be 
193Minutes of the Electoral Law Reform Caucus Committee (30 May 1990) [Bolger, Birch, and 
Anderson absent]. 
194Above; see also Peters, above n 192. 
1955ubmission from the Hobson electorate of the New Zealand National Party, above n 133 (Rusk wrote 
this submission in his capacity as Policy Committee Chairman of the Hobson Electorate; it became 
widely cited in the course of National's direct democracy debate because it dealt with the central issues 
succinctly and was one of the few documents available to policy-makers in the National Party that 
contained any empirical data regarding the use of direct democracy). 
196Peters, above n 192, 1. 
197Peters, above n 192, 3. 
198Peters, above n 192, 2. In addition, Peters argued that the electorate was becoming increasingly 
educated and was able to decide issues on a more complex formula than the Yes/No equation. In 
keeping with his earlier argument that conscience votes on moral issues should be referred to the 
electorate, Peters used the issue of homosexual law reform as an example: "For example, homosexual 
law reform could have been decided on the basis that the public decided on whether or not homosexual 
acts between consenting adults should be decriminalised. For those who answered affrrmatively, the 
next list of questions would have read - 'what age should be the age of consent? - 16, 18 or 20 years of 
a§e?'" Peters, above n 192, 1-2. 
19 Peters, above n 192, 2. 
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excluded as a referendum subject for the time being to allow the public to become 
sufficiently sophisticated to decide appropriation issues. 200 
In the Hobson submission, Rusk regaled the Committee with accessible and useful 
information pertaining to the Committee's direct democracy deliberations. He began 
by reminding the Committee that the party wing had only endorsed the adoption of 
the legislative referendum, which immediately invalidated any arguments against 
direct democracy that stemmed from the legislative initiative. With respect to the 
signature trigger, Rusk provided the Committee with a survey of parliamentary 
petitions from 1968 to 1987, which showed that only seven petitions out of 1,369 
managed to attract more than 100,000 signatures and that only 25 petitions had 
attracted more than 30,000 signatures.201 He suggested that the signature trigger 
should be 100,000 rather than the 300,000 he had recommended earlier as his survey 
indicated that 300,000 signatures would be too high.202 
In addition, Rusk argued that "referendums must be binding." He provided three 
reasons: 1) a non-binding system would not provide the electors with an effective 
means to check parliamentary excess because the result could be ignored; 2) the value 
of non-binding referendums would be very low, particularly because they would be 
less important to people than binding ones; and 3) all overseas legislative referendum 
systems are binding. 203 
However, Rusk indicated that eXlstmg direct democracy systems are subject to 
limitations. Accordingly, he suggested the exemption of the following subjects: 1) 
enactments passed during a declared national emergency, or regarding natural 
disaster, epidemic, war, terrorism, or aggression; 2) enactments regarding defence 
and military intelligence; 3) enactments regarding the status of Parliament, its internal 
procedures, or its Standing Orders; 4) enactments whose rejection would result in 
discrimination on the basis of race, sex, ' or religion, or would infringe any human 
rights legislation or any bill of rights; 5) enactments regarding the function and 
existence of the courts; and 6) enactments regarding trade or diplomatic relations, 
unless they involved joining an economic or political union. 204 
In light of these developments, the Committee re-opened its discussion of direct 
democracy on 7 June 1990. It came to the conclusion that "there should be more 
200Peters, above n 192, 3-4. 
201Submission from the Hobson Electorate of the New Zealand National Party, above n 133, 4-8. 
202Submission from the Hobson Electorate of the New Zealand National Party, above n 133, 4, 21. 
203Submission from the Hobson Electorate of the New Zealand National Party, above n 133, 14. 
204Submission from the Hobson Electorate of the New Zealand National Party, above n 133, 11. 
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scope for the use of initiative referenda. ,,205 It also agreed that the signature trigger 
should be 10 percent of registered electors (approximately 232,000 electors). In 
addition, the Committee voted five to two in favour of a non-binding system.206 
However, the Committee did not resolve the question of exemptions, even though it 
reached the "general view" that exemptions would be unnecessary in a non-binding 
system.207 
The Committee resumed its consideration of drrect democracy on 6 July 1990,2°8 soon 
after its Chairperson, McCully, had returned from a three week coast -to-coast tour of 
the United States where he had "undertaken some study on electoral reform issues," 
particularly "citizens initiative referenda. ,,209 During his tour, McCully visited 
Washington, DC; New York, New York; Boston, Massachusetts; Jackson, 
Mississippi; Miami, Florida; Denver, Colorado; and Sacramento, California. 
McCully stated that "Massachusetts and California provided the most compelling 
insights into the [citizens initiative referenda] process. ,,210 This was not surprising as 
New York and Mississippi do not have direct democracy systems; Florida's system, 
which was adopted in 1978, only has the constitutional initiative and is rarely used; 
and Washington's system is not well-documented.2lI However, the choice of 
Massachusetts over Colorado was surprising for two reasons: 1) Massachusetts' 
system is indirect; and 2) Colorado's system is used more than four times as 
frequently than Massachusetts' .212 
In addition, McCully, despite his effort, only supplied the Committee with the 
following documents: 1) the part of the Massachusetts Constitution dealing with its 
direct democracy system; 2) a summary of voting results in Massachusetts broken 
down by county on four propositions; and 3) a two page excerpt from a chapter on 
205Minutes of the Electoral Law Reform Caucus Committee (7 June 1990) [Bolger (afternoon) and 
Muldoon (morning) absent]. 
206Above [McCully, Birch, Graham, Gray, and Muldoon voted for a non-binding system; Peters and 
Anderson voted for a binding system; Bolger was absent]. 
207 Above; see also W Eagleson Exemptions to Initiative Referenda (5 June 1990). The Committee had 
instructed Eagleson, who was serving as its Secretary, to prepare this brief discussion paper for its 5 
June meeting. Minutes, above n 193. 
208Minutes of the Electoral Law Reform Caucus Committee (6 July 1990). 
209Memorandum from Murray McCully to the Electoral Law Reform Caucus Committee re US Trip (5 
July 1990); see also R Ninnes "Disappointment Quite Likely" Daily News, New Zealand, 16 July 1990 
(quoting McCully: "The fact that I've spent three weeks in the States looking probably more than 
anything else at the referendum process suggests to me that I've wasted a good deal of time if we're not 
~iving it serious study") . . 
IOMemorandum, above n 209. 
211See D Magleby Direct Legislation: Voting on Ballot Propositions in the United States (John Hopkins 
University Press, Baltimore, 1984) 38-39; T Cronin Direct Democracy: The Politics of Initiative, 
Referendum, and Recall (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1989) 51; A Ranney ."The United 
States of America" in D Butler and A Ranney (eds) Referendums: A Comparative Study of Theory and 
Practice (American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington, DC, 1978) 70-72. 
212See Magleby, above n 211, 38-39, 71. 
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California's legislature which summarised the mechanics of the initiative and 
referendum in California.213 Relying on this information and his brief experiences in 
Boston and Sacramento, McCully informed the Committee that the course it had 
chosen would eliminate the risk that direct democracy would "become the tool of 
major vested interests to the exclusion of the ordinary citizen. ,,214 With the approval 
of the Committee/IS he also began to use his "fmdings" in press releases and 
interviews to justify opposition to "binding public referenda, ,,216 which prompted 
several National Party stalwarts, including Rusk, Knowles, and Jim Tatham, to 
question the Committee's impartiality. 217 
After considering McCully's report, the Committee nearly concluded its deliberations 
regarding direct democracy. Although it was still unable to resolve the issue of 
exemptions, it fmalised the following "procedure for the holding of referenda: ,,218 
1 A Commission consisting of a High Court Judge and the Clerk of the House 
would be established; 
2 Any person intending to seek signatures to a petition calling for a referendum 
would file a notice of intention with the Commission which would then give 
the applicant advice and assistance in the wording of the question to be put in 
the referendum; 
3 Signatures to the petition would be identified by name, address, and page and 
line number on electoral rolls for verification purposes; 
4 The threshold for holding a referendum would be 10 percent of eligible 
electors; 
213See Memorandum from Wayne Eagleson, Secretary, to Members of the Electoral Law Reform 
Caucus Committee (11 Ju1y 1990). 
21~emorandum, above n 209. 
21SSee Summary of the Electoral Reform Forum held at the New Zealand National Party Conference, 
22 July 1990 (25 July 1990) 3 (McCully answered criticism for speaking publicly about the defects of 
America's direct democracy systems by stating that he had raised the issue with the Committee prior to 
making his statements). Wayne Eagleson, the Committee's Secretary, prepared the Summary. Minutes 
of the Electoral Law Reform Caucus Committee (25 July 1990). 
216See eg M Daly "Scepticism Rife in National, Claims Hobson" Northern Advocate, New Zealand, 19 
July 1990; Ninnes, above n 209. 
217Forum, above n 215,3 (Tatham); Daly, above n 216 (Rusk); "Electoral Reform Debate Push" Daily 
News , New Zealand, 16 July 1990 (Knowles). 
21 8Minutes, above n 208. Minutes, above n 208 . The Committee actually decided to change the '25 
percent of those present in the House' veto to a '75 percent of all members of the House' veto. Above. 
However, the Committee's fmal report inadvertantly recommended the 25 percent veto. Report of the 
Committee, above n 177. 
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5 The petition, having achieved the requisite number of signatures, would be 
presented to the House by a member and referred to the Commission for 
verification; 
6 The Commission would advise the Speaker of the House whether or not the 
procedural requirements to hold a referendum had been met, with the Speaker 
to advise the House accordingly; 
7 The Government would be required to hold a referendum within 12 months of 
the House being advised that the requirements had been met, unless 25 percent 
or more of those members present in the House oppose such a proposal; and 
8 The result of the referendum would be non-binding. 
(e) National Party's Annual National Conference 
The Committee reached these decisions shortly after Bolger, National Party President 
John Collinge, and National's five divisional chiefs had decided against permitting 
debate on any remits regarding electoral reform at the National Party's Annual 
National Conference in Wellington, which was held on 20-22 July 1990.219 This, in 
effect, ruled out the possibility of discussing direct democracy, or any decisions that 
the Committee may have reached on the subject, at the Conference. 
In defence of the decision, Collinge stated that it was a "collective decision" made in 
recognition of the Committee's status as the appropriate forum and in deference to its 
impending recommendations, which were expected to be published soon after the 
Conference at the end of July. 220 Bolger stated that the issues had already been 
debated at party conferences; accordingly, the time had come "to make sure that there 
was mature reflection on the options , not some gut reaction . . . that mayor may not 
be engendered at a party conference. ,, 221 Bolger also used the decision to foreshadow 
the Committee's recommendations. Aware that the Committee's fmal 
recommendations would diverge considerably from Rusk's proposal, he pointed out 
that national conference remits have never been binding.222 
219See J Clifton "Bolger Faces Revolt over Electoral Reform" The Dominion, Wellington, New 
Zealand, 5 July 1990; J Clifton "Electoral Reform Policy Best Left to MPs, Says Bolger" The 
Dominion, Wellington, New Zealand, 6 July 1990; J Clifton "Coalition Dismayed at Bolger's 'Lack of 
Faith'" The Dominion, Wellington, New Zealand, 7 July 1990; Editorial "Bolger Seen in New Light" 
The Dominion, Wellington, New Zealand, 9 July 1990. 
220 "Revolt" , above n 219. 
221 "Best Left" , above n 219; Editorial , above n 219. 
222"Best Left", above n 219. 
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In response, Rusk and his supporters went to the media in an effort to counteract the 
decision. Jim Tatham, a delegate from the Bay of Islands and a leading member of 
Voters' Voice, attributed the decision to Bolger's public disapproval of citizens 
initiated referendums. 223 Bruce Knowles, Chairman of the National Party's Taranaki 
electorate organisation, stated that he would push to ensure that electoral reform 
would be debated at the Conference. He also took umbrage at McCully's action of 
using his trip to the United States as a means of opposing the 1989 remit calling for a 
binding legislative referendum system, and criticised McCully for falling into line 
with Bolger. 224 
Rusk, with approval of the Executive Committee of the National Party's Hobson 
electorate organisation, took the unusual step of releasing copies of his Hobson 
submission to promote a fair and informative debate on the issue of direct democracy. 
He argued that the issue could be debated at the Conference despite the decision to 
remove a remit on the issue from the Conference's agenda. He also criticised 
McCully's public opposition as being "quite out of order" for a supposedly 
independent chairperson. Rusk also implied that McCully's opposition was misplaced 
by pointing out that the arguments he had raised against direct democracy upon his 
return from the United States applied to the legislative initiative, but not to the 
legislative referendum. 225 
The National Party's direct democracy advocates were not alone in their criticism. 
The Dominion characterised the decision as illogical, hypocritical, and arrogant. 226 
The Electoral Reform Coalition stated that Bolger had shown "a complete lack of faith 
in his own party to debate [electoral reform] properly." It also stated that MPs 
worried that the vigorous citizens initiated referendum lobby would dominate the 
debate should organise to counter the lobby rather than to suppress it. John Alan, 
Christian Heritage Party spokesman and a former National Party candidate, stated that 
the decision was typical of the attitude that led to his leaving the party. He also stated 
that it made the Committee's work look like window dressing, as the National Party 
could not expect people to believe it was sincere about electoral reform if it was not 
prepared to have it debated openly. 227 
Michael Laws, the National Party's candidate for Hawke's Bay, stated that the 
decision was not wise for two reasons: 1) delegates were looking forward to debating 
electoral reform and sending a clear message to the party's parliamentary wing, which 
223 "Revolt" , above n 219. 
224 " Reform Debate", above n 217. 
225Daly, above n 216. 
226Editorial, above n 219. 
227"Coalition Dismayed", above n 219. 
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is the prime purpose of party conferences; and 2) "the public likes to see good, 
healthy debates in parties , not stage-managed conferences. ,,228 Peters predicted that 
the issues before the Committee would be debated at the Conference.229 He was half-
right. 
Rusk was able to use this negative reaction to reach a compromise. With the help of 
Collinge, Bolger, and McCully, he arranged a forum on electoral reform to be held 
across the street from the Conference venue during the last day of the Conference. 230 
This gave Rusk and his supporters the opportunity to debate direct democracy; at the 
same time, it provided justification for keeping electoral reform off the Conference's 
agenda. 
if) Forum 
The Electoral Reform Forum took place on 22 July 1990. McCully chaired the two 
hour meeting, which drew more than 120 delegates and close to 30 observers .23 1 The 
other Committee members in attendance were Birch, Douglas Graham, Gray, and 
Bolger. McCully tried to broaden the debate through speeches given by Birch on 
parliamentary reform, Graham on proportional representation, Gray on the senate, 
and Bolger on the need for electoral reform. However, between each speech, the 
delegates steadfastly returned to the subject of direct democracy. Nineteen delegates 
had the opportunity to speak. Sixteen focused on the subject of direct democracy: 
eight were in favour, five were opposed, and three were ambivalent. 232 
The debate was spirited and, at times, tense, but it was also inconclusive.233 Although 
Rusk and his supporters had the opportunity to present a well-organised, reasoned, 
and authoritative case in favour of a binding legislative referendum, they failed to do 
so . Their approach was uncoordinated and unfocussed. Rather than emphasise the 
merits of a particular proposal, they expressed their support in general terms and 
spent valuable time criticising the status quo and the decision to forbid discussion of 
direct democracy on the main floor of the Conference. Even Rusk dwelt on his 
disappointment, discussing the limits of his loyalty to a party that at times resembled a 
"recycled dictatorship. ,, 234 
228Above. 
229 "Best Left" , above n 219. 
230Rusk, above n 79; see also M Daly "Electoral Reform Debate Gets Nod" Northern Advocate, New 
Zealand, 21 July 1990. 
23 1 Forum, above n 215; M Munro "Spirited Debate in a Back Room" Waikato Times , New Zealand, 23 
July 1990; J Armstrong "McCully Catches Verbal Lashing" New Zealand Herald, Auckland, New 
Zealand, 23 July 1990. 
232Forum, above n 215 (Rusk and Tatham were among those who spoke in favour) . 
233See generally n 231. 
234Forum, above n 215; "Nats Move of Vote Reform" Northern Advocate, New Zealand, 23 July 1990; 
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In addition, McCully managed to avoid any discussion of the Committee I s 6 July 
1990 decisions regarding direct democracy. 235 This obviated the necessity of 
defending those decisions at the Forum or having to change them in the light of their 
reception at the Forum. It also gave the Committee the opportunity to present its pre-
Forum decisions at a later date as if they were made as a result of the Forum. 
The Forum also assuaged Rusk. Despite expressing his disillusionment with the 
debate early in the Forum,236 Rusk hailed it in the press as a "new beginning" for 
electoral reform in New Zealand. Before the Forum, he was worried that the 
Committee was orchestrating a "snow job." After it, he was convinced that the 
Committee was no longer just "going through the motions" in its investigation of 
electoral reform. 237 Rusk stated that the Forum "was very successful from the point 
of view of citizens initiated referenda. ,, 238 He returned to the Hobson electorate 
optimistic that the electors were likely to have the choice of several reform options in 
a referendum and that "citizens initiated referendum" would likely be part of any 
reform because it was compatible with all the other options. 239 
(g) Caucus Committee's final recommendations 
The Forum, however, had no appreciable effect on the deliberations of the 
Committee. On 15 August 1990, the Committee fmalised its recommendations 
regarding direct democracy, which varied from its 6 July 1990 position in only one 
respect: the Committee finally resolved the question of exemptions, voting five to 
two that "there would be no matters which could not be the subject of a 
referendum. ,, 240 Nevertheless, in its September 1990 report to the National Party 
Caucus , the Committee mentioned that it had "benefited from the proceedings of [the 
Forum]" which had "elicited wide ranging contributions from delegates on various 
electoral reform issues which were helpful to the Committee in fmalising its report to 
Caucus. ,, 241 After providing several reasons for not supporting the legislative 
initiative, binding referendums, or subject matter limitations, the Committee made the 
following recommendation:242 
235See Forum, above n 215 . 
236Above. 
237 "Nats Move", above n 234. 
238Rusk, above n 79. 
239 "Nats Move", above n 234. 
240Minutes of the Electoral Law Reform Caucus Committee (15 August 1990) (Birch, Peters, Graham, 
McCully, and Anderson voted against exemptions on the grounds that they were unnecessary in a non-
binding system; Gray and Muldoon voted for exemptions on the grounds that fiscal matters should be 
excluded; Bolger did not vote); Report of the Committee , above n 177, 12 (outlining fmalised "proposed 
r,rocedure for the holding of referenda"). 
41Report of the Committee , above n 177, 1. 
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[T]he Committee recommends to Caucus that the National Party give a Manifesto 
commitment to put in place a procedure for holding initiative referenda, non-binding on 
the Government, where 10 percent of eligible voters sign a petition seeking such a 
referendum. The Committee further recommends that Caucus accept the procedure for 
holding referenda outlined in . . . this report. 
The National Party Caucus approved the Committee's recommendations. On 11 
September 1990, the National Party released its Manifesto Policy on Electoral 
Reform. The National Party promised to:243 
establish a mechanism to enable members of the public to initiate the holding of non-
binding referenda on any issue of public concern. For a referendum to be held, a 
petition signed by 10 percent or more of eligible voters must be presented to 
Parliament. The government will then be required to hold a referendum within 12 
months of this occurring. 
4 NationalRejonn 
The struggle between the party and political wings of the National Party had the effect 
of formalising support for a binding legislative referendum system within the party 
wing. On 2 December 1990, a little over a month after the National Party won the 
1990 general election, Mike Houlding of Tauranga, a founding member of FAIR, 
announced the formation of National Reform.244 National Reform was a small, 
nationwide group of loyal, active, and generally influential National Party members 
promoting direct democracy. 245 It was a formal pressure group with the goal of 
building on Rusk's work within the National Party .246 Although based in Tauranga, 
National Reform had plans to establish a representational presence in each 
electorate. 247 
National Reform advocated the introduction of direct democracy because its members 
were convinced that New Zealanders wanted a more responsive governmental 
system. 248 It had four specific objectives: 1) introduce new parliamentarians to the 
243 "Improving New Zealand's Democracy" National's Policy on Electoral Reform (11 September 1990) 
3. McCully served as the National Party's Spokesperson on Electoral Reform. Above. 
244National Reform Press Release (2 December 1990). Toward the end of 1984 Houlding met Leo and 
Thea Gilich in Auckland; they introduced him to Switzerland's direct democracy system. At the time, 
Houlding was a member of a group agitating for a national referendum on the Fourth Labour 
Government's "unilateral decision" to pursue a nuclear free policy, which "concerned and annoyed" 
him because he knew it "would effectively terminate [New Zealand's] membership in ANZUS ." Letter 
from Mike Houlding of National Reform to Mark Gobbi (8 May 1991). 
245See M Houlding "'National Reform' Who are They? What is It?" 6 Electoral Newsletter No.3 
(14 June 1991) 6; "CIR End for Splinter Groups" Bay of Plenty Times, Bay of Plenty, New Zealand, 4 
May 1991; "'Get Real' Over Electoral Reform" Bay of Plenty Times, Bay of Plenty, New Zealand, 10 
~ril 1991 , 36. 
Houlding, above n 244. 
247Houlding, above n 245, 6. 
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concept of direct democracy; 2) clarify National Party thinking about the precise 
nature of direct democracy reform; 3) introduce a timetable for the introduction of 
direct democracy; and 4) campaign for direct democracy as an option to be 
publicised, debated, and included in the National Government's 1992 government 
controlled referendum on electoral reform. 249 
National Reform made some progress toward meeting its fIrst two objectives. It 
wrote to all new National Party parliamentarians; it received supportive messages 
from several, and expressions of interest from most. Individuals within National 
Reform also personally lobbied Ministers and MPs.250 In addition, National Reform 
produced two papers for distribution within the National Party, and among New 
Zealand's direct democracy groups, that presented the case for the legislative 
referendum. 251 
Like FAIR, National Reform had established contact with most of the other direct 
democracy groups in New Zealand.252 National Reform was also in contact with 
Walker, whose pro-direct democracy work had inspired its members,253 and Rusk, 
whose direct democracy proposal had influenced its campaign strategy and formed the 
basis of its direct democracy publications.254 National Reform also tried to coordinate 
support for direct democracy in New Zealand. On 23 May 1991, for example, it sent 
a letter to New Zealand's main direct democracy groups informing them of the 
government's plan to introduce a non-binding system, asking who would make oral or 
written submissions, and setting out the minimum requirements of effective 
submissions.255 However, for the reasons outlined in the next section, National 
Reform's efforts to coordinate action among New Zealand's direct democracy groups 
failed. 
Like FAIR, National Reform supported the adoption of both the legislative 
referendum and the legislative initiative. However, like Rusk, it saw the 
establishment of direct democracy in New Zealand as an evolutionary process that 
should begin with a realistically attainable goal, namely, the legislative referendum. 
249Press Release, above n 244. 
25oHoulding, above n 244. 
251 Citizens, above n 248; National Reform Citizens Initiated Referendum Gives You A Say (10 April 
1991). 
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Submission from the Hobson Electorate of the New Zealand National Party, above n 133 with Citizens, 
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255Taylor, above n 252. 
243 
I 
National Reform believed that once the legislative referendum was established, a 
popular broad-based push for the legislative initiative would be feasible. 256 National 
Reform's legislative referendum would have been bindin~7 and would have required 
the signatures of 100,000 electors to trigger. Those using the device would have had 
exclusive control over the drafting of propositions placed on the ballot. However, the 
following subjects would have been exempt from the device: declared emergencies, 
defence issues, the status of Parliament, the judicial system, external relations 
(excluding economic and political unions), and legislation promoting non-
discrimination. 258 
National Reform also saw its proposal as a means of defusing other constitutional 
reform efforts, especially the proposals for proportional representation and a senate.259 
It argued that direct democracy, unlike the other reforms, directly addressed New 
Zealand's chief governmental illness, that is, the lack of "effective accountability in 
politics." It believed that direct democracy would deliver a "people responsive 
government" from the hands of the special interest groups that have "hijacked" New 
Zealand's law-making process.260 National Reform regarded the other reforms as 
cosmetic institutional re-arrangements that would exacerbate governmental illness 
rather than cure it. 261 The argument presented direct democracy as an attractive 
alternative to those who were dubious about the merits of either proportional 
representation or a senate. 
5 Reaction of direct democracy advocates 
The direct democracy advocates began to react to the National Party's Electoral Law 
Reform Caucus Committee proposal soon after it had delivered its report to Caucus. 
Each attacked the proposal as inadequate, objecting primarily to the non-binding 
nature of the system and its high signature trigger threshold. Most of the advocates 
viewed the proposal as an attempt to subvert the call for direct democracy. 
Ironically, this perception initially produced the opposite effect. Angered and 
threatened by the proposal, many of the advocates began meeting to establish common 
ground and to fmd ways in which to work together. However, the failure of National 
Reform's uncompromising attempt to win support among the main direct democracy 
256Letter from Mike Houlding of National Reform to Mark Gobbi (15 June 1991). 
257Houlding stated that the results of a referendum should be binding "provided enough voters 
rsarticipate." Houlding, above n 244. 
8Gives You A Say, above n 251, 5-8 . 
259Houlding, above n 245, 6. 
260Gives You A Say, above n 251, 1-2. National Reform's position regarding the lack of political 
accountability is largely based on its frustration with New Zealand's economic deterioration over the 
~ast 20 years. Gives You A Say, above n 251, 1. 
61See Gives You A Say, above n 251, 9. 
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groups for its 'legislative-referendum-fIrst' strategy foreclosed the possibility of 
developing a common long-term strategy. 
(a) Voters' Voice 
After studying a leaked copy of the Committee's report, Voters' Voice Tauranga 
issued a warning, published on 19 September 1990, that the Committee's proposed 
procedure created obstacles that would render the election manifesto promise 
meaningless. Voters' Voice Tauranga specifically objected to government control 
over a petition's wording, page and line electoral roll verification of signatures, the 
huge signature trigger requirement, and the veto which could be exercised by 25 
percent of MPs in the House of Representatives. 262 
Robert Anderson, MP from Kaimai and a member of the Committee, dismissed the 
warning by stating that Douglas Graham had drafted the proposed procedure in 
conjunction with the Clerk of the House as a possible set of rules , but that Caucus had 
not formally adopted it. He also indicated that Graham's ideas would not constitute 
the legislative drafting brief given to the Department of Justice once the National 
Party came to power. 263 
However, Anderson's assurances were misplaced. On 28 November 1990, a month 
after the National Party won the 1990 general election, Justice Minister Douglas 
Graham stated that he would be working with the Committee to establish a framework 
for "citizens initiated referendums. ,, 264 However, six days later, on 4 December 1990, 
Graham outlined his proposed framework to the media. With one exception, his 
proposal replicated the Committee's recommendations : he abandoned the 25 percent 
veto , but replaced it with a mechanism that would allow parliamentarians to delay the 
holding of a citizens initiated referendum if 75 percent of all MPs voted to defer it. 265 
(b) Professor Geoffrey Q de Walker 
In September 1990, Walker addressed the annual conference of the New Zealand 
Democratic Party in Auckland as one of its keynote speakers on the subject of direct 
democracy. 266 He criticised the National Party's proposal on the following grounds: 
1) it was unlikely to check the government's power because it was non-binding; and 
262"Nats Plan to Scupper Referendum - Claim" Bay of Plenty Times, Bay of Plenty, New Zealand, 19 
September 1990. FAIR also criticised the high signature requirement and the non-binding nature of the 
National Party 's election manifesto promise. FAIR Newsletter No. 11 (October 1990}. 
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2) the 10 percent signature trigger threshold would be difficult to achieve, which 
could keep the process out of the reach of ordinary people and conflne its availability 
to organised groups like unions or industry associations. 267 These ideas reached the 
other direct democracy advocates through the media, the Democrats, and FAIR.268 
Walker also acted independently. In June 1991, shortly after the Minister of Justice 
and the Department of Justice had worked out the main features of the Citizens 
Initiated Referenda Bill (CIR Bill), he sent Prime Minister Bolger a copy of 
Queensland's Constitution (Direct Democracy) Bill.269 The Bill was prepared for 
introduction in April 1988, but the Queensland legislature did not proceed with it. 270 
The Bill would have established a binding legislative initiative system, with a two-step 
trigger. First, a person intending to use the device would have had to submit a 
petition containing the signatures of 1,000 electors, a copy of his or her bill, and a 
fee of $1,000.271 Second, once the Minister prepared a succinct 100 word summary 
of the bill, 272 the person would have 12 months to collect the signatures of electors 
amounting to flve percent of the turnout in the last general election. 273 If endorsed by 
the electorate, the bill would be submitted to the Legislative Assembly, which would 
be required to ratify it.274 The bill would then be sent to the Governor-General for the 
Royal Assent. Once the Governor-General assented, the bill would become law. 275 
Parliament could preempt the referendum if it enacted the bill prepared by the 
promoter, with the services of the Parliamentary Counsel, prior to the referendum. 276 
All proposals had to conflne themselves to a single subject.277 No proposal could 
address matters affecting the interests of a particular locality of the State or any 
particular person(s), the appointment of particular persons to public offlce , an 
appropriation of Crown moneys to the ordinary annual services of the government or 
to any particular purpose, the composition of the judiciary or the appointment or 
removal or conditions of the judiciary, the constitution, powers or procedure of 
Parliament, the elector's obligation to vote or the manner and method of voting at 
267"Referendum Trigger Level Too High: Expert" Daily News, New Zealand, 17 September 1990. 
268See above; Walker, above n 266; FAIR Newsletter No. 12 (January 1991). 
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272CDD Bill, above n 271, d. 10(1). 
273CDD Bill, above n 271, ds. 11(4) & 12. 
274CDD Bill, above n 271, cl. 40(1)-(2). 
275CDD Bill, above n 271, cl. 40(3). This procedure is consistent with the Privy Council cases dealing 
with direct democracy in Canada. See section I1I.B.2(c) in chapter two. 
276CDD Bill, above n 271 , cl. 21. 
277CDD Bill, above n 271, cl. 10(2). 
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elections for members of the Legislative Assembly, and any matter provided for by an 
Act where that provision could be repealed, amended or affected only in a manner 
and form effectually prescribed by that Act. 278 
Bolger sent a copy of the Constitution (Direct Democracy) Bill to the Director of 
National's Parliamentary Research Unit. 279 However, neither he nor the Director sent 
a copy to the Department of Justice.280 This omission might have been justified on the 
grounds that the Bill was marked confidential or that it bore little resemblance to 
National Party's election manifesto promise to institute a non-binding citizens initiated 
referendum system. Nevertheless, the Bill would have accelerated the drafting of the 
CIR Bill because it would have provided the Department of Justice with a more 
appropriate model. 281 
(c) FAIR 
FAIR began attacking the National Government's proposal as early as January 1991. 
It criticised the proposal as an extremely weak form of direct democracy because the 
referendum result would be non-binding and it would require a massive number of 
signatures (230,000 plus electors) to trigger. 282 FAIR characterised these features as 
being contrary to a democratically viable system.283 It also resisted the National 
Government's suggestion that the non-binding proposal was a step in the right 
direction by criticising the proposal as "an expensive sham, a waste of the taxpayers' 
money and a cynical attempt to deceive the public. ,,284 The National Government 
responded to this criticism by arguing that governments which ignored the results of 
non-binding referendums would pay for it at the next election. FAIR countered with 
the observation that recent governments were not adverse to ignoring the wishes of 
the people.28s 
(d) NationalRefonn 
National Reform also considered the proposal as illusionary. 286 Like Walker and 
FAIR, it objected to the proposal's high signature trigger requirement and its non-
278CDD Bill, above n 271, cl. 8(2). 
279See Eagleson, above n 269. 
280The Department's files on the CIR Bill contain no record or copy of the Constitution (Direct 
Democracy) Bill. 
281 See section I.C in chapter eight. According to Walker, Bolger did not reply or acknowledge his 
letter. Walker, above n 269. 
282PAIR Newsletter No. 12 (January 1991). PAIR initially objected to the signature threshold level as 
being too high, thinking that the collection period would be 3 to 4 months, which would require a large 
organisation and lots of money. PAIR Newsletter No . 14 (July 1991). 
283PAIR Newsletter No. 12 (January 1991). 
284PAIR Newsletter No. 13 (March 1991); see also PAIR Newsletter No. 14 (July 1991). 
28sPAIR Newsletter No. 13 (March 1991). 
286" 'Get Real"', above n 245; "CIR End", above n 245. 
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binding character.287 These features caused National Reform to view the proposal "a 
mere palliative. ,,288 As a consequence, its members resolved "to decrease 'trigger 
levels' from 10 percent as envisaged by Murray McCully's Caucus Committee to 
three to five percent, and to change the non-binding rule to binding. ,,289 
With this objective in mind, members of National Reform met in Wellington on 26 
January 1991. Rusk attended the meeting "to keep an eye on things. ,,290 The meeting 
had two important outcomes. First, it resulted in the publication of Citizens Initiated 
Referenda Gives You a Say on 10 April 1991, which outlined National Reform's 
arguments for direct democracy and presented a detailed binding legislative 
referendum proposal. It eventually formed the basis of several submissions from the 
party wing of the National Party on the CIR Bill including its own.291 Second, Rusk 
became loosely affiliated with National Reform. Initially, he simply supplied 
information regarding direct democracy and his experience advocating its adoption 
within the National Party.292 Subsequently, however, he allowed National Reform to 
use his name as a contact in its publications. 293 Eventually, he worked with its 
members to build support for "binding citizens initiated referenda" within the 
National Party. 294 
(e) ONZF, NZCM, and NZDP 
The ONZF rejected the National Government's proposal for the same reasons.295 It 
argued that the high signature trigger requirement would act as a break on any 
petition drive. It also argued that referendum results had to be binding to make sure 
that politicians were responsible for their actions. It called the proposal a "placebo" 
designed to avoid giving the electors a real say. 296 Consequently, in its newsletter of 
287Houlding, above n 245,6; "'Get Real''', above n 245 . 
288Houlding, above n 245, 6. 
289Houlding, above n 244; "'Get Real' ", above n 245. 
290Rusk, above n 79. 
291 See Submission from Michael Taylor to Electoral Law Select Committee, No. 4 (April 1992); 
Submission from the Otumoetai Branch of the National Party (Tauranga Electorate) to Electoral Law 
Select Committee, No. 13W (April 1992); Submission from National Party Taranaki Electorate to 
Electoral Law Select Committee, No. 18 (April 1992); Submission from National Reform to Electoral 
Law Select Committee, No. 34 (April 1992). 
292Rusk, above n 79. 
293See eg Gives You A Say, above n 251; Submission from National Reform to Electoral Law Select 
Committee, No. 34 (April 1992). 
294See eg Letter from National Reform to Members of the National Party (7 May 1992) (providing 
Rusk's address and telephone number and stating that he would be pleased to address the electorate 
organisation and answer any queries regarding "binding citizens initiated referendums"). Shortly before 
the introduction of the CIR Bill, Rusk reduced his involvement in his campaign for direct democracy 
for family reasons. After surmounting these difficulties , he returned to the campaign and was pleased 
to fmd that others within the National Party had taken up the cause. Telephone interview with Merv 
Rusk (12 June 1993). 
295Telephone interview with Wally Boyd (28 September 1991). 
296Letter from Boyd, above n 88; Boyd, above n 295 . 
248 
25 June 1991, the ONZF warned its supporters that the proposal was "not to the 
advantage of ordinary New Zealanders . ,,297 The NZCM found the National 
Government's proposal "totally unacceptable." Like the other direct democracy 
advocates, it attacked the proposal's high signature requirement and its non-binding 
nature. The NZCM, however, went further by rejecting the proposal on the grounds 
that it was not a form of direct democracy. It saw the proposal as "nothing more than 
an expensive 'Heylen' poll. ,, 298 The Democrats also faulted the proposal for its high 
signature requirement and its non-binding results. They viewed the proposal's non-
binding nature as its greatest draw-back. The Democrats concluded that the proposal 
would be "about as useless as a glorified public opinion poll. ,, 299 
if) Failure of joint action 
The uniformity of the response from the direct democracy advocates was a natural 
consequence of their interaction. The NZCM had been trying, without success, to 
bring the direct democracy groups together in Hamilton to discuss ways in which they 
could work together to establish direct democracy in New Zealand.3°O Nevertheless , 
various combinations of the groups had been exchanging advice, information, and 
views regarding direct democracy several years before the National Government's 
proposal had surfaced. The National Government's proposal, however, gave the 
direct democracy groups an incentive to work together. 
In March 1991, the NZCM reissued its invitation to meet in Hamilton. 301 Forty-one 
people decided to attended the 6 April 1991 meeting, including delegates from FAIR, 
National Reform, the NZCM, Voters Voice, the CCC, and the ONZF. 302 Those 
attending reached "a general consensus that the National Government's proposed non-
binding referendum [was] totally unacceptable." They saw the proposal "as another 
contemptuous attempt to offer something that would not work and so could easily be 
discredited." They also unanimously agreed that it would be "no more than a very 
costly and complicated way of conducting a public opinion poll." In addition, they 
opposed the proposal's high signature requirement. 303 
However, those attending the meeting disagreed in one important respect. The 
groups "were not in agreement as to what forms of direct democracy to pursue ." For 
2970NZF Newsletter (25 June 1991). 
298Tait, above n 104. 
299Leitch, above n 37. 
300Newsletter, above n 104. 
30lAbove. 
302Letter from Leo Gilich, National Coordinator of FAIR, to Mark Gobbi (25 June 1991); Holding, 
above 245 ; Tait, above n 104 (Cliff Enemy of New Plymouth was also in attendance); Newsletter, 
above n 104. 
303Letter from Gilich to Gobbi, above n 81. 
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tactical reasons, National Reform and Voters Voice Tauranga recommended that the 
groups concentrate their efforts on establishing the legislative referendum. FAIR, 
Voters Voice Auckland, and the ONZF expressed support for both the legislative 
initiative and the legislative referendum. The NZCM and the CCC did not explicitly 
declare which form(s) they supported. Nevertheless, the groups generally agreed that 
direct democracy should be applied as widely as possible.304 They also agreed that the 
results of "citizens initiated referendums" should be binding, triggered by 30,000 to 
50,000 electors (one and a half to three percent of the votes cast in the last general 
election), and be free of subject matter limitations. The wording of a proposition 
should be determined by those using the device. 305 Essentially, the groups were 
"unanimous in [their] objective but agreed that there was no one way to achieve that 
objective. ,,306 
The groups also decided to hold discussions with their membership to develop a 
common strategy. They agreed to report back on 26 May 1991.307 Twenty people, 
representing most of the original gathering, attended the May meeting in Hamilton. 308 
Their discussion centred on the National Government's recently announced intention 
to introduce legislation giving effect to its proposal. National Reform, given its 
members' experience with the submission process, attempted to coordinate action 
among the main direct democracy groups, initially by renewing its offer to assist 
those interested in making submissions. 309 
However, National Reform's efforts floundered. 31o The May meeting was 
inconclusive in terms of developing a common strategy. Paradoxically, National 
Reform had contributed to this outcome. On 10 April 1991, four days after the fIrst 
Hamilton meeting, National Reform published its Citizens Initiated Referenda Gives 
You a Say, which proved antagonising because it included a detailed legislative 
referendum proposal. 311 According to FAIR, the groups promoting direct democracy 
304Gilich, above n 302 (these groups also supported the recall, a device which would allow petitioning 
electors to run a referendum that would decide whether a public official or an elected representative 
should continue to serve in his or her office). 
305 Above; Houlding, above n 244. 
306Newsletter, above n 104. 
307 Above; see also Houlding, above n 244. 
308Tait, above n 104. 
309Newsletter, above n 104; see also A Paltridge "Referenda Plans Criticised" The Daily News, New 
Zealand (28 May 1991). A few days before the meeting National Reform sent a letter to each of the 
direct democracy groups offering to help prepare and coordinate submissions on the CIR Bill. It 
recommended that interested individuals within each organisation should make submissions in addition 
to the submission put forward by their organisation. It also recommended that each submission should 
state that the results of citizensinitiated referendums should be binding "to ensure [that] the legislation is 
made more effective." Taylor, above n 252. These recommendations were designed to increase the 
number of submissions in favour of a binding system of direct democracy. 
310Houlding, above n 256; National Reform Newsletter (16 June 1991). 
311 NZCM Newsletter [Citizens' Roundtable] (undated); Houlding, above n 244. 
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had generally accepted the strategy of ftrst convincing parliamentarians to accept the 
basic principles of direct democracy. Once this was accomplished they would engage 
a constitutional law expert to draft a proposal handling the legislative details. FAIR 
criticised National Reform for pre-empting this plan by producing what was in effect 
draft legislation with some serious shortcomings. 312 The NZCM agreed with, and 
subsequently published, FAIR's assessment adding that National Reform should have 
consulted the other direct democracy groups.313 As National Reform acknowledged 
later, the incident caused some "ill-feeling" among the direct democracy advocates. 314 
It also revealed that FAIR and National Reform favoured different strategies. 315 FAIR 
sought to promote the basic concept of direct democracy ahead of a campaign pushing 
for the simultaneous adoption of the legislative referendum and the legislative 
initiative. 316 National Reform took the position that the establishment of direct 
democracy in New Zealand was an evolutionary process that should begin with a 
realistically attainable goal, namely, the legislative referendum. 317 Once the 
legislative referendum was established, a popular broad-based push for the legislative 
initiative would be feasible. 318 
Despite these circumstances, those attending the May meeting remained hopeful. 
They agreed to meet at Cambridge on 13 July 1991 to discuss in more detail a request 
from Peter Clark of Voters' Voice Tauranga for a defmed strategy. 319 As a response 
to National Reform's independent initiative and the National Government's proposal, 
FAIR drafted a detailed plan for discussion at this meeting. FAIR's plan called for 
the simultaneous establishment of the legislative referendum and the legislative 
initiative. It also spelled out the essential features of each device. 320 
FAIR's plan had the effect of subverting the goal of developing a common strategy. 
By emphasising differences rather than areas of agreement, it created "a degree of 
suspicion and hostility towards the National Party that produced acrimony and time 
wasting." Instead of planning strategy and coordinating their efforts, those attending 
the meeting spent most of their time "dealing with misunderstandings and 
inflexibility. " Strategic planning was also hampered by disagreement about the 
signiftcance of the National Government's proposal. Some viewed the proposal as a 
312Gilich, above n 302. 
313Newsletter, above n 311. 
314Houlding, above n 256. 
3l5Letter from Leo Gilich, National Coordinator of FAIR, to Mark Gobbi (8 February 1992). 
316Gilich, above n 302. 
317Houlding, above n 244. 
318Houlding, above n 256. 
319Newsletter, above n 311. 
320FAIR Proposal/or CIR, preliminary draft (21 June 1991) (calling for the recall as well). 
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"stumbling block of magnitude," while National Reform saw it as "a panacea, but an 
advance nevertheless, and a Bill that could be used to agitate for further reform 
measures. ,,321 
In spite of their differences, the direct democracy advocates met again in Cambridge 
on 29 September 1991. According to the ONZF, the purpose of the meeting was to 
determine what measures could be taken to pressure the National Government to end 
its delay in introducing its proposed CIR Bill. 322 With the exception of the NZCM, 
which flatly opposed the passage of the CIR Bill,323 the direct democracy advocates 
decided to welcome the CIR Bill in the hope that they would be able to win support 
for its modification during its select committee stage. 324 This decision gave the direct 
democracy advocates an opportunity to present a common front in their submissions 
to the Electoral Law Select Committee in April and May 1992. However, it failed to 
resolve their fundamental differences to the extent necessary to produce a common 
long-term strategy. 
6 Consequences 
These developments played into the hands of strategists within the political wing of 
the National Party. Both Wayne Eagleson and Murray McCully had predicted that 
the direct democracy groups were too disparate in their interests and objectives to 
work together long enough to be effective. 325 In part, this explains why the National 
321 Letter from Mike Houlding, National Reform, to Mark Gobbi (30 June 1993); see also Letter from 
Bruce Knowles, National Reform, to CIR Supporters (8 June 1991). 
322Boyd Interview, above n 295. 
323Submission from NZCM to Electoral Law Select Committee, No. 14 (28 April 1992). 
324See eg Submission from Voters' Voice Auckland to Electoral Law Select Committee, No. 19 (10 
April 1992); Submission from the ONZF to Electoral Law Select Committee, No. 27 (24 April 1992); 
Submission from National Reform to Electoral Law Select Committee, No. 34 (April 1992). FAIR did 
not expressly welcome the CIR Bill; however, it approached the CIR Bill as a given and presented 
arguments for its modification. Submission from FAIR to Electoral Law Select Committee, No. 21 (23 
April 1992). The CCC viewed the CIR Bill as an attempt to "legislate CIR into oblivion;" however, 
like FAIR, it approached the CIR Bill as a given and presented arguments for its modification. 
Submission from CCC (Nelson Branch) to Electoral Law Select Committee, No. 39W (28 April 1992); 
Submission from Coalition of Concerned Citizens to Electoral Law Select Committee (National 
Headquarters, Lower Hutt), No. 43 (29 April 1992). 
325Eagleson Interview, above n 133. Murray McCully made his observation as a casual observer at the 
New Zealand Politics Research Group Conference on Referenda (Stout Research Centre - Victoria 
University of Wellington, 6 December 1991). On the whole, the participants at the Conference 
reluctantly endorsed the National Government's proposal: If New Zealand must have direct 
democracy, then it should be non-binding; the signature trigger should be high; the Clerk of the House 
of Representatives should determine the wording of referendum questions; and Parliament should retain 
control over the citizens initiated referendum process. They also warned that it would not eliminate the 
problems associated with New Zealand's democracy. Despite the calibre of the participants, their 
influence was slight. Both McCully and Eagleson attended part of the afternoon session of the 
Conference. Although they undoubtedly detected support for a non-binding system, they missed most 
of the concerns that were expressed. In addition, organisational difficulties delayed publication of the 
conference papers until after the Electoral Law Select Committee had finished its study of the 
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Government "tolerated" the long, drawn-out process involved in drafting, 
introducing, and debating the CIR Bill, which is examined in the next chapter. 
However, the strategists misjudged the effect of the promotional work of the direct 
democracy groups. Although Eagleson, McCully, and Bolger had tried to 
marginalise the direct democracy groups,326 the publicity they generated helped Rusk 
in his effort to mobilise support for direct democracy within the party wing of the 
National Party.327 Due to their efforts, many members of the National Party had 
heard of direct democracy, which allowed Rusk, and later National Reform, to spend 
less time on educating them and more time on organising their support. 
The publicity-generating antics of Michael Laws and Winston Peters also generated 
support for direct democracy. On 6 June 1991, Laws delivered a speech to the 
Commonwealth Press Editors' Conference in which he presented a case for 
parliamentary reform. His speech, which highlighted the undemocratic aspects of the 
parliamentary system, was widely reported. 328 On 11 June 1991, Peters echoed Laws' 
theme in a speech to the Business Network. He called "for an increase in both the 
quality and incidence of democratic choice for New Zealanders." He also reminded 
his audience of National Party's election manifesto promises regarding electoral and 
parliamentary reform. Finally, he reiterated his decision to "go on the campaign trail 
. to urge voter support for . . . the use of referenda. ,,329 
Although designed to support the campaign for proportional representation, these 
speeches heartened those campaigning for direct democracy in two ways. First, 
Laws and Peters rebutted the argument that parliamentarians would reform Parliament 
of their own accord. 330 Second, they delivered their speeches in the midst the 
National Government's failure to remove the Fourth Labour's superannuation surtax. 
submissions and departmental reports on the CIR Bill. Consequently, the Select Committee did not 
refer to the conference papers when deliberating on the CIR Bill or reporting it back to the House. See 
NZPD, no 86, 17608-17616. For a collection of the conference papers, see A Simpson (ed) 
Referendums: Constitutional and Political Perspectives (Victoria University of Wellington, Wellington, 
1992). 
326See eg above note 80. 
327 Although Rusk acknowledged their work, he chose to keep his distance from them for the following 
reason: "Most issues have a fringe element and I have been careful to keep my distance from people 
who don't realise they often hamper the progress of the very thing they work for. The attitudes and 
actions of some proponents of CIR really hampered sensible discussion with the politicians by providing 
convenient, and sometimes sound reasons, for the politicians to refuse what was wanted." Rusk, above 
n 79. 
328Laws, above n 77. 
329"Electoral Reform - Why it is Needed," Address by Winston Peters MP, Business Network, 
Wellington (11 June 1991). Laws had also applauded the Minister of Justice for his work on "citizens 
initiated referenda." Address, above n 77. Both Laws and Peters were under the impression that the 
Government had promised to include direct democracy as an option in the 1992 referendum. 
330Laws, above n 77; Peters, above n 329. 
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The resulting "broken promises" chorus from the media and superannuitants gave the 
National Government every incentive to deliver on its more memorable campaign 
promises. At the same time, National Reform intensified its campaign within the 
National Party for a binding system of direct democracy. 331 Given these factors, the 
National Government began to take action on some of its promises to improve New 
Zealand's democracy, including the pledge to "establish a mechanism to enable 
members of the public to initiate the holding of non-binding referenda on any 
issue. ,, 332 
In ASSESSMENT 
The direct democracy debate in New Zealand dates back to 1891, when the Liberals 
first introduced their perennially ill-fated Referendum Bill. The debate resurfaced 
periodically , but did not coalesce into a politically significant demand for 
constitutional reform until after the 1987 crash. As in Switzerland and California, a 
significant campaign for direct democracy came into existence in New Zealand when 
economic turmoil coincided with a profound disillusionment with representative 
democracy. 
The 1987 crash followed a whirlwind of social and economic change that the Fourth 
Labour Government had ushered in without an electoral mandate. 333 However, the 
previous National Government shared some responsibility for the economic 
difficulties that contributed to the call for direct democracy. Muldoon's generous 
superannuation scheme and his 'Think Big' projects proved to be financially 
unsustainable. 334 In this respect, he created a time bomb which his electoral fortunes 
eventually forced him to hand over to the Fourth Labour Government in 1984. 
Rogemomics , for all its rhetoric, was essentially a failed attempt to defuse this bomb. 
The crash triggered its explosion 1987. The blast destroyed the Fourth Labour 
Government. 
Amid the debris stood many New Zealanders profoundly worried about their 
continued prosperity. While many people simply laid the blame at the Labour Party's 
doorstep, some decided that the time had come to change the way in which 
governmental decisions were legitimised. Some also came to the conclusion that New 
Zealanders could no longer afford to continue abdicating all responsibility for their 
331See eg Letter from Bruce Knowles , National Reform, to Murray McCully MP, Chairman of the 
Electoral Reform Caucus Committee (20 June 1991). For discussions of the surtax issue, see above 
notes 126-131. 
332 "Improving " , above n 243, 3. 
333Chapman, above n 3, 27. 
334See Barber, above n 1, 193-194, 201 ; see also D McLoughlin "Nine Years After the Revolution: 
Why Won't the Economy Fly?" North and South, July 1993, 46. 
254 
welfare to unresponsive elected representatives. Walker's timely book in favour of 
direct democracy coincided with these circumstances. It had enormous appeal as it 
presented direct democracy as a viable and effective means by which to acquire some 
control over the legislative process. Thus inspired, these people became advocates 
for the adoption of direct democracy in New Zealand. They sought Walker's advice 
and used his work to promote their cause. 
These advocates wanted a binding system of direct democracy. Most of them 
favoured establishing both the legislative referendum and the legislative initiative. 
Some were inclined to focus their efforts on establishing only the legislative 
referendum. This common ground led these advocates to seek each other out and to 
exchange information. However, their attempts to coordinate their efforts were 
largely non-existent prior to the National Party's 1990 election manifesto promise to 
introduce a non-binding citizens initiated referendum system. Although the decision 
brought them together briefly, they failed to develop a common long-term strategy. 
Nevertheless, they had already made a significant contribution to the direct 
democracy debate. 
The groups these advocates formed, especially FAIR and Voters' Voice, broke the 
ice. By making others aware of direct democracy and the promise it held, they 
managed to bring direct democracy to the attention of the political establishment. 
However, it would take the commitment of someone within the political establishment 
to bring the idea closer to reality, namely Merv Rusk. His campaign for direct 
democracy, which eventually led to the enactment of the CIR Act, was well underway 
before the direct democracy groups first tried to work together. Rusk had secured the 
support of the party wing of the National Party for a binding legislative referendum 
system. The political wing of the National Party tried to kill the idea altogether. The 
resulting compromise was the inclusion of a promise to introduce a non-binding 
citizens initiated referendum system in the National Party's 1990 election manifesto, 
which ultimately became the basis of the CIR Act. 
National Reform came into existence as a result of Rusk's campaign. In some 
respects, National Reform was similar to the reform groups that grew out of the 
existing political parties during the direct democracy debates in California and 
Switzerland. The Progressives, who established direct democracy in California, had 
taken over the Republican Party before it swept to power in the 1910 general 
election. 335 In Switzerland, the breakaway left-wing of the ruling Liberal-Radical 
335See S Olin California'S Prodigal Sons: Hiram lohnson and the Progressives, 1911-1917 (University 
of California Press, Berkeley, 1968) 11; W Beck and D Williams California: A History of the Golden 
State (Doubleday, Garden City, New York, 1972) 340; D Fehrenbach A Basic History of California 
(Van Nostrand, Princeton, 1964) 57-58; Hyiuk, above n 9,65; Lavender, above n 9, 163. 
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grouping, the Swiss Democrats, won a hard-fought battle to establish popular control 
over local and national government through the introduction of the direct 
democracy.336 The California Progressives and the Swiss Democrats were reacting to 
the effects of the Industrial Revolution and the monopolistic practices of "Robber 
Barons" who had acquired control over the exercise of governmental power. They 
were ardent supporters of fundamental constitutional reform aimed at restoring the 
legitimacy of their constitutional systems. 
National Reform wanted to restore the legitimacy of the New Zealand constitutional 
system. It also had come into existence during a period of economic turmoil and 
operated within an established political party. However, unlike the Swiss Democrats 
and the California Progressives, its objective did not lead its members into prolonged 
conflict with the established National Party leadership.337 The members of National 
Reform did not displace the National Party hierarchy, or provide any indication that 
they would attempt to do so. They had little incentive to take this approach, as they 
did not perceive the National Party as being controlled by self-serving economic 
interests, as were the ruling parties were in Switzerland and California prior to the 
triumph of the Swiss Democrats and the California Progressives. More importantly, 
the leaders of political wing of the National Party were able to formulate a 
compromise which held sufficient developmental potential to appease those in the 
party wing who supported establishing direct democracy in New Zealand, including, 
for a time, Merv Rusk. Nevertheless, as the next chapter shows, National Reform 
played an indispensable role in preventing the National Government from abandoning 
the National Party's election manifesto promise to introduce an non-binding citizens 
initiated referendum system. 
336E Gruner and K Pitterle "Switzerland's Political Parties" in H Penniman (ed) Switzerland at the 
Polls: The National Elections of 1979 (American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 
Washington, DC, 1983) 37; see also Bonjour, above n 9, 299-301; Dandliker, above n 9, 284-289; 
Martin, above n 9, 235, 237; W Oechsli History of Switzerland: 1499-1914 (Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 1922) 406-408, 414-415; Thurer, above n 9, 120-123. 
337Gruner and Pitterle, above n 335, 37; Bonjour, above n 9, 300; Oechsli, above n 335, 407; Beck, 
above n 334,340; Hyink, above n 9,65; Olin, above n 334, 11, 13. 
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8 
LEGISLATIVE mSTORY OF THE CIR ACT 1993 
This chapter traces the legislative history of the Citizens Initiated Referenda Act 1993 
(CIR Act). In doing so, it continues the analysis begun in chapter seven, which 
documented the events that led the National Party to promise to introduce a non-
binding citizens initiated referendum system in New Zealand. This chapter completes 
the analysis of the factors which determined the form and content of the CIR Act by 
examining what happened to the CIR Act at each stage of the legislative process, 
which is necessary as New, Zealand's direct democracy advocates, unlike their 
counterparts in Switzerland and California, failed to secure control of the legislative 
process. In doing so, this chapter draws almost exclusively on primary sources . 
Although the electorate's decision in 1993 to introduce a proportional representation 
electoral system has complicated the process, primarily by diffusing the locus of 
power, the CIR Act's legislative history nevertheless provides an instructive example 
to those who wish to bring about or forestall legislative change or constitutional 
reform in New Zealand, particularly when considered along with the discussion in 
chapter seven. 
The legislative process begins with the acceptance of an idea by the parliamentarians 
who control the process . Regarding the CIR Act, the acceptance stage was discussed 
in chapter seven. This chapter takes the idea behind the CIR Act, namely the 
National Party's Electoral Law Reform Caucus Committee's plan for a non-binding 
citizens initiated referendum system, ( through its legislative stages: drafting, fIrst 
reading, select committee, report back, second reading, Committee of the whole 
House, third reading, and assent. Along the way, this chapter outlines the reactions 
of the direct democracy advocates at various stages in the process and the steps they 
took to counteract the general antipathy of parliamentarians, particularly those in the 
National Government, toward direct democracy. Their combined efforts, although 
largely uncoordinated and ineffectual in changing the form or content of the National 
Government's Citizens Initiated Referenda Bill (CIR Bill), prevented the National 
Government from allowing the eIR Bill to die quietly somewhere along the way. 
(Report of the Electoral Law Reform Committee to Caucus (September 1990). For an outline of the 
plan, see sections II.B.3(d) and II .B.3(g) in chapter seven. 
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I DRAFTING THE CITIZENS INITIATED REFERENDA BILL 
On 7 December 1990, Douglas Graham, as Minister of Justice, advised the 
Department of Justice that he hoped to introduce a bill giving effect to the National 
Party's citizens initiated referendum election manifesto promise early in 1991.2 
Starting with the Electoral Law Reform Caucus Committee's plan, officials in the 
Law Reform Division of the Department of Justice began the process of preparing 
legislative drafting instructions for the Parliamentary Counsel Office. 
A Initial Changes Recommended by the Department of Justice 
On 19 December 1990, the Department provided the Minister with its initial queries 
regarding the CIR Bill's legislative detail. It sought clarification regarding the House 
veto and signature checking provisions. The Department also suggested the 
possibility of conducting referendums by postal vote. 3 The Minister responded that 
the veto provision should be 75 percent, not 25 percent as stated in the Caucus 
Committee's plan. He asked the Department to determine whether a page and line 
electoral roll verification process would be too onerous. He decided that referendums 
should be conducted on an electorate by electorate basis as in a general election rather 
than by postal vote. 4 
The Department also sought the views of those in government most likely to be 
affected by the CIR Bill. Specifically, the Department wrote to the Clerk of the 
House, the Chief Justice, the Chief Ombudsman, the Officials Committee on Electoral 
Matters, and the Director of Planning in February 1991.5 Based on their responses 
and its own research, the Department, by 9 April 1991, had developed the view that 
referendums should be subject to the Ombudsman Act 1975 and the Official 
Information Act 1982.6 The former would add accountability to the referendum 
process by giving individuals the means to lodge complaints and initiate investigations 
regarding delays, carelessness in verification, lack of procedural compliance, or 
incorrect advice to the Speaker. The latter would give individuals the means to 
2Minutes of Meeting with Minister of Justice, LEG 27-1-9 (7 December 1990). 
3Letter from Department of Justice to Minister of Justice (19 December 1990). The Department 
calculated that voting on referendums in polling booths would cost $9,760,000 and that voting by post 
would cost $7,518,000. Letter from Secretary of Justice to Minister of Justice (5 April 1991). 
4Department, above n 3 (the Minister sent his response in a form of note dated 8 April 1991 on the 
letter the Department sent to him). The Caucus Committee had actually decided to raise the '25 
percent of those present in the House' veto to a '75 percent of all members of the House' veto. 
Minutes of the Electoral Law Reform Caucus Committee (6 July 1990). However, the Caucus 
Committee's fInal report inadvertantly recommended the 25 percent present veto. Report, above n 1, 
1. 
5See Letter from Department of Justice to Minister of Justice (9 April 1991); see also Minute Sheet, 
LEG 27-1-9 (1 April 1991). 
6Department, above n 5. 
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( 
monitor the referendum process by giving them access to information on proposals 
and their disposition, including the number of electors who signed or were ruled 
ineligible, the names of those proposing referendums, details of the verification 
process generally and in respect of individual petitions, governmental advice 
regarding the wording of petitions, and information stating when the Speaker received 
advice that the procedural requirements were met. 
The Department also developed the view that various aspects of the Caucus 
Committee's proposed framework should be modified. First, it recommended that the 
proposed referendum commission should not include a High Court Judge for three 
reasons: 1) High Court Judges do not normally perform advisory and clerical 
functions; 2) they do not have the research facilities required to assess whether 
referendum questions are clear and fair or whether any explanatory material is 
comprehensive and accurate; and 3) if an extended period of time were involved, 
replacement appointments would be essential. 7 
Second, the Department recommended that the signature page and line electoral roll 
verification procedure be replaced with a different procedure because reliance on 
printed rolls, at times more than a year out of date, could result in the rejection of 
signatures of people who are on the current roll and the acceptance of signatures of 
people who are not on the current roll. As an alternative, the Department suggested 
that persons signing a petition be required to give their names, addresses, occupation, 
current electorate (if known), and date of birth (if they wished). The body checking 
the signatures would take a statistically valid sample and send those names to the 
Electoral Roll Centre for checking. The result of the checking would determine 
whether the petition had sufficient signatures of eligible electors to enable it to 
proceed. s 
Third, the Department came to the conclusion that the phrase "10 percent of eligible 
electors" was ambiguous. "Eligible electors" could mean those people on the current 
roll, those who were qualified to vote under section 99 of the Electoral Act 1956, or 
those who were eligible to enrol as voters under section 42 of the Act. The 
Department suggested that "eligible electors" be defmed in terms of those people on 
the current roll because the definition provided a fixed figure by which to calculate 
the required 10 percent signature threshold. 
In addition, the Department advised the Minister that it WOUld, unless countermanded, 
instruct the Parliamentary Counsel Office to limit the amount of money any individual 
7Above . 
sAbove. 
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or group may spend promoting or opposing a particular referendum proposal. 9 The 
Department reasoned that advertising limits might reduce the opportunity for 
campaign manipulation. 1O However, given the precedent of campaign expenditure 
limits placed on candidates and parties in the Electoral Act 1956, it did not initially 
consider the freedom of speech implications of its spending limit proposal. II 
The Department also advised the Minister that it would, unless countermanded, 
instruct the Parliamentary Counsel Office that any money required for the purposes of 
the Bill be paid out of the Public Account without further appropriation. 12 The 
Department, however, did not evaluate its proposal in terms of the frequency of 
referendums or in terms of pre-determined referendum dates. Since the Department 
had estimated that a referendum conducted on the same basis as a general election 
would cost $9,760,000,13 mismanagement of either factor could render the 
Department's appropriation proposal expensive. 
B Minister of Justice's Response 
On 16 April 1991, the Minister agreed to each of the Department's recommendations. 
However, he added several refmements. To initiate the non-binding referendum 
process, a person would have to present a draft petition to the Clerk of the House. 
The petition would be addressed to the Speaker of the House and contain a request 
that Parliament hold a referendum on the question stated in the petition. The Clerk 
would not have any discretion to reject a petition, but WOUld, subject to judicial 
review, have the power to determine the fmal wording of the question. In addition, 
the Clerk would have the power to determine whether a proposed petition dealt with a 
subject considered in a referendum held within the last five years. If it did, then the 
petition would not be permitted to proceed. 14 
Once the question was fmalised, its initiator would have 12 months to collect the 
necessary signatures. If the signature requirement were met, the Clerk would certify 
the petition and transmit it to the Speaker of the House. The Speaker would then 
present it to the House of Representatives. The proposed House veto provison 
9Above. 
IOMinute Sheet, LEG 27-1-9 (19 February 1991). 
liThe Department of Justice vetted the CIR Bill for compliance with the New Zealand Bill of Rights 
Act 1990 after the Parliamentary Counsel Office produced its preliminary draft of the Bill. As a 
practical matter, the Department of Justice, even in the case of its own bills, generally vets bills for 
compliance with the Bill of Rights after the Parliamentary Counsel Office or a private law firm 
commissioned by the government of the day has drafted them. 
12Department, above n 5. 
13Secretary, above n 3. 
14File Note: CIR Bill: Discussion with Minister of Justice - 16 April 1991, LEG 27-1-9 (17 April 
1991). 
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became a House delay provision. Unless 75 percent of the entire membership of the 
House voted to defer the referendum, it would have to be held within 12 months of 
the petition's presentation. The House would not be able to defer it for more than 12 
months. IS 
The Department's progress encouraged the Minister, particularly as he had already 
publicly relied on 22 March 1991 assurances from officials that the CIR Bill was in 
preparation and that the next step was to forward drafting instructions to the 
Parliamentary Counsel Office. 16 Consequently, in mid-April, he informed the media 
that the CIR Bill was well-advanced in its drafting and that it should be introduced in 
Parliament about June 1991. 17 
C Delays 
However, several factors rendered this deadline unrealistic. First, the Department did 
not produce its first draft of the CIR Bill's drafting instructions until May 1991. 
Second, the May draft identified a series of technical problems that took a 
considerable amount of time to solve. The most important of these problems involved 
working out the sampling method to be used to verify whether the requisite number of 
signatures had been collected. 18 Although the Department of Statistics worked out a 
solution as early as 20 May 1991,19 the Department of Justice did not capture it on 
paper until June.20 The Department of Statistics did not have the opportunity to 
review the relevant provisions until July.21 Its response on 24 July 1991 remained a 
subject for discussion as late as 22 November 1991. By December 1991, both 
Departments had agreed that the original provisions were adequate. 22 
IS Above. Apparently, the Minister of Justice unilaterally decided that the veto power should be 
transmuted into a delay power. See J Clifton "Graham to Introduce Referendum Trigger" The 
Dominion, Wellington, New Zealand, 5 December 1990; see also above note 4 . The decision may 
have been made to present the CIR Bill as a plausible compromise to the direct democracy advocates. 
16Minutes of Meeting with Minister of Justice, LEG 27-1-9 (22 March 1991) (informing the Minister 
that the CIR Bill was in preparation and that the next step was to forward drafting instructions to the 
Parliamentary Counsel Office). The Minister announced on 1 April 1991 that a separate bill to permit 
citizen initiated referendums was at the drafting stage and should be passed by Christmas. S Collins 
"Electoral Poll Will Offer Clear Choice" New Zealand Herald, Auckland, New Zealand, 2 April 1991. 
I7N McMillan "Electoral Reform Promises of the Government Nearly Ready for Parliament" Taranaki 
Daily News, Taranaki, New Zealand, 22 April 1991. 
18CIR Bill - Drafting Instructions, LRD 27-1-9 [Draft] (May 1991). 
19pax from Department of Statistics to Department of Justice (20 May 1991). 
20CIR Bill - Drafting Instructions, LRD 27-1-9 [Draft] (June 1991). 
21 Letter from Department of Justice to Department of Statistics (3 July 1991). 
22See Letter from Department of Statistics to Department of Justice (24 July 1991) (containing note of 
22 November 1991 discussion); see also Letter from Department of Statistics to Department of Justice 
(16 December 1991). 
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In addition, the Department of Justice came to the conclusion that neither the 
Freedom of Information Act 1982 nor the Ombudsman Act 1975 applied to the Clerk 
of the House as an officer of Parliament. 23 Consequently, the Department had to 
build the political consensus required to extend the application of these Acts to the 
Clerk of the House. In June 1991, the Clerk agreed to the application of these Acts 
with respect to matters arising under a cm Act. To give effect to this, the 
Department drafted a provision in June 1991 that would treat the Clerk as an officer 
of government subject to the Acts when acting pursuant to the cm Act. 24 
The Department also had difficulty in locating a suitable precedent upon which to 
base its drafting instructions.25 Overseas models proved problematic because they 
were binding and woven into the fabric of written constitutions.26 Domestic 
referendum enactments also proved problematic because they dealt exclusively with 
government controlled referendums. Although the Department had studied Knapp's 
Popular Initiatives Bill 1984/7 it eventually chose the Term Poll Act 1990 as its 
starting point.28 McCombs' Popular Initiative and Referendum Bills of 1918 and 1919 
were not considered. 
The Term Poll Act 1990 proved to be an incomplete model. This presented two time-
consuming difficulties: 1) many of the essential provisions had to be prepared from 
scratch; and 2) many of the technical provisions of the Term Poll Act had to be 
reworked. For example, the Term Poll Act only provided for a government 
controlled referendum to be held in conjunction with a general election. To allow 
citizens-initiated referendums to be held at any time, the Department had to modify 
this provision. It found a solution by adapting the by-election writ provisions of the 
Electoral Act 1956.29 
These factors delayed transmission of the drafting instructions to the Parliamentary 
Counsel Office until 5 July 1991.30 Two days earlier, the Department had presented a 
copy of the instructions to the Minister for his approval. The Department informed 
the Minister that the signature verification provisions were not yet fmalised. It also 
informed the Minister that, in anticipation of Treasury raising the issue of cost 
23Draft May, above n 18. 
24Draft June, above n 20. 
25Draft May, above n 18. 
26See eg Minute Sheet, LEG 27-1-9 (15 April 1991) (summarising the experience with direct 
democracy legislation in Canada). 
27Letter from Department of Justice to Parliamentary Counsel Office (3 July 1991). 
28See May Draft, above n 18; compare CrR Bill 1992 with Term Poll Act 1990. 
29May Draft, above n 18; compare CrR Bill 1992 with Electoral Act 1956. 
30Department, above n 27 (although dated 3 July 1991, the Department hand-deliv"red the instructions 
to the Parliamentary Counsel Office on 5 July 1991 after the Minister of Justice had an opportunity to 
consider them); Letter from Department of Justice to Minister of Justice (3 July 1991). 
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recovery, the cm Bill would include a provision that would require a person 
submitting a draft petition to the Clerk to pay an unspecified fee. The purpose of the 
fee was to cover the costs of the Clerk, the Government Statistician, and the Chief 
Registrar of Electors, and to deter frivolous petitions. The Department also asked the 
Minister if it could provide copies of the drafting instructions to the Clerk of the 
House, the Chief Electoral Officer, and the Chief Registrar of Electors to facilitate 
further consultation. 31 
The Minister gave his approval to these matters, including the transmission of the 
cm Bill drafting instructions to the Parliamentary Counsel Office with a priority G 
introduction rating. The rating meant that the CIR Bill was on the legislative program 
for 1991, but would be introduced near the end of the year, if at all. 32 
The further consultation also slowed down the drafting of the CIR Bill. The Chief 
Electoral Officer and the Chief Registrar of Electors responded by the end of July 
1991.33 The Clerk responded by the end of August 1991.34 They raised a series of 
minor technical issues, which the Department had little incentive to resolve before the 
end of November 1991.35 Although the Prime Minister had advised National Party 
members on 1 August 1991 that the National Government would be introducing the 
cm Bill in the next few months,36 the Minister of Justice sanctioned the CIR Bill's 
delay on 18 August 1991 when he announced that pressure on the parliamentary 
timetable required deferral of the CIR Bill's introduction until 1992.37 
As a consequence of the National Government's legislative activity, the Parliamentary 
Counsel Office did not produce a preliminary draft of the cm Bill until 8 November 
1991. 38 At this time, as a matter of course, the Parliamentary Counsel Office sent 
copies of the draft eIR Bill to the Department of Justice's Bill of Rights Team and the 
31 Department to Minister, above n 30. 
32 Above (the Minister noted his approval on the letter sent to him by the Department). 
33See Letter from Chief Electoral Officer to Secretary of Justice (29 July 1991); Notes of Meeting with 
Chief Registrar of Electors, LEG 27-1-9 (30 July 1991). 
34See Letter from the Office of the Clerk of the House of Representatives to Secretary of Justice (30 
August 1991). 
35See Note regarding responses, LEG 27-1-9 (undated) (setting a deadline of 29 November 1991). 
36Letter from Jim Bolger, Prime Minister, to National Party Member (1 August 1991) (containing The 
National Government in Office - Promises and Performance: An Update on the Progress Made by the 
Government in Implementing Its Manifesto Commitments (31 July 1991) (reiterating the National 
Government's promise to "[e]stablish a procedure whereby non-binding referenda can be held on any 
issue that attains the signatures of 10 percent of eligible voters on a petition seeking such a referendum" 
and stating that "[l]egislation is currently being drafted to give effect to this commitment and will be 
introduced to Parliament in the next few months"). 
37S Collins "Government Reviews Referendum" The Dominion, Wellington, New Zealand, 19 August 
1991. 
38See CIR Bill, PCO 115/P (8 November 1991). 
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Treasury for analysis. On 22 November 1991, Treasury objected to the CIR Bill's 
appropriation clause, which read: 39 
All expenses incidental to the holding of an indicative referendum under this Act shall 
be paid out of public money without further appropriation than this section. 
Treasury wanted to rewrite the appropriation clause as follows: 40 
All expenses incidental to the holding of an indicative referendum under this Act shall 
be met out of public money appropriated by Parliament. 
The former clause provided for a permanent legislative appropriation for citizens 
initiated referendums. The latter required Parliament to decide how much to 
appropriate for each citizens initiated referendum. 
On 26 November 1991, the Department of Justice advised the Minister of Justice that 
a permanent legislative appropriation would remove the option of preventing a 
citizens initiated referendum by simply refusing to provide the necessary funding. 
The Department, however, also informed the Minister that it would prevent the 
government of the day from exercising direct control over the cost of a citizens-
initiated referendum, which was now estimated to be $12,380,000 (including GST) 
per referendum. The Minister directed the Department to retain the permanent 
legislative appropriation clause. 41 
The draft CIR Bill also survived the Bill of Rights Team's scrutiny unchanged. 
Initially the Team determined that clauses 9-12, 13, 39, 40, and 51 of the draft Bill 
prima facie infringed the freedom of expression guaranteed under section 14 of the 
Bill of Rights Act 1990. However, it concluded on 28 November 1991 that each 
infringement was justifiable under section 5 of the Act, which obviated the necessity 
of redrafting the clauses.42 The Crown Law Office, which reviews bills produced by 
the Department of Justice for compliance with the Bill of Rights, did not post any 
objections either. 43 
39Fax from Treasury to Department of Justice (22 November 1991); see also Letter from Department of 
Justice to Minister of Justice (26 November 1991) 
4ODepartment, above n 39. 
41 Above (the Minister of Justice noted his instructions on the letter sent to him by the Department of 
Justice; his exact words were "leave bill as is") . 
42Minute Sheet, CIR Bill - Bill of Rights Vetting, 2420Y, LEG 7-5-27 (28 November 1991); see also 
section 14 Bill of Rights Act 1990. Clauses 9-12, 13, 39, 40, and 51 of the draft CIR Bill were 
numbered 8-11, 12,41 , 42, and 53 in the CIR Bill 1992 (PCO 11/P). 
43The Crown Law Office orally advised the Department of Justice a few days before the introduction of 
the CIR Bill that it had reached the same conclusion. See Fax from Department of Justice to Chief 
Parliamentary Counsel (4 March 1992). 
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D Cabinet Legislation Committee's Decisions 
At the Minister's direction, the Department of Justice prepared a paper asking tbe 
Cabinet Legislation Committee (CLC) to submit the CIR Bill to Cabinet.44 The paper 
reached the CLC on 4 December 1991,45 after the Treasury delayed its completion by 
haggling over the expression of its comment on appropriation. 46 In the paper, the 
Minister of Justice recommended that the CIR Bill be introduced no later than 19 
December 1991 and passed no later than 31 May 1992.47 
On 5 December 1991, the CLC met to consider the paper.48 During the meeting, the 
Clerk of the House argued that the House, not the Clerk, should determine the 
wording of referendum questions. He also argued that the House, not the Prime 
Minister via advice to the Governor-General, should determine the date of 
referendums. 49 The Minister of Justice opposed these recommendations on the 
grounds that future governments could use these requirements to delay referendums. 
However, he informed the Clerk that he was prepared to accept the Electoral Law 
Select Committee's decisions on these matters and invited the Clerk to present his 
concerns to the Select Committee.50 
The CLC approved submission of the CIR Bill to Cabinet while taking into account 
the concerns of the Clerk and the Treasury. It gave the Clerk authority to make a 
submission to the Select Committee on the points he had raised. It assuaged 
Treasury's concerns by adjusting clause 59 of the draft CIR Bill to state more clearly 
that the Governor-General would have the power of "prescribing fees for the purposes 
of the Act." However, the CLC did not endorse the Minister's timetable . Instead, it 
"agreed that the draft Bill should be introduced as soon as possible. ,,51 
E Cabinet's Decisions 
Cabinet was less generous. On 9 December 1991, it "deferred consideration of the 
CIR Bill until 1992. ,,52 The Department of Justice recorded two ostensible reasons for 
the delay: 1) the legislative timetable was too tight; and 2) the necessity of having to 
work with the Clerk to resolve his concerns. However, the Department noted that the 
44See Draft Cabinet Legislation Committee Paper re CIR Bill, LEG 27-1-9 (2 December 1991). 
45Pile Note, CLC, LEG 27-1-9 (5 December 1991). 
46See Pax from Treasury to Department of Justice (2 December 1991). 
47 Cabinet Legislation Committee, LEG (91) 160 (4 December 1991). 
48Pile Note, above n 45; Cabinet Legislation Committee, LEG (91) M 36/3 (5 December 1991). 
49Pile Note, above n 45; Draft, above n 44. 
50Pile Note, above n 45. 
51 Cabinet Legislation Committee, above n 47 . Compare clause 59 CIR Bill, PCO 115/3 (4 December 
1991) with clause 59 CIR Bill 1992. 
52Cabinet, CAB (91) M 51115 (9 December 1991). 
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real reason was political: the National Government simply did "not want these sorts 
of referenda right now. ,,53 
As late as 4 March 1992, the Minister of Justice was unable to ascertain when he 
would be able to introduce the CIR Bill.54 A few days later, however, he was able to 
secure a place on the Parliamentary Order Paper for the introduction of the CIR Bill.55 
On 10 March 1992 at 3:40 pm, nearly 16 months after he began working on the 
National Party's election manifesto promise to institute a non-binding citizens initiated 
referendum system, the Minister rose in the House of Representatives to introduce the 
CIR Bill.56 
Prior to this date, the Department of Justice and the Parliamentary Counsel Office had 
refmed the draft CIR Bill by incorporating the CLC' s instructions, as endorsed by 
Cabinet, and a few minor technical changes. 57 By the time of its introduction, the 
CIR Bill provided for a non-binding system, without any significant subject matter 
limitations, which could be triggered by the signatures of 10 percent of eligible 
electors (approximately 232,000 electors). The Clerk would have the power to 
determine the wording of questions. 58 Despite the changes that were made, the CIR 
Bill captured the essence of the Caucus Committee's proposal. 
II INTRODUCTION OF THE CIR BILL 
The first reading debate was frank yet confused. It outlined the main features of the 
CIR Bill and the issues that it created. It also revealed the Labour Opposition's 
opposition to and the National Government's ambivalence toward direct democracy. 
The most cogent arguments against direct democracy actually came from the National 
Government's backbench. The debate left the Labour Opposition with the impression 
that the National Government did not support the Bill wholeheartedly.59 In addition, 
53File Note, LEG 27-1-9 (10 December 1991). 
54"Referendum Trigger" Waikato Times Hamilton, New Zealand (4 March 1992); see also Sharon 
Crosbie Show: Interview of Douglas Graham, Minister of Justice (National Radio broadcast, 23 January 
1992) (transcript on file at Department of Justice, LEG 27-1-9) ("Well, you will be aware, possibly that 
very shortly I'll be introducing the Citizens' Initiated Referendum Bill, ... "). 
55See Parliamentary Order Paper (10 March 1992). 
56NZPD, vol 522, 6703 (10 March 1992). 
57Compare CIR Bill, PCO 115/3 (4 December 1991) with CIR Bill, PCO 115/4 (5 December 1991); 
compare CIR Bill, PCO 115/4 (5 December 1991) with CIR Bill 1992; see also Letter from 
Department of Statistics to Department of Justice (16 December 1991) (confirming that the draft CIR 
Bill's signature verification clauses captured the Department of Statistics formula, but that the formula 
did not provide for the case of duplicate signatures or the case of fraudulent signatures); Fax from 
Department of Justice to Department of Statistics (10 March 1992) (advising the Department of 
Statistics that the Department of Justice would attend to the points raised by its letter of 16 December 
1992 while the CIR Bill was before the Electoral Law Select Committee). 
58See generally CIR Bill 1992. 
59See eg NZPD, above n 56, 6720 (Hilt), 6721 (Cullen). 
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those debating the Bill often made points by relying on examples taken out of context 
or by ignoring the distinctions between the various forms of direct democracy. For 
example, excesses correctly associated with government controlled referendums were 
wrongly attributed to citizens initiated referendums. 60 
A National Government 
The Minister of Justice, McCully, Chris Fletcher, Robert Anderson, and Tony Ryall 
spoke for the National Government. Each emphasised that the cm Bill fulfilled the 
National Party's 1990 election manifesto promise to introduce a non-binding system 
of direct democracy. 61 The ploy appears to have been designed to recover some of 
the political capital lost in the National Government's failure to honour its pledge to 
repeal the Fourth Labour Government's superannuation surtax. Anderson went so far 
as to boast that the National Government had kept more and broken fewer promises 
than any government in recent history and challenged the Labour Opposition to 
dredge up a broken promise other than superannuation. 62 
With the exception of Ryall, they also argued that the CIR Bill was a complementary 
and progressive measure which would improve New Zealand's democratic tradition.63 
It would give the electors a greater say on issues of national importance during the 
parliamentary term. 64 It would also keep the electors in greater touch with Parliament 
and the government between elections,65 and give them greater power to act as a 
check and balance on the executive. 66 According to Fletcher, the National Party 
believed that a healthy democracy is one in which participation by the largest number 
of people is to be encouraged. She pointed out that the demand for citizens initiated 
referendums stemmed from the feelings of powerlessness and distrust resulting from 
the Fourth Labour Government's asset sales. 67 
The Minister of Justice rejected Burke's theory of representation,68 which was 
embraced by David Lange during the debate. 69 He argued that accepting the 
60See eg NZPD, above n 56, 6722 (Cullen) (relying on the example of Napoleon's self-serving use of 
government controlled referendums to argue that questions in citizens initiated referendums could be 
biased). 
6I NZPD, above n 56, 6703 (Graham), 6709 (McCully), 6712, 6713 (Fletcher), 6716 (Anderson) , 6720 
(Ryall). 
62NZPD, above n 56,6716. 
63NZPD, above n 56,6724 (Graham), 6713 (Fletcher). 
64NZPD, above n 56, 6703 (Graham), 6717 (Anderson), 6713 (Fletcher) . 
65NZPD, above n 56,6717 (Anderson), 6723 (Graham). 
66NZPD, above n 56,6709 (McCully) . 
67 Above (Fletcher). 
68NZPD, above n 56, 6723. For a discussion of Burke's theory of representation, see section III.B.2(d) 
in chapter two. 
69NZPD, above n 56,6706. 
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proposition that Parliament has the right to govern without interference or comment 
from the electorate, whether formal or informal, did not account for issues that arise 
during the life of Parliament, or for the reality that the electors may support a 
candidate, but not his or her party's policies, or that they may like some policies, but 
dislike others. 70 
In addition, the Minister of Justice provided the only explanation for the 10 percent 
signature threshold. He argued that it would weed out vexatious referendums, reduce 
the cost of referendums by limiting their number, and enhance the credibility of 
results by establishing broad-base support at the start of the referendum process.71 
Both Anderson and Ryall acknowledged the Labour Opposition's criticism of the 
involvement of the Clerk of the House,72 but it failed to accept Anderson's invitation 
to provide an alternative. Anderson also deflected the Labour Opposition's argument 
that referendums are costly by pointing out that most forms of democracy and 
democratic reform are costly. 73 
In the course of the debate, McCully stated that direct democracy is not without its 
flaws.74 Ryall used his speaking time to enumerate its perceived shortcomings. He 
argued that it can be hijacked by special interest groups with money or by politicians 
eager to score political pointS.75 He pointed out that over the past 12 months Mike 
Moore, then Leader of the Labour Opposition, had abused the parliamentary petition 
process by presenting more petitions to the House of Representatives than anyone else 
in history, all at the taxpayers' expense. He also argued that the Swiss experience has 
shown that direct democracy separates issues from parties, which produces 
governments which do not stand for anything.76 In addition, given the accessibility of 
parliamentarians and their continuous interest in and sensitivity to public opinion, he 
questioned the need for direct democracy. 77 Despite his criticisms, Ryall attributed 
the Labour Opposition's hostility to the CIR Bill to its fear that the electorate would 
use the CIR Bill to its disadvantage, that is, pass a measure that would limit the 
number of terms that MPs could serve and abolish their pensions, as had been done in 
California with Proposition 140.78 
70NZPD, above n 56,6723 . 
7I NZPD, above n 56,6705. 
72NZPD, above n 56,6716 (Anderson), 6720 (Ryall). 
73NZPD, above n 56,6716,6717. 
74NZPD, above n 56, 6709. 
75NZPD, above n 56, 6719, 6720. 
76NZPD, above n 56, 6719. 
77NZPD, above n 56, 6720. 
78NZPD, above n 56, 6721. For a discussion of Proposition 140, see section II.A.l in chapter six. 
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B Labour Opposition 
David Lange, David Caygill, Jonathan Hunt, George Hawkins, and Michael Cullen 
spoke for the Opposition. Aware of the CIR Bill's origins, they accused the National 
Government of insincerity, electioneering, and fraud. Cullen described the eIR Bill 
as "an ill-thought-out piece of political flummery" that was the product "an ill-
thought-out piece of electioneering before the election. ,,79 He, along with Lange and 
Hawkins, predicted that it would not satisfy the demand that led to National Party's 
manifesto promise. 80 Lange and Cullen both argued that the CIR Bill would create 
conflict between the electors and a government unwilling to act on their opinion. 81 
Cullen also argued that rejecting a referendum result could engender a feeling of 
betrayal, which would invite contempt of Parliament. 82 
Lange also reminded the Minister of Justice that the Prime Minister opposed direct 
democracy. 83 In addition, both he and Hawkins insisted that the Minister of Justice 
did not really support it either. 84 The Labour Opposition tried to prove the National 
Government's hypocrisy by arguing that the CIR Bill created an insurmountable 
obstacle course. 85 Caygill stated that the signature threshold was high enough to 
question whether the exercise was worth pursuing. 86 Cullen pointed out that the CIR 
Bill did not define the nature of the sample to be taken to check the validity of the 
signatures, a failing which would create arguments about whether the threshold had 
been properly met. 87 He also argued that requiring promoters to supply all the forms 
for the petitions would present a tremendous barrier to small groups without money. 88 
Lange warned that the undetermined application fee could be set high enough to 
eliminate potential applicants. 89 
Lange and Hunt also argued that the CIR Bill was an illusionary reform. It would be 
disappointing because it would not affect the practices of the House or the political 
parties. 90 It did not resolve the real problem of political parties making election 
79NZPD, above n 56, 6721. 
soNZPD, above n 56,6708 (Lange), 6718 (Hawkins), 6721 (Cullen). 
8I NZPD, above n 56,6708 (Lange), 6723 (Cullen). 
82NZPD, above n 56, 6723. Given the factors which gave rise to the call for direct democracy, 
Cullen's point was ironic. 
83NZPD, above n 56,6706. 
84NZPD, above n 56,6706 (Lange), 6719 (Hawkins). 
85NZPD, above n 56,6707,6709 (Lange). 
86NZPD, above n 56, 6712. 
87NZPD, above n 56, 6723. 
88NZPD, above n 56,6722. 
89NZPD, above n 56,6707,6709. 
9ONZPD, above n 56,6708 (Lange) . 
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promises that they do not keep.91 According to Lange, the democratic process would 
be unchanged, which would make the CIR Bill "a fraud on the community. ,,92 
The Labour Opposition also argued that most issues are too complex to be resolved 
by referendum. 93 Cullen stated that framing a question in a way that allows only one 
of two answers rules out the consideration of an enormous number of issues. 94 
Caygill reasoned that it would allow skewed questions. For example, a group could 
run a referendum on penal punishment that gave a choice between hanging and 
flogging. 95 The result would not indicate whether either option enjoyed popular 
support. Cullen also noted that questions can be biased.96 Hunt, using abortion as an 
example, doubted that the Clerk of the House could frame questions which were fair 
to both sides. 97 
In addition, Lange and Hunt embraced Burke's theory of representation. Lange 
argued that a government should be allowed to govern until it fails to command a 
parliamentary majority or is turfed out at a general election. In his view, indicative 
referendums are destructive of government authority; the implementation of an 
election manifesto or program should not be frustrated by initiatives. 98 Hunt admitted 
that he had never polled his electorate and stated that he probably never will. He 
argued that his only obligation to the electorate was to vote on the issues without 
abstaining. His record was open for judgement at election, which was to be expected 
in a democracy. If his constituents did not like his decisions, they could vote him out 
of office. He opposed the CIR Bill because it would upset this system of 
accountability.99 However, Hawkins softened this stance by arguing that the 
"government is answerable to the people at all times. " 100 
The Labour Opposition also criticised the CIR Bill for placing a raft of novel 
obligations on the Clerk of the House. 101 Caygill argued that requiring the Clerk to 
determine the questions for referendums would draw the Clerk into the political arena 
in an unprecedented manner. 102 Cullen predicted that it would politicise the Office of 
the Clerk. 103 In addition, the Labour Opposition faulted the CIR Bill's advertising 
9I NZPD, above n 56, 6716 (Hunt), 6719 (Hawkins). 
92NZPD, above n 56, 6707, 6708. 
93NZPD, above n 56, 6706 (Lange), 6712 (Caygill), 6715, 6716 (Hunt), 6721 (Cullen). 
94NZPD, above n 56,6721. 
95NZPD, above n 56, 6712. 
96NZPD, above n 56,6722. 
97NZPD, above n 56,6716. 
98NZPD, above n 56,6706. 
99NZPD, above n 56,6715. 
looNZPD, above n 56,6718. 
1OI NZPD , above n 56, 6707 (Lange), 6712 (Caygill). 
I02NZPD, above n 56, 6712. 
103NZPD, above n 56, 6722. 
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restrictions as unenforceable. I04 Lange argued that any amount could be spent; third 
parties, ostensibly working independently, could circumvent the $50,000 limit placed 
on individuals or those working in conjunction with others. 105 
Lange, Hunt, and Hawkins also reminded parliamentarians that the Royal 
Commission on the Electoral System was fmnly against the idea of citizens initiated 
referendums. 106 Lange and Hawkins pointed out that referendums attract lower 
turnouts than general elections. I07 Hawkins also suggested that the CIR Bill would 
give some people an opportunity to manipulate public opinion, which he characterised 
as easy. 108 Hunt implied that promoters would flood New Zealand with referendums 
designed to reduce taxes. 109 In addition, Lange criticised the delaying mechanisms 
built into the CIR Bill because they would allow the marshalling of all referendums 
into one election. 110 
C Common Ground 
Despite their differences, the National Government and the Labour Opposition agreed 
that the system should be non-binding! II Those participating in the debate provided 
the following reasons: 1) some issues, like national security, foreign affairs, and 
fiscal policy, must always remain the responsibility of the government of the day 
because only it has all the information necessary to make a decision;112 2) it provides a 
safeguard for minority · rights, particularly in cases with low turnouts and narrow 
majorities;113 3) the National Party's election manifesto promised it would be non-
100NZPD, above n 56, 6712 (Caygill). 
IOSNZPD, above n 56,6709. 
106NZPD, above n 56, 6707 (Lange), 6715 (Hunt), 6719 (Hawkins). The Australians also noted that 
the CIR Bill was contrary to the Royal Commission's recommendations . "Developments" (1992) 3 
Public L R 127. 
107NZPD, above n 56, 6709 (Lange), 6718 (Hawkins). 
108NZPD, above n 56, 6718. 
109 Above. Hunt incorrectly claimed that every proposition in the United States concerns the reduction 
of taxation. See generally eg D Magleby Direct Legislation: Voting on Ballot Propositions in the 
United States (John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1984); G Walker Initiative and Referendum: 
The People's Law (The Centre for Independent Studies Ltd, St Leonards, 1987); T Cronin Direct 
Democracy: The Politics of Initiative, Referendum, and Recall (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 
1989). 
IIONZPD, above n 56,6721. 
IIINZPD, above n 56,6723. 
112NZPD, above n 56,6704 (Graham). 
113NZPD, above n 56, 6704, 6705 (Graham), 6714 (Fletcher), 6720 (Ryall), 6706, 6707 (Lange), 6723 
(Cullen). The Minister of Justice argued that under a binding system low turnouts with narrow 
majorities could permit a small percentage of the electors to impose their will, which would risk the 
oppression of minority groups . NZPD, above n 56, 6704, 6705. Cullen argued: "It is utterly wrong to 
have binding referendums because the House at times stands to protect minorities against majorities. 
Democracy is not just about the majority ruling; it is also about the protection of minorities, and 
binding referenda are a very dangerous mechanism for destroying the rights of minorities. NZPD, 
above n 56,6723. Both Lange and Hunt argued that direct democracy in Switzerland prevented women 
from getting the vote in national elections until 1971 (but they did not mention that giving women the 
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binding; 114 4) it avoided the necessity, and complex problem, of developing subject 
matter limitations; 115 5) changes to the parliamentary system of representative 
democracy should be made carefully, cautiously, and deliberately; 116 6) the moral 
force of a non-binding referendum result would be enormous and overpowering;117 7) 
it would protect the silent majority against a vocal minority, especially well-organised 
or well-fmanced minority;118 8) there is no need to regain control of the legislature 
from powerful moneyed interests; 119 9) it is a compromise; 10) a government should 
be allowed to govern without interference until it fails to command a parliamentary 
majority or is voted out of office at a general election;l20 11) a binding system would 
take the process of lawmaking away from legislators and result in an incoherent and 
chaotic body of law;121 and 12) the example of history and of other countries indicates 
that a binding system would be unwise and would force the government of the day to 
change the legislation in the years to come. III 
However, the National Government left open the possibility of a binding system. The 
Minister of Justice noted that none of the speakers wanted a binding system at this 
time. 123 He stated that the National Government would review the cm Bill in 5 
years, at which time making referendums binding may be appropriate. 124 Anderson 
echoed the Minister's sentiments; however, he suggested a 10 year period. l2S 
McCully invited those who wanted a binding system to run a referendum to 
demonstrate public support for their position. 126 These comments were undoubtedly 
intended to assuage those who were advocating a binding system. 
right to vote in national elections necessitated a constitutionally required referendum). NZPD, above n 
56,6707, 6715. Lange also argued that worthwhile reforms, like the abolishment of capital punishment 
or the decriminalisation of homosexuality, would not have occurred if put to a referendum. NZPD, 
above n 56, 6707. 
114NZPD, above n 56, 6710 (McCully) , 6720 (Ryall) . 
llsNZPD, above n 56,6710 (McCully) , 6720 (Ryall) . 
116NZPD, above n 56, 6710 (McCully) , 6714 (Fletcher) , 6717 (Anderson). They argued that the CIR 
Bill was a cautious first step toward greater public participation. Above. 
117NZPD,. above n 56,6710 (McCully) , 6717 (Anderson) , 6724 (Graham). 
118NZPD , above n 56, 6717 (Anderson) , 6720 (Ryall). Fletcher argued that it would allow common 
sense to deal with the problem of frivolous and vexatious petitions. NZPD, above n 56, 6714. 119 . NZPD, above n 56, 6720 (Ryall). 
120NZPD, above n 56, 6706 (Lange) . 
121 NZPD, above n 56, 6711 , 6712. To suggest that the California legal system is chaotic is erroneous. 
The error is compounded by suggesting that the complex interplay between federal and state laws in 
California is chaotic because of binding referendums, particularly as the vast majority of the successful 
referendums in California have been sponsored by the California State Government. See generally 
chapter six. 
122NZPD, above n 56, 6717 (Hunt). 
123NZPD, above n 56,6723 . 
124NZPD, above n 56,6705. 
12SNZPD, above n 56, 6717. 
126NZPD, above n 56, 6710. 
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In addition, both Lange and Anderson suggested that a non-binding system would 
present many of the difficulties inherent in a binding system. Lange argued that 
indicative referendums were destructive of government authority. 127 Anderson 
explained why: 128 
Any government that does not recognise a clear mandate from the people would be 
foolish to ignore the message that comes from the public . .. . 
In his view, both parties would implement a referendum result backed by an 
overwhelming majority. 129 The Minister of Justice acknowledged this point by 
stating: 130 
If the Government allows the people to have a say, and a large number of people 
support the proposition, the Government will have to go out of its way to persuade the 
public why its wish is not being adopted. If the Government cannot do that it will fail. 
However, the Minister viewed this as a virtue rather than as a vice. Lange, who had 
anticipated this argument, rationalised the Minister's stance by arguing that the 
National Government had no intention of giving effect to any result which it found 
objectionable. 131 
In spite of its objections, the Labour Opposition decided to let the CIR Bill go to the 
Electoral Law Select Committee without forcing a division. Both Lange and Hunt felt 
that the Bill involved issues on which people should make sUbmissions.132 However, 
Lange also hoped it would result in a replay of the debacle Bolger experienced in 
trying to remove direct democracy from the agenda of the National Party Annual 
National Conference in 1990.133 Cullen stressed that the Labour Opposition's decision 
could not be interpreted as support for the CIR Bill. 134 
127NZPD, above n 56,6706. 
128NZPD, above n 56, 6717. Hawkins argued that having to respond to some referendum issues would 
cause all sorts of problems for a government. NZPD, above n 56,6719. 
129NZPD, above n 56, 6717 (Anderson). However, Anderson defmed "majority" in terms of registered 
electors, not just those taking part in the referendum. Above. This point was debated and rejected in 
the context of the proportional representation debate. Peter Shirtcliff, the Chief Executive Officer of 
Telecom and Head of the Campaign for Better Government organisation, had asked the Electoral Law 
Select Committee to amend the Electoral Reform Bill so that proportional representation could only 
become law if a majority of registered electors approved it, rather than just a simple majority of those 
who voted. The Select Committee rejected Shirtcliff's proposal as undemocratic. Caygill argued that it 
would effectively give those who did not vote a vote against proportional representation. The so-called 
Shirtcliff amendment also failed to win support when the Electoral Reform Bill reached the Committee 
of the whole House. 
130NZPD, above n 56,6724. 
13I NZPD, above n 56, 6708 (Lange) (stating: "We are throwing out to the waiting dogs a crumb of 
hope, and when they fmd it they will be tranquillised by it, because the Government will not take any 
notice of what the public seems to prefer"). 
I32NZPD, above n 56,6708 (Lange), 6714 (Hunt). 
133NZPD, above n 56, 6708. See sections II.B.2(e) and II.B.2(1) in chapter seven. 
134NZPD, above n 56, 6721. 
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D Media Response 
The New Zealand Press Association (NZPA) produced a widely published account of 
the eIR Bill's first reading debate.135 It reported, without challenge, the concerns that 
Caygill and Hunt had raised regarding the wording of referendum questions. It also 
briefly mentioned Lange's observation that the National Government reluctantly 
supported the eIR Bill. However, it focused on two main issues: 1) the eIR Bill's 
non-binding nature; and 2) its 10 percent signature threshold requirement. 
Although the NZPA referred to the eIR Bill's non-binding nature as a "catch," it did 
not offer one argument against it. Instead it paraphrased the main arguments for a 
non-binding system: 1) it was promised in National Party's election manifesto; 2) 
some issues, particularly national security, foreign policy, and fiscal policy, should 
remain the responsibility of the government because only it has all the information 
necessary to make a decision; 3) it obviated the necessity of devising subject matter 
limitations; and ' 4) it offset the risk that minority groups would be oppressed by 
results based on low turnouts with small majorities. 
The NZP A also defended the 10 percent signature trigger threshold. However, it 
offered a justification that did not arise during the first reading debate. The NZPA 
suggested that the 232,000 odd signature requirement was reasonable because it fell 
135 See eg "Bill Backs Referenda: But Gov't Will Insist on Veto Clause" Daily News, New Zealand, 11 
March 1992; "Referendum Draft Holds Catch" Daily Post, New Zealand, 11 March 1992; "Bill Allows 
Petitions to Force Referendums" The Evening Post, Wellington, New Zealand, 11 March 1992; 
"Petitions May Force Polls" Nelson Evening Mail, Nelson, New Zealand, 11 March 1992; "Bill to 
Allow Referenda Introduced" Timaru Herald, Timaru, New Zealand, 11 March 1992; "Giving Us a 
Say in a Way" Waikato Times, Hamilton, New Zealand, 11 March 1992. For additional syndicated 
commentary in the same vein, see M Munro "The Voice of the People May Not Be Powerful" The 
Dominion, Wellington, New Zealand, 16 March 1992; M Munro "Non-binding Vote Cooked Up" The 
Waikato Times, Hamilton, New Zealand, 16 March 1992; M Munro "MPs Lock Horns with Dilemma" 
The Timaru Herald, Timaru, New Zealand, 16 March 1992. See also J Armstrong "Government 
Grapples with Another Promise" New Zealand Herald, Auckland, New Zealand, 14 March 1992. 
Other reports simply covered the highlights of the debate and concentrated on the CIR Bill's procedural 
aspects, particularly the power given to the House to delay a citizens initiated referendum for up to 24 
months if 75 percent of all MPs agree. However, as a point of departure, they highlighted the National 
Government's intention to review the legislation in five years time to consider whether to move to a 
binding system. See eg M Munro "Referendum Bill Introduced - With Several Conditions" The 
Dominion, Wellington, New Zealand, 11 March 1992; "Government Introduces Referendum Bill" The 
Press, Christchurch, New Zealand, 11 March 1992; P Luke "Gov't Not Bound by Outcome of Polls" 
The Press, Christchurch, New Zealand, 11 March 1992, 6; A Stone "Gov't Can Ignore Citizens' 
Referendum" New Zealand Herald, Auckland, New Zealand, 11 March 1992. One reporter quipped 
that the way things were going the first to use the CIR Act would be the National Government's own 
backbench and some of its Ministers. J Clifton "Referendums to the Rescue" The Dominion, 
Wellington, New Zealand, 11 March 1992. 
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"well within the range of big petitions in recent years. ,,136 After citing some of the 
largest parliamentary petitions, it mentioned the 181,551 signatures that then New 
Labour Leader Jim Anderton had collected for his petition asking the National 
Government to resign. Although the NZP A did not report the fact, Anderton had 
collected the signatures in five months. 137 Anderton inadvertently lent more support 
to the NZPA's 'ease-of-collection' theory when he declared that he had gathered the 
signatures by "trundling around the electorates and quite without any mass 
institutional support. ,,138 
The NZPA's argument, however, was flawed in two respects. First, it did not 
acknowledge that collecting signatures from registered electors would be more 
difficult than collecting signatures from anyone regardless of their status, which is 
typically the case with parliamentary petitions. Anderton, for example, stated that 
every single person who passed him in Bluff had signed his petition. 139 Second, 
petitioners would have to collect substantially more than the minimum number of 
required signatures to compensate for the margin of error that any sampling technique 
used to verify the signatures would produce. A certain percentage of electors who 
were registered when they signed a petition would not be registered by the time their 
signatures were checked. l40 
The leading editorials gave the CIR Bill a mixed reception. 141 The New Zealand 
Herald, the Timaru Herald, and the Waikato Times welcomed it as a means of 
reducing the likelihood that politicians would continue to ignore public opinion as 
they have, which would place some constraints on executive power. The Daily Post, 
the Gisborne Herald, the Evening Post, the Dominion, and the Press opposed it for a 
variety of reasons: 1) it would be a costly exercise that would only create the illusion 
of greater participation; 2) it was the product of an ill-judged election promise; 3) 
136The NZPA cited the petitions regarding the Homosexual Law Reform Bill (817,000 signatures), the 
Maruia Declaration (337,000), and the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (333,052). See NZPA 
articles, above n 135. 
137 Anderton launched his petition on 9 August 1991. "Election Petition" The Dominion, Wellington, 
New Zealand, 10 August 1991. He closed his petition drive on 30 November 1991. See D Dawson 
"Elderly Voice Criticism" The Dominion, Wellington, New Zealand, 25 November 1991, 3. 
138J Anderton "Reflections on Referendums" in A Simpson (ed) Referendums: Constitutional and 
Political Perspectives (Victoria University of Wellington, Wellington, 1992) 88. 
139 Above. 
140The inverse is unlikely as prudent petitioners would generally ask those who sign their petitions 
whether they are registered to vote, which is the practice in California. 
141"Referendum Bill a Futile Exercise" Daily Post, New Zealand, 11 March 1992; "Two Cheers for 
Polls" New Zealand Herald, Auckland, New Zealand, 12 March 1992; "Referendums an Extra 
Communication Line" Waikato Times, 13 March 1992; "Risks of Referendums" The Press, 
Christchurch, New Zealand, 14 March 1992; "A Say for the Public" Timaru Herald, Timaru, New 
Zealand, 16 March 1992; "An Illusion of Participation" The Dominion, Wellington, New Zealand, 17 
March 1992; "More Common Sense and There Would Be No Need for Referenda" Gisborne Herald, 
Gisbome, New Zealand, 17 March 1992; "Referendums Bill a Hollow Gesture" The Evening Post, 18 
March 1992. 
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referendums are blunt and crude devices; 4) MPs are elected to govern and to 
represent the public and to make decisions for its betterment, not reflect its opinion; 142 
and 5) the triennial election remains the best option to curb executive power, 
especially if politicians stick to their word. 143 
However, they all agreed, for the reasons articulated in the fIrst reading debate, that 
citizens initiated referendums should be non-binding. Although some stated that the 
10 percent signature threshold was high, none objected to it.l44 They also agreed that 
the eIR Bill was produced in response to voter frustration with broken promises and 
the implementation of policies that had no mandate because they were not signalled in 
a government's election manifesto. In their view, support for direct democracy would 
have been virtually non-existent if political parties had honoured their election 
manifestos. 
In addition, the editorials revealed the irony inherent in the eIR Bill's introduction. 
The Evening Post suggested that the eIR Bill proved that the formal lines of 
communications between electors and the elected had broken down. The New 
Zealand Herald reached the opposite conclusion, arguing that it showed that the 
system was responsive. The Press declared that it would make government less 
responsive by increasing reliance on referendums, which would be contrary to the 
aims of those the CIR Bill was meant to placate. It would also increase the influence 
of "pressure groups, ... morals police, and behavioural gauleiters" by giving them a 
platform for their "propaganda campaigns. ,,145 
142The Timaru Herald and the Waikato Times also agreed that once a government was elected, the 
electors had to invest some faith in its representatives and leave them to implement policy unless certain 
conditions were met. According to the Timaru Herald, referendums can be a legitimate addendum to 
Westminster democracy, but they cannot be a substitute for it. See above editorials note 141. 
143For additional commentary in the same vein, see B Rudman "Stone Age Way of Conducting a Poll" 
The Sunday Star, New Zealand, 15 March 1992. 
I44The New Zealand Herald, without judging the matter, stated that the trigger was high. However, the 
Waikato Times viewed it as acceptable. In addition, the Gisbome Herald argued that obtaining 
signatures from 10 percent of the electorate would not be difficult if emotions were running high. The 
Press declared that most referendums would be on contentious issues. The New Zealand Herald noted 
that few contentious issues lend themselves to simple questions and open and shut answers, or give 
precise answers. The Press predicted that contentious issues would be re-litigated every five years, as 
the CIR Bill prohibited referendums on the same subject within five years of each other. See above 
editorials note 141. Despite the difficulty of narrowing a question down to a yes/no answer, the 
Minister of Justice said he would be surprised if someone did not have a referendum up and running 
within the next five years. He predicted that the subject would involve a moral choice, like the death 
penalty, abortion, or homosexuality. Radio Pacific News (Radio Pacific radio broadcast transcript, 11 
March 1992). Little did he realise that the Royal New Zealand Society for the Prevent of Cruelty to 
Animals would be the first to use the device to seek an end to battery egg production. See section IV in 
chapter nine. 
145The Press, above n 141. The reaction of the direct democracy groups to the CIR Bill was the same 
as their reaction to the National Party's election manifesto promise. For a discussion of their reaction 
to the promise, see section II.B.S in chapter seven. For discussions of their reaction to the Bill, see eg 
"Referenda Bill 'Flawed'" The Press, Christchurch, New Zealand, 16 March 1992 (National Reform 
labelled the Bill as fatally flawed because of its non-binding nature and high trigger signature trigger); 
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TIl THE SELECT COMMITTEE 
On the heels of this media response, the Electoral Law Select Committee began its 
consideration of the CIR Bill. The Select Committee system is often touted as a 
parliamentary innovation that has increased public participation in the legislative 
process. l46 However, Rusk, on the basis of his considerable experience within the 
National Party, has characterised the process in a less charitable light:147 
It's a bit of a play that's put on to let the public think it is actually participating in the 
process. Generally speaking the government of the day goes ahead and does what it 
intended. 
His assessment was both apt and prophetic regarding the CIR Bill. 148 
Murray McCully, who was a key player in the formation of the National 
Government's CIR proposal, chaired the Electoral Law Select Committee. He had 
also weathered the National Party's Annual National Conference direct democracy 
debacle in 1990. In short, he knew what to expect. Although the direct democracy 
D Blanshard "MPs Reject Criticism of Bill" Bay of Plenty Times , Bay of Plenty, New Zealand, 16 
March 1992 (Voters Voice criticised the Bill for its non-binding nature and high signature trigger); D 
Blanshard "Nats Call for Binding Referendums" Bay of Plenty Times, Bay of Plenty, New Zealand, 18 
March 1992 (National Party Tauranga electorate organisation criticised the Bill for its non-binding 
nature and promised that it would submit a remit for a binding system to the Waikato divisional 
conference in May); D Blanshard "'Pacts' Challenge Put Up on Referendums " Bay of Plenty Times, 
Bay of Plenty, New Zealand, 20 March 1992 (National Reform challenged the Minister of Justice to 
prove that direct democracy has been used to oppress minorities) . Anderson and Peters indicated that 
the CIR Bill was a positive starting point for reform and that critics should appreciate the huge step 
being taken. Peters, while stating that he pushed for a five percent signature threshold, noted that 
others were pushing for a 15 percent signature threshold. The 10 percent compromise, in his view, 
would not present the hurdle some claim. "MPs Reject", above. Grant Thomas, the MP for Hamilton 
West, came out in favour of a binding system of direct democracy. G Thomas "Public's Wish Must 
Wash" Waikato Times , Hamilton, New Zealand, 14 March 1992 (citing Walker for the proposition that 
there is not one recorded instance of direct democracy devices being used to oppress minorities) . Colin 
Clark, Chairman of the Electoral Reform Coalition (ERC) stated that referendums had a place, but he 
doubted that the CIR Bill would achieve anything because it was non-binding. He also stated that 
referendums carried the risk of becoming vehicles for well-funded groups seeking to impose restrictive 
laws. A Stone "Poll Worth Questioned" New Zealand Herald, Auckland, New Zealand, 12 March 
1992. Steve Withers, Secretary of the ERC, stated that the ERC did not see any incompatibility 
between direct democracy and proportional representation. However, he argued that if New Zealand 
had a binding system of direct democracy, the need for a more representative Parliament would be 
greater to protect minority interests. The ERC deliberately chose not to take a stand for or against 
direct democracy for practical reasons: All of its members supported mixed member proportional 
representation (MMP) , but some strongly opposed direct democracy and some strongly supported it. 
To avoid splitting the ERC over a secondary issue, it chose to focus exclusively on MMP. The inverse 
occurred in the direct democracy groups: all supported direct democracy, but their membership was 
sglit regarding MMP. Letter from the ERC to Mark Gobbi (11 May 1991). 
1 See WIles "New Zealand Experience of Parliamentary Scrutiny of Legislation" (1991) 12 Statute L 
Rev 165, 169-170, 178; J Burrows and P Joseph "Parliamentary Law Making (1990) NZU 306. 
147Letter from Merv Rusk to Mark Gobbi (15 August 1991). 
148Compare CIR Act 1993 with CIR Bill 1992 (PCO 111P). 
277 
advocates had managed to put aside their differences long enough to present a united 
front, McCully's position worked to their disadvantage. In both their written and oral 
submissions they argued for a binding system with a lower signature threshold. 
However, McCully used his procedural powers to employ a rush and delay strategy 
which undermined their focussed approach. In effect, he vanquished any hope that 
Lange entertained for a replay of the 1990 debacle. 
A Written Submissions 
A few weeks after the 10 March 1992 introduction of the cm Bill, the Select 
Committee quietly called for public submissions on the cm Bill. It set 30 April 1992 
as the deadline. 149 The low key request for submissions combined with a five week 
deadline all but ensured that Select Committee hearings would not invite many new-
comers to the direct democracy debate or inspire additional support for direct 
democracy. 150 Few individuals or organisations unfamiliar with the issues raised by 
the cm Bill would have had the opportunity or the resources to prepare persuasive 
submissions under these conditions. 151 
Nevertheless, the CIR Bill generated 66 written submissions, most of which came 
from the main direct democracy advocates. 152 Thirty-eight groups and 28 individuals, 
including the Clerk of the House and one quasi-governmental committee, the 
Legislative Advisory Committee, made submissions. Eight were in the form of 
petitions which, taken together, carried 1,636 supporting signatures. The main direct 
democracy groups produced 21 submissions: six came from divisions of the CCC, 
five from various incarnations of Voters' Voice, three from superannuitant 
organisations, two each from the ONZF and National Reform, and one each from the 
NZCM, the Democrats, and FAIR. Five submissions also came from officials within 
the National Party, all of whom were members of National Reform. Most of the 
149See eg Parliamentary Order Paper (28 April 1992). 
150A five week deadline is typical. Iles, above n 146, 169. However, this period is often inadequate. 
See Burrows, above n 146. 
151See Burrows, above n 146. 
15~e Department of Justice counted 59 written submissions. Department of Justice CIR Bill: Report 
of the Department of Justice: Part A (17 August 1992). The Office of the Clerk counted 58 written 
submission and 4 organised campaigns. Office of the Clerk CIR Bill: Submissions Summary Report (28 
May 1992); see also Office of the Clerk CIR Bill: Clausal Analysis of Submissions (undated). 
However, the Department's 59th submission and the Clerk's 4 responses were actually a collection of 8 
petitions which contained enough variation as to be counted individually. Office of the Clerk CIR Bill: 
Campaign Letters/Forms (28 May 1928). See also Submissions on the CIR Bill to the Electoral Law 
Select Committee (1992). According to officials at the Department of Justice, the number of 
submissions for the CIR Bill was above average. 
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individual submissions also came from people involved with or influenced by one of 
the main direct democracy groups. 153 
Fifty-seven of these submissions expressed support for direct democracy. One 
expressed qualified support, while five expressed no view. Three rejected the CIR 
Bill because they were opposed to direct democracy in principle. Fifty-four opposed 
the CIR Bill because of its form. Nine did not express a view. Forty-nine 
submissions stated that citizens initiated referendums should be binding, however, six 
of these called for special majorities. Two stated that a binding system should be 
entrenched. Two expressly supported a non-binding system. Five argued that the 
CIR Bill, given its non-binding nature, was misnamed; they suggested that it should 
be called the "Public Opinion," "Indicative Referenda," "Government Indicative 
Poll," or "Public or Citizens Preference Survey" Bill. 
Forty-five of the submissions complained that the signature trigger level was far too 
high. Thirty-six argued for a trigger between two to three percent of registered 
electors or 50,000 signatures, of which three suggested that signatures of 100,000 
electors would be appropriate for constitutional issues. Four suggested five percent 
or 100,000, while one suggested 80,000. Four did not express an alternative. In 
correlation with a lower trigger, fourteen of the submissions argued that the time 
frame for the citizens initiative referendum process could be and should be shortened. 
The expenditure limits that the CIR Bill imposed on advertising referendum 
campaigns also came under criticism. Five submissions argued that they were too 
low, while two argued that they were unnecessary. Another four considered them 
unenforceable. As a related point, most of the submissions viewed the language of 
the Bill as unclear. This inspired a host of suggested technical changes. One 
submission went so far as to submit a complete rewrite of the CIR Bill to the Select 
Committee for its consideration. 
The requirement that the Clerk of the House must determine the precise referendum 
question also proved contentious. Seven submissions argued that the question should 
be in the exact form proposed by its promoter. Two argued that the precise question 
should be framed by an independent commission and one suggested that independent 
lawyers should frame the precise question. The Clerk recommended that this 
responsibility be given to the Speaker of the House. 
153This appears to be a consequence of National Reform's submission strategy. See note 309 in chapter 
seven. 
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The submissions also took issue with the unstated fee. Three stated that it should be 
$200. Two said it should be not be a barrier to participation. However, one argued 
that the fee should recover part of the cost of certification, which would be 
significant. In addition, three submissions addressed the topic of voter information 
pamphlets. They suggested that the em Bill should contain provisions requiring the 
government to supply them to the electors to ensure their access to balanced 
information. 
Some of the submissions also considered the issue of minority rights. Four argued 
that citizens initiated referendums could be used to express popular prejudices, curb 
programs for the disadvantaged, or enforce cultural dominance. 154 Two of these were 
particularly concerned about protecting Maori Treaty rights against the rule of the 
majority. However, three submissions pointed out the absence of any documented 
evidence demonstrating that citizens initiated referendums have been used to oppress 
minority rights .155 On a related topic, three submissions applauded the absence of 
subject matter limitations, while four suggested the following limitations: the budget 
as a whole, human rights, foreign affairs, internal security, and defence (unless it 
concerned a decision to rejoin ANZUS, or to join an international organisation, or the 
multilateral unification of law). 
The submissions also raised a number of general criticisms against the eIR Bill. 
Eleven called it a farce. Seven opposed it because it gave control over the process to 
the government of the day. Six argued that it would be costly, of which one 
suggested that an opinion poll would be cheaper. Three thought it created too many 
hurdles to be useful. Three believed that the em Bill was drafted hastily without 
proper consultation with interested groups. Two viewed it as a glorified opinion poll. 
One stated that the National Government had not provided any justification for it. 
One argued that it would not make politicians more responsive while one suggested it 
would make them less responsive. One warned that it would fragment a 
government's policy direction. However, another argued that its uselessness in 
curbing executive power would increase the disillusionment of the electorate. 
154Submission from the Auckland Lesbian & Gay Lawyers Group to the Electoral Law Select 
Committee, 7W (undated); Submission from Joint Methodist - Prebyterian Public Questions Committee 
to the Electoral Law Select Committee, 44W (29 April 1992); Submission from Catholic Commission 
for Justice, Peace and Development to the Electoral Law Select Committee, 46 (30 April 1992); 
Submission from New Zealand Aids Foundation to the Electoral Law Select Committee, 57W (11 May 
1992). 
155Submission from Michael Taylor to the Electoral Law Select Committee, 4 (undated); Submission 
from National Party, Otumoetai Branch of the Tauranga Electorate to the Electoral Law Select 
Committee (Mike Houlding, Chairperson), 13W (April 1992); Submission from National Party, 
Taranaki Electorate (Bruce Knowles, Chairperson) to the Electoral Law Select Committee, 18 
(undated). The principal author of each of these submissions was a member of National Reform. 
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This irony also ran through the submissions of those who expressly opposed direct 
democracy . The New Zealand Aids Foundation and the Auckland Lesbian & Gay 
Lawyers Group both argued that the CIR Bill would enable small groups with ultra-
right agendas to exert a disproportionate influence on the policy making process by 
playing on the fears and prejudices of the population at large. 156 However, the New 
Zealand Employers Federation came out against the CIR Bill because rejection of a 
crucial aspect of a government's economic policy would undermine its overall 
economic program because a government would be morally obliged to implement the 
wishes of a majority. 157 
These groups expressed the fear that direct democracy would work against their 
interests. One submission suggested that these fears were baseless by pointing out 
that experience with binding direct democracy devices has shown that they are 
electorally neutral, that is, they favour neither the right nor the left}58 The 
Department of Justice had come to the same conclusion. 159 The majority of the 
remaining comments concerned technical changes to the CIR Bill which would 
accommodate the concerns raised in the submissions or would give life to a particular 
system of direct democracy. 
B Oral Submissions 
The Clerks servicing the Electoral Law Select Committee completed their summary of 
the written submissions on 28 May 1992, four weeks after the submission deadline. 160 
Upon receiving their report, McCully instructed them to inform all interested parties 
that he had selected 10 June 1992 as the date to begin consideration of the oral 
submissions. 161 Thirty-one of the groups or individuals making submissions indicated 
that they wanted to appear before the Select Committee to argue their case; however, 
only 15 had the resources or the flexibility to comply with the Select Committee's 
Wednesday morning meeting schedule. 162 
156Lawyers Groups, above n 154; Aids Foundation, above n 154. 
157Submission from the New Zealand Employers Federation to the Electoral Law Select Committee, 53 
(April 1992). 
1580tumoetai Branch, above n 155. 
159Justice, Part A, above n 152; see also Magleby, above n 109, 190-191 ; Cronin, above n 109, 200-
201. 
160See Summary, above n 152. 
1611n the interim, the Department of Justice provided the Select Committee members with a summary of 
the CIR Bill for their consideration. Department of Justice CIR Bill: Briefing Paper (3 June 1992). 
162See generally Submissions, above n 152. 
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1 First day of hearings 
McCully decided that the main direct democracy groups should appear together on the 
ftrst day of the hearings. 163 He also scheduled the appearance of several opponents of 
direct democracy, which were positioned ftrst, third, and eighth out of ten 
submissions. He set aside 3.5 hours to hear them; however, approximately 40 
minutes of this time was dedicated to administrative matters, which left the 
submissioners standing in the hall for the ftrst 30 minutes of the scheduled hearing 
time. The effect was fourfold: it unsettled further those advocates who were 
appearing before a select committee for the ftrst time; it diverted the advocates from 
their planned arguments to a paraphrase of them given a shortage of time; it 
contrasted their arguments and style with the opponents of direct democracy; and, it 
revealed inconsistencies in their arguments. 
McCully's absence also worked to the disadvantage of the direct democracy 
advocates. When they fmally came before the Select Committee they were 
disappointed to discover that Marie Hasler, a ftrst-term parliamentarian, would be 
chairing the proceedings. By scheduling a hearing which he could or would not 
attend, McCully had deprived the direct democracy advocates of their only 
opportunity to understand fully the National Government's opposition to their 
proposals, which reduced their chances of assuaging its concerns. 
Paradoxically, all of the submissioners spoke against the CIR Bill. The advocates of 
direct democracy denounced it as insufftcient, while its opponents rejected it as 
unnecessary, dangerous, or contrary to the recommendations of the Royal 
Commission. The Select Committee rarely engaged the opponents, preferring to note 
their concerns and to thank them for their contributions. However, it pursued a 
confrontational line with the advocates, which was encouraged by their predisposition 
and manner during the hearings. Most of the opponents were expensively-dressed, 
extremely courteous, and selectively-informed professionals who appear regularly 
before select committees as part of their work. Most of the advocates were 
inexpensively-dressed, slightly contemptuous, and well-informed amateurs who were 
personally fmancing their ftrst appearance before a select committee. 
Both sides were articulate. However, the advocates tended to belabour their views 
and to undermine their case by overselling the virtues of direct democracy. 164 In 
163M Gobbi, Electoral Law Select Committee Proceedings Notes (10 June 1992). 
164Por example, several of the advocates, particularly FAIR and the CCC tried to argue that the 
economic success of Switzerland was attributable to direct democracy. Ryall repeatedly rejected this 
claim by arguing that it could not be proven as the success could be attributed to any number of other 
factors. Above. 
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addition, the Select Committee was predisposed against their arguments. The 
National Government MPs were not prepared to reconsider any of the policy 
decisions underlying the CIR Bill. One Select Committee member, Tony Ryall, the 
National Party MP for East Cape, was openly hostile. During the hearings he 
challenged the assertions of the advocates but left unquestioned similarly 
insupportable statements made by their opponents. The Labour Opposition had 
declared its animosity toward the CIR Bill during its flrst reading. 
The National Council of Women began the hearings. It opposed the CIR Bill for 
three reasons: 1) women would not beneflt from it because they do not constitute an 
organised interest group that could effectively counteract moneyed opponents using 
the mechanism against their interests;16S 2) it promised something it could not deliver; 
and 3) governments were elected to govern. The NCW also argued that the CIR Bill 
was contrary to the principles of consultation. 166 It concluded that it would never 
support a binding system because special interests would be too influential. 167 
However, the NCW noted its growing alarm regarding the widespread belief that 
governments were not sufficiently responsive to the wishes of the people. 168 As a 
result, it declared that it was exploring other ways to make government more 
responsive. 169 
FAIR began with the inference that New Zealand could avoid its destiny as a third 
world country if it adopted a binding system of direct democracy. Sensing the futility 
of this argument, FAIR shifted its attention to the CIR Bill's primary failing: a non-
binding system would not restore trust in the political process because it would be 
16SIt is paradoxical that a national organisation for women would claim that women do not constitute an 
organised interest group or that they lack the sophistication to do battle with monied interests. 
166The NCW stated that it used a canvas system, where due weight is given to size/group of comment, 
to determine its position; it tries to reflect membership opinion/feeling by using open questions to obtain 
qualitative data. Notes, above n 163. 
167The League of Women Voters of California reached a different conclusion in its study of the 
California system of direct democracy: "Direct Legislation was an idea whose time had come in 
California in 1911. Despite the criticisms and concerns that process is attracting, it does not appear to 
be an idea whose time has passed." League of Women Voters of California Initiative and Referendum 
in California: A Legacy Lost? A Study of Direct Legislation in California from Progressive Hopes to 
Present Reality (League of Women Voters of California, Sacramento, 1984 reprint 1987) 74. In 
addition, the Women's Division of the Federated Farmers of New Zealand stated that the CIR Bill had 
very little value and no real justification if there was no obligation on the government of the day to take 
further action. Submission from the Women's Division Federated Farmers of New Zealand to the 
Electoral Law Select Committee, 49W (Apri11992). . 
168Submission from the National Council of Women to the Electoral Law Select Committee, 15 
(undated). 
169Jocelyn Keith and Anne Holden represented the NCW; they spoke for 10 minutes; the exchange was 
polite. Notes, above n 163. 
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perceived as an attempt to deceive the public. FAIR argued that the electors should 
have the right to decide, just like shareholders in a public company. 170 
The Committee members, however, were less interested in FAIR's arguments, than in 
its membership and constitutional structure. Due to its regular and well-organised 
letter writing campaigns and its monthly newsletters, they viewed FAIR has the 
leading non-party advocate of direct democracy. They wanted to know what it would 
cost in electoral support to resist its demand for a binding system of direct 
democracy. Although evasive at flrst, FAIR stated that its membership was national 
and consisted of 700 to 800 paid up supporters, and that it also enjoyed the support 
of other organisations. FAIR also informed them that it had a central committee 
made up of four people, whose sole objective was to establish direct democracy ill 
New Zealand. 171 
The New Zealand Employers Federation (NZEF) followed FAIR with arguments 
against direct democracy as well as the CIR Bill. In its view, direct democracy would 
separate representatives from their responsibility to make decisions, oversimplify 
issues, obstruct representative government, upset the allocation of tax money, 
encourage regional politics at the expense of national interest,172 and produce 
inconsistent government policy. The NZEF argued that the CIR Bill should not 
proceed, because the process could easily be abused and badly affect business 
confldence. 173 In addition, people who sign petitions often do not realise the 
consequences of their action. However, if the CIR Bill did proceed,174 it should be 
non-binding and should exempt monetary and flscal policy or be limited to conscience 
issues. 175 
170FAIR also questioned the estimated cost figures for citizens initiated referendums (approximately 
$8,500,000 excluding GST). According to FAIR, it costs Australia an estimated $2,500,000 to run its 
constitutionally required referendums, which involve more people over a greater geographical area. 
FAIR could not believe that the National Government had spent $15 million on the September 1992 
referendum. It suggested that there should be more set referendum dates each year, with no limit on 
the number of referendums to keep costs down. National Reform also characterised the cost estimates 
as extravagant. It suggested that cost could be reduced by voting by mail or voting by computer. 
FAIR also argued that the system should be binding, and that the trigger level should be lower because 
the CIR Bill would place the device out of reach for those without money or large volunteer 
organisations. Above. 
171Gilich represented FAIR. He spoke for 20 minutes; the exchange was confrontational and 
argumentative. Above; see also Submission from FAIR to the Electoral Law Select Committee, 21 (23 
Af.ril 1992). 
17 The NZEF cited the Auckland Harbour sale row as an example in which a national referendum might 
be used to settle a local issue. Notes, above n 163. 
I73Submission from the New Zealand Employers Federation to the Electoral Law Select Committee, 53 
(April 1992). 
174The NZEF's submission compelled Ryall to defend the CIR Bill; he avoided giving it his 
endorsement by noting that it fulfilled an election undertaking. Notes, above n 163. 
175John Pask and Barbara Burton represented the NZEF. They spoke for 5 minutes; their exchange was 
polite. Above. The submissions from the New Zealand Aids Foundation and the Auckland Lesbian 
and Gay Lawyers Group could also be read as opposing referendums on conscience issues, at least as 
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John Mann came out in favour of direct democracy. However, he considered the CIR 
Bill "totally unacceptable." If it remained in its current form, its name should be 
changed because it was misleading.176 He also attacked cost as a grounds for 
objecting to direct democracy. It should be judged on whether it would improve 
democracy in New Zealand, which he was confident it would do. In his view, direct 
democracy would encourage MPs to consult the electorate regularly and reduce the 
delegation of authority to unelected representatives, the importation of foreign laws, 
and international control over New Zealand. It would also attract qualified people to 
government as it would have an anti-patronage affect. In addition, cost could be 
reduced in a number of ways. For example, fixed dates for referendums could be set 
or computer technology could be used. 177 
National Reform argued that the system should be binding because the fundamental 
purpose of direct democracy was to countermand government action that lacked a 
mandate. In its view, a binding system would improve the representative system, 
slow down the legislative process, and promote responsible and accountable 
government. It would also give the electors the ability to decide issues for 
themselves, which they should have the right to do. In addition, National Reform 
pointed out that all of the systems in existence are binding and they work. It also 
argued that the CIR Bill was a failed and ill-informed attempt to appease those calling 
for direct democracy. In closing, National Reform asked the Select Committee 
members to take the issue more seriously and encouraged them to study Walker's 
work to acquire the necessary factual basis for their deliberations. 178 
The National Party's Taranaki electorate organisation characterised the CIR Bill as an 
expensive vote of no confidence in the intelligence of the average New Zealander. It 
they affected health policy and minority rights . See Submission from the New Zealand Aids 
Foundation to the Electoral Law Select Committee (undated); Submission from the Auckland Lesbian 
and Gay Lawyers Group to the Electoral Law Select Committee (11 May 1992). 
I76Five submissions argued that the CIR Bill should be renamed to more accurately reflect its non-
binding character. Submission from John Mann to the Electoral Law Select Committee, 9 (27 April 
1992) (Indicative Referenda Bill); Submission from NZCM to the Electoral Law Select Committee, 14 
(undated) (Government Indicative Poll Bill); Submission from FAIR to the Electoral Law Select 
Committee, 21 (23 April 1992) (Public Preference Survey Bill or Citizens' Preference Survey Bill); 
Submission from Rusk to the Electoral Law Select Committee, 28W (undated) (Indicative Referenda 
Bill or Public Opinion Referenda Bill); Submission from Andrew Webber to the Electoral Law Select 
Committee, 40W (undated) (Public Opinion Bill) . 
I77Fletcher responded by defending the CIR Bill on the grounds that it would increase accountability and 
encourage greater public participation. Mann spoke for 15 minutes; the exchange was polite. Notes, 
above n 163; see also Submission from John Mann to the Electoral Law Select Committee, 9, 9a (27 
Ar.ril 1992) 
17 Knowles represented National Reform; he spoke for 30 minutes; his exchange was confrontational. 
Knowles described National Reform as a-one-issue lobby within the National Party that had supported 
binding citizens initiated referendums for the last two to three years. Notes, above n 163; see also 
Submission from National Reform to the Electoral Law Select Committee, 34 (April 1992). 
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was designed to fail, which would further frustrate the electorate. The organisation 
also argued that laws are useless if people have no respect for them. Accordingly, 
giving people the power to ratify their laws will increase their respect for the law. In 
addition, a binding system would provide the means to combat broken promises and 
to found an enduring written constitution. Further, it was not an accident that those 
countries with direct democracy were the most wealthy, democratic, and stable in the 
world. People wanted to know that their opinion counts; the future of the nation 
should not be left in the hands of a few people. 179 
Surprisingly, the CCC presented the best-reasoned case for a binding system of direct 
democracy. It would arrest the trend of governments acting without a mandate, make 
governments more accountable, increase government interest in public opinion, free 
MPs from the yoke of the party line, reduce the number of undecided voters, and give 
effect to the National Party's 1989 Annual National Conference remit.180 As it stood, 
the CIR Bill would be a cumbersome, toothless, and expensive "Heylen Poll." 181 In 
addition, no country that has direct democracy has considered abolishing it. It also 
does not deny legislative bodies their proper legislative function. Careful study of 
Walker's work would reveal that the CIR Bill's restrictions were designed to 
overcome non-existent problems. Ironically, however, the CCC' s reputation as the 
organiser of the enormous petition against the Homosexual Law Reform Bill was 
more influential than its arguments. It had the effect of confirming the need to protect 
the rights of minorities; hence, a non-binding system. 182 
The Legislative Advisory Committee (LAC) stated that it had not reached a view 
regarding the merits of having direct democracy, which was ironic since its purpose is 
to comment on the constitutional implications of legislation before the House of 
Representatives. Nevertheless, it drew the Select Committee's attention to the Royal 
Commission's arguments against it. These arguments, however, did not represent the 
views of the LAC as a whole. Instead, the LAC concentrated on technical issues and 
179Knowles, as well as Bruce McCready and Yan Quintus, represented the National Party's Taranaki 
electorate organisation. Knowles spoke for 18 minutes; his exchange was still confrontational, but less 
intense than his submission on behalf of National Reform. Notes, above n 163. 
IsoRyall and the CCC also debated the issue of low voter turnout. Ryall asserted that low voter turnout, 
which is common to direct democracy system, was a problem. The CCC disagreed, stating the 
underlying democratic principle was f1rst-past-the-post which was the basis for the existing electoral 
system; it was a question of democratic principle, not statistics. Fletcher told the CCC that MPs have 
generated the most parliamentary petitions through the practice of encouraging their constituents to 
reverse the letters they send out. Notes, above n 163. 
181This position ran counter to the position taken by the NZEF, which opposed direct democracy, but 
stated that if the National Government should decide to proceed with the Bill it should be non-binding. 
Above. 
182Raymond Souza, along with Max Shierlaw, Brad Eatwell, and Chris Salt, represented the CCC. 
Souza spoke for 35 minutes; the exchange was spirited. Above; see also Submission from the Coalition 
of Concerned Citizens (National Executive) to the Electoral Law Select Committee, 43 (28 April 1992) 
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matters of clarity, of which the following were the most important: 1) the question 
should be framed in neutral and balanced terms; 2) the advertising limits should be 
better defmed to enhance their enforceability; 3) the source of funding for referendum 
campaigns should be disclosed; and 4) the advertising restrictions should apply to 
broadcasting. The LAC also indicated that the advertising limits may be too low 
given the length of time it may take to bring about a referendum (as long as three and 
a half years). 183 
The Select Committee approached the ONZF as it approached FAIR, inquiring into 
its membership and organisational structure. The ONZF responded that it had 3,000 
to 4,000 members throughout the country, held regular annual general meetings and 
produced a newsletter. The general reaction of its constituency toward the CIR Bill 
was negative, as it was seen as a Clayton's bill. The ONZF argued that a binding 
system with a shorter process and a lower signature threshold would assist in 
counteracting the feeling of powerlessness that permeated the electorate. Since the 
electorate pays taxes, it should be entitled to a greater say. It would also make 
Parliament more accountable. In addition, the ONZF declared that a binding system 
of direct democracy would constitute the most important advance since women got the 
vote; therefore, it should encourage participation by breaking the monopoly that 
elected representatives have over the legislative process. However, the ONZF's 
primary objective of establishing one law for all New Zealanders turned out to be 
more influential than its arguments, given its obvious implications for Maoridom. l84 
The Select Committee also asked the NZCM about its membership and organisation. 
It stated that it had no paid membership, but enjoyed the fmancial support of 300 
people who subscribe to its newsletter. The NZCM also stated that it worked with 
the other groups, but preferred not to join them because it wanted to work in its own 
way. Unlike the other groups, the NZCM was bold enough to voice its concern that 
the Select Committee was biased against citizens initiated referendums. It supported a 
binding system of direct democracy because electors have no access to the political 
system between elections. In its view, the country was run between elections by a 
small number of Cabinet members relying on the party whip system. No matter how 
much people complain, they were not taken seriously. A binding system would 
183Mervyn Probine, Chairman of the LAC, represented the LAC. He spoke for 6 minutes; the 
exchange was polite. The Select Committee members made a special point to thank the LAC for a 
useful and constructive submission. Notes, above n 163; see also Submission from the Legislation 
Advisory Committee to the Electoral Law Select Committee, 27 (24 April 1992). 
l~ally Boyd and A Reid represented the ONZF. Boyd spoke for 33 minutes; the exchange was even-
tempered. Notes, above n 163; see also Submission from the One New Zealand Foundation to the 
Electoral Law Select Committee, 27 (24 April 1992). 
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change this, which would restore the faith of the electorate. If MPs could trust 
electors to elect them, they could trust them in their use of the referendum. 185 
Aside from its probing to assess the political clout of the direct democracy groups, the 
Select Committee only took issue with a small number of comments. Ryall disputed 
as unprovable the assertion, made by FAIR and the CCC, that direct democracy 
produced stability and prosperity. However, he also tried to soften the NZEF's 
criticisms by stating light-heartedly that the CIR Bill constituted fulfllment of a 
National Party election manifesto promise. Pete Hodgson, a Labour MP, fell into a 
pointless and erroneous debate with National Reform over the proper interpretation of 
California's Proposition 13. Fletcher responded to John Mann's comments by 
arguing that the CIR Bill would increase accountability and encourage greater public 
participation. 186 
2 Second day of hearings 
On 17 June 1992 the hearings resumed. 187 The Select Committee heard from the 
Clerk of the House and the New Zealand Law Society (NZLS). The Clerk argued 
that he should be involved in authenticating compliance with Bill because it created a 
procedure to petition the House. The Select Committee agreed. However, the Clerk 
also argued that the Speaker of the House should determine the precise question to be 
put to the voters in a proposed indicative referendum, not the Clerk. He feared that 
the responsibility would politicise his Office. 188 
This suggestion ran counter to McCully's view that the Speaker would be 
inappropriate because he was usually a member of the government, which could give 
the impression of bias. The Office of the Clerk, which is politically neutral, would 
avoid that criticism yet keep the referendum process within Parliament. The Select 
Committee also noted that the Speaker did not want the responsibility. In addition, if 
it were given to the Speaker, he would delegate it to the Clerk. The Select 
Committee also came to the conclusion that giving the responsibility to a quango, as 
suggested by some of the submissions, would be impractical. I89 Dissatisfied with this 
decision, the Clerk chose to fight it. His opposition nearly scuttled the CIR Bill later 
in the legislative process. 
185Patricia Neagle and Brian Johnston represented the NZCM. Neagle spoke for 19 minutes; the 
exchange was straightforward. Notes, above n 163; see also Submission from the New Zealand 
Citizens Movement to the Electoral Law Select Committee, 14 (undated). 
186Notes, above n 163. 
187M Gobbi, Electoral Law Select Committee Proceedings Notes (17 June 1992). 
188 Above; see also Submission from the Clerk of the House of Representatives to the Electoral Law 
Select Committee, 35 (April 1992). 
189Notes, above n 188. 
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The NZLS did not take a stand on the CIR Bill. 190 However, it did raise several 
constitutional concerns: 1) the CIR Bill should expressly preserve the status of the 
existing petition process; 2) the Select Committee should reconsider giving 
corporations the power to initiate referendums, especially given their resources;191 3) 
the CIR Bill should have a deeming provision to protect signature verification 
determinations from being challenged in the courts; and 4) it was debatable whether 
Parliament could fetter its future actions regarding the delay of referendums with a 75 
percent majority requirement. l92 Given the procedural delays built into the CIR Bill, 
the NZLS suggested opinion polls instead. It also suggested that the CIR Bill might 
be better if it allowed for multiple choice referendums to permit a range of answers. 
In addition, it considered the sanctions in the CIR Bill to be unnecessary, which 
prompted members of the Select Committee to disagree. The NZLS concluded that 
the system should remain non-binding. 193 
3 Third day of hearings 
McCully chose 24 June 1992 to hear the balance of the oral submissions. Nicky 
Hager, an anti-nuclear campaigner, N R McLarin, the Pahiatua Christian Fellowship, 
the CCC (Eketahuna), M C F Oomen, and the Catholic Commission for Justice, 
Peace, and Development were scheduled to appear. 194 However, fog had grounded 
most of the committee members in Auckland, which forced McCully to reschedule the 
hearing. He chose 22 July 1993; however, N R McLarin and the CCC (Eketahuna) 
were unable to attend. 195 Hager reserved his views on direct democracy, but stated 
that if the CIR Bill were to become law, his organisation would use it to counter any 
moves by the National Government to repeal New Zealand's anti-nuclear laws. Both 
Oomen, who quoted from Bolger's 1989 Canterbury Politics Club speech on direct 
190 Above; see also Submission from the New Zealand Law Society to the Electoral Law Select 
Committee, 56 (6 May 1992). Ed Wylie, an NZLS Legislation Committee member from Christchurch, 
represented the NZLS. Notes, above n 188; see also "Citizens Initiated Referenda Bill" 375 Law Talk 
(20 July 1992) 6. 
191The Department of Justice argued that refusing to extend the right to corporations would not prevent 
them from using the device as they would simply use a front person. Justice, Part A, above n 152. In 
other words, expressly permitting corporations to use the device would promote transparency by 
encouraging them to take credit for their initiatives. However, corporations that wanted to distance 
themselves from an initiative they wanted to promote would still use a front person. 
192The NZLS argued that it is a constitutional principle that Parliament can override its enactments by a 
simple majority. However, it acknowledged that it was a matter of debate whether Parliament can 
fetter its future actions with legislative provisions that require special majorities. Notes, above n 188; 
see Law Talk, above n 190, 6. 
193Notes, above n 188. 
194M Gobbi, Electoral Law Select Committee Proceedings Notes (24 June 1992). 
195M Gobbi, Electoral Law Select Committee Proceedings Notes (22 July 1992). 
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democracy, and the Pahiatua Christian Fellowship called for a binding system with a 
signature threshold of 50,000. 196 
The Catholic Commission for Justice, Peace, and Development, which is a national 
Maori Catholic organisation, reminded the Select Committee that it had an obligation 
to ensure that the cm Bill was consistent with the Treaty of Waitangi. It argued that 
the cm Bill should include a mechanism for ensuring that the Maori Treaty partner is 
formally consulted on referendum issues so that its views can be ascertained. It also 
supported a non-binding system for two reasons: 1) there is always a danger that the 
views of the majority, if acted upon, may result in tyranny over the minority; and 2) 
the views of Maori may not be in accord with those of non-Maori, which would 
eliminate the possibility of reaching the consensus necessary to satisfy the partnership 
principle in the Treaty. 197 
C Consideration and Deliberation 
The written and oral submissions were overwhelmingly in favour of a binding system 
of direct democracy with a lower signature threshold. For the most part, the 
advocates focussed their attention on challenging the policy choices underlying the 
cm Bill, which meant that they spent very little time discussing the merits of 
adopting a particular direct democracy device. Although the content of the CIR Bill 
influenced this orientation, the limited short-term strategy adopted by the main direct 
democracy groups at their Hamilton and Cambridge meetings also contributed to this 
course of action. 198 
The opponents, however, focussed their attention on improving the cm Bill 
technically, which they could afford to do given the cm Bill's content. This 
approach also found favour with the National Government members of the Select 
Committee because it was constructive rather than confrontational. Ironically, despite 
the NZLS' s glowing assessment of the influence of its submission,199 the Select 
Committee adopted very few of the suggestions made by the CIR Bill's opponents. 
Although it discussed some of the drafting points raised by the LAC, the Select 
Committee only made a few changes, which were intended to meet several technical 
concerns raised subsequently by the Department of Justice. 
This was not surprising given the National Government's apparent reluctance to 
proceed with the CIR Bill at all. The cm Bill's history indicated that it was a simply 
196Above. 
197Above. 
198For a discussion of these meetings, see section II.B.5(f) in chapter seven. 
I99See Law Talk, above n 190, 6. 
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a tool to defuse the direct democracy lobby within the National Party. Although the 
National Government fended off criticism from the CIR Bill's opponents, ostensibly 
to present it as a sensible compromise, it had not seriously considered enacting the 
CIR Bill at this stage. McCully delayed taking decisive action on the CIR Bill until 
17 August 1993 , some13 months after hearings on the CIR Bill closed.2OO McCully 
would later attribute the delay to the results of the 19 September 1992 referendum on 
proportional representation, which gave the Electoral Law Select Committee the 
difficult task of fmalising the bill that would eventually become the Electoral Act 
1993. W I However, the circumstances surrounding the delay suggest that he hoped that 
support for direct democracy would diminish in time which would make it 
unnecessary to report the cm Bill back to the House of Representatives or, in the 
least, that time would give him a favourable opportunity to report the cm Bill back to 
the House in its original non-binding form. 
1 Departmental report 
McCully 's delaying tactics were subtle, yet effective. First, on 29 July 1992, he 
asked the Department of Justice for a preliminary report summarising the main issues 
raised in the submissions and addressing the following issues: 1) the right of 
corporations to trigger referendums; 2) the review procedures in the Department 
regarding legislation and the Treaty of Waitangi; 3) a breakdown of the American 
direct democracy systems according to signature thresholds and their binding or non-
binding nature; 4) the commercialisation of the referendum process overseas; 5) the 
role of interest groups, particularly big business, labour, special lobby groups (liquor, 
insurance) overseas; 6) the method by which conflicts among referendums on the 
same issues are resolved overseas ; and 7) limitations regarding advertising 
overseas .202 
He gave the Department a little more than two weeks to prepare the report. The 
Department was able to meet this seemingly unrealistic deadline; however, the effort 
diverted its resources away from its primary task of identifying and commenting upon 
the technical questions raised during the course of the submission process. In 
addition, the Department could not seriously analyse the CIR Bill in the light of the 
submissions until the Select Committee expressly conflrmed that it would stand by the 
original policy decisions underlying the cm Bill .203 
200M Gobbi, Electoral Law Select Committee Proceedings Notes (17 August 1993). 
20I NZPD , no 86, 17608, 19 August 1993 . 
202Pile Note, LRD: 12-1-3 (29 July 1992). 
203 Justice, Part A , above n 152. 
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The Department delivered its report on 17 August 1992, in time for the Select 
Committee's last meeting before the parliamentary recess, which was held on 19 
August 1992.204 McCully, however, chose to wait until 16 September 1992 to advise 
the Department of the Select Committee's response. He stated that no one had second 
thoughts regarding the threshold requirement. Since the process was now estimated 
to cost approximately $11,500,000,205 the threshold had to be high to deter frivolous 
referendums. He also stated that the system should remain non-binding for three 
reasons: 1) it was a government election manifesto commitment; 2) it obviated the 
necessity of formulating subject matter limitations; and 3) in jurisdictions like 
California, unlike New Zealand, minorities had the power to challenge referendum 
results that violated their constitutional rights in the courts. Accordingly, McCully 
asked the Department to prepare a clause by clause analysis of the CIR Bill in the 
light of the Select Committee's reaffIrmation of policy decisions underlying the CIR 
Bill.206 
2 Clausal analysis 
The Department delivered its clausal analysis on 6 October 1992 as required. 207 It 
made recommendations on 39 aspects of the CIR Bill, all of which were technical in 
nature. However, as McCully had anticipated, the Select Committee's work was 
overtaken by the results of the 19 September 1992 electoral system referendum. 
Ironically, the result nearly cost McCully his position as chairman of the Electoral 
Law Select Committee. Both the media and the public were intensely suspicious of 
the Select Committee's composition, particularly of McCully's role as chairman, as 
he was known to oppose change to the electoral system. 208 The National Government 
gave some thought to a reshuffle, but in the end decided to stick with McCully. 209 
Due to the Select Committee's subsequent preoccupation with preparing legislation 
that would, once approved by the electors, establish a proportional repesentation 
electoral system, the Select Committee did not respond to the Department's clausal 
analysis of the CIR Bill until 31 March 1993 .210 In the interim, Cabinet saved the 
204 Above; File Note, above n 202. 
205The Department of Justice calculated the cost to be $9,760,000, then $12,380,000 including GST. 
Secretary, above n 3; Department, above n 39. However, the administrative cost for the 19 
September 1992 government controlled referendum on the electoral system was approximately 
$11,500,000. The education campaign for this referendum cost around $3 ,500,000. 
206M Gobbi, Electoral Law Select Committee Proceedings Notes (19 September 1992). 
207Department of Justice CIR Bill: Report of the Department of Justice: Part B (6 October 1992). 
208See eg "Welch's Week" Listener & TV Times, 17 October 1992, 36. 
209 Aside from Jeff Grant, the Government whip, who took an active interest in the formulation of the 
new electoral legislation, no one else in the National Government seemed prepared to accept a position 
on the Electoral Law Select Committee. 
210M Nixon, Electoral Law Select Committee Proceedings Notes (31 March 1993). 
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CIR Bill from being buried in the legislative onslaught typical of the third year of a 
fIrst term government. It gave the CIR Bill a priority rating that was high enough to 
be allocated time in the House of Representatives during the 1993 legislative year. 
However, the CIR Bill was tentatively scheduled to come before the House toward the 
very end of the parliamentary term. Since the date for the dissolution of Parliament 
depended on the date that the National Government set the 1993 election, the CIR Bill 
was placed in grave danger of falling off the legislative agenda. The Department was 
unsure whether it would be reported back, let alone debated again in the House. Its 
passage was not guaranteed. Every circumstance that placed pressure on the 
legislative schedule would threaten its chances of being enacted. 
Regarding the Department's causal analysis, the Select Committee made four specillc 
decisions upon Caygill's initiative.211 First, it agreed to change the commencement 
date of the CIR Bill to 1 February 1993 from 1 July 1992. Second, it agreed ~o 
expand the usual Gazette notice provision to include newspapers that the Clerk 
considered necessary. Third, it agreed to change the voting results provisions to 
provide for electorate by electorate results. Fourth, it agreed to strike out a clause 
that dealt with the naming of persons found guilty of any irregularity in connection 
with a referendum. 
3 Drafting slip 
The Department immediately conveyed the Select Committee's decisions to Walter 
Iles, the Chief Parliamentary Counsel. However, Iles, who usually drafted the most 
important legislation himself, was swamped. The Department's instructions regarding 
the CIR Bill reached him during the most pressing stages of his work on the 
'Companies Package', the Electoral Reform Bill, and the Electoral Amendment Bills. 
Given the signifIcance of the CIR Bill, he chose not to delegate the work. As a 
result, Iles did not produce the required drafting slip until 1 August 1993.212 
After receiving a copy of the slip, officials from the Department met with Iles. They 
concluded that the CIR Bill should be checked against the Electoral Reform Bill to 
eliminate any inconsistencies. The Department responded on 2 August 1993 with a 
list of technical changes. 213 Iles produce a new slip on 3 August 1993.214 The 
Department replied on the same day with another set of technical changes.215 Iles 
211 Above; see also Pile Note, LRD: 12-1-3 (20 April 1993). 
212See CIR Bill Slip, peo 11IP (1 August 1993). 
213See Pax from Department of Justice to Chief Parliamentary Counsel (2 August 1993). 
214See CIR Bill Slip, PCO 11/1 (3 August 1993). 
2l5pax from Department of Justice to Chief Parliamentary Counsel (3 August 1993). 
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delivered a new slip on 4 August 1993.216 The Department replied on the same day 
with an additional set of technical changes. 217 Iles responded with a new slip on 5 
August 1993, which the Department accepted without further comment on 6 August 
1993.218 In addition to several new matters, the [mal drafting slip included most of 
the minor technical changes that the Department had outlined for the Select 
Committee in its 6 October 1992 clausal analysis. 219 
4 Consideration of the drafting slip 
The Select Committee met on 11 August 1993 to consider the drafting slip and 
Electoral Amendment Bill No. 3.no It tentatively decided that the changes the slip 
would incorporate into the CIR Bill were acceptable. It scheduled 17 August 1993 as 
the date to deliberate on the CIR Bill, with a view toward having it in the House in 
the fIrst week after the parliamentary recess. However, McCully outlined a new 
problem: the Clerk had informally renewed his opposition to being responsible for 
determining referendum questions . He had suggested two alternatives: 1) the 
Speaker; or 2) the soon to be created Electoral Commission. The Committee rejected 
the notion of giving the responsibility to the Electoral Commission, but would 
consider the Speaker if the Clerk was adamant in his opposition. McCully undertook 
to investigate the matter further and advise the Department whether the Speaker 
should be given the responsibility . He did not get back to the Department. 
5 Deliberation of the CIR Bill 
The Select Committee deliberated on the CIR Bill on 17 August 1993 for 10 minutes, 
after spending nearly 3 hours on the Electoral Amendment Bill No.3 . 221 The 
Department advised the Select Committee that the changes reflected the matters raised 
in its causal analysis of 6 October 1992 and the Select Committee's decisions on 31 
March 1993. Caygill asked whether the CIR Bill had been changed to make it 
binding, which he hoped was not the case. McCully assured him that it was still non-
binding. Although pleased by the response, Caygill stated that some members of the 
Labour Opposition viewed the Bill with total abhorrence. Ryall and Thorne replied 
that some members of the National Government held the same view. 
216See Fax from Department of Justice to Chief Parliamentary Counsel (3 August 1993). 
217Fax from Department of Justice to Chief Parliamentary Counsel (4 August 1993). 
218See CIR Bill Slip, PCO 1113 (5 August 1993). 
219Compare CIR Bill Slip, above n 218, with Justice, Part B, above n 207. 
220M Gobbi, Electoral Law Select Committee Proceedings Notes (11 August 1993). 
221M Gobbi, Electoral Law Select Committee Proceedings Notes (17 August 1993). 
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McCully stated that the only issue was whether the Clerk of the House should be the 
person who determines referendum questions. He stated that the National 
Government had formed the view that the Clerk should. Caygill stated that would put 
the Clerk in some difficulty, as it would require the exercise of some political 
judgment, as the wording of referendums can influence their outcome. However, 
Caygill, like other members of the Select Committee, reasoned that the job had to be 
done by either the Clerk or the Speaker. Although he indicated that the Clerk would 
be acceptable, he stated that he might argue for the Speaker if the matter reached the 
floor of the House. On the whole, the Select Committee was sympathetic to the 
Clerk's concern, partly in deference to the Clerk's crucial role in the smooth running 
of a government's legislative program. However, it formed the view that the House 
of Representatives should retain control of the citizens initiated referendum process 
and that the Clerk was the appropriate parliamentary officer for administering the 
process, including the determination of the precise question. 222 
McCully reiterated that he would like to report the CIR Bill back to the House, 
although he did not expect it to be debated until after the next parliamentary recess. 
He stated that he wanted to report it back now because a large number of people were 
interested in the CIR Bill, that is, hounding him with correspondence and phone 
calls.223 McCully's new-found sense of urgency seemed paradoxical, as delaying the 
CIR Bill appeared to play into his hands. The first casualties of the delay were Rusk 
and Peters. Neither attended any of the Select Committee hearings pertaining to the 
CIR Bill. Rusk had originally planned to make an oral submission, despite his 
opinion regarding its effectiveness.224 However, family tragedy and other personal 
concerns diverted his attention from the direct democracy debate throughout 1992.225 
Peters, who had fought earlier for a binding system of direct democracy, found 
himself sinking deeper and deeper into a quagmire of political infighting, culminating 
in his departure from the National Party.226 At the same time, Peters began to focus 
222Above; see also Letter from Department of Justice to Minister of Justice (10 September 1993). 
223Notes, above n 221. 
224Rusk, above n 147. 
225Telephone Interview with Merv Rusk (12 June 1993). 
226Peters fell out with the Government over the Ka Awatea Report regarding the future of Maoridom 
and the Quality Inns deal, which prompted the Prime Minister to sack him as the Minister of Maori 
Affairs. He then became embroiled in the Bank of New Zealand saga, which lead to his ejection from 
the National Party's Caucus. Subsequently, he resigned from Parliament, which forced a by-election, 
which he won. He then created the New Zealand First Party to contest the 1993 general election. See 
eg I Templeton "Tauranga Clash as Forerunner to MMP Races" The Sunday Star, New Zealand, 31 
January 1993; "Caucus Kicks Out Peters" The Evening Post, Wellington, New Zealand, 1 October 
1992; B Edwards "Bolger Reaffirms Peters Sacking" The Evening Post, Wellington, New Zealand, 10 
October 1991, 1; B Edwards "Public Inquiry into BNZ Ruled Out" The Evening Post, Wellington, New 
Zealand, 9 October 1992, 2; Editorial "Only One Way to Resolve BNZ Saga" The Evening Post, 
Wellington, New Zealand, 16 October 1992, 4; Editorial "Winston Peters, Bribes, and the BNZ" The 
Evening Post, Wellington, New Zealand, 5 June 1992, 4. 
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his attention on campaigning for the introduction of a proportional representation 
electoral system. 227 
Shortly after the hearings, FAIR and the NZCM virtually imploded. Gilich became 
increasingly engrossed in the turmoil unfolding in his home land, Croatia.228 As a 
consequence, both FAIR and the non-party direct democracy advocates lost an able 
and energetic leader. The NZCM, went out of existence as a consequence of Tait's 
efforts to coordinate the main direct democracy groups.229 According to Boyd, 
President of the ONZF, the attempt of the direct democracy groups to work together 
collapsed because the groups could not agree to disagree. 230 According to Tait, 
however, an offshoot of Voter Voice, which was controlled by the National Party 
(mostly likely a reference to National Reform), tried to place all the groups under its 
direction. The main direct democracy groups soon realised that this attempt would 
subvert their intentions. Rather than regrouping, they decided to go their separate 
ways. The move split the NZCM, which ended its existence.231 In addition, the 
ONZF's role in the direct democracy debate waned after Boyd stepped down as its 
president due to health concerns.232 
However, several other factors offset these developments. First, both Voters Voice 
and National Reform continued to grow in strength and influence. At one point, they 
combined their efforts to establish direct democracy for use in Tauranga District 
Council matters in July 1992.233 Second, National Reform stepped up its campaign to 
win support for the legislative referendum. In March 1992 it launched a campaign to 
consolidate support for "binding citizens initiative referenda" by sending a well-
documented "political reform" package to the executive policy committee of each 
National Party electorate organisation. 234 By November 1992 it was systematically 
227Telephone Interview with Mike Houlding (13 September 1993). 
228Above; see also Letter from Leo Gilich, National Coordinator of FAIR, to Mark Gobbi (8 February 
1992); Letter from Mike Houlding of National Reform to Mark Gobbi (30 June 1993). 
229Letter from Clifford Tait to Mark Gobbi (29 July 1993). 
23°Letter from Wally Boyd to Mark Gobbi (26 August 1993). National Reform attributed the 
breakdown to two factors: 1) a difference in strategy; and 2) a degree of suspicion and hostility towards 
the National Party that produced acrimony and time wasting. Houlding, above n 228. 
23lTait, above n 229. Tait subsequently become a Hamilton City Councillor. He also stood as the 
Alliance Candidate for Hamilton West in the 1993 general election. The Alliance invited Tait to make 
recommendations on the subject of direct democracy; he also had plans to remain active in this regard. 
Above. This development was surprising because Anderton, then Leader of the Alliance, had taken a 
~ersonal position against direct democracy. See Anderton, above n 138. 
32Boyd, above n 230. 
233See Letter from Bruce Knowles to the Minister of Justice (4 November 1992); Houlding, above n 
228; Tauranga District Council Your Choice: Citizens Initiated Referenda (Local Body Elections, 
1992). Subsequently, the Council has held two referendums under the system, one on chemical 
spraying for vegetation control and other on the fluoridation of water. Tauranga District Council, 
above. 
234Letter from National Reform to Executive of Electorate Policy Committee (7 March 1992). 
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lobbying parliamentarians, particularly the Minister of Justice, whose Department had 
primary responsibility for the eIR Bill. 235 
Third, es First Boston, in a September 1992 report commissioned by the Business 
Roundtable, came out in favour of National Reform's binding legislative referendum 
proposal. This bolstered its campaign, particularly as es First Boston came out 
against proportional representation.236 National Reform distributed copies of the 
report to all parliamentarians and leading party officials. 237 It also began to emphasise 
that its proposal was a more effective means than proportional representation to make 
the governmental system more accountable to the electors.238 In Apri11993, Knowles, 
in his capacity as Chairman of the National Party's Taranaki electorate organisation, 
supplied each National Party electorate chairperson with a follow up package in 
support of its proposal, including the es First Boston report.239 National Reform also 
began to establish links with Peter Shirtcliff's anti-proportional representation 
organisation, the Campaign for Better Government to suggest that its legislative 
referendum proposal would blunt the campaign for proportional representation. 240 
Fourth, when Rusk was ready to re-enter to fray, he was able to build on their work 
rather than have to make up for any lost momentum. His re-emergence was quiet, 
but effective. As the 1993 election drew nearer, which was expected to be a closely 
fought contest, National Party officials began to solicit funds from their moneyed 
electorate organisations to help fmance campaign efforts in its marginal electorates. 
Due to its organisational structure and leadership, the Hobson electorate organisation 
happened to be one of those electorates that had raised money surplus to its 
requirements. When approached, Rusk, as chairman of the Hobson electorate 
organisation, indicated that his organisation would be more than willing to contribute 
to the campaign war-chest for the marginal electorates if the National Government 
was prepared to deliver on some of its 1990 election manifesto promises, including 
direct democracy. 241 
235See eg Letter from Merv Rusk to Minister of Justice (29 November 1992); Knowles, above n 233. 
236CS First Boston An Analysis of Proposals for Constitutional Change in New Zealand (1992). The 
report also supported non-binding citizens' initiatives and binding government controlled referendums 
on constitutional issues. However, it opposed binding citizens' initiatives. The Business Roundtable 
adopted these recommendations as its position, which was at odds with the position taken by the NZEF. 
237See eg National Reform Binding Citizens Initiated Referenda (4 December 1992). 
238See National Reform The Principles of Direct Democracy and How it Works: Binding Citizens 
Initiated Referenda (5 January 1993). 
239Letter from Bruce Knowles, Chairman of National's Taranaki Electorate, to National Party 
Electorate Chairman (26 April 1993). 
24OHoulding, above n 228. 
24IInterview, above n 225. 
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Together, these factors conspired against McCully. They prevented him from letting 
the CIR Bill die quietly in the Electoral Law Select Committee. He could not dismiss 
Rusk or National Reform like the main direct democracy groups because of their 
intimate connection with the National Party and the prominent role played by Rusk 
and the members of National Reform. Consequently, he had to report the CIR Bill 
back to the House before Parliament was dissolved for the 1993 general election. 
Nevertheless, McCully chalked up two important victories. First, he had managed to 
defuse the direct democracy debate to such an extent that the media had lost interest 
in it. 242 Second, he had preserved the National Government's non-binding proposal 
intact. 243 
Caygill agreed with McCully's report back plan after debating the scope of the 
regulation power set out in the CIR Bill.244 He suggested that the clause should be 
redrafted because it did not defme the precise limits of the law-making power 
conferred by Parliament or the precise implications of its reference to the Electoral 
Act 1956 and its regulations. The Select Committee decided not to amend the clause, 
primarily because parliamentarians have shown an inherent predisposition toward 
tinkering with electoral law. In this area, members of the Select Committee 
concluded that flexibility was more desirable than complying with the policy of 
placing defmed limits on the scope of delegated legislation. Accordingly, it approved 
the slip, the Bill as amended, and the decision to report the CIR Bill back to the 
House of Representatives.245 
IV REPORT BACK 
On 19 August 1993, McCully and Caygill presented the report of the Electoral Law 
Select Committee on the CIR Bill to the House of Representatives.246 McCully 
attributed the lengthy delay of the report to the "intervention of the Electoral Reform 
Bill." He also stated that the CIR Bill remained "substantially in the form in which it 
was referred to the Select Committee. ,,247 However, he highlighted three issues, 
"which were the focus of most of the submissions. ,,248 
242See Letter from Merv Rusk to Mark Gobbi (September 1993). 
243Compare CIR Bill 1992 (introduction version) with CIR Act 1993. 
244Notes, above n 22l. 
245 Above. 
246NZPD, above n 201, 17608-17616. For media reports, see R Laugesen "Petitions May Soon Spark 
Referendums" The Dominion, Wellington, New Zealand, 20 August 1993; "Referenda Bill May 
Restore Esteem: Caygill" Daily Telegraph, New Zealand, 20 August 1993; "Referendum Bill Praised 
by MPs" Bay of Plenty Times, Bay of Plenty, New Zealand, 20 August 1993; 2ZB Tonight Live: 
"Citizens Initiated Referenda" (2ZB radio Broadcast, 25 August 1993) (transcript on me at the 
Department of Justice, LRD: 12-1-3). Robin Harrison interviewed Tony Ryall, as a National MP in 
favour of the Bill, and Steve Maharey, as a Labour MP against the Bill. Above. 
247NZPD, above n 201, 17608. 
248NZPD, above n 201, 17609. 
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A Key Points 
First, McCully mentioned that many of the submissioners believed that the system 
provided for in the CIR Bill should be binding. He acknowledged that "a fairly 
strong lobby group" held that view and revealed that correspondence to his office had 
been dominated by this group from time to time. However, he stated that the 
National Government members of the Select Committee felt obligated to honour the 
National Party's election manifesto promise for a non-binding system. He also stated 
that a non-binding system eliminated the technical difficulties involved in formulating 
subject matter limitations. He also stated that if the system proved successful, those 
who wanted a binding system could use it to "communicate their desire for that 
further change in due course. ,,249 
Second, McCully mentioned that the Select Committee had entertained requests to 
lower the signature trigger level. However, it kept the 10 percent threshold for three 
reasons: 1) no one had presented "a particularly cogent case for a lower threshold"; 
2) the cost of referendums should only be incurred on the basis of the 
recommendation of a sizeable proportion of the electorate; and 3) it was not unduly 
onerous.250 
Third, McCully mentioned that the Clerk of the House had some misgivings about 
being the officer in charge of determining referendum questions. He stated that the 
Select Committee was confident that he could carry out the responsibility. In 
addition, it could not fmd anyone who was better placed or more able to do the job. 
He noted that the Select Committee had considered the Speaker, but felt that he was 
open to the suggestion of being involved in party politics as he was an elected 
member of the National Government. Nevertheless, he invited parliamentarians to 
explore other options. 251 
In conclusion, he thanked the thousands of people who had corresponded with him on 
the matter. He also predicted that the CIR Bill would, over time, constitute "a very 
important addition to the democratic fabric" of New Zealand.252 
Caygill agreed with McCully's assessment of the CIR Bill's importance.253 He also 
addressed the same three issues, but in a less detailed fashion. He was glad that the 
249 Above. 
25oAbove. 
251 Above. 
252NZPD, above n 201, 17610. 
253 Above. 
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Select Committee had adopted a cautious approach by adopting a non-binding system 
with a significant threshold requirement. In addition, he stated that the Clerk's 
concerns required further thought. However, Caygill warned that the system 
proposed in the eIR Bill required maturity from New Zealanders. Rather than 
engendering healthy debate in which public opinion could be meaningfully tested, the 
CIR could be divisive and fruitless if special interest groups were able to command 
public funds to test their minority opinions against the wider public opinion. 254 
Caygill's remarks, however, were more notable for what he did not say. The tenor 
and content of his speech signalled that the Labour Opposition had backed away from 
the outright opposition it expressed toward the CIR Bill during its first reading. 25S By 
the time the CIR Bill had reached its third reading, Caygill was virtually 
characterising it as a bi-partisan measure.256 The change of heart may have been due 
to the following factors: 1) the direct democracy lobby was large and politically 
significant, particularly given the inclusion of NZSF and the CCC; 2) an election was 
just a few months away; 3) voting against an apparent increase in public participation 
was acknowledged as being generally unpopular in a democracy; and 4) the system 
was non-binding and cumbersome, meaning it might deliver the semblance of direct 
democracy without diminishing a government's power. 
Peters, reincarnated as the leader of the New Zealand First Party, tried to reposition 
himself as a champion of direct democracy despite his long absence from the debate. 
Essentially he tried to use the report back to embarrass the National Government by 
voicing the suspicions of the direct democracy groups. 257 Peters argued that the 
National Government chose McCully to chair the Electoral Law Select Committee 
because of his opposition to electoral reform. He also argued that the CIR Bill should 
have been taken more seriously than it had been because it was of "very great 
significance to a great number of New Zealanders. ,,258 
However, his attack failed to attract media attention for two reasons. First, he made 
the mistake of spending the bulk of his speaking time criticising the well-established 
parliamentary convention of printing bills after they are reported back. Second, Jeff 
Grant, National Party MP for Awarua, who was a member of the Electoral Law 
Select Committee, informed the House that Peters had not attended any of the Select 
254NZPD, above n 201, 17611. 
25SSee above text accompanying notes 79-110. 
256See below text accompanying note 279. 
257NZPD, above n 201, 17611-17613. 
258NZPD, above n 201, 17613. 
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Committee hearings on the CIR Bill, which discredited Peters' bid to style himself as 
an advocate of direct democracy . 259 
B Reaction of the Clerk of the House 
The Clerk of the House was dissatisfied with the Select Committee's decision 
regarding his role in the CIR process. Accordingly, he lodged a formal request with 
the National Government on 7 September 1993 to amend the CIR Bill. In a letter 
addressed to the Speaker of the House, the Leader of the House, the Minister of 
Justice, and McCully, the Clerk requested the following amendments: 1) divest the 
Clerk of all responsibility for administering the CIR Bill by giving it to the soon-to-
be-established Electoral Commission; and 2) change the mechanism from a petition to 
Parliament to an application to the Electoral Commission. 260 
The request resulted in a meeting between the Clerk, the Minister of Justice, and the 
Leader of the House. The Minister of Justice, in a spontaneous gesture of goodwill , 
told the Clerk that he would consider amending the legislation to accommodate the 
Clerk if there were no technical reasons for not doing so. The Minister asked the 
Department of Justice whether there were any technical barriers to the Clerk's 
requests . The Department responded that there were none, but that the request would 
require a number of amendments and deletions to the CIR Bill, which could 
jeopardise its passage given the time constraints. It also mentioned that the Clerk's 
request had changed substantially and that the Select Committee had already rejected 
the idea, which was raised in submissions, of giving a quango the responsibility of 
running the citizens initiated referendum process. 26 1 
The Minister asked the Department to advise him of the implications of the Clerk's 
request. The Department did so in a letter delivered to the Minister on 13 September 
1993.262 After outlining the history of the Clerk's opposition to the CIR Bill, the 
Department noted that the Clerk's latest proposal went farther than his earlier ones. 
It went beyond the question of divesting the Clerk of the responsibility of determining 
the precise question. It would divest the Clerk of all responsibility for administering 
the referendum petition process. 
259NNZPD, above n 201, 17615. 
260Letter from the Clerk of the House of Representatives to the Speaker, the Leader of the House, the 
Minister of Justice, and the Minister of Customs (7 September 1993). 
261Pile Note, LRD: 12-1-3 (9 September 1993). 
262Letter from the Department of Justice to the Minister of Justice (10 September 1993). 
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The Department also noted that the Clerk's proposal also ran counter to the objective 
of retaining parliamentary control over the citizens initiated referendum process.263 In 
addition, it was inconsistent with the Clerk's previous submission that authentication 
of compliance with the CrR Bill should rest with the Clerk.264 Given this argument, 
the Clerk's proposal could only be justified if the CrR Bill were amended to change 
the mechanism from a petition to Parliament to an application to the Electoral 
Commission.265 
The Select Committee, however, had considered and rejected a similar proposal. A 
number of submissions on the Bill suggested that a quango should administer the CrR 
Bill. The Select Committee rejected this course of action as it would negate the 
centrality of Parliament. This was thought inappropriate for several reasons . 
Removing referendum petitions from the parliamentary process would detract from 
their status. It would undermine Parliament's status as a focal point for legislative 
change. It would increase the distance between petitioners and Parliament. 266 
The Department also argued that the Electoral Commission, as envisaged by the 
National Government was not the appropriate body to administer the citizens initiated 
referendum process. The responsibility would be incompatible with its functions and 
funding. The National Government intended it to be an advisory body that met 
occasionally to register political parties, to promote public awareness on electoral 
matters, and to report on electoral matters referred to it. It was not envisaged that it 
would have the staff and the logistical support required to administer the citizens 
initiated referendum process. 267 
In addition, the Clerk had previously indicated that the cost of administering the 
citizens initiated referendum process could be absorbed into his existing budget. The 
Electoral Commission, however, would require funding to take over administration of 
the citizens initiated referendum process. It would have to establish staff to receive 
and process referendum petitions, even if they were few and infrequent, to comply 
with the CrR Bill's timing provisions . It would also have to dedicate considerable 
resources to acquiring the expertise already in the possession of the Office of the 
Clerk.268 
263 Above. 
264See above text accompanying note 188. 
265Department, above n 262. 
266Above. 
267Above. 
268Above. 
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Given these implications, the Department sought the Minister's direction to proceed 
with the CIR Bill as reported back. 269 The Minister, however, did not reply, leaving 
the Department in the dark as to how he would proceed. The Department had already 
prepared and provided the Minister with his second reading speech, which he had 
approved. It did not signal any changes to the CIR Bill. In fact, it was designed to 
justify the CIR Bill in the form in which it had emerged from Select Committee.27o 
This uncertainty was compounded by the National Government's sudden decision to 
reprioritise the Companies Package and its need to debate the Estimates. Before the 
recess, the CIR Bill was at the top of the Order Paper. However, after the recess the 
Estimates (which took longer than expected), the Takeovers Bill, the Financial 
Reporting Bill, the Companies Bill, and the Companies Ancillary Bill all came before 
the CIR Bill. The National Government also had to rush validation legislation 
through the House to prevent legal challenges to elections that were improperly 
carried out for the Meat and Wool Boards. 
V THE FINAL MOVES 
The CIR Bill was in grave danger of slipping off the legislative agenda. Time was 
running extremely short. The Department of Justice was unsure whether the Minister 
of Justice would be able to proceed with the CIR Bill, and if he did, how he would 
proceed. However, on 14 September 1993, after the dinner break, the. House of 
Representatives suddenly found itself without much to do; it decided to consider the 
CIR Bill in all its remaining stages. 271 
A Second Reading 
The Minister of Justice commenced the second reading debate, but did not mention 
the role of the Clerk of the House. Instead, he concentrated on defending the non-
binding nature of the system proposed in the CIR Bill and its 10 percent trigger 
requirement. He justified the 10 percent trigger requirement by arguing that it would 
"ensure that any measure that is placed before the electors is not frivolous or 
vexatious, but of concern to a substantial proportion of the community. ,,272 He 
269 Above. 
27oC1R Bill: Second Reading Speech Notes, LRD: 12-1-3 (undated); see also NZPD, no 88, 17951-
17954, 14 September 1993 (Graham). 
271 NZPD, above n 270, 17950-17965; M Gobbi, House of Representative Proceeding Notes (14 
September 1993). John Carter, the Junior Government Whip, successfully sought leave to consider the 
Bill in all its stages in the middle of the second reading debate. NZPD, above n 270, 17961 
272NZPD, above n 270, 17951. 
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justified the non-binding nature of the system by comparing New Zealand's 
constitutional system with Switzerland's and California's:273 
In California, where referenda are binding, the courts have the power to render 
referendum results null and void if they attack fundamental rights or essential 
governmental powers . Our courts do not have that kind of power. We do not have a 
written constitution that our courts can use to strike down referendum results that 
violate its principles. 
Although Switzerland's courts do not have that power either, the Swiss, at the federal 
level, can veto only newly enacted legislation or initiate constitutional referenda. The 
legislative veto does not prohibit the Swiss Parliament from re-Iegislating. The Swiss 
Parliament can revisit the issue regardless of the referendum result. It is, in effect, 
non-binding. 
Constitutional initiatives can carry only if a double majority is achieved. A double 
majority requires an overall national majority of those who voted and a majority vote in 
a majority of the Swiss cantons. That double majority requirement, along with the 
heterogenous make-up of Switzerland, means that a constitutional initiative must have 
the support of a significant cross-section of Switzerland to be successful. That 
safeguard protects minorities from the possible tyranny of the majority. It is inherent in 
Switzerland's constitutional system. That safeguard does not exist in our governmental 
system. 
. . . In summary, our constitutional system does not provide the same array of 
protections as California's or Switzerland's constitutional systems. Nevertheless, we 
desire to give our people a greater voice in the affairs of our nation. We do not want to 
suppress that voice with subject-matter limitations, which would be necessary if we 
were to establish a binding system of direct democracy. At this stage of our 
constitutional development, Parliament guards us against the excesses of majority rule. 
The Labour Opposition did not take issue with these points. However, Caygill, as he 
had foreshadowed in the Electoral Law Select Committee, questioned the role of the 
Clerk,274 which set the issue as the only point of contention between the National 
Government and the Labour Opposition. 
B Committee of the whole House 
Once the CIR Bill reached the Committee of the whole House, the stage in which the 
MPs present and vote upon amendments to the bills that have passed their second 
reading, Caygill argued for giving the task of determining questions to the Speaker of 
the House. 275 The Minister of Justice, relying upon the advice he had received from 
the Department of Justice, maintained that the Clerk of the House was the appropriate 
parliamentary officer for ' the task. 276 Cay gill , s amendment failed. 277 Consequently, 
th~ responsibility would remain with the Clerk. 
273NZPD, above n 270, 17952, 17954. 
274NZPD, above n 270, 17956. 
275NZPD, above n 270, 17962. 
276Notes, above n 271. 277 -NZPD, above n 270, 17956. 
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C Third Reading and Assent 
By 1O:3Opm that evening the CIR Bill had passed its third reading. The Govemor-
General assented to the CIR Bill on 28 September 1993 .278 Aside from the 
disagreement regarding over the role of the Clerk, Cay gill , s fInal words all but 
characterised the CIR Bill as a bi-partisan measure.279 The main line of criticism 
actually came from Ian Peters, a freshman National Government MP representing 
Tongariro, who happened to be Winston Peters' brother. During the second reading, 
he argued that the CIR Bill should be binding.280 Caygill had only one reservation. 
In his view, the device should be used carefully because it had the potential to be 
divisive. 281 
D The Fee Regulations 
The media reaction was subdued. 282 Rusk characterised it as a "deafening silence . ,, 283 
The media, however, was not the only party to fail to appreciate what the passage of 
the CIR Bill meant. The direct democracy advocates also let their guard down by 
forgetting that the CIR Act prescribed a fee, to be set by regulation, that had to be 
paid to use the CIR process. Although several direct democracy advocates argued in 
their submissions that a fee higher than $200 would be prohibitively high, they did 
not follow through by lobbying the National Government to set a low fee after the 
CIR Bill was passed. This error in judgment could have been disastrous as the fee 
could have been set at a discouragingly high level. 
To determine the fee, the Department of Justice consulted those that would be 
involved in the CIR process, namely the Department of Statistics, the Electoral Role 
Centre, and the Clerk of the House. 284 The Deputy Government Statistician 
determined that it would cost the Department of Statistics $10,000 a petition to carry 
278C1R Act 1993, Assent Green (28 September 1993). 
279NZPD , above n 270, 17964-17965. 
28oNZPD, above n 270, 17961-17962. 
28 INZPD, above n 270, 17964-17965. 
282Por versions of the NZPA's brief account, see "Referenda Law Passed" The Evening Standard, New 
Zealand, 15 September 1993; "Referenda May Divide Country, Caygill Says" Northern Advocate, New 
Zealand, 16 September 1993; "Referenda Arguments Predicted" Waikato Times , Hamilton, New 
Zealand, 15 September 1993; see also A Stone "Citizen's Voice Loud and Clear" New Zealand Herald, 
Auckland, New Zealand, 16 September 1993. The New Zealand Herald appears to be the only 
newspaper to publish an editorial on the passage of the CIR Bill. See Editorial, "Not So Non-Binding" 
New Zealand Herald, Auckland, New Zealand, 27 September 1993, 8 (arguing that direct democracy 
has its foot in the door and that the moral force of non-binding referendums will be significant) . 
283Rusk, above n 242. 
284Letter from Department of Justice to Department of Statistics (14 September 1993); Letter from ' 
Department of Justice to New Zealand Post Limited (14 September 1993); Letter from Department of 
Justice to Clerk of the House of Representatives (16 September 1993). 
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out its sampling duties under the Act. 285 The Manager of Policy and Practices of New 
Zealand Post Limited determined that it would cost the Electoral Enrolment Centre 
approximately $345 for every 1,000 signatures it had to check for authenticity against 
the rolls. 286 The Clerk of the House calculated that each petition would cost his office 
$3,977.287 
In short, for a sample of 20,000 signatures, the cost would be approximately 
$16,378.11, including GST. The Planning Unit in the Department of Justice 
recommended a fee of $2,000 which was substantially less than its true cost. 
Although Treasury normally pursues a full cost recovery policy , it endorsed a fee less 
than true cost given the constitutional implications of making the device inaccessible 
to those without lots of money. However, in its view, the fee should be sufficient to 
deter frivolous referendums.288 The Minister of Justice agreed with this assessment, 
as it matched advice he had already received from the Department of Justice. 
However, he came to the conclusion that $2,000 was too high. Accordingly, he 
decided that the fee should $500.289 
VI ASSESSMENT 
Although disappointed in the media's low key reaction, Rusk predicted that New 
Zealanders would eventually understand what had been achieved by the passage of the 
CIR Bill. 290 Rusk was pleased by the passage of the CIR Bill as he saw it as an initial 
step on the way toward flrst a binding legislative referendum system and then a 
binding legislative initiative system. As he was taking a long-term view, unlike most 
of the main direct democracy groups, he was able to see the CIR Act in a positive 
light. Accordingly, Rusk praised New Zealand's governmental process as 
democratic. In his view, his success in getting the National Party to pledge to 
introduce direct democracy in its 1990 election manifesto, even though the promise 
was for a non-binding system, showed how individuals could change the system.291 
However, as discussed in chapter seven, it is unlikely that Rusk would have 
succeeded without, the coincidence of economic hardship and widespwad 
disillusionment with representative democracy, the ground breaking work of the main 
direct democracy groups , and the support provided by National Reform. 
285Letter from Department of Statistics to Department of Justice (15 October 1993). 
286Letter from New Zealand Post Limited to Department of Justice (13 October 1993). 
287Letter from Clerk of the House of Representatives to Department of Justice (13 October 1993). 
288See Fax from the Treasury to the Department of Justice (22 September 1993). 
289Citizens Initiated Referenda (Fees) Regulations 1993, r. 2. 
290Rusk, above n 242. 
291Stone, above n 282. Whether Rusk still holds this view is uncertain. In 1994 he quit the National 
Party along with the Hobson MP Ross Meurant to become chairman of Ross Meurant's Center of Right 
Party (ROC). Telephone Interview with Merv Rusk (October 1994). 
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The economic turmoil unleashed by the Fourth Labour Government was accentuated 
by the 1987 crash. As its policies were contrary to the expectations of the electorate 
at large, public confidence in elected representatives sank to an all time low. These 
conditions created the impetus for change, which gave rise to the main direct 
democracy groups.292 The promotional work of these groups was indispensable to 
Rusk's campaign. It allowed Rusk to spend less time on educating members of the 
National Party and more time on organising their support, which gave him the 
opportunity to focus his attention on his opposition in the political wing of the 
National Party. Although Rusk was unable to place a pledge for a binding legislative 
referendum in the National Party's 1990 election manifesto, he was able to prevent 
the political wing from killing his idea altogether, which led to the inclusion of a 
pledge to introduce a non-binding citizens initiated referendum system in the National 
Party's 1990 election manifesto. National Reform, a by-product of Rusk's battle with 
the political wing of the National Party, was instrumental in preventing the National 
Government from abandoning the National Party's 1990 election manifesto promise to 
introduce and enact the CIR Bill. 
However, National Reform and the main direct democracy groups were unable to 
influence the content and form of the CIR Bill at any time during the legislative 
process. For all practical purposes, the debate regarding the CIR Bill's form and 
content ended once the National Party's Electoral Law Reform Caucus Committee 
devised its citizens initiated referendum plan. As discussed in chapter seven, the 
political wing of the National Party had devised the plan to defuse Rusk's campaign 
and to water down his proposal. As a consequence, the direct democracy advocates 
in New Zealand were far less successful than their counterparts in Switzerland and 
California. 
In Switzerland, the Swiss Democrats broke away from the ruling Liberal-Radical 
grouping and eventually took control of local then central government institutions. 
They used their power to introduce direct democracy, rather than rely on elected 
representatives who were widely perceived as serving the interests of the new 
industrial elite. The California Progressives took a similar approach in California, 
when they wrested control of government from the Southern Pacific Railroad. After 
winning control of key city governments, they infiltrated and refashioned the 
Republican Party. Using this vehicle, they managed to elect people to office who 
would use their power to introduce direct democracy. 
The direct democracy advocates in New Zealand consciously avoided these 
approaches. They were largely unwilling to form their own political party or to 
292It also gave rise for an organised campaign for proportional representation. 
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invest the time and energy required to take over an existing party, primarily as they 
were only interested in establishing direct democracy. The Swiss Democrats and the 
California Progressives, in comparison, were interested in a far greater range of 
issues. Direct democracy was to them a means to an end rather than an end in itself. 
They had every intention of breaking the nexus between privileged economic interests 
and elected representatives beholden to those interests. In New Zealand, the crisis of 
legitimacy was driven primarily by a failure of successive governments to meet the 
expectations of the electors rather than being a function of organised corruption. 
In addition, the debate regarding the adoption of an electoral system based on 
proportional representation overshadowed the direct democracy debate, which 
diverted attention and resources away from the campaign for direct democracy. 
However, the direct democracy advocates were shrewd enough to position direct 
democracy as an alternative to proportional representation. This may have been a 
factor that encouraged the National Government to enact the cm Act so close to the 
1993 general election, which presented the government controlled referendum on 
proportional representation to the electors. Nevertheless, the public at large 
perceived proportional representation, not direct democracy, as the remedy for the ills 
besetting New Zealand's representative democracy. As a consequence, if the 
motivation had existed, the direct democracy advocates would probably have been 
unable to build the kind of political support that would have been required to convince 
parliamentarians that they should introduce a binding system of direct democracy or 
to organise the election of people who would introduce it. 
Another important factor lies in the speed in which elected representatives responded 
to the call for direct democracy. Rather than ignore it and allow frustration to build, 
as was the case in Switzerland and California, the political wing of the National Party 
became involved in the debate and devised several strategems to defuse the support 
for direct democracy within the National Party. Although the political wing was 
unable to quell the demand for direct democracy altogether, largely by failing to 
honour its 1990 election manifesto promise to repeal the Fourth Labour Government's 
superannuation surtax, it was able to position its non-binding alternative as a sensible 
compromise. 
In short, the direct democracy advocates failed where it mattered the most. Unlike 
the Swiss Democrats and the California Progressives, they did not secure control over 
the legislative process. Accordingly, they found themselves in the impossible position 
of relying on elected representatives to put into place a system that was expressly 
intended to curb the power of elected representatives. Although Rusk and his 
supporters, particularly National Reform, were able to apply the pressure necessary to 
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ensure passage of the CIR Act, they were unable to alter its contents. Consequently, 
they had to settle for the non-binding system devised by the National Party's Electoral 
Law Reform Caucus Committee. 
Thomas Cronin's hybrid model of representative and direct democracy does not apply 
in New Zealand as it does in Switzerland and California.293 The direct democracy 
devices in California and Switzerland have augmented the legal sovereignty of the 
electors by giving them the power to propose, enact, and veto laws , which has, in 
effect, limited the governmental power exercised by their elected representatives. 
The CIR Act, because it is non-binding, only gives the New Zealand electors the 
power to propose laws or to propose changes to laws. While it may have, in Dicey's 
terminology, augmented the political sovereignty of the electors, it has not diminished 
the legal sovereignty of Parliament. As a consequence, the CIR Act is far less 
significant as a check on the power of elected representatives than the direct 
democracy devices in Switzerland and California. 
The National Government did not clearly articulate a constitutional basis for its 
opposition to a binding system until the Minister of Justice delivered his second 
reading speech in support of the eIR Bill. The speech was designed primarily to 
portray the non-binding system produced by the political wing of the National Party 
as a considered and reasonable alternative to the party wing's demand for a binding 
system. However, it also provides the basis for understanding the differences 
between New Zealand's citizens initiated referendums system and the direct 
democracy systems in Switzerland and California, which are considered in the next 
chapter. 
293Por a discussion of Cronin's hybrid model of democracy, see section IV in chapter two; see also 
section IV in chapter three and section III in chapter five. 
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9 
ROLE OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN NEW ZEALAND 
The main direct democracy groups, Merv Rusk, and National Reform drew on the 
Swiss and California systems of direct democracy during their campaign for direct 
democracy in New Zealand. They all envisioned the adoption of the legislative 
referendum. Most also advocated the adoption of the legislative initiative, either 
simultaneously with or subsequently to the legislative referendum. They believed that 
one or both of these devices would restore the legitimacy of the New Zealand 
constitutional system, primarily by making elected representatives more responsive to 
the electorate. The political wing of the National Party responded to their campaign 
by proposing a non-binding system of direct democracy, which the National 
Government put in place in the form of the Citizens Initiated Referenda Act 1993 
(CIR Act). I 
Since the results of citizens initiated referendums are non-binding in New Zealand, 
they are legally less significant than the results produced by the direct democracy 
devices in Switzerland and California. Although the electors can use the CIR Act to 
propose a change in the law, they cannot use it to enact or veto law without the 
cooperation of elected representatives . In contrast, the Swiss and California electors 
can use their direct democracy devices to propose, enact, or veto law without the 
cooperation of elected representatives . These devices enable the Swiss and California 
electors to countermand or by-pass elected representatives, which, in effect, limits the 
legislative power of elected representatives. Although elected representatives may 
abide by the results of citizens initiated referendums for political reasons, the CIR Act 
does not, unlike the direct democracy devices in Switzerland and California, impose 
any legal limits on their power. In addition, as it is non-binding, it has not given the 
electors any legislative power. 
This fundamental difference came about as a consequence of the opposition of elected 
representatives in New Zealand to direct democracy. 2 Geoffrey Q de Walker has 
theorised that the opposition of elected representatives to direct democracy is the 
result of their acceptance of political theories which maintain that only elites such as 
themselves, by virtue of their training or intellect, are qualified and, therefore, 
ISee generally chapter seven and eight. 
2See above. 
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entitled to exercise governmental power. 3 Although chapters seven and eight provide 
some support for this theory, the Minister of Justice's justification for a non-binding 
system provides the constitutional basis for understanding the differences between the 
CIR Act and the direct democracy systems in Switzerland and California. Essentially, 
the Minister of Justice argued that Parliament is the only institution in New Zealand 
that has the power to safeguard minority rights; therefore, providing the electors with 
the means to override Parliament could jeopardise minority rights. 4 
As outlined in chapter two, minorities, not majorities, are the primary concern in the 
constitutional context. To be sustainable, democracy, whether representative or 
direct, must be based on limited majority rule.5 The direct democracy devices in 
Switzerland and California adhere to this principle. The Swiss devices are subject to 
procedural limitations which, in effect, protect minority rights. 6 The California 
devices are subject to a host of procedural and substantive limitations which also 
protect minority rights. 7 New Zealand's citizens initiated referendum system also 
adheres to this principle. As it is non-binding, Parliament can refuse to give effect to 
referendum results which would harm minority rights, particularly if they are 
inconsistent with New Zealand's international obligations, its human rights 
legislation, its parliamentary conventions, or the Treaty of Waitangi. 
This chapter examines the constituent parts of New Zealand's constitutional system 
and attempts to ascertain their relationship to the CIR Act, which is yet to be used 
successfully. In doing so, it draws primarily on the work of David McGee, Philip 
Joseph, Raymond Mulholland, Geoffrey Palmer, Keith Jackson, and F M Brookfield, 
who have produced the most recent and comprehensive discussions of New Zealand's 
constitutional system.8 The purpose of this chapter is to provide some basis for 
3See generally G Walker Initiative and Referendum: The People's Law (The Centre for Independent 
Studies Ltd, St Leonards, 1987); see also G Walker The People's Law: Initiative and Referendum: 
University of Queensland Inaugural Lecture (delivered 3 June 1987, University of Queensland Press, St 
Lucis, 1988); G Walker "The People's Law: Initiative and Referendum" (1988) 15 U Queensland L J 
33. 
4NZPD, no 88, 17952, 17954, 14 September 1993 (Graham) 
5See section III.A.2 in chapter two. 
6See generally chapter four. 
7See generally chapter six. 
8D McGee Parliamentary Practice in New Zealand (2 ed, GP Publishers, Wellington, 1994); P Joseph 
Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (Law Book Co. Ltd, Sydney, 1993); R 
Mulholland Introduction to the New Zealand Legal System (7 ed, Butterworths, Wellington, 1990); G 
Palmer Unbridled Power: An Interpretation of New Zealand's Constitution (2 ed, Oxford University 
Press, Auckland, 1987); K Jackson The Dilemma of Parliament (Allen & Unwin, Wellington, 1987); J 
Joseph Constitutional Entrenchment and the MMP Referendum" (1994) 16 NZULR 67; F Brookfield 
"Parliament, the Treaty and Freedom: Millennial Hopes and Spectulations" (1994) NZU 462; F 
Brookfield "A New Zealand Republic?" (1994) 8 Legis Stud 5; F Brookfield "The Monarchy and the 
Constitution Today: A New Zealand Perspective" (1992) NZU 438; F Brookfield "Kelsen, the 
Constitution and the Treaty" (1992) NZULR 163; F Brookfield "Constitutional Law" (1992) NZ 
Recent L R 231; F Brookfield "The Reconstituted Office of Governor-General" (1985) NZU 256; F 
311 
understanding the role citizens initiated referendums are likely to play in the New 
Zealand legislative process. The chapter begins with an overview of the New 
Zealand constitutional system, which differs conceptually from the Swiss and 
California systems. It then examines the division of governmental power among New 
Zealand's legislative, executive, and judicial branches, which is less formal than it is 
in Switzerland and California. The chapter then outlines how the CIR Act works and 
compares its operation to the direct democracy systems in Switzerland and California. 
It concludes that the citizens initiated referendum system provided for in the CIR Act 
differs from the direct democracy systems found in Switzerland and California, 
particularly in the manner in which it pays homage to the theory of parliamentary 
sovereignty,9 a theory which has no place in the Swiss or California constitutional 
systems. 
I OVERVIEW OF THE NEW ZEALAND CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM 
Mulholland describes New Zealand as a "sovereign independent unitary State with a 
constitutional monarchy, responsible Government and a unicameral legislature." 10 
Unlike Switzerland or California, New Zealand does not have a written constitution 
which embodies the supreme law of the landll or which is "based on or expressive of 
popular sovereignty. ,,12 According to Joseph, New Zealand's constitutional system 
is: 13 
embedded in the statutes of the British and New Zealand Parliaments, the common law, 
constitutional convention, the law and custom of Parliament, the great legal 
commentaries (such as those of Blackstone and Dicey), and an impressive heritage 
devolving from British constitutional history. New Zealand is a constitutional monarchy 
deriving from the oldest of all temporal sovereignties, the British Crown, whose lineage 
reaches beyond the Norman Conquests to Saxon times. New Zealand has the closest 
adaptation of the Westminster system in the British Commonwealth. 
In theory, the New Zealand constitutional system is whatever Parliament proclaims it 
to be. 14 Parliament is sovereign. Its legislative enactments are the supreme law of the 
Brookfield "Parliamentary Supremacy and Constitutional Entrenchment: A Jurisdictional Approach" 
(1984) 5 Otago L R 603; F Brookfield "High Courts, High Dam, High Policy" (1983) NZ Recent L R 
62. 
9See section III.B.2(c) in chapter two. 
IOMulholland, above n 8, 17; see also Joseph, above n 8, 7, 11. For collections of New Zealand's 
basic constitutional documents, see Joseph, above n 8, 875-931; see also generally M Chen and G 
Palmer Public Law in New Zealand: Cases, Materials, Commentary and Questions (Oxford University 
Press, Auckland, 1993). 
IIMulholland, above n 8, 17; see also Jackson, above n 8, 8-13; Joseph, above n 8, 1. 
12Brookfield "A New Zealand Republic?," above n 8,10. . 
13Joseph, above n 8, 1. 
14See eg The Constitution Act 1986. This Act is now the central document in the New Zealand 
constitution; however, it is not a written constitution in itself; it is merely a constitutional document. 
Mulholland, above n 8, 18. According to Palmer, who was the Act's principal architect, the Act is 
merely a "basic guide to the composition and powers of the institutions with which it deals." Palmer, 
312 
land. The courts do not have the power to declare an Act of Parliament 
unconstitutional. 15 Nor do they have the power to force Parliament to follow its own 
long established conventions. 16 The role of the courts is simply to determine what 
Parliament intended and to enforce that intention. 17 According to Joseph, 
"[Parliament's] powers of legislation know no legal limitation.,,18 Consequently, 
"any statute which empowers governmental action has constitutional significance. ,,19 
In practice, parliamentary sovereignty is constrained by constitutional conventions, 
public opinion, pressure groups, the doctrine of mandate, election promises, treaty 
obligations, international law, and pragmatism. 20 For example, New Zealand has 
ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and affirmed its 
commitment to it under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. It has also ratified 
the First Optional Protocol to the Covenant, which provides New Zealand citizens 
with a right of petition to the United Nations Human Rights Committee for alleged 
violations of the Covenant. According to Joseph, "[t]hese instruments [have] injected 
new content into the rule of law by laying down minimum standards for national legal 
systems. ,,21 In addition, the "rule of law supplements the principle of legality by 
imposing minimum standards of justice. ,,22 
However, these standards are not easy to ascertain. 23 More importantly, they have 
not provided the courts with the power to declare an Act of Parliament 
unconstitutional. Section 4 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 specifically 
states that the courts cannot use its provisions to override any conflicting enactment. 
If the Act had given the courts this power, Parliament would still have had the legal 
power to repeal the grant as the Act is ordinary unentrenched legislation. 
Consequently, Parliament has the legal power to quash any of the rights guaranteed 
above n 8, 3. The Act was prompted by Muldoon's reluctance to hand over power after his 
government was defeated in the 1984 general election; the Act, among other things, clarifies the rules 
regarding the transfer of power from one government to another. Mulholland, above n 8, 19. 
15Joseph, above n 8, 9. 
16Joseph, above n 8, 239; Palmer, above n 8, 1. 
17See Joseph, above n 8, 104. 
18Joseph, above n 8, 12. 
19Joseph, above n 8, 16; see also Jackson, above n 8, 13 (noting that the New Zealand Parliament 
derives its structure from statute, unlike the British Parliament which has evolved over centuries) . 
20See Joseph, above n 8, 446-453. 
2lJoseph, above n 8, 197-198; see also I Richardson "Public Law and Constitutional Issues" (1993) 
NZU 198, 199 (stating that "the development of public law in New Zealand is likely to be increasingly 
influenced by appeals to international norms"); Legal Division of Commonwealth Secretariat "The 
Application of International Human Rights Standards in Domestic Law" (1992) 22 VUWLR 1; J Elkind 
"The Optional Protocol and the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights" (1991) NZU 409; J Elkind 
"International Obligations and the Bill of Rights" (1988) NZU 205. 
22Joseph, above n 8, 196. 
23See above. 
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under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. In short, as Jackson has noted, 
"constitutional safeguards in New Zealand are minimal.,,24 In his view:25 
There is a tendency to equate the will of the majority party with parliament and to 
assume that whatever the majority says goes, thereby pushing to one side the whole 
question of constitutionality. It is partly because this lack of institutional restraint that 
Lijphart was able to regard New Zealand as an exemplar of the majoritarian model. 
Although the proportional representation electoral system adopted in 1993 is yet to be 
tested, its introduction is unlikely to change this equation. The new electoral system 
is likely to produce coalition governments and more compromise among the parties in 
House of Representatives/6 but it will not alter the essential majoritarian nature of 
Parliament as it does not create any external institutional mechanism by which to 
check Parliament's legislative power. Furthermore, calls for a written constitution 
have generated little interest among political parties.27 Joseph has argued that;2s 
[o]pposition to an entrenched Constitution (or a Bill of Rights) may stem from 
party politicians imbued with the spirit of majority rule in a unicameral 
Parliament. They may find it repugnant that their powers may be limited when 
in office. Their organised and systematic opposition is part of the reason, some 
contend, why the Constitution should be entrenched. 
Although Joseph has suggested that New Zealand's high degree of political consensus 
has made a formal constitution unnecessary /9 he points out that;3° 
consensus does not necessarily replace an effective constitutional framework; the only 
real sanction remaining in the country is that of triennial elections based upon the simple 
plurality system. Given rising racial consciousness and the passing of the economic 
security it enjoyed as a colony, it may be that New Zealand's crude majoritarianism is 
now dated. Certainly the degree to which the actions of New Zealand governments are 
unhindered by constitutional considerations is unique. No other country in the world, 
claiming to be democratic, has gone so far. 
The move to proportional representation is unlikely to undermine this assessment 
either. Although the triennial electoral sanction shifts from one based on plurality to 
one based on proportionality, the new system does not establish any new legal limits 
on Parliament's power. The likelihood of coalition government invites the possibility 
of political compromise, but it does not guarantee individual rights as no institution 
rivals the power of Parliament. 
24Jackson, above n 8, 13. 
25Above. 
26Por a defInition of the House of Representatives, see below text accompanying notes 44-52. 
27Joseph, above n 8, 111; see also section I.C. in chapter seven. 
2sJoseph, above n 8, 111. 
29Joseph, above n 8, 103. 
30Above; see also Jackson, above n 8,21-22. 
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II STRUCTURE OF NEW ZEALAND GOVERNMENT 
Unlike the constitutional systems in Switzerland and California, New Zealand's 
constitutional system is based on an informal, rather than formal, separation of 
powers.31 As Palmer has observed, the political party that controls Parliament 
"effectively controls both the legislative and executive branches."32 However, Joseph 
has argued that "the distinctions between the primary functions of law-making, law-
executing, and law-adjudicating cannot be abandoned, for their separability is a 
function of the concept of law itself. ,,33 Palmer has conceded this point by stating that 
"the theory of the separation of powers provides a useful touchstone against which to 
fmd the location of powers in the New Zealand Government and judge the propriety 
of the arrangement. ,,34 
Joseph outlines the division of governmental power among the legislative, executive, 
and judicial branches as follows: 35 
The executive embraces the administrative powers and functions of central government 
and includes all the government departments under ministerial control. Cabinet 
Ministers elected to power as "the government" are the political executive. Since 
historically it is His or Her Majesty's Government, "the Crown" is often used as the 
legal representation of executive government. The legislature is the Parliament of New 
Zealand and exercises the functions of law-making and holding to account the political 
executive. The third organ of government exercises powers for adjudicating disputes 
according to law, including disputes between individuals and the state. The judiciary is 
comprised of a hierarchy of courts - the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, the 
Court of Appeal, the High Court and District Courts. 
This outline provides the basis for examining the New Zealand constitutional system 
in more detail, and determining the role that the CIR Act is likely to play within it. 
A Parliament (Legislature) 
Parliament has full power to make laws. 36 Section 14 of the Constitution Act 1986 
defmes Parliament as consisting of the Sovereign and the House of Representatives. 
31Joseph, above n 8, 228, 237; see also generally chapters four and six. 
32Palmer, above n 8, 6. 
33Joseph, above n 8, 237. 
34Palmer, above n 8, 5. 
35Joseph, above n 8, 5. For discussions of "the Crown," see P Joseph "The Crown as a Legal Concept 
(I)" (1993) NZU 126; Brookfield "The Monarchy and the Constitution Today: A New Zealand 
Perspective", above n 8; D Mathieson "Does the Crown have Human Powers?" (1992) 15 NZULR 
117; N Jamieson "The Demise of the Crown" (1989) NZU 329. 
36Constitution Act 1986, s. 15. 
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1 The Governor-General 
The Sovereign, who happens to be the English monarch,37 is the Head of State of New 
Zealand and is represented by the Governor-General. 38 The Governor-General is 
appointed by the Sovereign on advice from Ministers of the Crown. As a general 
rule, Ministers of the Crown are senior members of the House of Representatives 
from the party or parties that have a working majority in the House. The Governor-
General's most important task is to confer the royal assent on bills passed by the 
House. As David McGee, the Clerk of the House, has noted, the Governor-General's 
assent to a bill is essential to transmute it from a bill into an Act of Parliament and, 
therefore, law. 39 
When presented with a bill, the Governor-General has three options. He or she can 
assent to it, refuse assent, or return the Bill to the House with proposed amendments. 
However, according to McGee, "[n]o bill presented to a ... Governor-General has 
ever been refused the Royal Assent in New Zealand."4O This can largely be attributed 
to the constitutional convention that the Governor-General generally acts only on the 
advice of Ministers except in the most extraordinary circumstances. 41 According to 
Palmer, the Governor-General can act on his or her own in only three cases: the 
appointment of a Prime Minister, the dismissal of a Prime Minister, and the refusal of 
a request to dissolve Parliament for the purpose of holding a general election. 42 
Although these "reserve powers" have "never been used in modern times, ,,43 they are 
likely to be used under the new proportional representation electoral system, 
particularly if coalition governments become the norm. The Governor-General could 
regularly be confronted with would-be or existing Prime Ministers unable to form or 
hold together coalition governments. 
2 The House of Representatives 
Members of the House of Representatives are called members of Parliament (MPS).44 
They are elected for the term of Parliament, which cannot exceed three years in 
length. 45 Prior to the advent of proportional representation, the House of 
Representatives consists of 97 constituency representatives, who were elected to 
37 See Palmer, above n 8, 24. 
38Constitution Act 1986, ss. 2-3; see also Brookfield "The Reconstituted Office of Governor-General" , 
above n 8. 
39McGee, above n 8,228. 
4OMcGee, above n 8,239. 
41 Above. 
42Palmer, above n 8,29. 
43Above. 
44Constitution Act 1986, s. 10. 
45Constitution Act 1986, s. 17. 
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Parliament under a plurality system, that is, the candidate in each constituency with 
the most votes was elected. Although the majority of MPs generally received more 
than 50 percent of the vote in their constituencies, no party that won control of 
Parliament has received 50 percent or more of the national vote since 1954 under this 
electoral system. 46 
In 1993, the electorate, concerned largely by the unrepresentative and unresponsive 
nature of Parliament,47 voted in a government controlled referendum to change the 
system by which to elect MPs. Under the proportional representation electoral 
system, the number of MPs will be approximately 120. MPs will be elected for three 
year terms in one of three ways: 1) as a general constituency candidate, of which 
there will initially be approximately 60; 2) as a Maori constituency candidate, of 
which there will initially be 5; or 3) as a party list candidate, of which there will be 
approximately 55. 48 
Increasing the number of MPs from 97 to 120 was controversial. Given the public's 
low regard for MPs, many proportional representation proponents feared that it would 
lead the electors to reject proportional representation. Once the electorate approved 
the move to proportional representation, a few MPs came to the conclusion that many 
electors would prefer proportional representation with fewer MPs. A few months 
after the CIR Act went into effect, several sitting MPs decided to use it to challenge 
the National Government's decision to offer the electors the opportunity to approve a 
proportional representation system with 120 MPs. Michael Law, a maverick National 
MP from Hawkes Bay, New Zealand First Leader Winston Peters, an all but 
excommunicated former National MP from Tauranga, and Geoff Braybrooke, a 
Labour MP from Napier, obtained approval from the Clerk of the House to circulate 
a petition calling for a citizens initiated referendum on the following question: 
"Should the size of Parliament be reduced from 120 members to 100 by reducing the 
number elected from party lists?" According to Laws, a referendum on this question 
would give the electorate a chance to choose between proportional representation with 
120 MPs or 100 MPS. 49 If the question qualifies for the ballot, the electors approve 
the reduction, and the government of the day decides to implement the result, the 
number of party list seats would be reduced by 20 to approximately 35. 
46See generally C Norton New Zealand Parliamentary Election Results, 1946-1987 (Victoria University 
of Wellington, Wellington, 1988); The General Election 1990: Enrolment and Voting Statistics form 
the General Election Held on 27 October 1990 (1990) AJHR E.9; The General Election and Electoral 
Referendum 1993 [1994] AJHR E.9 
47 See generally chapters seven and eight. 
48See Electoral Act 1993, ss. 35(3)(a), 35(3)(c), 45(3)(a), and 191(7)-(8). 
49«Petition to Reduce House Proceeds" The Evening Post, Wellington, New Zealand, 22 August 1994, 
2. 
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As a general rule, each MP belongs to a party to which he or she owes allegiance. 
According to Jackson, political parties in New Zealand have been:50 
classically majoritarian, being heavily programmatic, by inference class conscience, 
acting as parties of social integration rather than individual representation, and therefore 
highly disciplined. The development of a pluralist pressure groups system has 
consequently placed heavy demands upon them and over the years they have intensified 
this self-discipline in the face of such diverse activity. 
As Jackson has noted, "the scale of ethics in parliamentary democracy today is 
roughly that your conscience comes last, your constituency second, and your party 
requirements come fIrst . ,, 51 This phenomenon is completely at odds with Burke's 
theory of representation. 52 
3 Legislative process 
As the legislative history of the CIR Act showed, the legislative process consists of 
eight steps: drafting, fIrst reading, select committee, report back, second reading, 
Committee of the whole House, third reading, and assent.53 Bills are generally 
drafted on the instruction of the government of the day, either by a private law fIrm 
or the Parliamentary Counsel Office. Any MP may introduce a bill. However, 
virtually all bills that are enacted are government bills. A government bill is 
introduced by the Minister whose portfolio covers the subject dealt with in the bill. 
Once the bill is introduced, it is given its fIrst reading, which is primarily an 
opportunity for the Minister in charge of the bill to explain its purpose and for other 
MPs, mainly those not part of the government of the day, to "raise questions about its 
contents so that they can be better informed about it and about the Government's 
intentions. ,,54 
After a bill's fIrst reading, the bill is automatically referred to the appropriate 
parliamentary select committee for study and public comment unless the government 
of the day decides to deal with the bill under urgency or the bill is a money bill , that 
is deals primarily with appropriations or imprest supply. The urgency exception 
removes nearly 10 percent of all government bills from select committee scrutiny. 55 
McGee contends that the money bill exception is of little consequence.56 However, it 
50Jackson, above n 8, 58 . 
5lJackson, above n 8, 60. 
52See section III.B.2(d) in chapter two. 
53 See generally chapter eight; see also W Jeffries "Parliamentary Conventions and Procedures - How 
Laws are Made" (1992) NZU 159. 
54McGee, above n 8, 259. 
55 McGee , above n 8, 262. 
56 Above. The government of the day generally deals with two or three appropriation bills and two or 
three imprest supply bills each year. McGee, above n 8, 298-299. 
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removes bills of a fInancial or budgetary nature from public comment through the 
normal select committee process. 
Once the bill is assigned to the relevant select committee, the select committee may 
call for public submissions and schedule public hearings on the bill. The majority of 
submissions come from organisations or associations with an interest in the bill. 
According to Jackson, "the influence of interest groups has been, and is, a most 
important factor in the New Zealand political scene. ,,57 In addition to the influence of 
caucus and party organisations, he attributes the democratic control of Parliament to 
interest groups.58 The select committee also considers the advice provided by the 
officials serving the Minister in charge of the bill. 
After the select committee has considered the issues raised by the public submissions 
and officials, it deliberates on each clause of the bill, that is, it decides whether the 
clause should stand as was when introduced or be modifIed or deleted. Although 
select committees do not have the formal power to amend bills, they can and often do 
recommend amendments to the bill to the House, which are deemed to be adopted 
when the bill is read a second time. 59 The second reading takes place after the select 
committee reports the bill back to the House. At this stage in the legislative process 
the House is asked to adopt the bill in principle, that is, it has to decide whether 
passing the bill is desirable. Aside from putting forward arguments for and against 
the bill, MPs, particularly those who are not part of the government of the day, often 
use the second reading to signal their intention to propose amendments to the bill once 
it reaches the Committee of the whole House. 60 
Once the bill reaches the Committee of the whole House, the bill and its proposed 
amendments are considered clause by clause. The ensuing debate, if any, is generally 
led by the Minister in charge of the bill, who is supported by officials serving the 
Minister. 61 According to McGee, the object is to determine whether the bill's 
"detailed provisions properly incorporate the principle of the bill agreed to on second 
reading. ,,62 Although the government of the day often accepts amendments to the bill 
57Jackson, above n 8, x; see also A Robinson "The Role of Pressure Groups in New Zealand" in S 
Levine (ed) Politics in New Zealand (George Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1978). 
58Jackson, above n 8, xi-xii. Palmer has argued that lawyers who effectively represent the interests of 
their clients are those who understand the governmental decision-making process and are actively 
involved in it. G Palmer "Lawyer as Lobbyist: The Role of Lawyers in Influencing and Managing 
Change" (1993) NZU 93; G Palmer "The New Public Law: Its Province and Function" (1992) 22 
VUWLR 1, 7-10 (stating the importance of "making carefully crafted arguments which can alter 
policies while they are in the gestation period ... ensuring client's interests are fully taken into account 
within the process"). 
59McGee, above n 8,264-265. 
6OMcGee, above n 8,269. 
6lMcGee, above n 8, 274. 
62McGee, above n 8,272. 
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that improve its drafting or eliminate technical glitches or what would be unintended 
consequences, it rarely accepts amendments concerning the bill's basic policy. 
Once the Committee of the whole House has completed its work, the bill is submitted 
to a third reading. As often as not, the third reading is not debated. If it is, the 
debate is confmed to the general principles of the bill as it has emerged from the 
Committee. Aside from approving the bill as it may have been changed by the 
Committee, the third reading provides an opportunity to record the arguments raised 
during the Committee's deliberations as its proceedings are not officially recorded. 63 
After the third reading, the bill is sent to the Governor-General for the royal assent. 
Once the assent is given, the bill becomes law. 64 
As in Switzerland and California, the passage of bills through the legislative process 
gives laws their legitimacy. Both Palmer and Joseph agree that this legitimacy stems 
from the fact that the House of Representatives is composed of elected 
representatives. 65 Joseph points out that representative democracy in the Westminster 
context brings together both the doctrine of the consent of the governed66 and the 
doctrine of mandate.67 In theory, the parties that win control of Parliament are bound 
by their election promises as they form the basis upon which the electors consent to 
be governed. As a corollary, the winning parties have a mandate to put their 
promises into effect. The resulting laws derive their legitimacy from the supposition 
that they are endorsed by most electors. 
In strictly legal terms, the cm Act does not provide a means to alter the basic 
character or behaviour of the legislative process, as Parliament is not obliged to give 
effect to referendum results. Furthermore, if Parliament were inspired by a 
referendum result to legislate, the CIR Act provides no guarantee that the legislation 
must give effect to the aspirations of those who placed a particular proposal on the 
ballot. In political terms, however, the CIR Act could encourage Parliament to 
legislate if MPs or their parties fear that failing to give effect to a referendum result 
would cost them the support of the electors. As the action of MPs remains vital to 
whether a referendum result is written into law in New Zealand, the CIR Act is 
unlikely to separate issues from candidates and their parties as the direct democracy 
systems have in Switzerland, for example. 68 
63McGee, above n 8,290. 
64McGee, above n 8, 328. 
65Palmer, above n 8, 97; Joseph, above n 8,284. 
66Joseph, above n 8, 284; see also section II1.A.3 in chapter two. 
67Joseph, above n 8, 285; see also Jackson, above n 8, 30; section III.B.2(b) in chapter two. 
68See section III.B in chapter four and .section II.A in chapter eight. 
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B Cabinet (Executive) 
Although Part II of the Constitution Act 1986 is nominally concerned with the 
Executive branch, it does not describe the Cabinet system of government or how it 
works. According to Joseph, Cabinet is a cardinal feature of the New Zealand 
constitutional system yet the law takes no account of it. 69 It is largely the product of 
convention. 70 Nevertheless, it is the supreme decision-making body in New 
Zealand.71 As Mulholland has noted, "all vital decisions are either ratified by Cabinet 
or emanate from it.,,72 Cabinet decisions are recorded and become the source of 
authority for governmental action. 73 
Cabinet is comprised of Ministers of the Crown. As in Switzerland, only MPs can be 
Ministers, which, according to Palmer, "is the essence of responsible government as 
it connects the popularly elected legislature to the executive. ,,74 As a general rule, 
Ministers are senior members of the party or parties that won control the House of 
Representatives in the last election.75 The Governor-General appoints Ministers on 
the recommendation of the Prime Minister. 76 The Prime Minister is also appointed by 
the Governor-General. The Governor-General selects a person to be Prime Minister 
based on his or her ability to form a government, that is, to command majority 
support in the House. Prior to the introduction of proportional representation, the 
person chosen was generally the leader of the party which had obtained a majority of 
the seats in the House. Under proportional representation, with its tendency to 
produce coalition governments, the person chosen is likely to be the leader of one of 
the two or more parties that have decided to work together. 77 
The Prime Minister wields more power than his or her parliamentary colleagues, 
including those in Cabinet. He or she serves as the chairperson of Cabinet. 
69Joseph, above n 8, 238. 
70Mulholland, above n 8, 30; Joseph, above n 8, 633. Cabinet is co-incidental with the Executive 
Council, which is a legal body set up under Royal Prerogative, and derives much of its authority from 
that identity. Cabinet decisions requiring legal authentication, such as regulations, are promulgated by 
the Governor-General on the advice of the Council and gazetted as Orders-in-Council. As Joseph has 
noted: "The Executive Council has the same membership as Cabinet but discharges different functions . 
Whereas Cabinet is an informal, deliberative body for formulating policy, government Ministers tender 
advice to the Governor-General in Executive Council for promulgating their decisions by Order, 
Proclamation, regulation, or other instrument as may be required by law. ... Orders in Council are 
second only to Acts of Parliament for implementing government decisions which require the force of 
law.» Joseph, above n 8, 641. See also Cabinet Office Manual (1991). 
71 Mulholland, above n 8, 31; Joseph, above n 8, 633; Palmer, above n 8, 10. 
72Mulholland, above n 8, 30-31; see also Palmer, above n 8, 34. 
73Palmer, above n 8,40. 
74Palmer, above n 8,34. 
75See Mulholland, above n 8, 30; Joseph, above n 8,625. 
76McGee, above n 8, 66. 
77See Joseph, above n 8,598-98; McGee, above n 8, 66. 
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According to Palmer, "[h]is or her opinion will carry weight on all issues, whereas 
individual Ministers will tend to be regarded at their most authoritative in dealing 
with matters inside their own portfolios. ,,78 As was demonstrated during the Muldoon 
period (1975 to 1984), the Prime Minister can possess an overwhelming concentration 
of power if he or she is also Minister of Finance.79 Palmer is convinced that this 
combination should "never be permitted to happen again.,,80 In his view: 
it makes the conduct of modern Cabinet Government as it oUght to work impossible. In 
any system of decision-making there must be safeguards and checks. For one person to 
hold both positions reduces the safeguards substantially and condemns other Ministers to 
a subordinate and somewhat inconsequential role . 
Cabinet meets and deliberates in secret. 81 In addition, as Joseph has noted, "Ministers 
reach decisions collectively under the mantle of joint responsibility. ,,82 Accordingly, 
Cabinet's "decisions are notionally unanimous and not open to public scrutiny. ,,83 
The practice is meant to encourage free debate and to allow the government of the day 
to present a common front to its critics and to the electorate at large. However, it 
also renders Cabinet's decision-making process virtually impossible to assess.84 
Furthermore, the doctrine of collective ministerial responsibility serves to mute public 
dissent that would otherwise come from individual Ministers. According to the 
doctrine, Ministers who wish to disagree publicly with a decision taken by Cabinet 
must resign to do so. In Palmer's words, "Cabinet must speak with one voice." 85 
Joseph offers the following explanation:86 
Although the Queen in right of New Zealand is the head of state, enjoying vast statutory 
and common law powers, there must always be a government capable of acting, of 
advising the Crown and of accepting responsibility for that advice. The persons who 
are appointed as the Crown's advisers (the "government") are chosen from persons 
elected by the people, and who have the confidence of the House of Representatives . 
Under the party political system, the leader of the political party with the most members 
returned or elected at a general election is asked to form the government. The lynchpin 
is the convention of ministerial responsibility which requires a government to retain the 
support of the House, and to resign if defeated on a no confidence motion. 
However, as Joseph also notes, "[i]n modem times, party discipline in the House 
virtually forecloses the possibility of governments being defeated on a confidence 
issue. ,,87 As Jackson points out: 88 
78Palmer, above n 8,66. 
79palmer, above n 8, 67. 
8OAbove. 
81 Mulholland, above n 8, 30. 
82Joseph, above n 8, 626. 
83Joseph, above n 8, 634. 
84See above. 
85Palmer, above n 8,45 . 
86Palmer, above n 8, 5-6. 
87Palmer, above n 8,6. 
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· .. New Zealand has developed the most highly disciplined (albeit self-disciplined) 
parliamentary parties of any 'democratic ' country. . .. Further, with the level of 
cohesion in New Zealand's political parties today, it may be argued that the most 
important debates which do take place are not made public, while the debates on the 
floor of the House become largely ritualistic . ... It is too readily assumed that what 
is good for the political party must automatically be good for the country. 
This party discipline, when coupled with the doctrine of collective ministerial 
responsibility, ensures the dominance of the Executive over the Legislature. 89 As 
Palmer has observed, "Parliament is highly unlikely to pass legislation or approve 
measures which are unacceptable to the Cabinet,,,90 particularly as the government of 
the day controls the legislative agenda as well as the policy underlying most of the 
legislation it enacts .91 In this vein, Jackson has conc1uded: 92 
The pretense that Parliament somehow represents any sanction upon executive power 
has almost disappeared, except on rare occasions when a government has a fmely 
balanced party majority. The only effective remaining sanctions are the triennial 
elections .... [I]n matters of moment Parliament is party, and very largely the majority 
party. 
Unlike California, the Executive in New Zealand can usually be sure that its 
proposals will become law without being altered by compromise in the legislative 
process. 93 This process serves more to perfect the legislative form of government 
policy than to resolve competing political considerations. As a general rule, real give 
and take is confined to the policy formation process prior to Cabinet directive. Once 
Cabinet decides to legislate, it is rare for the final enactment to deviate from the 
policy underlying the decision. 
In legal terms, the CIR Act does not affect Cabinet, particularly as Cabinet has the 
power to authorise its repeal or amendment. More importantly, the results of citizens 
initiated referendums are not binding. Accordingly, Cabinet is not legally obliged to 
take any notice of their results, let alone authorise legislation giving them effect. 
In political terms, however, ignoring the results of citizens initiated referendums 
could prove impossible, especially if a particular referendum topic becomes an 
88Jackson, above n 8, 68 . 
89See Joseph, above n 8, 281. 
9OPalmer, above n 8,9. 
91See Joseph, above n 8, 281. 
92Jackson, above n 8, 15. 
93See Palmer, above n 8, 139; see also Joseph, above n 8, 288; but see B Robertson "Constitutional and 
Administrative Law in New Zealand" NZU 213 , 216-217 (claiming, in a review of Joseph's book, that 
the Fourth Labour Government restored Parliament to it rightful place where the important issues 
facing the nation are debated and that government backbenchers are influential in shaping government 
policy) . 
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election issue. In these circumstances, the government of the day could be faced with 
a serious dilemma if the result of a referendum runs counter to principles fundamental 
to the government's policies and election manifesto promises. For example, on 30 
November 1994 a group styling itself "The Next Step Democracy Movement" re-
lodged six proposed referendum questions with the Clerk of the House which 
threatened to re-litigate some of the key policy decisions underlying the National 
Government's political program. In contradiction to accepted government policy, the 
questions proposed free medical care; free education from pre-school through 
university; full employment with a livable wage for those not in paid employment; 
reduction of military spending by half with the savings allocated to health, education, 
and conservation; repeal of the controversial Employment Contracts Act 1991; and 
meeting the increasing demand for energy through conservation and from sources that 
are environmentally sustainable and do not produce carbon dioxide. 94 
If a citizens initiated referendum proposal contrary to government policy qualifies for 
the ballot and appears likely to by approved by the electorate, the government of the 
day could try to undermine support for it by placing a counter proposal on the ballot. 
If the proposal is approved, the government, if unwilling to abandon its policy, would 
have to pursue evasive strategies. If the turnout is low and the vote is close, the 
government could try to dismiss the result as unrepresentative. This approach has its 
limits, however, as the National Government discovered when it failed to discount the 
results of its first government controlled referendum on electoral system in this 
manner in 1992. Furthermore, the strategy would probably be useless regarding 
referendums held in conjunction with general elections, as they traditionally produce 
high turnouts in New Zealand. Alternatively, the government could try ignoring the 
result or try providing some plausible reason for not giving effect to the result in the 
immediate future, hoping that the electors would lose interest in the issue by the time 
the next general election is held. In addition, the government could try legislating in 
a manner that gives the appearance of compliance with the result, but, in effect, 
preserves the status quo. 
The approach taken, from complete compliance to complete rejection, will depend on 
whether the citizens initiated referendum coincides with a general election or a change 
of government. If a referendum on government policy is held between elections, the 
media will most likely view it as a referendum on the government of the day, even 
though the result will simply approve or reject a particular aspect of the government's 
political program. Win or lose, the political damage could be sufficient to jeopardise 
94"Citizens Initiated Referenda" (13 December 1994) 25 Parliamentary Bulletin 18-19. Next Step 
Democracy originally submitted these proposed questions on 20 June 1994 but withdrew them on 16 
September 1994 just before the Clerk had to determine them. See "Citizens Initiated Referenda" (19 
September 1994) 16 Parliamentary Bulletin 17-18. 
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a government's re-election hopes, particularly if the policy was controversial but 
necessary. If a referendum on government policy is held at a general election, the 
parties opposing the government will undoubtedly try use the issue to augment their 
electoral fortunes. If the electors do not re-elect the government and approve the 
referendum, the new government would probably give effect to the result. If the 
electors return the government but approve the referendum, the outcome is less 
certain as this would put the government in the novel position of having to reconcile a 
general mandate to govern according to its basic policies with a specific request to 
reject one of those basic polices. In either case, the CIR Act has the potential to re-
politicise some of the more controversial decisions taken by Cabinet. 
C Courts (Judiciary) 
The New Zealand judicial structure consists of four levels: the District Court, the 
High Court, the Court of Appeal, and the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. It 
is augmented by the Family Court and approximately 130 miscellaneous tribunals, 
ranging from the Disputes Tribunal, which covers small claims up to $ 3,000, to the 
Treaty of Waitangi Tribunal, which hears grievances regarding alleged violations of 
Treaty rights. 
Most of the judicial activity takes place in the District Court. District Court judges 
preside individually over most of the crime cases and, with certain exceptions, civil 
cases that do not exceed $50,000. They are appointed by the Governor-General and 
generally serve until they retire. 95 The High Court has virtually unlimited 
jurisdiction. Essentially, any case outside the jurisdiction of the District Court can be 
commenced in the High Court. The High Court also hears appeals from the District 
Court as well as from many of the tribunals and specialist courts. The Governor-
General appoints High Court judges, including the Chief Justice, who must retire 
when they turn 68.96 High Court judges can only be removed on the grounds of 
misbehaviour or incapacity. 97 
For the great majority of criminal and civil cases, the Court of Appeal is the fmal 
court of appeal. It does not have any original jurisdiction. It consists of six judges: 
95Mulholland, above n 8, 42-44, 47-49. 
96Mulholland, above n 8,45-47. 
97Constitution Act 1986, s.23. Furthermore, the salary of High Court judges cannot be reduced while in 
office. Constitution Act 1986, s. 24. These rules, which are designed to ensure judicial independence, 
also apply to the Court of Appeal. See Palmer, above n 8, 183. Judicial independence is augmented 
by a convention that the government of the day should not exert any form of pressure on judges to make 
decisions in a particular way. As corollary, judges are expected to refrain from participating in 
political partisan activity. Palmer, above n 8, 184, 186. In addition, the courts have powerful 
contempt powers which they can use to punish people who make scandalous statements about Judges or 
make public statements calculated to influence the outcome of a trial. Palmer, above n 8, 186. 
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the Chief Justice ex officio, one High Court judge who is appointed President of the 
Court of Appeal, and four other High Court judges who are appointed as judges of 
the Court of Appeal. The quorum for the Court of Appeal is three judges. However, 
only two judges need to be present for the delivery of judgments or for hearings 
regarding leave to appeal to the Privy Council. 98 
The Judicial Committee of Privy Council, which sits in London, is the fInal Court of 
Appeal. In civil cases involving amounts over $5,000, litigants have an open right of 
appeal. If the amount is less, they must obtain leave of the Court of Appeal. Appeals 
in all criminal actions also require leave of the Court of Appeal. According to 
Palmer, the Privy Council usually handles no more than two or three cases a year 
from New Zealand. Since 1983, when the Minister of Justice suggested that this 
appeal was no longer required, constitutional lawyers have been debating the 
suggestion. 99 Although both Palmer and Mulholland appear to agree that abolishment 
is inevitable, largely as a natural consequence of national sovereignty, 100 it could 
amount to the elimination of a check on arbitrary Executive action. As Mulholland 
has observed: 101 
New Zealand has no written constitution, nor second chamber to its parliamentary 
system, nor Bill of Rights. The Privy Council could be seen, at least to some extent, in 
substitution for these institutions and assisting in upholding the rights of the individual 
against arbitrary conduct by the Government. 
Although Parliament enacted the New Zealand Bill of Rights 1990 a few months after 
Mulholland published his observation, his assessment is unlikely to change as section 
4 of that Act expressly denies the courts the power to strike down legislation that 
conflicts with the Act's provisions. As Jackson has noted, the courts "lack any 
capacity to declare an [A]ct unconstitutional or beyond the scope of Parliament's 
powers; [they] will not question the validity of what purports to be an [A]ct of 
Parliament. ,,102 
Nevertheless, the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 has given the courts an 
additional tool by which to interpret and enforce parliamentary enactments. Section 6 
of the Act requires and empowers the courts to give meaning to enactments that are, 
as far as possible, consistent with the rights and freedoms contained in the Bill of 
98Mulholland, above n 8, 49. 
99Mulholland, above n 8, 49-52. 
I ooMulholland , above n 8,50-51; Palmer, above n 8, 181. 
IOIMulholland, above n 8, 51. 
102 Jackson, above n 8, 23-24; see also Joseph, above n 8, 166; Palmer, above n 8, 186, 194, 214. 
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Rights. This requirement is similar to the approach the courts take regarding New 
Zealand's international obligations. As Joseph has noted, they apply: 103 
a presumption of interpretation that Parliament does not intend legislating in breach of 
international law or specific treaty obligations. If a statute may reasonably bear more 
than one meaning, a court will prefer the meaning that is consonant with international 
law. International comity obliges courts to take notice of an international treaty when 
construing a statute for implementing its terms. That obligations enures even if a statute 
omits to state that it is for implementing a treaty. 
Aside from determining the meaning of parliamentary enactments, the courts have the 
power to declare subordinate legislation invalid if it is outside the scope of the 
authority granted by the applicable parliamentary enactment. 104 Furthermore, by-
laws, which are generally enacted by local bodies, can be struck down on the grounds 
that they are unreasonable.105 This power is significant as Parliament has conferred 
upon the Executive "wide discretionary powers in many different areas of activity. ,,106 
As Palmer has stated: 107 
numerous tribunals exist to decide specialized questions of licensing and registration. 
When Ministers, public servants, local authorities or tribunals act in a manner which is 
illegal or unfair their decision can be quashed by a Court. 
According to Palmer, however, Parliament can enact legislation that expressly limits 
the courts ability to review Executive action. 108 Parliament can also pass legislation 
that alters or reverses the law as determined in judicial decisions.109 Although 
parliamentary action in this respect is rarely retroactive, it can be. 110 
Accordingly, as in Switzerland but unlike in California, the role of the courts in New 
Zealand with respect to the CIR Act is confmed to interpretation of the Act and 
103Joseph, above n 8,453; see also Police v Hicks [1974] 1 NZLR 763 at 766 per O'Regan J; Salomon 
v Customs and Excise Commissioners [1967] 2 QB 116 at 144 per Diplock U. 
I 04Palmer , above n 8, 147, 194; Jackson, above n 8, 23-24; see also G Taylor Judicial Review 
(Butterworths, Wellington, 1991); G Taylor "The Limits of Judicial Review" NZULR 178; R Harrison 
"Judicial Review of Administrative Action: Some Recent Developments and Trends" (1992) NZU 
200; J Fogarty "Judicial Review: A Review Article" (1992) NZU 88; 
105Palmer, above n 8, 147, 196. 
I06Palmer, above n 8, 190. 
107 Above. Palmer asserts that the courts have a duty to ensure that Executive action is consistent with 
the principles of natural justice and in accordance with the rule of law as interpreted and applied 
correctly. Palmer, above n 8, 194. 
108Palmer, above n 8, 192. 
109palmer, above n 8, 196, 200. 
llOEg Clutha Development (Clyde Dam) Empowering Act 1982 (nullifying a decision regarding water 
rights reached via Gilmore v National Water and Soil Conservation Authority and Minister of Energy 
(1982) 8 NZPTA 298 (Casey J); Annan v National Water and Soil Conservation Authority and Minister 
of Energy (1980) 7 NZTPA 417; (1982) 8 NZTPA 396); see also Annan v National Water and Soil 
Conservation Authority and Minister of Energy (No.2)(1982) 8 NZTPA 369 (Planning Authority); 
Brookfield "High Courts, High Dam, High Policy," above n 8. 
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review of any administrative decisions carried out under the Act.11I The courts cannot 
rule on the constitutional validity of the CIR Act or any of the Acts that give effect to 
citizens initiated referendum results. In addition, they cannot rule on Parliament's 
decisions to ignore or give effect to the results of citizens initiated referendums, as the 
results are legally non-binding. In Switzerland and California, the courts need not 
intervene to enforce referendum results as their effect is immediate and does not 
depend on the action of elected representatives. If the CIR Act is used frequently and 
successfully, however, the interpretation and review functions of the courts could 
grow in importance as opponents look for ways to delay or subvert referendum 
questions which are contrary to their interests. 112 
If Parliament were to amend the CIR Act to make the results of citizens initiated 
referendums binding and to include subject matter limitations, the role of the courts 
would expand. Subject matter limitations would give the courts the power to disallow 
the placement of a determined question on the ballot on the grounds that it concerns a 
subject exempt from citizens initiated referendums. It would also be possible to 
challenge results on this ground if officials failed to keep questions dealing with 
exempt subjects off the ballot. However, assuming that Parliament would still be 
required to give effect to binding citizens initiated referendum results, the courts 
would have to respect and uphold enactments that gave effect to a result which dealt 
with an exempt subject. 
III CITIZENS INITIATED REFERENDA ACT 1993 
Although New Zealand has had some experience with government controlled 
referendums,1I3 it has not had any experience with the elector-controlled direct 
IIISee The Egg Producers Federation of New Zealand v The Clerk of the House of Representatives and 
The Royal New Zealand Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, unreported, 20 June 1994, 
High Court, Wellington Registry, CP 128/94 (Eichelbaum CJ); see also same, unreported, 23 May 
1994, High Court, Wellington Registry, CP 128/94 (Gallen J) (holding that the CIR Act 1993 did not 
permit the court to enjoin the promoter from collecting signatures even though the court was 
empowered to review the Clerk's determination of the question). 
I12See eg Egg Producers, above 111 (Eichelbaum CJ). 
113Jackson, above n 8,8,29-30 (stating that government controlled referendums are rarely used and that 
they are used when the government of the day is internally divided on an issue, when the matter is a 
constitutional issue touching upon the entrenched clauses of the Electoral Act, or when a 'moral' 
question is involved, particularly gambling or liquor); see also "NZ Referendums Rare Phenomenon" 
National Business Review, 18 September 1992. For statistics on New Zealand's government controlled 
referendums, see J Wilson New Zealand Parliamentary Record: 1840-1984 (Government Print, 
Wellington, 1985) 298-301 (summarising results of referendums from 1896 to 1984); New Zealand 
Official Yearbook 1988 (93 ed, Dept of Statistics, Wellington, 1988) 74 (summarising results of 
referendums from 1972 to 1987); New Zealand Gazette (29 October 1990) 4505-4506 (summarising 
results in 1990); The General Election 1990 (1990) AJHR E.9, 174-175 (same); New Zealand Gazette 
(29 October 1992) 3543-3544 (summarising results in 1992); New Zealand Gazette (16 December 
1993) 3753-3754 (summarising results in 1993). For discussions of New Zealand's government 
controlled referendums, see L Watt The Referendum: 1ts Uses and Abuses (MA thesis in political 
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democracy devices found in Switzerland or California, that is, the constitutional 
initiative, the legislative initiative, or the legislative referendum. While the CIR Act 
gives the New Zealand electors the opportunity to gain some experience in the general 
procedure involved in triggering these devices, it does not provide them with any 
legal power to change the law independently of Parliament or their elected 
representatives. Proposals that win the support of the electorate will only change the 
law if Parliament agrees to give effect to them. This difference is consistent with 
theory of parliamentary sovereignty, which is one of the theories upon which the New 
Zealand constitutional system is based. The CIR Act sets up a citizens initiated 
referendum process that consists of six stages. 
A Submitting a Proposal 
To start the process, a proposer, who may be a legal or natural person,114 submits a 
written proposal to the Clerk of the House of Representatives. The proposal must 
include the proposer's name, the name of the proposer's representative (if any), and 
contact addresses for both. 115 The proposal must also be accompanied by the 
prescribed fee ($500);16 and a draft of the proposed indicative referendum petition, 
which must specify the question that the proposer would like to put to the electors. 1I7 
In practice, proposers submit a question together with the requisite identification 
information and the fee; however, as a general rule, the Clerk provides them with a 
model petition form as a guide. 
science held by Victoria University of Wellington, 1956); J Lee Simple on a Soap-Box (Collins 
Publishers, Auckland, 1963) 250-257 (compulsory military training referendum of 1949); W Oliver The 
Story of New Zealand (Farber & Farber, London, 1960) 218-219, 275- 276 (same); K Sinclair A 
History of New Zealand (Penguin, Middlesex, 1959) 284 (same); K Sinclair A History of New Zealand 
(4 rev ed, 1991) 287 (same, but changed emphasis); J Rowe and M Rowe New Zealand (Ernest Berm, 
London, 1967) 81 (same); B Brown The Rise of New Zealand Labour: A History of the New Zealand 
Labour Party from 1916 to 1940 (Price Milburn, Wellington, 1962) 30-32 (liquor prohibition); R Milne 
Political Parties in New Zealand (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1966) 13 (general), 60 (compulsory 
military training), 124 (liquor prohibition), 273-286 (general); K Jackson The New Zealand Legislative 
Council (University of Otago Press, Dunedin, 1972) 193 (general); H Penniman (ed) New Zealand at 
the Polls: The General Election of 1978 (American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 
Washington DC, 1980) 93 n 50 (liquor prohibition); J Ringer An Introduction to New Zealand 
Government (Hazard Press, Christchurch, 1991) 152-154 (general); see also N Jamieson "The Age of 
Referenda" (1992) NZU 334. 
114See Citizens Initiated Referenda Act 1993, s. 11(2)(a)(iii). For an official outline of the citizens 
initiated referendum process, see How You Can Have Your Say: The Citizens Initiated Referenda Act 
1993 (Law Reform Division, Department of Justice, Wellington, 1994). 
I15CIR Act, above n 114, s. 6. 
116CIR Act, above n 114, s. 6(2)(b); Citizens Initiated Referenda (Fees) Regulations 1993, r. 2. 
117CIR Act, above n 114, s. 5(1)(b). 
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B Determining the Question 
Once these requirements are met, the second stage begins. The Clerk advertises the 
proposed question in the Gazette, the government publication in which official notices 
appear, and the principal newspapers. The public is given at least 28 days from the 
date of publication of the proposed question in the Gazette to provide the Clerk with 
written comments on its wording.lI8 However, the Clerk can accept and consider 
submissions at any time before he or she determines the question, which the Clerk 
must do within three months of receiving the proposal. 119 
In determining the wording of the question, the Clerk must take into account the 
proposal, any public comments received, and his or her consultations with the 
proposer and others. 120 Although the Clerk is not required to consult others, in 
practice the Clerk generally consults those whose interests are likely to be affected by 
the proposal as well as government officials who advise the government on matters or 
administer legislation that may be affected. The Clerk also routinely seeks the views 
of the Legislation Advisory Committee. The public comment is available for public 
inspection, and the views of officials are subject to requests under the Official 
Information Act 1982. The Clerk, as a matter of policy, provides the proposer with 
copies of all submissions on the proposer's proposal. 
The National Government is yet to decide whether it should issue guidelines for 
government officials commenting on proposed questions. 121 It would appear to be 
appropriate for officials to comment on proposals only to the extent that it assists the 
Clerk in the task of clarifying proposals. Officials providing a written record 
suggesting changes to questions designed to preserve the status quo could expose the 
government of the day to accusations that it was trying to subvert the citizens initiated 
referendum process. In addition, comments of this nature, whether from officials or 
private sector opponents of a particular proposal, are superfluous to the Clerk's task. 
The Clerk's primary function at this stage is to determine whether the wording of the 
proposed question is only capable of one of two answers and shows clearly the 
purpose and effect of the citizens initiated referendum. 122 In The Egg Producers 
Federation of New Zealand v The Clerk of the House of Representatives and The 
Royal New Zealand Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, Chief Justice 
118C1R Act, above n 114, s.7. 
119CIR Act, above n 114, s.11(2). 
120C1R Act, above n 114, ss. 9, 10(2). 
121See CAB (94) M 31/27 (22 August 1994). 
122CIR Act, above n 114, s. 10(1). 
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Eichelbaum ruled that "the Clerk is not required or indeed permitted to turn the 
proposal into something it does not purport to be. ,,123 Accordingly, he held: 124 
. . . I accept the Clerk is obliged to take reasonable steps to frame the question in a 
neutral way. I think that follows from the arbitral role the legislation requires the Clerk 
to play where, as one would expect will generally be the case, those with opposing 
views on the issue raised by the proposal will have differing opinions or preferences 
regarding the form of the question. The proposition of neutrality cannot be stated in 
absolute terms, because the subject matter may not permit complete neutrality. While 
the question should try to ensure a fair contest the fact remains that the playing field has 
been chosen by the promoter. The question is limited to the parameters of that playing 
field; the Clerk cannot shift the contest to another venue. 
This conclusion is supported by the almost complete lack of subject matter limitations 
on proposed questions. A promoter may circulate a citizens initiated referendum 
petition on any topic, even if it "does not concern Government or is such that no 
Government would take action on it," 125 provided it does not concern the election of 
an MP or the way a prior citizens initiated referendum was held,126 and does not relate 
to more than one question. 127 If the proposed question concerns either of these 
prohibited topics, the Clerk cannot determine it. The Clerk will also not determine 
the question if a citizens initiated referendum "to like effect" was held within the last 
five years, or if the proposer withdraws the question (in writing), dies or, being a 
corporation, is liquidated before the Clerk determines the question. 128 
Once the question is determined, the Clerk will approve the petition form to be used 
to collect signatures. 129 Once the question is determined and placed on the approved 
petition form, the proposer, now called the promoter, is responsible for ensuring 
"that a sufficient quantity of forms is made available and that the forms are printed in 
accordance with the approval given by the Clerk." 130 At this point, the Clerk 
publishes the question and information identifying its promoter in the Gazette and the 
principal newspapers. 131 
C Signature Collection 
This begins the third stage in which the promoter collects the signatures required to 
trigger a citizens initiated referendum. The promoter has 12 months to collect and 
123Egg Producers, above n 111 , 7 (Eichelbaum CJ). 
I24Egg Producers, above n 111, 14. 
I25Egg Producers, above n 111, 7. 
126CIR Act, above n 114, s. 4. 
127CIR Act, above n 114, s. 5(2). 
128CIR Act, above n 114, s. 11(2). 
129CIR Act, above n 114, s. 12(1). 
130CIR Act, above n 114, s. 14(3). 
131CIR Act, above n 114, s. 13. 
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deliver the signatures of at least 10 percent of all eligible electors to the Clerk. Given 
the requirements of the signature checking procedure, this means that a signature will 
only be counted if it belongs to a person whose name is on the General or Maori 
electoral roll at the time his or her signature is checked.132 In short, 10 percent of all 
eligible electors means 10 percent of all registered electors at the time of checking, 
which, if carried out just prior to the 1993 general election, would have required 
approximately 232,000 signatures. Accordingly, a promoter may collect signatures 
from people who are eligible to vote, but who are not yet registered to vote, if the 
promoter is confident that they would be registered by the time their signatures are 
checked. Given the practice in Switzerland and California, the promoter is likely to 
collect substantially more than the required number of signatures to allow for invalid 
signatures. Promoters that wish to shorten the time it takes to trigger a citizens 
initiated referendum will endeavour to collect the signatures well before the 12 month 
deadline expires. 
Signatures will only be counted if they appear on an approved petition form. 133 
Electors who sign the form are required to print their full name, their electoral 
address, the name of the electorate (if known) , and the date next to their signature. 134 
They may include their birth date. 135 This information will enable the Chief Registrar 
of Electors to verify whether the signatures belong to people registered on the 
electoral rolls. Before delivering the petition to the Clerk, the promoter must identify 
each page on which erasures appear, identify each page that is not filled with 
signatures, and note on each unfilled page the number of signatures that appear on 
it. 136 These requirements are intended to make it easier for the Clerk to calculate the 
total number of unverified signatures appearing on a petition delivered to him or her, 
and to assess the extent to which the petition may have been altered. 
D Checking the Petition and Verifying the Signatures 
The fourth stage begins once the promoter has delivered the petition to the Clerk. 
The Clerk has 20 working days to check that each page of the petition is filled out 
correctly. 137 
132C1R Act, above n 114, ss. 2, 15(3), 18(2), 19. In . CIR Act, above n 114, s. 16(3). 
134CIR Act, above n 114, s. 15(1)(a). 
135CIR Act, above n 114, s. 15(1)(b). 
136CIR Act, above n 114, s. 15(2). 
137CIR Act, above n 114, s. 16(1). 
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1 Mistakes 
If there are mistakes, the Clerk may return the entire petition or the incorrect pages to 
the promoter to be corrected. 138 In either case, the promoter has two months to make 
the necessary corrections. 139 If the promoter is late in returning a corrected petition, 
the promoter is given an additional two months to collect more signatures and return 
the petition to the Clerk.l40 Failure to meet this last deadline or to obtain enough valid 
signatures will end the process. 141 If the promoter is late in returning corrected pages, 
signatures on these pages will not be counted. 142 The Clerk then has two months to 
decide if the returned pages, if any, and the rest of the petition have enough valid 
signatures. 143 If they do not, the promoter is given another two months to collect 
more signatures and return the petition to the Clerk.l44 If the promoter returns the 
petition late or it still does not have enough valid signatures, the process will end. 145 
2 No mistakes 
If each page of the petition is correctly filled out, the Clerk has two months to 
determine whether the petition has enough valid signatures. l46 If it does not, the 
promoter will be given two additional months to collect more signatures and return 
the petition to the Clerk. 147 The process will end if the promoter returns the petition 
late or if it still does not have enough valid signatures. 148 
3 Verification of signatures 
To verify whether the promoter has obtained the requisite number of valid signatures, 
the Clerk is required to take a sample of the signatures in accordance with a statistical 
sampling technique devised by the Government Statistician and to provide the sample 
to the Chief Registrar of Electors. The Chief Registrar of Electors will check the 
validity of each signature in the sample, that is, whether the signatures belong to 
electors registered on either the General or Maori electoral rolls. The Clerk, with 
the assistance of the Government Statistician, uses the result of this check to 
138C1R Act, above n 114, s. 16(2). 
139C1R Act, above n 114, s. 17(1). 
140C1R Act, above n 114, s. 17(3),20(1). 
141CIR Act, above n 114, s. 20(2). 
142CIR Act, above n 114, s. 17(2). 
143C1R Act, above n 114, s. 18(1). 
144CIR Act, above n 114, s. 20(1). 
145C1R Act, above n 114, s. 20(2). 
146CIR Act, above n 114, ss. 18, 19. 
147CIR Act, above n 114, s. 20(1). 
148CIR Act, above n 114, s. 20(2). 
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determine whether the petition has met the 10 percent signature requirement. 149 If the 
petition has enough valid signatures, the Clerk certifies it and presents it to the 
Speaker of the House of Representatives who then presents it to the House. ISO 
E Setting the Referendum Date 
The fifth stage begins at this point. The Governor-General has a month from the date 
the petition is presented to the House to set a date for the referendum. 151 The 
referendum must take place within 12 months of the petition's presentation to the 
House. 152 However, the House can defer the date for up to an additional 12 months if 
75 percent of all MPs agree. IS3 The House, by simple majority, can also vote to 
change the date of the referendum to coincide with a general election if that election 
will take place within 12 months of the petition's presentation. ls4 If the government 
of the day calls a snap election, the Governor-General can reset the referendum date 
to coincide with the snap election. 155 In addition, there is no limit on the number of 
citizens initiated referendums that may be held at one time. IS6 These rules are 
designed to provide the government of the day with the means to reduce the costs of 
administering the system by consolidating citizens initiated referendums or holding 
them in conjunction with general elections. 
F Results 
The sixth stage involves announcing the result of the citizens initiated referendum, 
which the Returning Officer in each electorate is required to do as soon as the result 
becomes known. The Chief Electoral Officer is responsible for announcing the 
national result. 157 The result in each electorate can be questioned by applying to the 
District Court for a recoune58 or by filing a petition of inquiry with the High Court. 159 
If the High Court fmds that some irregularity materially affected the result in the 
electorate, it must declare the result void, which requires the Returning Officer for 
that electorate to restage the referendum in that electorate within 30 days of being 
notified of the fmding.l60 The government of the day is not obliged to give effect to 
149C1R Act, above n 114, s. 19. 
150C1R Act, above n 114, s. 21. 
151 C1R Act, above n 114, s. 22(1)-(2). 
152CIR Act, above n 114, s. 22(3). 
153C1R Act, above n 114, s. 22(4)(a). 
154CIR Act, above n 114, s. 22(4)(b). 
IS5CIR Act, above n 114, s. 22. 
156C1R Act, above n 114, s. 55. 
IS7See CIR Act, above n 114, s. 24. 
158CIR Act, above n 114, s. 38. 
159C1R Act, above n 114, s. 48. 
160CIR Act, above n 114, s. 51. 
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the result, as it simply "indicate[s] the views held by the people of New Zealand on 
specific questions but will not be binding on the New Zealand Government. ,,161 
G Advertising Restrictions 
The process is subject to media advertising restrictions. It is an offence for promoters 
or supporting organisations to spend more than $50,000 on published or broadcast 
advertisements "in relation to an indicative referendum petition. ,,162 As an "indicative 
referendum petition" only comes into being after the Clerk determines the question 
and approves the petition form, this restriction only applies during the period in 
which the promoter is collecting signatures. 163 However, it is also an offence for 
promoters or supporting organisations to spend more than $50,000 on published or 
broadcast advertisements promoting an answer to a citizens initiated referendum. 164 
Both advertising restrictions include expenditures that promoters knowingly make "in 
combination with others." 165 In practice the "in combination with others" aspect of 
the limitation could prove to be unenforceable. In the least, the inherent vagueness of 
the phrase is an invitation for litigation. The maximum penalty for overstepping each 
advertising restriction is $100,000, which means that a person overstepping both 
restrictions could be fmed up to $200,000.166 Promoters are required to record the 
amount of money they or supporting organisations spend on advertising in relation to 
a petition or a referendum and to report it to the Returning Officer in their 
electorate. 167 The maximum penalty for making a false report is $70,000. 168 The 
reports are open to public inspection. 169 In addition, every advertisement in 
connection with a petition, or promoting an answer to the referendum, must include 
the true name and contact address of the person responsible for the advertisement. 170 
The maximum fme for not doing this is $70,000. 171 
Although these provisions are meant to neutralise the advantage of money, they are 
likely to render an effective national campaign by small groups all but impossible to 
conduct without media interest. They could also prove to be a boon to large 
grassroots organisations with plenty of committed volunteers. Opponents without this 
161C1R Act, above n 114, Title . 
162CIR Act, above n 114, s . 42(a). 
163See CIR Act, above n 114, ss. 5, 6, 11, 12, 14. 
164CIR Act, above n 114, s. 42(b). 
165CIR Act, above n 114,s. 42. 
166Above. 
167CIR Act, above n 114, s . 43(1). 
168C1R Act, above n 114, s. 43(2). 
169C1R Act, above n 114, s . 45. 
170C1R Act, above n 114, s. 41(1). 
171CIR Act, above n 114, s. 41(2). 
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resource will not be able to counter a referendum that threatens their interests with a 
well-fmanced media campaign.172 Although a prima facie violation of the freedom of 
expression,173 the advertising restrictions are consistent with the approach taken under 
the Electoral Act 1993, which limits the amount that candidates standing for the 
House of Representatives may spend in their campaigns. However, the restrictions 
are inconsistent with the approach taken by the National Government with respect to 
government controlled referendums. For example, the Campaign for Better 
Government, an organisation against proportional representation, was permitted to 
spend as much as it could afford in its failed effort to overcome the campaign in 
favour of proportional representation led by the Electoral Reform Coalition, which 
enjoyed an organisational advantage but was poorly-fmanced in comparison. 
IV ASSESSMENT 
If direct democracy is understood to be a means by which to obtain "some measure of 
popular control over the government" which would alleviate "the sense of 
powerlessness and disillusionment that many New Zealanders feel concerning their 
government and their political system," 174 then it would be inappropriate to classify 
New Zealand's citizens initiated referendum system as a direct democracy device. 
Despite procedural similarities with the direct democracy devices in Switzerland and 
California,175 New Zealand's citizens initiated referendum system is fundamentally 
different because it is non-binding. Governments in New Zealand, unlike those in 
Switzerland and California, can avoid giving effect to referendum results that are 
unfavourable to their policies. 176 
The decision to make the citizens initiated referendum system non-binding essentially 
stemmed from a hostile reaction of the political wing of the National Party to a well-
supported National Party remit calling for a binding legislative referendum system. 
Despite its self-serving power-preserving basis, however, the decision is consistent 
with the constitutional principles underlying the New Zealand constitutional system, 
particularly the theory of parliamentary sovereignty. As discussed in chapter two, the 
I72Helena Catt, Paul Harris, and Nigel Roberts have suggested that the CIR Act's advertising limits are 
unlikely to limit the influence of those who wish to spend large sums on promoting or denigrating a 
citizens initiated referendum proposal. H Catt, P Harris, and N Roberts Voter's Choice: Electoral 
Change in New Zealand? (The Dunmore Press, Palmerston North, 1992) 141. 
173New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s. 14. However, the infringement is arguably justifiable in a 
free and democratic country. Bill of Rights Act, above, s. 5; see eg R v Blake (1988) 42 CCC (3d) 271 
(Man Prov Ct) (holding that the advertising expenditure limits imposed on candidates by the Manitoba 
Elections Finance Act did not violate the freedom of expression as protected under the Canadian 
Charter); see also Reform Party of Canada v Canada (Attorney-General) [1993] 3 WWR 139, 136 AR 
1, 13 CRR (2d) 107 supplementary reasons loc cit WWR at 171, CRR at 137, 7 Alta LR (3d) 34 (QB). 
174Catt, above n 172, 140. 
175See section III in chapter four and section III in chapter six. 
176See Catt, above n 172, 140; see also FAIR Newsletter No. 18 (Jan 1994). 
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theory holds that Parliament is supreme and that its powers cannot be circumscribed 
by any institution including itself. Its enactments are, in effect, constitutional law. 
The Prime Minister or Cabinet cannot unilaterally veto parliamentary enactments and 
the courts cannot strike them down as unconstitutional. 
Under a binding system, Parliament would have neither the power to ignore citizens 
initiated referendum results nor the power to repeal or amend legislation enacted by 
the electors. Parliament would be required to give effect to referendum results, 
which would remain in effect until the electors decided otherwise. This would place 
the New Zealand elector on a par with the electors in California and Switzerland, who 
are constitutionally recognised in these jurisdictions as being the source of legislative 
power. 
In some respects, the New Zealand constitutional system is similar to the Swiss 
constitutional system. The Federal Council does not have the power to veto the 
Federal Assembly's enactments. In addition, the Federal Tribunal cannot invalidate 
the Federal Assembly's enactments. However, the constitutional basis for these 
common elements of the Swiss and New Zealand constitutional systems is entirely 
different. In Switzerland, the electors are sovereign rather than Parliament. If the 
Swiss electors do not like an enactment they can use the legislative referendum to veto 
it or the constitutional initiative to replace, modify, or repeal it. If the electors do not 
attack and reject an enactment in this fashion, the enactment is presumed to have been 
sanctioned by them. As the Swiss electors are ultimately the legal sovereign, neither 
the Federal Council nor the Federal Tribunal has the power to overrule any legislative 
enactment that the Swiss electors are deemed to have approved. The binding nature 
of Switzerland's direct democracy devices is consistent with this underlying 
constitutional principle . 177 
The California constitutional system, in contrast to the Swiss system, does not have 
any features that may suggest that the theory of parliamentary sovereignty applies. 
The Governor of California has the power to veto legislative enactments. The 
California Judiciary, unlike its Swiss and New Zealand counterparts, has the power to 
declare legislative enactments unconstitutional. The California constitutional system 
emphasises a formal separation of governmental power, primarily to ensure that "no 
governmental agency can be dictatorial and successfully refuse to serve the will of the 
people, ,,178 particularly as the electors are ultimately the legal sovereign. 
Accordingly, the Executive and the Judiciary operate as a check on the power of the 
Legislature in California. California's constitutional initiative, legislative initiative, 
177 See generally chapter four . 
178Constitution of the State of California (California State Senate, Sacramento, 1961) 351 
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and legislative referendum are consistent with this approach. These devices 
contribute to the diffusion of responsibility for governmental decisions among 
different branches and levels of government primarily by adding another locus of 
decision-making or check to balance the system. The binding nature of California IS 
direct democracy devices is consistent with this underlying constitutional principle. 179 
As shown in chapters four and six, the exercise of legislative power by elected 
representatives in California and Switzerland is not absolute, either in theory or 
practice. In contrast, the legislative power of the New Zealand Parliament is absolute 
in theory if not in practice. As Joseph has observed: lso 
Few lay people would appreciate the absolutism of Westminster parliamentary 
sovereignty. Under the Westminster doctrine, Parliament enjoys unlimited and 
illimitable powers of legislation. Parliament's word can be neither judicially invalidated 
nor controlled by earlier enactment; its collective will, duly expressed, is law. 
The ultimate, if not only, legal check on this power appears to be the triennial general 
election. 181 Accordingly, the underlying safeguard limiting the majoritarian character 
of the New Zealand constitutional system is nothing more than political instinct. 182 
The English Parliament came into being and evolved to moderate the absolute power 
of the English Sovereign. However, for all practical purposes, this power is 
exercised in New Zealand by the New Zealand Parliament at the direction of Cabinet, 
which is the decision-making centre of the Executive and is composed of 
parliamentarians who vote in the House of Representatives. Consequently, the House 
of Representatives plays a far less crucial role in moderating the exercise of 
governmental power by the executive branch in New Zealand than the Federal 
Assembly does in Switzerland or the Legislature does in California. 
In Switzerland and California, representative democracy is defmed in terms of limited 
majority rule. By contrast, the New Zealand constitutional system is "highly 
majoritarian, with few curbs upon executive authority and party dominance 
omnipresent. ,,183 As Jackson has noted its "almost total lack of safeguards is unique" 
among those countries classified as democracies. l84 A binding citizens initiated 
referendum system would affect this constitutional milieu by breaking the monopoly 
that elected representatives and their parties have over the legislative process by 
giving the electors the power to propose, enact, or veto laws, as the direct democracy 
devices in Switzerland and California have done. 
179Seegenerally chapter six. 
18oJoseph, above n 8, 418. 
18lJackson, above n 8, ix. 
182See Joseph, above n 8, 267. 
183Jackson, above n 8, 174. 
I84Jackson, above n 8, ix. 
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In practice, the theoretical omnipotence of Parliament, if not its majontarian 
character, is limited, which suggests that a binding system could be incorporated into 
the New Zealand constitutional system with little practical difficulty. The most 
important limitation is the desire of the ruling party to be re-elected. Failing to meet 
the expectations of the electors can result in the loss of power, as the Fourth Labour 
Government discovered in its devastating 1990 defeat, which is one reason why the 
government of the day generally takes into account the views of the better organised 
and well-resourced interest groups during the legislative process. The views of these 
groups are taken seriously if they can demonstrate expertise that rivals or surpasses 
that provided by government officials of if they can demonstrate that they can deliver 
significant electoral support. As Jackson has noted, "[p]ressure groups are likely to 
have as much influence as an opposition party and it is with the former that the 
various compromises take place, usually behind close doors. ,,185 
Government officials also play a role in moderating the content of legislation, 
depending on the quality or nature of their advice. For example, the Department of 
Justice vets all bills for compliance with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. In 
most cases, the Department or Ministry developing a bill will modify infringing 
provisions in the draft bill to avoid having the Attorney-General report to the House 
that it infringes the Act. Government officials also rely on international agreements 
in many cases to direct legislative aspirations. On a wide range of issues, 
international standards or obligations constrain or dictate Cabinet's decision-making. 
Intercourse with other countries requires co-operation on matters as diverse as 
"postage, civil aviation, weather information, communications, customs, diplomatic 
and consular relations, visas, trade rules, banking obligations, money exchange, the 
movement of people, refugees, [and] extradition. ,,186 As Palmer has noted: 187 
Many of these matters are regulated through international treaties and conventions and 
some have international organizations to look after them. All those obligations place 
substantial restraint upon the freedom of action of the New Zealand Government. 
In 1994, for example, after taking advice from government officials, Cabinet directed 
government officials to prepare legislative enactments to comply with New Zealand's 
obligations under the GATT Agreement, namely the Layout Designs Act 1994, the 
Copyright Act 1994, and the GATT (Uruguary Round) Act 1994. Although 
"Parliament may legislate notwithstanding the 'comity of nations' and binding 
I 85Jackson, above n 8, 16. 
I 86Palmer, above n 8, 21; see also Jackson, above n 8, 185 (stating that New Zealand's Closer 
Economic Relations agreement with Australia "has introduced some limitations of freedom to 
manoeuvre in the economic sphere"). 
187Palmer, above n 8, 21-22. 
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international agreements, ,,188 New Zealand governments, as Joseph has noted, 
"seldom legislate in defiance or disregard of international obligations. ,,189 
The Treaty of Waitangi, which is an agreement between the Maori and the English 
Crown that provides the English Crown with the right to govern in New Zealand in 
exchange for protecting the rights accorded to the Maori, has also served as a 
constraint on the government of the day. Palmer believes that: 190 
The legitimacy of the system of government we have in New Zealand owes much to the 
Treaty of Waitangi entered into between the Crown and the Maori in 1840. The Treaty 
is a short document but it symbolizes the rights of the Maori and the undertakings which 
were given to them when the Crown assumed authority. In one sense New Zealand's 
right as a nation to make laws, to govern and to dispense justice can be said to spring 
from the compact between the Crown and the Maori in 1840. 
The Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975 set up a Tribunal to hear grievances arising under 
the Treaty and to make recommendations to the government of the day regarding their 
resolution. Palmer contends that governments have generally accepted the Tribunal's 
recommendations. 191 In practice, the Tribunal's recommendations are studied and 
analysed by the Treaty of Waitangi Policy Unit within the Department of Justice, 
which then advises the government of the day as to the appropriate response given the 
realities of resource constraints and competing political considerations. 
The lack of fmancial resources can serve as a major constraint on government 
policy.l92 In the decade following 1984, for example, the Treasury was successful in 
convincing successive Labour and National Governments to adopt a fiscal policy 
intended to overcome the negative effects of years of deficit spending. The new 
approach abolished or modified many of the laws regulating the economy and the 
provision of social services. Ironically, the reaction to this restructuring largely gave 
rise to the push for direct democracy and proportional representation. By and large, 
the electors perceived the Treasury's influence to be greater than theirs, and 
therefore, undemocratic. 
188Joseph, above n 8, 452 (citing Theophile v Solicitor-General [1950] AC 186 at 195 (HL, per Lord 
Porter) and Salomon v Customs and Excise Commissioners [1967] 2 QB 116 (Eng CA, per Diplock, 
U»; see also Ashby v Minister of Immigration [1981] 1 NZLR 222 (CA) (holding that the 1965 
International Covenant on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination could not deprive the 
Minister of his statutory authority under the Immigration Act 1964 to grant the entry permits to rugby 
~layers from South Africa). 
89Joseph, above n 8, 253. 
190Palmer, above n 8, 19; see also P Rikys "Trick or Treaty" (1991) NZU 370. Joseph has argued that 
claims that the Treaty is a founding or basic document are insufficient to elevate it to the status of 
supreme law or law simpliciter as it lacks entrenchment or statutory adoption and lacks any judicial 
recognition as fundamental law. Joseph, above n 8, 13. 
191Palmer, above n 8,20. 
192palmer, above n 8, 113. 
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According to Joseph, parliamentarians also observe a general convention which 
amounts to a rule that "Parliament must not exploit its sovereign powers for 
tyrannical or oppressive legislation. "193 However, as Joseph admits, this rule is 
difficult to apply as "what may be oppressive or unacceptable to some may be socially 
or economically desirable to others. ,,194 Its application appears to be defmed by extra-
legal limits on the sovereignty of Parliament, that is, "the pressure of public opinion, 
passive and active resistance, and ultimately revolution. ,,195 However, this 
convention, as well as any other, "risks being flouted from time to time. ,,196 For 
example, the actions of the Fourth Labour Government (1984-1990) seriously 
undermined the mandate theory.l97 David Lange, who led the Labour Party during 
the 1984 and 1987 elections, has stated that the Labour Party's 1984 election 
manifesto was "gloriously unspecified on economic policy." 198 The Labour Party 
went one step further in the 1987 election by publishing its election manifesto after 
the election!99 The logic appears to have been as follows: if vague promises are 
difficult to break, then no promises must be impossible to break. A government, 
however, cannot claim to have a mandate for a particular action and expect to enjoy 
the legitimacy it confers if it has not given the electors an opportunity to signal their 
support for the act. 
In the lead up to the 1990 election, the subsequent National Government attacked the 
Fourth Labour Government for its failings in this regard by publishing a detailed 
election manifesto. Ironically, the strategy served to undermined the mandate theory 
further, as the manifesto contained a highly publicised promise that the National 
Government was unable to keep. Prior to the election, Jim Bolger, the Leader of the 
National Party, promised to remove the Fourth Labour Government's unpopular 
surtax on superannuation. As Prime Minister, however, Bolger "claimed that fiscal 
restraints required his government to increase rather than remove the surcharge. ,,200 
The outcry was deafening. 201 
193Joseph, above n 8, 241. 
I 94Above. 
195Joseph, above n 8, 253. 
196Joseph, above n 8,267. 
197Joseph, above n 8,285,450-451; see also section III.B.2(b) in chapter two. 
198Joseph, above n 8, 450-451. 
199Above. 
200Joseph, above n 8, 451. According to Joseph, "the record of recent government leaves much to be 
desired. Governments have legislated hastily, with little consultation or regard for parliamentary 
rcrocedure, and made promises they could not keep." Joseph, above n 8, 4. 
OISee eg M Munro "Caucus Revolt on Super Growing" The Dominion, Wellington, New Zealand, 7 
August 1991; R Long "Cabinet Yielding to Super Pressure" The Dominion, Wellington, New Zealand, 
6 June 1991; R Long "U-turn on Pensions Will Cost $200 Million" The Dominion, Wellington, New 
Zealand, 4 October 1991, 1; J Clifton "Pension Surtax May Rise Only 10%" The Dominion, 
Wellington, New Zealand, 5 October 1991, 1; R Laugesen "Super Fiasco Blamed on the Balancing 
Act" The Evening Post, Wellington, New Zealand, 21 October 1991, 7; "Superannuitants' Hopes Rise" 
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These events helped to produce the political climate that made the introduction of 
proportional representation and the CrR Act possible, by blunting "the symbolism of 
representative government" and generating "much of the scepticism held about New 
Zealand's governmental institutions. ,,202 According to the Heylen polling service, 33 
percent of those polled in 1975 had faith in Parliament; in 1981, 14 percent did; and, 
in 1987, 8 percent. By 1989, the figure had sunk to 4 percent. 203 A nationwide crisis 
of confidence in the most important governmental institution in the country could only 
help the cause of constitutional reform, as it threw "into question Parliament's ability 
to discharge its bedrock function of legitimising representative government, ,,204 which 
generated electoral support for proportional representation and the CrR Act, despite 
the opposition of most parliamentarians. 
In short, there are a host of political factors that serve to restrain Parliament's 
absolute power of law-making. A binding citizens initiated referendum system would 
be not be at odds with these political limitations. However, a binding system would 
nevertheless amount to a diminution of parliamentary sovereignty in constitutional 
terms, which would present a number of complex constitutional issues. For example, 
for the diminution of parliamentary sovereignty to be secure, some means must be 
found to entrench the Act creating the binding system. Otherwise, the government of 
the day could use its majority in Parliament to repeal or amend that Act to attack 
results it was unprepared to accept. As discussed in chapter two, Parliament may not 
have the legal power to bind itself, as Dicey and his followers have argued. 
However, it appears to have the legal power to create procedural hurdles which would 
make the exercise of its legislative power difficult, as manner and form theorists have 
argued. Joseph has summarised the position as follows: 205 
Parliament may, by legislation, validly reconstitute itself or reformulate its legislative 
procedures, but it cannot alter the rules affecting area of power. Statutes for the former 
purposes bind Parliament, those for imposing legislative vacuums do not. 
Accordingly, Parliament could make the repeal or amendment of an Act creating a 
binding system conditional upon a super-majority vote of all members of the House of 
Representatives. This entrenching condition would itself have to be entrenched to 
avoid the possibility that the condition could be removed by a simple majority vote. 
The Evening Post, Wellington, New Zealand, 21 October 1991, 13; Editorial "Searching for a Super 
Policy" The Evening Post, Wellington, New Zealand, 8 November 1991. 
202Joseph, above n 8, 285; see also J Caldwell "Election Manifesto Promises: The Law and Politics" 
(1989) NZU 108 (concluding that electors who feel aggrieved by any subsequent departure from 
announced policies have little prospect of legal redress) . 
203Joseph, above n 8, 285; see also Jackson, above n 8, 42. 
204Joseph, above n 8, 285. 
205Joseph, above n 8, 460. 
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In addition, the doubly entrenched Act would have to be approved by a super-
majority to avoid the possibility that the courts would refuse to enforce it on the 
grounds that a mere political majority in the House would be an insufficient 
expression of the will of the people to prevent a future Parliament from repealing the 
Act by simple majority. 206 Judging from the hostile reception parliamentarians gave 
to the CIR Bill, however, the National Government would have been unable to meet 
the super-majority requirements if it had chosen to establish a binding system of 
direct democracy. 
A binding system would also have entailed the consideration of subject matter 
limitations. If Parliament is bound by the results of citizens initiated referendums and 
the courts have no power to strike down legislative enactments, the system would lack 
any of the anti-majoritarian safeguards that are built into the Swiss and California 
direct democracy systems. For example, Maori interests would be threatened, as 
Maori issues could be decided by a simple majority vote, in which the great majority 
of the electors would be non-Maori, without reference to the principles of the Treaty 
of Waitangi. A binding system could be subject to the Treaty of Waitangi and the 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 to provide broad-based protection for minority 
rights. It could also include geographical requirements to protect regional interests by 
adopting a double majority system similar to Switzerland's or by requiring a certain 
number of signatures to be collected from designated regions. In addition, it could 
specify that the electors may not use the system to abolish a fundamental 
governmental power, such as the power to tax, but may use it to exercise a 
fundamental governmental power, such as repealing or imposing taxes. 
Providing the courts with the power to declare legislation unconstitutional has 
consistently met with resistance in New Zealand. Parliamentarians rejected the idea 
when considering whether to entrench the Bill of Rights Act in the late 1980s207 and to 
206See Joseph, above n 8, 104 (stating that Robin Cooke, the President of the Court of Appeal , believes 
that "the efficiency of entrenchment would depend on 'a value judgment by the courts, based on their 
view of the will of the people" ') (citing R Cooke "Practicalities of a Bill of Rights" F S Dethridge 
Memorial Address (1984), reproduced in (1984) 112 Council Brief 4); see also A Bill of Rights for New 
Zealand: A White Paper [1985] AJHR A6, 57 (stating that the courts would be unlikely to uphold 
entrenchment enacted by a simple majority). 
207See generally P Rishworth "The Potential of the New Zealand Bill of Rights " (1990) NZU 68; B 
Harris "A Changing Perception of the Law-making Powers of Parliament? (1988) NZU 394; R Martin 
"A Bad Idea to Give Judges Wide Charter Powers" (1987) NZU 136; D Stuart "Now the Positive 
Impact of Judges' Charter Decisions" (1987) NZU 138; D Dugdale "Common Sense about the Bill of 
Rights : A Criticism of Geoffrey Palmer's Super-law" (1986) NZU 127; P Joseph "The Challenge of a 
Bill of Rights: A Commentary" (1986) NZU 416; K Keith "A Bill of Rights for New Zealand?" 
(1985) NZULR 307; K Keith "The Bill of Rights: Reply to a Criticism" (1985) NZU 270; P East 
"The Proposed Bill of Rights" (1985) NZU 268; "Bill of Rights Auckland Seminar Commentaries" 
(1985) NZU 230; B Harris "Bill of Rights: Redistribution of Power" (1985) NZU 49. For some 
post-enactment discussions of the Bill of Rights, see P Fitzgerald "Section 7 of the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act 1990: A Very Practical Power or a Well-intended Nonsense" (1992) 22 VUWLR 135; A 
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establish a written constitution as the supreme law of the land in the early 1960s. 208 
However, in the case of direct democracy, the power of the courts to declare 
legislation unconstitutional could be restricted to legislation that would be put in place 
as a result of a citizens initiated referendum. This would allow the courts to 
invalidate legislation proposed and approved by the electors, but would give them no 
power to invalidate legislation proposed and approved by elected representatives. The 
Privy Council cases dealing with direct democracy in Canada could, however, present 
some difficulty in this regard. 209 If Parliament must enact a referendum result for it to 
take effect, as the Privy Council cases suggest, then the courts would in effect be 
reviewing a parliamentary enactment if Parliament has given effect to the result. In 
theory, however, citizens initiated referendum proposals that conflict with any subject 
matter limitation would not reach the electors as they would be disallowed by the 
Clerk or challenged in the courts before the referendum were held. 
A non-binding citizens initiated referendum system avoids the necessity having to 
grapple with these complex constitutional issues, particularly those inherent in 
deciding which subjects should be exempt from citizens initiated referendums. In 
addition, a non-binding system allows Parliament, rather than the courts, to serve as a 
safeguard "against hasty and ill-considered referenda. ,,210 If Parliament decides to 
give effect to a referendum result, it is free to legislate in a manner that can take into 
account its international obligations, its human rights legislation, or the principles of 
Treaty of Waitangi, among other things. If referendum results were binding, 
Parliament would not have this freedom. 
Parliament, however, cannot be relied upon to protect minority rights, particularly if 
the government of the day lacks the "political courage that might be needed in the 
face of strong popular opinion backed by a majority in a referendum. ,,211 
Consequently, whether Parliament puts a citizens initiated referendum result into 
effect could depend on the re-election aspirations of MPs rather than on the 
Frame "Fundamental Rights in the Realm of New Zealand: Theory and Practice" (1992) 22 VUWLR 
85, 93-96; J McLean "The Impact of the New Zealand Bill of Rights on Administrative Law" (1992) 
Legal Research Foundation 62; J McGarth "The Bill of Rights and the Legislative Process" (1992) 
Legal Research Foundation 98; A Shaw "The New Zealand Bill of Rights Comes Alive (I)" (1991) 
NZU 400; A Butler "The New Zealand Bill of Rights and Private Common Law Litigation" (1991) 
NZU 261; N Jamieson "The New Look Legislation" (1991) NZU 24; P Rishworth "Applying the 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 to Statutes: The Right to a Lawyer in Breath and Blood Alcohol 
Cases" (1991) NZ Recent L R 337. 
208See generally Report of Public Petitions M to Z Committee 1961 on Draft Constitution for New 
Zealand [1961] AJHR 1.2A, 1-66; L Cleveland and A Robinson Readings in New Zealand Government 
(AH&W Reed, Wellington, 1972) 220-270. 
209For a discussion of these cases, see section III.B.2(c) in chapter two. 
2 lOCatt , above n 172, 140-141. 
211Catt, above n 172, 141. 
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application of well-thought out subject matter limitations, which does not bode well 
for the principled protection of minority rights. 
New Zealand's citizens initiated referendum system also differs from Switzerland's 
and California's direct democracy devices in several other important respects. In 
Switzerland and California, the wording of a proposition put before the electors is 
entirely in the hands of its promoter. In New Zealand, the Clerk of the House has the 
power to determine proposed referendum questions. Although the Clerk cannot use 
this power to subvert the intent of those who wish to put a particular question on the 
ballot,212 he or she can strip a question of non-essential language which is designed to 
generate support. For example, the Royal New Zealand Society for the Prevention of 
Cruelty to Animals (SPCA) proposed that the inhumane production of eggs from 
battery hens be prohibited. The Clerk eliminated the word inhumane. The Clerk's 
determination role was justified in terms of making citizens initiated referendums 
cost-effective. Given the expense of holding referendums, the question should be 
clear. However, the safeguard appears to be unnecessary as unclear questions are 
unlikely to gamer the necessary signatures to qualify for the ballot as the confusion 
they would cause would make them difficult to promote or support, or to enact if 
approved. Furthermore, neither Switzerland nor California have found it necessary to 
make sure that questions are clear. 
In addition, New Zealand's citizens initiated referendum system is geared toward 
producing simple questions for the electors to consider rather than providing them 
with detailed legislative proposals for consideration, which is typically the case in 
California and Switzerland. However, the CIR Act does not limit the length of a 
question or prescribe its form. Accordingly, a promoter in New Zealand should be 
able to present the electors with a detailed legislative proposal if it is prefaced with a 
question. For example, the promoter could ask the electors whether a particular 
legislative proposal providing for free medical care should be enacted and then 
present the proposal. Alternatively, an entire legislative proposal could be framed as 
a question. 
The New Zealand system also does not require the government of the day to provide 
any information to the electors regarding citizens initiated referendums, either by way 
of official publicity or elector information pamphlets. In contrast, Switzerland and 
California provide the electors with information pamphlets to ensure that promoters 
and their opponents have the same opportunity to reach the electors with their views 
and that the electors have access to the main arguments for and against a question on 
the ballot. 
212Egg Producers, above n 111 (Eicbelbaum CJ). 
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In addition, the CIR Act, unlike the direct democracy devices in California, does not 
have any significant subject matter limitations. The National Government concluded 
that they would be unnecessary as the system is non-binding. However, this decision 
could permit divisive and polarising debates regarding fundamental right at the 
expense of minority groups or could place the government of the day in the position 
of being unable, for political reasons, to resist giving effect to an oppressive citizens 
initiated referendum result. 
Another distinguishing feature is the CIR Act's signature requirement. On a per 
capita population basis, the requirement is more onerous than the signature 
requirements in Switzerland and California.213 The National Government justified the 
high requirement on the grounds that it would demonstrate convincing support for 
placing a proposal on the ballot. However, it appears to be designed to make the CIR 
Act difficult to use. 
Regarding government controlled referendums, Jackson has observed that "the 
referendum in New Zealand has scarcely been tested as a serious democratic device 
and does little to abridge parliament's powers. ,,214 Although the CIR Act has the 
potential to be a fruitful testing ground, it does not abridge the powers of Parliament 
either. The SPCA' s question to phase out battery egg production could provide 
Parliament with its first opportunity to refuse to give effect to a citizens initiated 
referendum result on the grounds that it impairs minority rights. Madison's concern 
regarding majoritarianism stemmed from his fear that those without property would 
deprive those with property of their property. 215 Higher egg prices would effect most 
electors, but the vast majority of them are not engaged in battery egg production. If 
the battery egg question qualifies for the ballot and carries, the government of the day 
will have to decide whether or not it will protect the property interests of a small 
number of battery egg producers. 
However, if the government of the day regularly refuses to give effect to citizens 
initiated referendums, the system will be "no better than a large and expensive public 
opinion poll. ,,216 Given this possibility, New Zealand's citizens initiated referendum 
system cannot be placed into the same class as the direct democracy devices in 
Switzerland and California. It is fundamentally different because it does not 
constitute a legal limitation on the legislative power of elected representatives by 
213See note 224 in chapter six. 
214Jackson, above n 8, 30. 
215 A Koch "Introduction" in Notes of Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 Reported by James 
Madison (2 rev ed, Ohio University Press, Athens, 1985) xix. 
216Catt, above n 172,141. 
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providing the electors with the power to veto or enact laws. In this regard, New 
Zealand's constitutional system does not fit Thomas Cronin's hybrid model of 
democracy.217 Nevertheless, the shift to proportional representation, particularly its 
tendency to produce coalition governments, could affect the political importance of 
the system. The electors will only use the system if the government of the day does 
not respond to their demands through traditional political channels. If the government 
of the day is more responsive under proportional representation, the citizens initiated 
referendum system could fall into disuse. If not, the system could threaten the 
stability of coalition governments if the result of a citizens initiated referendum 
concerns an issue on which the coalition cannot agree. 
In any case, the citizens initiated referendum system is unlikely to be removed from 
the statute books. In effect, its creation can be compared to the extension of the 
voting franchise. Once a democratic right is conferred, it is enormously difficult to 
rescind. As the experience in Switzerland and California indicates, few MPs are 
likely to see any political advantage in repealing the CIR Act, particularly as the 
system is non-binding. The risk of being branded "anti-democratic" is not worth the 
effort. Whether the system will be made binding is difficult to predict, given the 
prevailing principles underlying New Zealand's constitutional system. However, if 
New Zealand were to become a republic with a written constitution, a metamorphosis 
which Brookfield suggests is inevitable,218 the probability of establishing a binding 
system would increase because the change would undermine the justifications for a 
non-binding system, such as they are.219 
2l7For a discussion of Cronin's hybrid model of democracy, see section IV in chapter two; see also 
section IV in chapter three, section III in chapter five, and section VI in chapter eight. 
218See Brookfield "A New Zealand Republic?", above n 8, 11; see also generally Brookfield, 
"Parliament, the Treaty and Freedom", above n 8 (arguing for a written constitution in New Zealand on 
the grounds that it would secure the protection of Maori Treaty rights' and individual rights and 
freedoms by eliminating the threat to these rights and freedoms posed by parliamentary sovereignty). 
219For additional discussions of the binding/non-binding issue, see A Simpson (ed) Referendums: 
Constitutional and Political Perspectives (Victoria University of Wellington, Wellington, 1992). 
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CONCLUSION 
The direct democracy systems in Switzerland, California, and New Zealand are not 
the same, nor could they be, given the unique forces that contributed to the fonnation 
and practice of constitutional law in these jurisdictions. When Simon Deploige 
predicted that other countries would eventually consider adopting Switzerland I s direct 
democracy system, few believed that it could be done without importing other parts of 
the Swiss constitutional system. However, the experience of California during the 
Progressive Era and of New Zealand during the early 1990s have proven otherwise. 
Not only has direct democracy taken root outside of Switzerland I s unique 
constitutional environment, but constitutional considerations peculiar to each 
jurisdiction have made its adaptation unavoidable. 
This conclusion is based on a comparative study of the origin and role of direct 
democracy in Switzerland (Part II), California (part ill), and New Zealand (part IV) 
which drew on the constitutional principles underlying representative and direct 
democracy and the conceptual differences between American and Westminster 
constitutionalism (part I) . Constitutional law in representative democracies is 
concerned primarily with the limits on the exercise of governmental power. In 
Switzerland, California, and New Zealand, which are representative democracies, 
constitutional law provides the means for detennining whether the exercise of 
governmental power is legitimate, that is, whether it was exercised properly and fairly 
with respect to awarding benefits to, or imposing burdens on, individuals or groups. 
The very existence of democracy in these jurisdictions depends on the willingness of 
minorities to abide by decisions made by majorities. 
The constitutional systems found in Switzerland, California, and New Zealand have 
adopted, in one fonn or another and to a greater or lesser extent, institutional 
arrangements or conventions that provide minorities with the right of opposition, that 
is, the means by which they can maintain respect for and safeguard their rights. 
Essentially, the exercise of governmental power in these jurisdictions is legitimate if it 
creates generally accepted obligations rather than a set of prescriptive nonns that 
require force to ensure widespread compliance. In all representative democracies this 
acceptance is expressed in periodic elections which allow the electors, in a generalised 
fonn, to provide some indication of their approval or disapproval of the exercise of 
governmental power. However, in Switzerland, California, and, to a lesser extent, 
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New Zealand, direct democracy has provided the electors with the means to voice 
their approval or disapproval more frequently and with greater precision. 
Direct democracy raises the fundamental political question of whether the electors 
should play a greater role in the exercise of governmental power, especially as it 
manifests itself in the legislative process. Switzerland, California, and, New Zealand, 
albeit less emphatically, have answered this question in the affIrmative by 
institutionalising various direct democracy devices. On the federal level, Switzerland 
has the constitutional initiative and the legislative referendum, which are integral to 
the Swiss constitutional system. California has the constitutional initiative, the 
legislative initiative, and the legislative referendum, which have become deeply 
rooted components of the California constitutional system. New Zealand has the so-
called citizens initiated referendum, which, being untested and non-binding (unlike the 
direct democracy devices in Switzerland and California), is not yet an integral or 
deeply rooted component of the New Zealand constitutional system. The 
constitutional importance of the direct democracy devices found in Switzerland, 
California, and New Zealand is a function of the factors that gave rise to the demand 
for direct democracy and shaped its form in these jurisdictions. 
Switzerland, California, and New Zealand established their respective direct 
democracy devices in reaction to periods of sustained economic hardship which 
coincided with widespread disillusionment with representative democracy. 
Switzerland, after a long and celebrated history of local autonomy emphasising direct 
participation in the exercise of governmental power, experimented with a pure 
representative democracy on the federal level as a means of securing economic 
advantage through unity while preserving cantonal sovereignty. The experiment 
floundered in the wake of the industrial revolution, when industrialists like Escher 
used their wealth and position to gain control over Switzerland's representative 
institutions and to use their power to further their interests, irrespective of the plight 
of their less fortunate compatriots. The failure of Escher and his ilk to address the 
dislocation problems produced by the industrial revolution, coupled with a native 
orientation toward direct participation, gave rise to the Swiss Democrats, who 
advocated the adoption of direct democracy as a means of breaking the hold of 
privileged elites on the exercise of governmental power. After proving successful in 
the cantons, the Swiss eventually established the legislative referendum in 1874 and 
the constitutional initiative in 1891 on the federal level. 
In California, during the late 1800s, industrialisation was accompanied by economic 
turmoil, the concentration of wealth and political power, and widespread political 
corruption. As in Switzerland during the heyday of Escher, representative democracy 
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in California was under the control of a few extremely wealthy individuals who used 
their power to further their personal economic interests, particularly the Big Four 
(Stanford, Huntington, Crocker, and Hopkins), who controlled the Southern Pacific 
Railroad Corporation. At the zenith of its power, the Southern Pacific was, in 
essence, the government. It used its power to advance and protect its interests, rather 
than solve the problems that the industrial revolution had created for those living in 
California. The excesses of the Southern Pacific gave rise to the California 
Progressives. Inspired by the use of direct democracy in Switzerland to break the 
hold of industrialists on the exercise of governmental power, they fought for and 
established the constitutional initiative, the legislative initiative, and the legislative 
referendum in 1911 after these devices proved successful in the main city centres. 
In New Zealand, the Citizens Initiated Referenda Act 1993 (eIR Act) was a reaction 
to the Fourth Labour Government's decisions to dismantle New Zealand's welfare 
state and to deregulate the economy. The structural changes ushered in by these 
decisions created high unemployment and fuelled a speculative stock market boom 
which crashed in October 1987, causing many companies to fold and thousands of 
people to lose a great deal of money, which compounded unemployment. As these 
decisions lacked a specific electoral mandate, the economic shock was accompanied 
by a psychological one, which produced an overwhelming demand for constitutional 
reform that was sustained by the subsequent National Government's surprising 
decision to "stay the course" mapped out by the Fourth Labour Government, 
particularly with respect to superannuation. The lengthy period of hardship and 
disappointment gave rise to a number of direct democracy groups who, inspired by 
the use of direct democracy in Switzerland and California, due largely to the timely 
work of Geoffrey Q de Walker, believed that direct democracy would deliver 
representative democracy from the clutches of unresponsive representatives. Their 
message was picked up by Merv Rusk, then a well-established and long serving 
member of the National Party, and his supporters. His decision to embrace direct 
democracy as a necessary constitutional reform to cure the ills besetting representative 
democracy in New Zealand led to the enactment of the CIR Act in 1993, but without 
experimentation on the local level. 
In each case, the demand for direct democracy arose because the legitimacy of the 
constitutional system was at issue. The Swiss Democrats, the California 
Progressives, and the direct democracy advocates in New Zealand had come to the 
conclusion, as had many of their respective compatriots, that representative 
democracy had failed to live up to its promise. In their view, elected representatives 
were subservient to privileged elites or political parties interested in perpetuating their 
hold on governmental power rather than being dedicated to giving effect to the 
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'general will'. Consequently, they saw pure representative democracy as being 
incapable of fairly regulating the competing interests in society. They believed that 
direct democracy would restore the legitimacy of their constitutional systems by 
eliminating the problems associated with representative democracy, primarily by 
providing the electors with the means to ensure that the exercise of governmental 
power conforms with their expectations, that is, the power propose, enact, and veto 
legislation. If elected representatives failed to act on behalf of the electors, then the 
electors could use direct democracy devices to obtain the result they desired 
irrespective of the disposition of their representatives. They embraced direct 
democracy as a means of improving, not displacing, representative democracy. 
The opponents of direct democracy, however, see it as a means of destroying 
legitimacy by undermining the virtues of representative democracy, particularly the 
established safeguards constitutional systems supporting representative democracy 
typically provide for the protection of minority rights, least of all the deliberative 
judgment of elected representatives as originally articulated by Burke and later refined 
by Madison. Consequently, the practical constitutional concern is whether, and to 
what extent, direct democracy can be established in a representative democracy 
without significantly impairing minority rights. 
The experience in Switzerland and California shows that direct democracy can be 
established without significant impairment of minority rights. Indeed, as a 
consequence of the struggle faced by reformers in Switzerland and California, direct 
democracy was tested locally before it was applied on the national or state level. The 
Swiss Democrats experimented with direct democracy in the cantons before the Swiss 
approved the incorporation of the constitutional initiative and the legislative 
referendum into the Constitution of 1874. The California Progressives experimented 
with direct democracy in California's main city centres before Californians approved 
the inclusion of the constitutional initiative, the legislative initiative, and the 
legislative referendum in the California Constitution. 
The experience with direct democracy on the local level in Switzerland and California 
showed that it could be used to break the nexus between elected representatives and 
privileged elites. For example, Escher's vaulted position collapsed in Zurich with the 
introduction of direct democracy in that canton. Similarly, its introduction in Los 
Angeles and San Francisco undermined the ward system that the political machines 
depended upon to maintain their control of these city governments. These practical 
successes with direct democracy gave the electors in Switzerland and California the 
basis upon which to evaluate the theoretical arguments for and against direct 
democracy, which was important as they were the ones who approved in referendums 
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the inclusion of direct democracy in the Constitution of 1874 and the California 
Constitution. 
In addition, the direct democracy devices in Switzerland and California are subject to 
safeguards that limit their majoritarian potential. In Switzerland and California, the 
legislative referendum is conservative in its effect. If employed successfully, the 
enactment subject to its operation is vetoed, which results in the preservation of the 
status quo. Although the device can be used to veto the creation of new rights, it 
cannot be used to eliminate any pre-existing statutory or constitutional rights. 
Furthermore, legislation that is required as a matter of urgency is exempt from the 
veto power of the legislative referendum in both Switzerland and California. In 
California, tax levies or appropriations for the usual expenses of the State are also 
exempt. Moreover, California I s legislative referendum cannot be used to veto federal 
legislation. Consequently, the legislative referendum is not susceptible to many of the 
traditional arguments against direct democracy, particularly the lack of protection for 
minority rights. 
The constitutional initiative and the legislative initiative, however, are potentially 
more dangerous than the legislative referendum in terms of affecting existing rights. 
They provide the electors with the power to propose and enact laws without recourse 
to their elected representatives or exposure to the moderating influences of the 
legislative process. In Switzerland, which does not have the legislative initiative on 
the federal level, the majoritarian potential of the constitutional initiative is limited in 
two important respects. First, extreme measures, whether radical or reactionary, 
have virtually no chance of being accepted by the Swiss electorate. Second, 
constitutional initiatives must be approved by a double majority, that is, a simple 
majority of the electors voting and a majority vote in more than half of the cantons. 
Few constitutional initiatives have been able to satisfy Switzerland I s complex mix of 
local interests and minority concerns to win approval under this unique double 
majority system. 
In California, the constitutional initiative cannot be used to encroach upon any of the 
powers reserved to the federal government. This removes subjects like defence, 
foreign affairs, interstate commerce, and federal taxation from their reach. More 
importantly, it cannot be used in any way that impinges upon the rights protected by 
or granted pursuant to the United States Constitution, particularly the Bill of Rights. 
The legislative initiative is subject to these limitations as well. In addition, it cannot 
be used in any way that impinges upon the rights protected by or granted pursuant to 
the California Constitution. The courts will invalidate any impinging constitutional or 
legislative initiative. 
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Whether the CIR Act will operate to impair minority rights in New Zealand is not as 
clear as the system is yet to be tested. Unlike Switzerland and California, New 
Zealand adopted the CIR Act without local experimentation. As a consequence, those 
engaged in the direct democracy debate did not have the benefit of practical 
experience that would have provided some indication as to how direct democracy 
would operate on the national level in New Zealand. As a result, the debate centred 
on theoretical arguments derived from Jefferson, who had faith in the electorate at 
large and distrusted those in positions of power, and Madison, who believed that 
elected representatives had the ability to make wise and deliberative decisions in the 
best interests of the nation. The lack of local experience also encouraged proponents 
and opponents of direct democracy to draw on Swiss and California examples to 
support their theoretical arguments, which proved unsatisfactory given their tendency 
to overlook the unique constitutional conditions in those jurisdictions and the 
differences between the various direct democracy devices. 
In addition, the New Zealand electors, unlike their Swiss and California counterparts, 
were not given the opportunity to decide in a referendum whether they supported the 
adoption of direct democracy, let alone the non-binding system created by the CIR 
Act. However, given the lack of local experience, they, like their elected 
representatives, were not in the same position as the Swiss or California electors to 
decide whether the practical virtues of direct democracy outweighed its practical 
vices, that is, whether the adoption of direct democracy would significantly impair 
minority rights. With the notable exception of the Minister of Justice, those engaged 
in the debate, by and large, did not acknowledge that the direct democracy devices in 
Switzerland and California are subject to safeguards that operate to protect minority 
rights . 
The CIR Act's principle safeguard is its non-binding nature. Parliament, unlike the 
legislatures in Switzerland and California, can reject citizens initiated referendum 
proposals approved by the electors, primarily by simply refusing to give effect to 
them. Furthermore, if Parliament decides to give effect to a particular citizens 
initiated referendum result, it is free to legislate in a manner that can take into account 
its international obligations, the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi, and the 
principles embodied in its human rights legislation, particularly the New Zealand Bill 
of Rights Act 1990. In short, Parliament has the legal power to quash citizens 
initiated referendum results that threaten minority rights. However, whether 
Parliament will exercise this legal power fairly and consistently is uncertain as the 
government of the day could lack the political courage to reject results that infringe 
minority rights. The decision to give effect to such results could depend on the re-
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election aspirations of MPs rather than on the application of well-thought out subject 
matter limitations. This does not bode well for the principled protection of minority 
rights. 
The courts, like those in Switzerland, do not have the power to strike down 
legislation that gives effect to the results of citizens initiated referendums. However, 
the constitutional basis for this similarity is not the same. In New Zealand, 
Parliament is sovereign; its enactments are, in effect, constitutional law, that is, the 
supreme law of the land. Accordingly, the courts cannot invalidate parliamentary 
enactments. In Switzerland, the electors, due to the historical emphasis on cantonal 
autonomy, are ultimately sovereign, both politically and legally. Consequently, any 
enactment approved by the Swiss electors, either directly through their direct 
democracy devices or indirectly through their elected representatives, cannot be 
overturned by the courts. 
Furthermore, the majoritarian potential of the direct democracy devices in 
Switzerland, California, and New Zealand is limited to an extent that is consistent 
with the constitutional principles underlying representative democracy in these 
jurisdictions. In Switzerland, the electors are sovereign. Accordingly, the results 
produced by its direct democracy devices are binding and cannot be invalidated by the 
courts. However, the double majority requirement for constitutional initiatives 
ensures that people living in small sparsely-populated cantons cannot be dominated by 
those living in large densely-populated cantons. In California, the California 
Constitution is subordinate to the United States Constitution, which is the supreme 
law of the land. In addition, due to the formal separation of governmental power in 
the California constitutional system, the courts are designed to operate as a check on 
the exercise of governmental power, particularly as it manifests itself in the legislative 
process. Accordingly, the results produced by California's direct democracy devices 
are binding insofar as they do not violate constitutional law. In New Zealand, 
Parliament is sovereign, that is, no other institution can rival its power. Accordingly, 
the results produced by the CIR Act are non-binding. In addition, Parliament must 
draft and enact the legislation necessary to give effect to citizens initiated referendum 
results, which means that it would be exposed to the moderating influences of the 
legislative process, unlike the results of initiatives in Switzerland and California 
which do not require any legislative action to take effect. 
The constitutional systems in Switzerland, California, and New Zealand also 
influenced the reform strategies of the direct democracy advocates in these 
jurisdictions, which ultimately affected the result they achieved. Switzerland was, by 
and large, a one party state in Escher's heyday. The Radical-Liberal grouping 
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controlled nearly every representative body in the country, including the federal 
government. The Swiss Democrats came into being when younger, better educated, 
but less influential members of this grouping were frustrated by party bosses in their 
attempts to address the plight of their compatriots. Aside from contesting and 
winning elections, the Swiss Democrats successfully challenged the ruling party by 
using the revision referendum clauses in cantonal constitutions and the Constitution of 
1848 to establish direct democracy in Switzerland. In short, they took the issue out of 
the hands of elected representatives and gave it to the electors to decide. The electors 
voted in favour of binding direct democracy devices largely because they were 
consistent with their ancient desire for local autonomy and their long history of direct 
participation in the exercise of governmental power. 
California was nominally a two-party state. However, during its reign the Southern 
Pacific controlled both the Republican and Democratic parties. The California 
Progressives, rather than attempting to overcome the difficulty associated with 
achieving electoral success with a third party under California's plurality electoral 
system, chose to concentrate on taking over one of the established political parties. 
They formed the Lincoln-Roosevelt League which eventually took control of the 
Republican Party. Once in control of the Republican Party, they began to select 
candidates that were wedded to progressivism rather than to furthering the interests of 
the Southern Pacific. With the success of these candidates, particularly Hiram 
Johnson, the California Progressives won control of the State government. They used 
the California Constitution's provision for constitutionally required referendums to 
provide the electors with the opportunity to establish direct democracy in California. 
The electors voted in favour of binding direct democracy devices, largely because 
they wanted to be sure that no individual or group would ever again be able dominate 
the exercise of governmental power as the Southern Pacific did when it managed to 
circumvent the separation of powers doctrine. 
The direct democracy advocates in New Zealand did not pursue the approach taken by 
the Swiss Democrats or the approach taken by the California Progressives. The latter 
approach would have been logical as New Zealand, like California, was primarily a 
two-party state during direct democracy debate. Rather than securing power and 
using it to introduce direct democracy themselves, they chose to rely on elected 
representatives to give effect to their demand for direct democracy. They were 
largely unwilling to form their own political party or to invest the time and energy 
required to take over an existing party, primarily as they were only interested in 
direct democracy. The Swiss Democrats and the California Progressives, in 
comparison, were interested in a far greater range of issues. Direct democracy was to 
them a means to an end rather than an end in itself. They had every intention of 
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breaking the nexus between privileged economic interests and elected representatives 
beholden to those interests. In New Zealand, the crisis of legitimacy was driven 
primarily by a failure of successive governments to meet the expectations of the 
electors rather a function of organised corruption. 
Essentially, the direct democracy advocates in New Zealand failed where it mattered 
the most. Unlike the Swiss Democrats and the California Progressives, they did not 
secure control over the legislative process. Accordingly, they found themselves in the 
impossible position of relying on elected representatives to put into place a system 
that was expressly intended to curb the power of elected representatives . They also 
had to contend with the campaign for proportional representation, which diverted 
resources and the attention of elected representatives from the campaign for direct 
democracy. Although Rusk and his supporters, particularly National Reform, were 
able to apply the pressure necessary to ensure passage of the CIR Act, they were 
unable to alter its contents or to elevate its constitutional status. Consequently, they 
had to settle for the non-binding system devised by the National Party's Electoral Law 
Reform Caucus Committee, a system which was calculated to preserve the 
sovereignty of Parliament, that is, the monopoly elected representatives have on the 
exercise of governmental power. 
In short, the Swiss Democrats and the California Progressives, unlike the New 
Zealand direct democracy advocates, belonged to reform parties that won control over 
the exercise of governmental power. They used that power to give the electors the 
opportunity to approve the introduction of direct democracy in the form of entrenched 
constitutional provisions, which has contributed to the importance of the direct 
democracy devices in Switzerland and California. Although an innovative addition to 
the New Zealand constitutional system, the CIR Act is ordinary unentrenched 
legislation that came into being as a result of interest group politics . Accordingly, the 
CIR Act is not as securely rooted as the direct democracy systems in Switzerland and 
California. The Electoral Act 1993, which was approved in a government controlled 
referendum on proportional representation, is an example of what could have been 
done to plant the CIR Act more securely within the New Zealand constitutional 
system. As the Electoral Act 1993 was endorsed by the electors, it has a greater aura 
of legitimacy than the CIR Act. 
An attempt to abolish the direct democracy devices in Switzerland or California, 
would undoubtedly be perceived as an attack on the Swiss or California constitutional 
system. In New Zealand, a proposal to abolish the CIR Act would not, at this stage 
at least, be seen in the same light. However, the CIR Act is unlikely to be abolished, 
primarily because it confers a democratic right and it is non-binding. Whether the 
357 
CIR Act flourishes will depend largely on the extent to which elected representatives 
are able to meet the expectations of the electors, the quality of citizens initiated 
referendum questions, the frequency of citizens initiated referendums, the 
circumstances in which they are held, and the reaction of the electors toward 
governments that refuse to give effect to citizens initiated referendum results. 
In conclusion, the direct democracy systems in Switzerland, California, and New 
Zealand are different. The differences are attributable to variations in the 
constitutional principles underlying representative democracy in these jurisdictions. 
These principles vary largely because constitutional law in each jurisdiction is a 
unique and intricate confluence of law, politics, history, economics, and cultural 
expectations. Despite these differences, reformers in Switzerland, California, and 
New Zealand embraced direct democracy sas a means of improving, not displacing, 
their particular brand of representative democracy. Thomas Cronin has articulated a 
hybrid model of democracy that can be used to explain why reformers in Switzerland, 
California, and New Zealand chose this path. In his view, people value 
representative institutions and want their representatives to make the vast majority of 
laws. However, they also want to vote occasionally on policy issues, particularly on 
matters that concern them directly. In addition, they value majority rule, yet 
generally understand the need to protect minority rights. 
These observations explain the general support for both representative and direct 
democracy where they co-exist, the acceptance of limitations on the majoritarian 
potential of direct democracy devices, and the general lack of interest in creating 
systems that enable routine public participation. It also reconciles the competing 
philosophical traditions upon which most of the arguments for and against direct 
democracy are based. Provided minority rights are protected sufficiently, 
Jeffersonian-inspired advocates of direct democracy should not offend adherents of 
representative democracy, whether Burkeian or Madisonian in its conception. It is 
hoped that direct democracy advocates in the years ahead, wherever they may be, will 
bear this in mind. 
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